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
INDIA'S ENERGY SECURITY IN A CARBON CONSTRAINED WORLD

Concept Note

Currently, India is the third-largest energy consumer as well as Carbon Dioxide (CO₂) emitter in the world, though per capita energy consumption and CO₂ emissions is low. According to International Energy Agency (IEA) India Energy Outlook 2021, India has contributed more than 10 percent increase in global energy demand, while its own total energy demand doubled, particularly since 2000; and its per capita energy demand also grew by 60 percent between 2000 and 2019. During the same period, India's CO₂ per capita increased from 15 percent of the world's average to around 40 percent as per IEA.

On the other hand, according to IEA, India's energy needs are largely met by coal, oil and biomass, constituting 80 percent of India's total energy demand since 1990. "Coal demand almost tripled between 2000 and 2019", meeting 44 percent of India's primary energy demand, "up from 33 percent in 2000." According to the Ministry of Coal, India's total coal production increased by 6.74 percent to 74.78 million tonnes (MT) during December 2021 as compared to the same period in 2019; also, coal-based power generation registered a growth of 11.84 percent in the month of December 2021. This indicates India's crippling dependence on coal and the necessity for serious introspection.

Meanwhile, India is aggressively making efforts to increase renewable energy production, with an investment of more than \$42 billion. As per the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, the efforts



have surely shown results as India has crossed 100 GW power generation capacity through green sources and an additional 50 GW is under installation and 27 GW is under tendering. Notwithstanding this encouraging trend, the role and share of coal in India's power generation capacity continues to be substantial and even growing, negating the renewable push and hindering the efforts towards achieving the 'net zero emission goal'. Along with India's economic growth trajectory the demand for sustainable energy supply and pressure to accept the Net Zero Emission target by 2050 will increase exponentially.

All these trends give rise to many intriguing questions on India's energy mix; long-term energy security plan for its ambitious economic growth; strategy to achieve carbon neutrality in cost-effective manner in a carbon constrained world. Will India be able to address the challenges of energy transition while maintaining its desired growth trajectory? The *Liberal Studies* journal invited expert opinions on these themes from eminent scholars on the field.

Majoj Kumar argues that India is well aware of its dependency on imported fossil fuels for transportation and power. However, the energy security in terms of dependency on thermal power plants to meet its bulk of energy needs, takes in a different hue owing to mainly to the following two counts: (a) India's need to demonstrate climate leadership on the international stage as a geo-political stratagem even being mindful of economic and energy security imperatives; and (b) there is a growing realization that coal or gas is not a long term solution to India's galloping energy requirements, owing to their environment and resource constraints. Undoubtedly the lofty targets set by India have already pushed it in the forefront of international climate leadership. If these are not followed through, as he concludes, the leadership would be shown as fickle with commensurate consequences.

Manish Vaid opines that, changes are necessary in India's current energy mix to ensure sustainable energy while confronting the climate change. He says, at present, India follows an "all-of-the-above" approach to energy supply, in particular promoting electricity based on both clean energy and fossil fuels. Meanwhile, India's Nationally Determined Contribution, linked to the Paris Agreement on climate change, aims to cut the country's emissions intensity by up to 35 percent and increase the share of power sourced from low-carbon sources to at least 40 percent of the total generation by 2022 (equivalent to 175 GW) (Government of India, 2016). The five-point agenda, which PM Modi described as 'Panchamrit' or five nectar elements, is expected to guide India to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2070.

Prachi Lokande argues that India being a power-hungry country will need a long-term vision and commitment to safe and clean sources of energy. Nuclear energy fulfils the checklist keeping in mind India's long-term vision. But this comes with its own set of challenges and is muddled with setbacks. The growth of nuclear energy in India is facing hurdles which it needs to address early with utmost care.

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
India in the Forefront of International Climate Leadership

Manoj Kumar*

Carbon Constraints: An Introduction

Global warming is a fact that has been accepted by the world as a significant challenge of our generation. The community of world leaders have been grappling with solutions to tackle this challenge. The problem is compounded by the fact that proliferation of carbon in the atmosphere leads to catastrophic climatic events due to global warming; at the same time our present-day economic development is inextricably linked to fossil fuels and thereby carbon emissions – cliched as carbon economy. The complications of the process to contain global warming is evident from the way world is trying to tackle the situation through various organs of the UN, with participation of each signatory country to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, in annual Conference of the Parties (COP), with its 26th edition being held in Glasgow, Scotland in 2021.

The historical baggage of causing the carbon proliferation in the environment have been proven and accepted by the developed nations owing to their rapid industrialization. From there emanated the concept of Common but



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Differentiated Responsibilities – Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC); the differentiation flowing from the principle of ‘polluter pays’. However, even with CBDR-RC, it was clear that in the present times each nation has a role to play to reduce the carbon load in the environment as the margin of carbon allowance to limit the temperature rise is now almost non-existent. With this realization came the concept of each nation setting up its own national climate plans highlighting action limiting the carbon emissions and adaptation roles. These were called the NDC – Nationally Determined Contribution – which have been ratified by the Paris Agreement on Climate Change of the COP-21, in 2015.

Under the NDCs, India has agreed to reduce its emission intensity: emissions as a function of economic growth (GDP). According to a report in *The Economic Times* (18 October 2021), India’s eventual target is to reduce the emission intensity by about 46 to 48 percent from the 2005 levels as well as to increase the non-fossil fuel sources in energy generation capacity to at least 60 per cent, with a possibility of raising it to 65 percent by 2030. These numbers in actual terms of India’s rising energy needs, are mind boggling. The sheer scale of infusion of capital and technical know-how required to meet the challenging targets are likely to be set in the future revised NDCs makes one wonder about the source of such finance and technology, in the Indian context. And from here flows the high stakes international climate leadership strategy being applied by the Indian government.

Energy Security

India is well aware of its dependency on imported fossil fuels for transportation and power. However, the energy security in terms of dependency on thermal power plants to meet its bulk of energy needs, takes in a different hue owing mainly to the following two counts

- (a) India’s need to demonstrate Climate leadership on the international stage as a geo-political stratagem even being mindful of economic and energy security imperatives.
- (b) In addition to the above, there is a growing realization that coal or gas is not a long-term solution to India’s galloping energy requirements, owing to their environment and resource constraints.

All the targets set by India in the NDC are not easy to achieve. For example, there is a realization in the academic circles that its pledge to generate an additional sink of 2.5-3.0 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent by 2030 may be met just halfway at best. Availability of funding and land being two stumbling blocks.

To show credibility, Indian government is going all out to meet those targets that are within its reach. Reducing emission intensity by 33 to 35 percent by 2030 (now revised to 45 percent in COP26) from 2005 level and secondly to increase the cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel sources to 50 percent (increase from initial commitment of 40 per cent).

While these are ambitious targets, a contradiction of sorts is visible. India is investing heavily in battery development and solar PV. However, India continues to support coal with few thermal power generation capacities. While the COVID 19 pandemic has slowed down the economic trajectory, the coal capacities continue to expand. Some estimates indicate this expansion to be to the tune of 17 to 18 percent in the next five years. With coal mining now opened for private investors, fossil fuel is likely to be mainstay for some times to come. India's announcement at COP26, to be carbon neutral by 2070 – and not by the mid-century, takes this reality into account. However, these strategic announcement, long term as they may be, help India's aim of energy security, to come out of dependency on fossil sources of energy.

India has already made sound bites prior and during the Glasgow meet (COP26) for being made a part of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), formally. Prima facie this is linked to meeting the ambitious target of 50 percent installed power capacity being from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030. But even more than that, this is a strategic move to counter Chinese roadblock to India's membership of NSG. These forays highlight various forces at work to secure India's energy future under the ambit of Carbon constraints. How many of these committed to as well as diplomatic maneuvers are successful, remains to be seen. Nevertheless, this also gives a unique leverage to India to hold its own in the shrinking carbon space, an alibi if one may call it that, that can be used at a later date by making the whole issue conditional on global support. The last statement should be seen in the context of India's current effort to meet these targets. The earlier target of installing renewable energy capacity of 175 GW by 2022, is likely to be unfulfilled, as by July 2021 it had only installed same, just below the 100 GW mark, without including the hydro installed capacity. With the large hydro, installed capacity increases to 139 GW as in February 2021. Now its announcement at Glasgow to install 500 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, needs to be looked from such a strategic prism, wherein it leverages these for strong bid to secure its nuclear fuel supplies as well as build up leadership in solar PV sector. The International Solar Alliance announced by India and France at COP21, in Paris, in 2015 is such a foray.

As already mentioned, India's target of 175 GW – mostly by solar, by 2022 is quite unlikely but its ambitiousness shown the aggressiveness in energy

security approach. Contextualizing this announcement: this target of 175 GW by 2022 was made in 2015 when the entire world's installed solar power capacity was 181 GW in 2014! Hence, this can be seen as a major move by India to be positioned as a serious renewable energy player. This can also be gathered from another major announcement of One Sun, One World, One Grid (OSOWOG) by India and the UK, in Glasgow. This is an ambitious creation of an international energy highway of globally interconnected solar power grid as the sun never sets around the world. OSOWOG can be construed as an answer to China's Belt and Roads initiative but with a much more inclusive aim.

In all these diplomatic moves, India's challenge would remain of phasing out or even starting the process of downsizing the thermal power generation to meet its NDC targets. In a recent report of the Central Electricity Authority, India plans to increase its coal capacity by 64 GW by 2029-30 above the 2021 levels. While it's a fact that the rate of addition of coal-based capacity has slowed down and the number of cancelled coal plants is also increasing; but India still has a huge dependency on coal and it has to move fast towards decarbonizing the energy sector.

As the process of decarbonizing the power sector starts, an existing challenge is that of optimum utilization of the available coal power plants. As per a report of Council of Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), 65 percent of total coal power generation capacity as of March 2020, was installed in the previous 10 years period. However, the older plants, read inefficient ones, are getting a disproportionate share of electricity dispatch due to contractual lock-in and such historical baggage. Notwithstanding, the issue still remains of managing these coal plants on one hand even while the carbon intensity as well as emissions in real terms have to reduce if India is to keep its date with the commitments pronounced at COP26. The financial consequences of phasing out the older plants and in a few years, the newer plants too, is quite large.

Technology and Finance: Key to Achieving Targets

Financial backing generates one more area of debate. India has articulated its commitments at COP26 and even before the conference. These commitments have been so worded that they become conditional on the developed countries meeting their own commitments of financial assistance under the CBDR-RC as well as transfer of green technologies. The noise about being allowed in NSG, adds but one more dimension to the same. This provides fodder to the diplomatic machinery in the international game of give and take. Now going by the dismal track record of the developed nations in meeting their commitments under the Paris accord, where ever and whenever there is a shortfall in meeting

their commitments – not a statutory promise/ target, the developing countries will always have a fall back provided by the developed countries. With respect to India, more clarity will come on this when India actually submits its updated NDC and the wording of the commitments would need to be studied. India's announcement of non-fossil energy capacity (presumably meaning the electrical power) of 500 GW by 2030 and to achieve net zero (Carbon emission offset by taking out equivalent Carbon from atmosphere) by 2070 are two issues of immense interest with respect to this paper.

Any timeline for net zero has always required a peaking year. Every country that has committed to net zero has announced it with a peaking year – China, The US and The UK, all have announced so. The emissions have to start decreasing after the peaking year. Both the US and the UK have announced a gap of 40 to 70 years after the peaking year to be net zero. China's commitment of this gap is said to be of 30 years. While it is entirely possible that as we move forward, technological advances would help us in coming up with cleaner technologies in mitigation and creation of carbon sinks but India's track record in developing cutting edge technologies does not generate that confidence. Dependency on other countries to get cleaner technology is likely to remain. In this context, for net zero to be 2070, India should be looking at its peaking year to be around the corner. Something that is unthinkable if India does not start phasing out its coal power plants, even some of those that have been constructed in the last decade. Without a substantial financial backing and alternate plans this seems a tough task. As per the study by CEEW, for peaking year to be around 2040, India would have to reduce emission intensity by 85 percent – a very stiff target indeed. It has so far reduced it to 24 percent from 2005 level as per an article published in *The Hindu* in November 2021.

Prime Minister Modi's plan to reduce and finally decarbonize Indian Railways is a good example to showcase sectoral level changes. Such sectoral targets are the nitty gritty of breaking down the huge transformational changes announced by the PM. These are very important as their performance becomes easy to monitor and thus give an idea if the path towards transformation is being adhered at all and if so, to what an extent. Similarly, the power sector transformation is something that would be eagerly anticipated, and as explained earlier, the devil would be in the detail of financial backing that is provided to the sector to achieve the change.

As of 2021, India's renewable energy installed capacity is 38.5 percent of the total as per a government press release attributing this statistics to the Environment Minister during the G20 meeting of the Energy and Climate Joint

Ministerial group. Another 10 percent capacity equivalent is under construction. So considering these statistics, India is set to add only about 38 GW (10 percent of the existing renewable installed capacity) above the presently installed (renewable + Hydro) capacity in the near future. Therefore, the Environment Minister asked the G20 nations “which have per capita GHG emissions above the world average to reduce their per capita GHG emissions and bring them down to the world average over the next few years which will vacate the carbon space to some extent and support the developmental aspirations of the developing nations.” This statement assumes significance as it reminds the developed nations of meeting their commitments too (read financial assistance) as well as allowing some carbon space to countries like India for them to keep the carbon emissions at the same level at least if not increase, as necessitated for their present-day fossil fuel dependent economy. PM Modi’s statement at COP26, on financial assistance of \$1 trillion, should be seen in this light. With poverty eradication still being a major challenge, it remains to be seen if India can achieve the goal of 500 GW of non-fossils power generation installed capacity by 2030.

Another major announcement by the PM in COP26 was reducing the total projected carbon emissions by 1 billion tonnes from now (?) to 2030. This is probably for the first time that India has made an absolute number target for controlling the emissions. This will have to translate to various sectoral caps. Moving towards emission control in sectors like transportation, electric mobility solution as well as bio fuel are two of the many proposed ways forward. While India has come a long way in developing use of bio fuel with some new technologies being developed by CSIR lab – Indian Institute of Petroleum (IIP) for aviation use, technology for electric mobility is mostly imported thus putting it at a premium. These and similar green energy technologies once home grown or achieved, has the potential to generate almost 4.5 million jobs over the next 25 years as per a report of Climate Policy Initiative (CPI). But for all these to actually happen, cost of technology like batteries required in bulk for green power, has to reduce drastically. At the same time their efficiency - size, retention and discharge, has to be improved multi-fold.

The CPI report also studies the usage of coal-based power plants and how their Plant Load Factor (PLF) is decreasing as the years are progressing. With enhanced commitment to non-fossil energy, it is recommended that by 2030, coal-based power generation may play the flexible role (read support role) of taking on the variability of non-fossil energy generation in meeting seasonal and peak loads, even operating at considerable low PLF. Since coal-based assets are still increasing to keep pace with ones being retired (or stranded due to low PLF) as per the CPI study, there is a requirement for direct policy intervention

for financial support to the sector (already mentioned) as also on their role in supporting the grid. To make the coal-based plants as flexible plants, as has been done in the US and Germany, technical know-how and finances will have to be committed. This is a short-term solution till technology matures further to take care of grid support for fluctuating loads and generation from non-fossil sources.

Strengthening the Homefront

With shrinking carbon space there is no alternative but to put our house in order so that we are able to move towards our committed targets. In the short term, this means using the existing resources efficiently; in the long term this requires structural changes in how energy is generated and consumed in the country. This will require some policy impetus so that renewable energy sources are properly incentivised in generation capacity and consumption too. A more robust approach to generation of carbon sinks and technologies dealing with Carbon Captures, Utilisation and Storage (CCUS) would also need to be adopted till the time the changeover to non-fossil fuel sources is well beyond the peak. CCUS has not seen much traction in the international forums, probably because the technologies for same are far from being mainstreamed. Considering the expected slow rate of away movement in the Indian power sector (read coal-based power plants), CCUS technologies would need to be better deployed to move towards a peaking year and net zero economy.

As mentioned in a report by CEEW, India is collaborating with EU and 24 other countries on innovation challenge that is focussed on Carbon capture to ensure near zero CO₂ emissions from power plants and similar Carbon intensive industries. Indian heavy industries like National Aluminium Company (NALCO), ONGC, and BHEL are initiating setting up their own CCUS facilities. India is now collaborating with other ACT (Accelerating CCUS Technologies) member countries like the US to come up with scaled technologies for CCUS. There is a growing realisation as per an analysis carried out by International Energy Agency (IEA) that achieving net zero without CCUS is virtually impossible for any country/ EU. This should be ground enough for India to take these technologies seriously as these are likely to be deployed globally as well as due to India's own net zero commitment in COP26.

Another issue of focus here is the dependency of Indian industry on fossil fuel energy sources. The report from CEEW also mentions that in the Indian industry fossil fuel energy sourced consumption was 66 percent of total industrial energy consumption and this is likely to decrease by only two percent by 2050. In this context, CCUS technologies become even more indispensable, with net

zero aim. CO₂ sequestration plants, at present, are at pilot/ demonstration stage in India. With scalability, the costs are likely to be brought down, thereby bringing the CCUS strongly in focus. Indian industry, with impetus from the government, needs to move strongly ahead on this front. Even with dependency on foreign patented technologies, private players that are driven and motivated like Dalmia cement are moving ahead with large scale CCUS facility in Tamil Nadu (in a JV with Carbon Clean Solutions, UK). Dalmia cement is doing this with a target of net negative by 2040. Such sectoral and micro level targets would be needed for meeting India's net zero target. Finally, it's the economics of these ventures that would determine the implementation of such technologies and this is where policy level intervention from the Indian government would become very important.

In a related study by CEEW, it is apparent that whatever be the net zero target year, in the absence of deployment of CCUS technologies, the fossil fuel share in energy mix and share of coal in the primary energy mix would have to decline so drastically so as to make the targets hardly achievable. Similarly, in the transportation sector share of biofuels in the net zero scenario would have to be 80-83 percent and sale of e-trucks would have to be increased 100 percent without CCUS. It is abundantly clear that CCUS projects have to be taken more seriously and financing provided for same for India to meet its net zero target.

Sectoral Highlights

Under the shrinking carbon space, each sector would need attention as well as a verifiable target of carbon emission reduction. As a small case of public mobility focus brings out some salient points in decarbonising the transportation sector in India. Taking a micro view of the Electric Vehicle (EV) introduction in the transportation sector, a move being touted as the panacea for transportation sector – the impacts are manifold. The trade-off would include:

- (a) Losses in oil production sector
- (b) Losses in traditional powertrain activity related to diesel and petrol vehicles
- (c) Losses in jobs in these two sectors – their manufacturing and production
- (d) Losses in Central and State government revenues from sale of petrol and diesel

While there would be some gains due to change over to EV and associated industrial ecosystem, the economic shortfall for the government, at least in the short run, is bound to be there to incentivise public movement towards EVs. It

would also require training of technical personnel in a different skill set, which incidentally, has to start immediately if common man has to gain confidence in the EV ecosystem and make the switch. This really adds to the positives in energy security as dependence on fossil fuel goes down and oil import bill reduces.

Recommendations

After taking an overarching view of the Indian energy landscape under the shrinking carbon space due to its climate change commitments, a set of recommendations can be made that would need to be implemented for India to move towards a low carbon economy.

- (a) India needs to explicitly laydown the peaking year to achieve net zero. This should be combined with sectoral caps of emission and alternate usage, with defined timelines, as has been done for Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) under the Montreal Protocol. Based on this, an inter-ministerial group would need to take stock of the progress made and take mid-course corrections.
- (b) Some sectors like fossil fuel-based power generation would need hard decisions of phase-out or cancelling the carbon spewers. Technology based grid management solutions would need to be implemented wherein coal-based plants can be made flexible to take on the variability in load.
- (c) Strategic and diplomatic leadership roles taken on by India during COP26, like OSOWOG, membership of NSG, financing by the developed countries and targets beyond the NDCs should be followed through with maneuvers in related economic forums like G20 and WTO etc.
- (d) All out support to development of CCUS technologies as well as their implementation by various large emission sectors. Without this the sectoral caps (sub para 'a' above) would be unrealistic.
- (e) Technology based green solutions are difficult to come by in India due to lack of focused R&D in these areas. Development parks focused on green technologies need to be developed with indirect governmental financial backing to their ecosystem. India should strive to be exporter of these technologies and not importer.
- (f) Solutions like Biofuel should be appreciated and similar or better e-mobility products suited to India should be introduced. Considering the energy security and economic impact of change in fossil fuel usage, these alternate energy products need all governmental and private encouragement.

- (g) An ecosystem of manufacturing the alternate energy products and their support equipment like being done for solar energy parts, need to be encouraged.

In the end, it needs to be appreciated that lofty targets set by India have pushed it in the forefront of international climate leadership. If these are not followed through or not seen to be periodically followed up, the leadership would be shown as fickle with commensurate consequences.


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India Needs to Articulate a Time-Bound Strategy

Manish Vaid*

Introduction

The extreme changes in global weather patterns, like floods, droughts, and cyclones, besides ice sheets melt, resulting in a sea level rise, is already wreaking havoc in our climate system, sparing no countries, advanced or developing. As put, it aptly by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), “warming of the earth’s climate system is ‘unequivocal’”, despite repeated climate denials. It has now been proven that over the past century, human activities are the primary cause of the observed climate-warming trend, besides



Source: <https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/>

Figure 1: Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is Warming
(Image Credit: NASA/NOAA)

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known, natural factors¹ through the process of positive and negative feedbacks. Moreover, 97 percent of climate scientists, with well-established evidence have concluded that human-induced climate change is happening.² Thus, the current trends of climate change, as demonstrated by the rigorous scientific research suggests the greenhouse gases emitted by human activities are the primary driver for the same.³

According to NASA, 2016 and 2020 has been the warmest years since 1880 (Figure 1), with 2021 tied with 6th warmest year in a continued trend, according to independent analysis done by NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. According to Bill Nelson, NASA administrator, “eight of the top 10 warmest years on our planet occurred in the last decade. . . .”⁴

Climate change refers to a broad range of heat-trapping global phenomena whether due to natural or human-caused changes. Global warming is a subset of climate change and refers to the trend of rising temperatures on earth since the early 1900s and more so in 1970s. Global warming at present is a result of rapid increase in carbon dioxide (CO₂) and other Greenhouse Gases (GHGs) by burning fossil fuels.

While it is true that these fossil fuels have contributed to Industrial Revolutions and economic growth and development of developed economies, followed by the emerging economies, which form the bulk of the world’s population, energy related emissions have also grown manifold.

According to the International Energy Outlook, 2019,⁵ absolute energy consumption will increase by 50 percent from now to 2050, of which 90 percent of the energy growth would come from the non-Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as noticed in the last decade. Out of non-OECD countries, more than half of the projected increase in energy consumption would be from Asia, followed by Middle East and Africa. Thus, India, which always had an energy-intensity lower than the world’s average, is expected to contribute towards most of the world’s energy use due to its rising population, changing demographics and higher standard of living.⁶

Another adverse impact of energy production and its use is felt on the environment. Nearly half of the air pollution mortality is due to indoor air pollution, with the use of wood for cooking, other half is due to ambient air pollution, mostly from vehicles and electricity generation. Asian countries are mostly impacted by the later.⁷

Like several other countries, India too is untouched by forces of climate change and air pollution has been a regular phenomenon, particularly during

winters. India's average temperature has risen by around 0.7°C during 1901–2018, mainly on account of GHG-induced warming, partially offset by forcing due to anthropogenic aerosols and changes in land use and land cover.⁸ By the end of the twenty-first century,⁹ average temperature over India is projected to rise by approximately 4.4°C relative to the recent past (1976–2005 average¹⁰).

According to the new IPCC report, 12 Indian coastal cities, including, Mumbai, Chennai, Kochi, and Visakhapatnam, are likely to get submerged underwater by nearly three feet due to climate change by the end of this century.¹¹

Regarding air pollution, as per AirVisual, 15 out of the 20 most polluted cities in the world are in India.¹² Also as per the latest report of Centre for Science and Environment, 12.5 percent of all deaths in India is caused by air pollution, killing over one lakh children under the age of five every year.¹³ Furthermore, India, which ranked third, only after Bangladesh and Pakistan, has seven times more PM_{2.5} concentration with 72.5 µg/m³ than the WHO guideline of 10 µg/m³.


Thus, extraction and burning of fossil fuels has contributed to CO₂ and other GHG emissions, thereby becoming a driving force for climate change. In its attempt to address the climate and development challenges, while India has met dual targets of curtailing the emissions intensity of its GDP by 33–35 per cent, while increasing the share of non-fossil power capacity to 40 per cent, that commensurate with the COP21 2°C goal, its current efforts would be insufficient to meet the 1.5°C goal set under the Paris Agreement. However, India surprised the world by announcing five-point agenda, which PM Modi described as 'Panchamrit'¹⁴ or five nectar elements, that would be needed to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2070.

The following sections highlights India's emerging energy and emissions trends, particularly, before and post-Covid 19 and its recent interventions to move towards cleaner energy transition, in a carbon constrained world. It also evaluates India's strategy towards net-zero target set for 2070.

India's Energy and Emissions Trends

India is a major force in the global energy economy. It is the world's third largest energy consumer and emitter of CO₂ despite having low per capita energy consumption and CO₂ emissions. It contributed to more than 10 percent increase in global energy demand, while its own total energy demand doubled since 2000.¹⁵ Its per capita energy demand also grew by 60 percent between 2000 and 2019. Over the same period, India's CO₂ per capita increased from 15 percent of the world's average to little under 40 percent over this period.

(a) *India's Complex Energy Mix:* According to IEA's India Energy Outlook 2021, India's energy needs are largely met by coal, oil and biomass, constituting 80 percent of India's total energy demand since 1990. Coal demand almost tripled between 2000 and 2019, meeting 44 percent of India's primary energy demand, up from 33 percent in 2000 (Figure 2). Production and quality constraints has resulted in coal's import, which accounted for 30 percent of total coal demand.¹⁶ According to IEA's Stated Policy Scenario¹⁷ (STEPS), India's coal demand grows by around 30 percent by 2030, primarily due to increase in industrial demand to the tune of 70 per cent.¹⁸ However, in the power sector, the coal use after increasing by around 20% to the mid-2020s, shows a declining trend, with wind and solar PV meets vast majority of electricity demand growth.¹⁹



Source: India Energy Outlook 2021, IEA.


Figure 2: Total Primary Energy Demand in India

Oil demand, on the other hand, has more than doubled during 2000-2019, owing to growing vehicle ownership, road transport and promotion of subsidized liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Most of this oil demand was met through oil imports, which has seen an upward trend, reaching around 75 percent in 2019 and to 85 percent as of December 2021.²⁰ Transport sector being the fastest growing end use sector, accounts for just under half of India's oil demand, of which 95 percent of demand is met by petroleum products.

India's energy demand fell by 5 percent in 2020 due to lockdown and restrictions imposed during the Covid-19 pandemic, with coal and oil use

suffering the biggest falls. However, as expected, oil demand has shown the signs of gradual recovery, as fuel consumption in December 2021, scaled to nine-month peak, and is likely to accelerate further after the passing of the current omicron wave.²¹ However, natural gas and modern renewables were least affected as both these sources of energy gained ground, particularly the solar PV, despite the fall in overall electricity demand in the second quarter of 2020.²²

On the other hand, India's natural gas share of 6 percent in its primary energy mix remains one of the lowest in the world, despite some growth in recent years. India aims to increase its share to 15 percent by 2030 to improve environmental sustainability and flexibility of its energy system. However, India's vision for the gas-based economy hasn't yet taken off as expected, with price remaining the sensitive issue for consumers, particularly in the power sector. India's gas demand has outpaced domestic gas production resulting in India's increasing dependence on liquefied natural gas, which are present has crossed 54 per cent²³ of India's total gas demand, as per Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoPNG). Thus, unmatched domestic fossil fuels production with its rising demand, has resulted in in imports for oil, coal and natural gas (Figure 3).



Source: India Energy Outlook 2021, IEA.

Figure 3: India Production and Trade of Coal, Crude Oil and Natural Gas

Regarding renewables, India has aimed to have 175 GW of installed renewable electricity capacity by 2022, with the combined target of 60 GW of utility-scale PV, 40 GW of rooftop solar PV, 60 GW of wind power, 5 GW of small hydro and 10 GW of bioenergy. India has reached the milestone of 100 GW by 2021.²⁴ This target was later enhanced to 450 GW by 2030, by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, at the United Nations' Climate Summit in New York on September 23, 2019.²⁵ This target was further raised to 500 GW, by the PM, in his address to the UN's Climate Change Conference in Glasgow on 01 November 2021, while announcing a 2070 net-zero carbon emissions target.²⁶ He also announced that by 2030, India would double its renewable electricity generation share to 50 percent by 2030,²⁷ increasing from 22 percent in 2020.

(b) *India's CO₂ Emission Scare*: India's rapid energy consumption has resulted into sharp rise in annual emissions, making India world's third largest emitter, irrespective of its per capita emissions remaining at the bottom of world's emitters. According to the IEA's STEPS, India's CO₂ emission rises by 50 percent to 2040, largest by any country in the world, attributed to booming industry and transport push, particularly from trucks.²⁸ Ever since 1990, these sectors, including the power sector has quadrupled energy-sector emissions. 14 percent of global energy-sector emissions growth has been recorded since 1990 has come from India. India's 45 percent of primary energy demand comes from coal, which however is responsible for 70 percent of India's energy sector CO₂ emissions. India's carbon intensity of power sector is also above the global average with 725 grammes of CO₂ per kilowatthour (g CO₂/kWh), compared with a global average of 510 g CO₂/kWh, underscoring the predominant role of inefficient coalfired generation in India.

India's Net-Zero Targets

As aforementioned, there are several instances of scientific evidence which says that human activities are increasingly responsible for GHG emissions and CO₂, which accounts for nearly two-thirds of this emissions, is mostly created by the burning of coal, natural gas, and other fossil fuels in our homes, factories, and transportation. In addition, farming and landfills which produce methane, another form of GHG, also contributes to global warming. Besides, global deforestation, resulting from rapid urbanization is yet another reason for CO₂ emissions.

To deal with the extreme impacts of climate disaster, and to save the world from manifold consequences of climate change on their livelihoods, several countries have stepped on gas and declared their respective net-zero targets.²⁹ India too has followed the suit, when PM Modi announced India's five-point

agenda (Panchamrit) for net-zero CO₂ emissions,³⁰ in the COP26 summit in Glasgow. The agenda included the following.

1. To reach non-fossil energy capacity to 500 GW by 2030, to include renewable, hydro and nuclear power capacity.
2. To meet 50 percent of its power-generating capacity from renewable energy by 2030.
3. To reduce the total projected carbon emissions by one billion tonnes from now onwards till 2030.
4. To reduce the carbon intensity of its economy by less than 45 per cent.
5. To achieve the target of Net Zero carbon emissions by 2070.

In addition, to facilitate India's net-zero carbon emissions target, Germany announced new development commitments to the tune of more than 10,025 crore to aid India's fight against climate change and for cooperation on clean energy.³¹

In a report, titled, "Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector", IEA has clearly stated that Net Zero by 2050 depends on an unprecedented clean technology push to 2030, with massive deployment of all available clean and efficient energy technologies.³² Any delay in action in this regard will put net zero out of reach and hence emphasized on the use of technologies regarding advanced batteries, hydrogen electrolyzers, and direct air capture and storage.³³ It also highlights the grim scenario of the job losses from fossil fuel sector, post fossil fuel declines and emphasize on retraining of workers.³⁴ Besides, the report asks for no further investments in new oil and gas fields, except those which are already committed as of 2021.³⁵ These stringent measures would help reduce both fossil fuel demand as well as its related emissions.

India's Strategy towards Net Zero

In a net zero strategy of any country, share of all renewables need to be increased manifold and India too has signaled its intent towards this direction. In this regard, India has revised its target for non-fossil fuel capacity from 450 GW to 500 GW, which is more than triple the installed capacity from non-fossil fuel as on December 12, 2021, of 158 GW (105 GW from RES,³⁶ 46 GW from hydro and 7 GW from nuclear).³⁷ India has also aimed to increase its power-generating capacity to 50 percent from renewable energy by 2030 (more than double the 22 percent share in 2020³⁸).

While there is certainly the need for India to take a lead in global energy transition to make its economic development more sustainable, it may however

be noted that, like any developed country, both coal and oil have been instrumental in India's growth story as well. In 2019, India reached a historic milestone of reaching nearuniversal household connectivity to electricity by providing access to electric connection to the households of 900 million citizens since 2000, improving the material well-being of the people.³⁹

Similarly, LPG has contributed to the growth of oil demand, which is being pushed by the government through the schemes under Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana and Pratyaksh Hanstantrit Labh. This push towards clean cooking fuel has helped the government to prevent more than an estimated 2,00,000 premature deaths between 2010 and 2019.⁴⁰

However, this rapid economic development based on increased use of fossil fuels has significantly contributed to CO₂ emissions as well, making India world's third largest emitter and energy consumer. With India's growth trajectory set to see an upward trend signals to its rising energy demand, India's announcement of net zero emissions by 2070 holds the key. Through this target, India would accelerate its ongoing clean energy transition in a more focused way. Some of the interventions are already under way with respect to not just enhancing the share of renewable energy but also bringing down its dependence on dirty fossil fuels.

India is working on a five-pronged strategy⁴¹ to both enhance the exploration and production of oil and natural gas and to reduce crude oil imports. The strategy includes promotion of energy efficiency and conservation measures and promoting biofuels, including other alternative fuels/renewables. These steps will go a long way to curb energy emissions and energy intensity. Some of these strategies are elaborated below.

1. *Phasing Down of Coal:* Besides, committing to net zero emissions by 2070, and being a second largest producer of coal, India also announced a global phase-down of coal in a COP26 summit. This has allowed India to prepare a detailed plan for phasing down of coal, while identifying its peak and aggressively pushing for renewable energy deployment. This could help India to diminish its coal capacity and its dependence through a smooth transition process. Moreover, this would also leave the door open for investments in clean coal technologies, such capture carbon and storage/utilization.

However, the transition process from coal to renewables has been termed as a "messy and complicated exercise" by researchers at the National Foundation for India in their findings in a report titled, 'Socio-Economic Impacts of Coal Transition in India',⁴² as this would impact

the livelihood of around 13 million people. Hence this process needs to be maneuvered carefully, as noted by Dr. Anil Jain, secretary of the Ministry of Coal.⁴³

2. *Ethanol Rush:* Government has approved a comprehensive biofuel policy⁴⁴ in 2018 that envisages a target of 20 percent blending (E20) of ethanol in petrol and 5 percent blending of biodiesel in diesel by 2030. The broader objective of this policy remains to achieve energy and environmental security, with the introduction of second and third-generation biofuels. In January 2021, India has aggressively pushed for E20 blending by revising the cut-off date from 2030 to 2025. Notably, lifting of ethanol demand is aligned with IEA's net zero pathway.

Some of the challenges⁴⁵ in rollout of E20 program relates to non-implementation of The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 by some states like Rajasthan, West Bengal, etc., non-utilization of the full Input Tax Credit of Goods and Service Tax, problems in getting approvals for ethanol distilleries and issues regarding marketing infrastructure.

3. *Alternative Fuel Usage:* India, along with several countries have aggressively pushed their e-mobility plans and in this regard batteries will be pivotal. Fall in the cost of lithium-ion batteries prompted India to aimed at 30 percent penetration target of electric vehicles by 2030. To accelerate its e-mobility plans, Modi government has approved the proposal for implementation of scheme titled 'Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric Vehicles in India Phase II, running till 31 March 2024.

However, price and availability of rare earth metals such as lithium and cobalt in a long-term could pose significant challenge to India's e-mobility plans. To address this challenge government has launched Production Linked Incentive Scheme for 'National Programme on Advanced Chemistry Cell Battery Storage, with an outlay of 18,100 crore to establish 50 Giga Watt Hour (GWh) of ACC and 5 GWh of niche ACC capacity.⁴⁶ PLI scheme for auto industry is aimed to push alternative fuel usage in India, having two components, namely, Champion OEM Incentive Scheme and Component Champion Incentive Scheme.⁴⁷

Thus, FAME-II scheme coupled with schemes on ACC and PLI, offers scope not just to technological advancements in the existing battery technologies but also faster introduction of next generation batteries which can be scaled up further to bring them out from the lab to the

market. These incentives are largely aimed at making India ‘Atmanirbhar’ in battery technologies in a way that it can become a hub for clean and new energy vehicles, with an objective to bring down vehicular emissions sooner than later and reduce its dependency on oil imports in a long run.

Conclusion

Given the size of India’s population and its growth trajectory, India is set to play the central role in global energy growth. Therefore, it becomes important to figure out a balanced approach towards its sustainable growth, as its legacy system based on fossil fuels is too large for its complex energy mix to change significantly. In this regard, despite being a victim of global warming, India has done well to pushed for climate justice, while demanding US\$ 1 trillion in climate finance for itself. According to Navroz Dubash,⁴⁸ India’s demand for climate finance is justified as accountability is a two-way street.

Thus, through net zero carbon emissions target India now needs to articulate a time-bound strategy, which addressing challenges to meet the same through a democratic manner, bringing on to the table all the respective stakeholders. This would help India to identify the peak for both usage of fossil fuels and carbon emissions, before striving it to bring it down slowly but surely.

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Nuclear Energy could be the Answer to India's Energy Woes

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In October 2021, India saw the highest power shortage in over five years owing to a sharp decline in coal supply. The power fiasco, as it may be called, necessitates an increased understanding of India's energy security. Being heavily dependent on fossil fuels as primary sources, India's energy security is highly compromised and could be perturbed in case of a similar occurrence in the future. Apart from that, lack of domestic production of primary energy sources leaves India vulnerable to change in the international system. As a rapidly growing economy, India's growth rate is directly proportional to its energy need which is set to increase exponentially in the coming decades. There is an urgency that looms over India to upgrade and enhance its energy sources in a bid towards a more sustainable future.

This urgency is also visible in India's draft National Energy Policy followed by its subsequent version, National Electricity Policy (NEP) 2021. The NEP aims to chart the way forward to meet the governments bold ambitions for India's energy sector developments. These aims could be divided into four: access at affordable prices, improved security and independence, greater sustainability, and economic growth. While the aims are actively concatenated, India's *current* energy scenario does not aim to bear fruit in the coming times.



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Coupled with the domestic pull factors, India is being majorly influenced by international push factors.

Increasing global warming threats mean that developing countries like India are under pressure to lessen its reliance on fossil fuels and make a progressive shift towards cleaner energy. There is a global demand for a shift to clean and green energy sources in a bid towards combating climate change and having a sustainable future. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) submitted by India ahead of COP26 outlines its intentions of developing clean energy capacities. While India progressively moves away from traditional sources, nuclear energy could emerge to fill in the void created by a change in its energy dimensions. Indian government is committed to growing its nuclear power capacity as a part of its massive infrastructural development program. In the backdrop of international pressure and domestic commitments towards a better energy alternative, nuclear energy might become an important source of energy for India in the coming decades.

India's Energy Basket

India is a fast developing country and the second fastest growing economy only second to that of China. Its GDP grew at an average annual growth rate of 6.8 percent per annum between 1991 and 2019 out pacing the annual growth rate of 4.2 percent of the preceding two decades. India's development is critically linked to its energy sector. At the present rate, India's per capita energy consumption is quite low as compared to the world average. India has a per capita energy consumption which is one-third of the global average. Over the last eight years, per capita electricity consumption has grown from 914 kWh in 2012-13 to 1208 kWh in 2020 which is an increase of 32 per cent. The per capita consumption of India is lower than other developing countries such as China, Brazil and South Africa. When compared with the human development indicators, a small increase in per capita energy consumption is correlated with a better HDI. The Economic Survey 2018-19 stated: "If India has to reach the HDI level of 0.8, it has to increase its per capita energy consumption by four times." This will require huge resources which would increase with time. India's energy consumption is expected to skyrocket with a predicted growth in population.

In other words, increasing demand would put a pressure on the energy resources which would have to grow at a similar pace. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that India's economic growth will continue to drive its energy consumption which is set to rise from the current 6 percent to 13 percent of global energy consumption by the year 2050. Electricity consumption has grown

at a Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 7.39 percent and the electricity demand is expected to reach 1894.7 TWh in the current year.

In analysing India's energy basket with respect to the Installed Generation Capacity (IGC), fossil fuels take the larger share contributing to 59.8 percent of the total contribution. Of this, coal accounts for 51.7 percent of the total generational capacity with natural gas taking the next highest place with 6.3 percent contribution. The remaining 40.2 percent of the share is dominated primarily by renewable energy. Surprisingly, nuclear energy contributes to only 1.7 percent of the total IGC. Given its current reliance on fossil fuels, India's energy future seems to be dimly lit.

According to the Ministry of coal, India's total coal production increased by 6.74 percent during December 2021 as compared to the same period in December 2019; also, the coal available in India is not of good quality and has a low calorific value and ash content of up to 45 percent as opposed to good quality coal which has an ash content of 5-10 per cent. This makes India rely on coal imports to power through its economic growth. But we will eventually run out of coal. So, how long will this happens?

One way to analyse this is to look at the Reserve to Production ratio R/P that is the ratio of reserves to current rate of production. Keeping pace with the R/P, the world is set out to run out of coal in another 100 odd years. The crippling dependence on coal as a dominant source combined with the dangers of adverse environmental impact calls for an introspection and increased contribution of non-fossil fuels to take up the dominant share in IGC. Nuclear energy, given its huge potential for growth, emission-free nature and consistent nature of production could be the best bet against coal in securing India's energy demands in the coming decades.

New-Clear Energy

Plans for developing India's civil nuclear energy first started taking roots in the mid 1950 with the beginning of construction of the first commercial nuclear plant in Soviet Russia in 1955. With added cooperation from Canada and United States (US), a plan to construct nuclear power plant at Tarapur was reached at by the late 1960s and it was finally constructed in 1972. Shortly thereafter, Canada and US both withdrew its cooperation in the after math of India's first Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) in 1974. India's civil nuclear capacity has largely developed indigenously over the three decades of its international seclusion following the PNE in 1974. The development of India's nuclear program could be attributed to Dr. Bhabha for planning a three-stage nuclear

cycle which aims at developing a closed fuel cycle to utilize the lack of uranium deposits in India while tapping into existent thorium reserves. The three-stage nuclear cycle is a closed sequential cycle which uses the spent fuel generated from one stage of the cycle and reprocesses it to use in the subsequent stages to produce power. The first two stages of the cycle aim at converting the abundant thorium reserves into fissile material. India has the world's third largest thorium reserve. A large percent of this thorium reserve is found in Monazite (ore), in the sands of India's eastern sea coast. India rightfully awaits to turn its beaches into nuclear fuel.

The Indo-US civil nuclear deal followed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver in 2008 led to a breakthrough in civil nuclear development only in the last decade. Since then, India has drawn up ambitious plans to develop and incorporate nuclear energy as a mainstream source of power. At present, as per NPCIL, India has 23 reactors with a total capacity of 6,885 MW in operation with the latest reactor with 700 MW capacity being inducted into the national grid in January 2021. India aims to triple the existent capacity to reach 22,480 MW by 2031. At present, there are nine nuclear power reactors at various stages of construction, targeted for completion by 2024-25. In addition, 12 more nuclear power reactors have been accorded administrative approval and financial sanction by the Government in June 2017. Thus, 21 nuclear power reactors, with an installed capacity of 15,700 MW are under implementation, envisaged for progressive completion by the year 2031 (NPCIL). While the plan may sound ambitious given the pace observed over the decades, there is an ardent need for exponential growth in the nuclear energy output for it to contribute substantially to India's energy mix.

India plans on strategic self-sufficiency reliant on domestic output and any source of energy that could significantly contribute towards this goal should be welcomed. Renewable energy is one area where India has a good foothold. Renewable energy is the fastest growing energy source in India. Renewable energy is observing a growth rate of 17.33 percent CAGR between FY 16-20 and contributes to 38 percent of the total IGC. The renewable energy scenario in India is dominated by hydro energy contributing 11.9 percent of the total power followed by solar, wind and other sources. As evident, renewable energy is an environment friendly, natural choice for India. The government has achieved 100 GW of the 175 GW target as per the Paris agreement by 2021. It aims to achieve the rest in the coming time and has set for itself a goal of achieving 450 GW (excluding 73 GW by hydro) by the year 2030. India has been extremely keen on furthering the case of renewable energy. But an assessment of its viability vis-a-vis nuclear energy is necessary to understand the merit of nuclear energy.

Firstly, generating renewable energy is land intensive. Around 50,000-75,000 square kilometres of land will be used in 2050 for solar energy generation and for an additional 15,000-20,000 sq. km for wind energy projects. For a 1,000 MW power plant, nuclear requires about one square mile of space compared with 50 square miles for solar, 250 for wind and 2,600 for biomass. Hydro power is water dependent and has a restricted area of operation. As Manpreet Sethi highlights, “Prime Minister Modi inaugurated Asia’s largest solar park in Madhya Pradesh in July 2020 which is spread over 1,590 hectares, and will produce 750 MWe. In comparison, Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS) houses two operational 220 MWe units, one 700 MWe that has just gone critical, and another similar capacity unit under construction and occupies only 959 hectares. Of this area, nearly 500 hectares is covered by the green belt and 200 hectares by a township, with the actual plant site a minor fraction of the total.”

Secondly, the exponential growth of solar and wind energy in the past decade is majorly dependent on imports. Import of solar cells and modules increased by 448 percent in the first nine months of 2021. According to Asia Europe clean energy solar advisory (AECEA), the prices of raw materials used in batteries and transmission technology, have increased which could be an added burden on Indian exchequer. Import based growth of renewable energy thus makes India vulnerable to the changing winds of international environment.

Additionally, post October 2021, “solar and wind energy tariffs have been negatively affected by the increase in Goods and Services Tax (GST) which has been increased to 12 percent from an earlier 5 per cent” (Binit Das, 2022). The Ministry of finance has imposed a basic custom duty (BCD) of 25 percent and 40 percent on solar cells and solar modules respectively. These measures would hamper the investors and developers in pushing the renewable energy engine. India’s civil nuclear energy, on the other hand has developed indigenously. The major achievement that we’re looking forward to is the attainment of criticality by Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) at Kalpakkam which is set to be operational from October 2022. India has approximately 400 reactor-year experience and knowing that the last PFBR has been decommissioned in December 2016, eyes are set on India to lead a new pathway in indigenous nuclear energy development. India is a power-hungry nation and will eventually need to rely on indigenous raw materials for the long-term sustainability of a country which is going to support one fifth of humanity.

Thirdly, capacity factor of an energy source plays a really important role when it comes to looking upon it as a reliable source of power. Often times, the capacity factor for renewable energy is found on the lesser sides of the records.

To put it unambiguously, the sun does not shine always nor does the wind blow daily. The hindrances in these phenomena hamper the ability of power generators to work efficiently. Another handicap related to solar and wind energy is the storage of produced electricity. Due to an irregular supply and storage incompetency, its unable to function as a baseload of electricity. In comparison, nuclear energy has been sturdily supplying power without hindrances. In the year 2019, nuclear energy in India had an energy availability factor of 74.3 percent and a capacity factor of 81 per cent. Thus, nuclear plants can provide the baseload-they give a steady stream of electricity day and night, required for a stable supply of electricity.

Criticism

Despite these challenges, renewable energy grants a merit in India's increasing energy needs. Being the power-hungry country, India will need a long-term vision and commitment to safe and clean sources of energy. Nuclear energy fulfils the checklist keeping in mind India's long-term vision. But this comes with its own set of challenges and is muddled with setbacks. The growth of nuclear energy in India is facing hurdles mostly due to the reasons mentioned below.

Primarily, it is an absolute necessity for India to start taking its masses into confidence when it comes to the propagation of nuclear power plants. In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, there has been a general wave of scepticism surrounding the proliferation of civil nuclear energy all around the world and India is not an exception. The shock in public faith and downward slump in the nuclear energy discourse in the post Daiichi era enforces this argument. Principally, the opposition by the people is sourced from their uninformed biases labelling nuclear power as 'unsafe' which generally leads to an opposition in such cases.

The primary task for the government is to build confidence by undertaking two tasks. First is to acquaint people with the safety measures undertaken by the government to ensure safety of its people including the area under the project and this needs to be done by information dissemination at the grass root level. The Government has taken several measures to enable setting up of nuclear power reactors in the country. These include: (i) Resolution of issues related to Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act & Creation of Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool (INIP); (ii) Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act-1962 (as amended from time to time) to enable Joint Ventures of Public Sector Companies to set up nuclear power projects in the country; (iii) Enabling agreements with the foreign countries for nuclear power cooperation including supply of fuel;

(iv) Identification and addressing of the issues in implementation of the projects through Pro-Active Governance And Timely Implementation (PRAGATI) (Press Information Bureau, 2019).

The criticism faced by India in terms of nuclear liability laws pertains to the acts upholding supplier's liability in case of an unfortunate incident. Nuclear growth in India sits on three hard fought nuclear landmarks, the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement, the nuclear suppliers group waiver and India's civil liability for nuclear damage law. Local incidents can have global implications and could affect the fate of nuclear power worldwide. Therefore, the national as well as international, both have stakes in nuclear growth in India making the creation of an impregnable safety culture mandatory. This step does have implications for nuclear industry and affects the cost. The country's ratification of the Convention on Supplementary Compensation (CSC) has firmly put an end to the game of 'will-they-or-wont-they'. While this has affected US investments in Indian reactors, Japan, France and Russia have moved on with their bilateral agreements related to nuclear commerce. The acceptance by these countries showcases the recognition of India as a responsible nuclear power by the international community (NSG states) and has opened windows for opportunity in nuclear commerce.

Second is to explain the need for such projects to be undertaken. People at the grass root level are largely unaware of the energy challenges India might face in the coming time. Peoples acceptance must come from a calculated analysis of risks and benefits involved. The people are to be taken on board not by coercion but by information dissemination. The information needs to trickle down to the grassroots to induce popular support. This task lies primarily with government institutions. Additionally, local institutions and NGOs may be supplemented in the task of furthering the agenda. We have had no public discourse on nuclear power hitherto which explains the quick side-lining of a potent energy source without careful analysis. Coercion and encroachment are not viable modes of action. Coercion in one place would only lead to a repeated cycle in another. The Jaitapur nuclear power plant project is a prime example of adversities that could be faced in the face of popular opposition. The plant originally proposed in 2010 could be "the world's largest nuclear power generating station with a name plate capacity of 9,900 MW."

Nuclear waste management is an important aspect of nuclear power generation. Management of these wastes cover the range of activities from handling, treating, storage and disposal. The recent technological developments in India ensure a high level of safety in the management of radioactive waste.

Disposal of waste is carried out in specially constructed engineering modules such as stone lined trenches, reinforced concrete trenches and tile holes at Near Surface Disposal Facility (NSDF). The high level solid wastes calls for final disposal into Geological Disposal Facility (GDF). A key idea was that long-term disposal would be best carried out by identifying suitable sites at which the waste could be buried, a process called deep geological disposal. Such repository sites are yet not found in India. With the refinement and enhancing of existent nuclear program, the disposal technologies will follow.

Overriding costs and longer period for the return on investment is another challenge India faces in pushing for nuclear energy. Market conditions coupled with strict regulations on maintenance, personnel training, popular opposition have discouraged investors to invest into a growing nuclear market.

Nuclear regulatory oversight is necessary to uphold the critical debate of nuclear safety, emergency planning, and non-permeable safety standards. Given the risks involved in the nuclear technology, it is essential to institute an independent regulatory authority to objectively and stringently monitor the supervision of the national nuclear programme. At present, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) is responsible for monitoring the safety of various Indian nuclear facilities operated by agencies such as the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) and the Uranium Corporation of India limited (UCIL). The AERB is *de-facto* independent and works meticulously, though there is always scope for further improvement. In the process of constant effort to sharpen regulatory supervision, the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) bill was introduced in the parliament in 2011 but lapsed. Probably, a fresh bill similar to the previous NSRA bill is under examination. The IAEA has also evolved such benchmark guidelines for the creation and functioning of regulatory organisations that India strictly adheres.

Considering growing environmental challenges, the need for emission free energy sources has become a priority. Considering India's current energy dimensions, nuclear energy is the top runner in the race of clean energy. According to data by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the carbon dioxide emission equivalent per unit electricity is almost the same between nuclear energy and that of renewable source like wind. At present, nuclear energy emits approximately 12gCO² equivalent per kWh which is in stark contrast with solar at 24gCO², Natural gas at 490 gCO² and coal at the highest with 820 gCO² (World Nuclear News 2019). With guidelines in place, the world aims to limit its rise in global temperature to well below 2 degrees Celsius compared to pre-industrial level. Electricity generation in particular

produces 40 percent of all the energy related carbon emissions. As more and more societies develop and move towards total electrification, decarbonising electricity supply while providing for reliable electricity should become the priority in combating climate change. At present, France draws 70 percent of its electricity from nuclear sources while USA draws around 20 percent (equivalent to coal). India's global stand on climate change policy and with its commitment towards carbon neutral future, nuclear energy is the best bet in consideration.

With technological innovation, the latest trend in nuclear technology is the creation of small modular reactors (SMR). These have the ability to generate a fraction of the energy of traditional reactors with a substantial reduction in cost. Existing nuclear reactors generate 500 megawatts to 1 gigawatt of energy. SMRs have the capacity to generate up to 300 MW.

Conclusion

Clean and green have become the terms to stand by in considering India's energy future. The power sector has witnessed substantial transformation owing to an increased demand (universal electrification) and supply (move towards green energy). India's economic future and prosperity is dependent on her ability to provide affordable, reliable and sustainable energy to all. For a large country like India, a large fraction of energy sources should come domestically but in a larger sense, we have limited options in this regard.

India has a set of strategic goals and self-sufficiency and development contribute to it in a major way. In these regards, bulk imports and dependence on it is neither affordable nor strategically prudent. The existent trend of an excessive reliance on coal needs to be dismantled as soon as possible and this requires added efforts in other directions. Solar, wind and other renewable energy sources along with non-conventional energy sources must be deployed to its full extent. But, in order to meet a large concentration of energy demand in the future, the only sustainable energy resource available for us would be nuclear energy. The efforts required to make this happen might seem exhaustive but the work to be done in this regard is more pioneering than conclusive. The Kakrapar criticality creates a fantastic opportunity for the government to overcome its first challenge of amassing popular support and thus, it must be seized.

Given India's humongous electricity requirement, lack of indigenous fuel sources, its long-term vision for a sustainable growth, environmental responsibility and a growing population with aspirational young demographic, nuclear energy is the last piece in the puzzle in India's energy security.

Articles

Debidatta Aurobinda Mahapatra*

Moral Realism: An Engagement with Gandhi

Abstract

This article explores the relevance of M.K. Gandhi to International Relations (IR) theory and practice and call for a dialogue between traditional realist IR and Gandhi. Gandhi shaped theory and practice of conflict and peace during his lifetime and continued to inspire movements even after his death. The Social Sciences in general and IR discipline in particular, however, have not adequately factored Gandhian methods towards realizing a peaceful world order. The article argues that in the contemporary world Gandhian theory and praxis demand attention as they have elements to enrich the discipline and offer peaceful solutions to global problems. It attempts a dialogue between Gandhian moral realism and the traditional realist IR. In this direction, the article finds English school as a bridge builder. Through identifying broad strands of Gandhian thought, the article argues Gandhian ideas on the questions of morality and politics, means and ends, and war and peace, demand attention from IR scholars. Such an exercise will make the theoretical foundation of the discipline eclectic and recast the discipline as an inclusive field offering tools to explore solutions to the protracted problems of the world.

Keywords: *Gandhi, Non-violence, non-Western IR, Realism, English School*

The scholars of International Relations (IR) in general, and the realist IR in particular, have appeared hesitant to engage non-Western thinkers like Gandhi, which has restricted the scope of the discipline towards embracing inclusiveness and offering alternative ideas to address international problems. A few studies (Acharya and Barry Buzan, 2019 and 2010; Jackson, 1993; Rosow, 2004; Crawford, 2002) in the post-Cold War period factored non-Western ideas in international relations. They have widened our understanding by emphasizing how these ideas and arguments were useful in understanding developments in the non-Western world. None of these studies, however, has factored exclusively Gandhi, a major figure in non-Western politics in the twentieth century.

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Following the recent calls for “opening up the neglected story of thinking about IR that took place outside the West” (Acharya and Buzan, 2019: 2), this research/study examines the ideas and methods of Gandhi as well as their significance for international relations.

Calls for increasing incorporation of ideas from non-Western thought into international relations in an increasingly globalized world, however, are not without challenges. As modes of inquiry in political thought, including international relations thought, are grounded in Western culture and experience, this inclusive enterprise confronts challenges from the Western universalism. This issue can be formulated thus: “Can Gandhi or Confucius have the same status as Plato or Nietzsche? Perhaps, but only to the extent that they can be seen as investigating the same questions as originating in Plato and Aristotle” (Rosow 2004: 256). But a project of comparative international relations would call for cross-cultural dialogue and accord a form of recognition and respect to non-Western thought. Following this idea of a comparative project, in this article an attempt is made for a dialogue between the traditional realist IR and Gandhi. This paper does not argue that there is yet a solidly founded Gandhian IR, but it definitely makes a case that Gandhi, who devoted his life to non-violent social change, has much to offer to investigate some of the fundamental questions in this discipline.

A dialogue between the traditional realist IR and Gandhi is found useful. For the purpose of this article, the term traditional realist IR has been identified with the classical realism and neo-realism. Unless mentioned, the terms traditional realists and realists have been used interchangeably in this article. While acknowledging that the realist IR is not monolithic, only those strands of thought are examined, identified with classical realism and neo-realism, and find that Gandhi has relevant questions to ask in a spirit of dialogue. His moral realism would stand in contrast to traditional realism. To a fixed and pessimistic portrayal of human nature and its translation to international relations, to a separation of means and goals, and to an emphasis on material power and relative gains, Gandhi presents us an alternate picture. He argues that his picture is more realistic than the traditional realist picture. English School is found more receptive to a Gandhian interpretation of human nature and the world. However, while the English school would not deny the role of morality in international relations, it would not give it the weight Gandhi would give. In this article, the argument is situated at a cross-section of the traditional realist school, English school, and Gandhian thought, and demonstrate a dialogue between the realist IR and Gandhi is useful as it offers an alternate paradigm to examine some of the core assumptions of the dominant realist IR.

The Realist IR

Political realism remained the dominant paradigm in international relations for most of the post-World War II era, and in the post-Cold War globalized world it provides context and motivation for many of the most important theoretical debates in the field (Donnelly 2000: 1). It “largely sets the agenda” in international relations (Booth 1991: 528). With its philosophical foundation in the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, the realist IR is based on the assumption that the states are the most important unit of analysis in international relations. *The Peloponnesian War* is the foundational text of the realist school, in which the Greek historian, Thucydides, explored how the considerations of interest and power eschew moral principles, and how “it has always been the way of the world that the weaker is kept down by the stronger” (2009: 38).

The classical realists base their argument on conflictual human nature and struggle for survival and power. The neo-realists apply this struggling and egoistic human nature to the behavior of states and focus on the international system. States are rational actors and struggle to realize national interests in an anarchical world. The more powerful a state is, the more it seeks to realize its relative gains (Waltz, 2001: xi). Under such a formulation, the ideas of morality and universal peace are undermined; rather the conflictual and egoistic nature of individual was emphasized as source of conflicts. For Reinhold Niebuhr, “The ultimate sources of social conflicts and injustices are to be found in the ignorance and selfishness of men” (1932: 23).

Morality can only be relative, not universal, argue the realists. Morality is a product of power and order is based on power, argued E. H. Carr. Further, “Just as the ruling class in a community prays for domestic peace, which guarantees its own security and predominance...so international peace becomes a special vested interest of predominant powers” (Carr, 2001: 76). Hans Morgenthau argued, “This being inherently a world of opposing interests and of conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized but must at best be approximated through the ever temporary balancing of interests and the ever precarious settlement of conflicts” (2005, p. 3). For this theory, human nature is “solitary, brutish, nasty and short” and laws of politics are based on this nature, and this nature and this politics “has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavoured to discover them” (Morgenthau, 2005: 4).

Though realism provides insights into conflicts rooted in egoistic human nature and struggle for survival, it offers a little about cooperation, no less important part of international relations. Critics have termed variants of realism

“deficient and unrealistic” (Kaufman, 2006), a mere “problem-solving theory” (Cox, 1981), suffering from “dilemmas” (Guzzini, 2004) and an “ideological move towards the economization of politics” (Ashley, 1984). Neo-realism, argues one study, emerged from the misreading of intellectual history, including the writings of Morgenthau (Behr and Heath, 2009). This misreading led to the erroneous assumption that Morgenthau advocates anarchy as a universal pattern in international politics (Behr and Heath, 2009: 328). One of the major criticisms, particularly against the neo-realist theory, is its crude separation of the domestic from the international, lacking sociological interpretation of international relations. Raymond Aron asked whether states, whatever their regime, pursue the same kind of foreign policy and whether “foreign policies of Napoleon or Stalin are essentially identical to those of Hitler, Louis XVI or Nicholas II, amounting to no more than the struggle for power?” He argued, “If one answers yes, then the proposition is incontestable, but not very instructive” (Aron, 1966: 598).

The English School (Bull, 1995; Butterfield and Wight, 1968; Linklater and Suganami, 2006; Buzan, 2001; Dunne, 1998) challenged some of the core assumptions of the realist school by focusing on the interlinking of three concepts: international system, international society, and world society. It argued that the relations between states cannot be characterized by a naked pursuit of power, but there are norms and values which guide these relations towards building an international society based on harmony of interests. While outlining the goal of his book, the *Anarchical Society*, as “an inquiry into the nature of world politics, and in particular into the society of sovereign states” (1995: xv), Hedley Bull emphasized that his study does not eschew moral principles. Rather, “a study of this kind that did not derive from moral and political premises of some kind would be impossible, and, if it were possible, it would be sterile” (1995: xviii).

The questions raised by Bull, Stanley Hoffman wrote in the foreword to the book, are quite pertinent research agenda, “not only for further empirical scrutiny of world politics, but also for normative reflections on the possibility of introducing more ethical concerns into the practices of actors on the world stage” (Hoffman, 1995: xii). Such an approach “concerned with the historical than the contemporary, with normative than the scientific, with the philosophical than the methodological, with principles than policy” (Butterfield and Wight, 1968: 12), hence, would not undermine the role of morality in politics. Gandhi would welcome this approach as it is elaborated subsequently.

The assumption of fixed conflictual human nature and its projection to international relations did not factor cross-cultural variations of societies and

their politics as it held uniformity in human motivation and action. Rationalist methods, often emphasized by the realists, “are ill-suited to provide insightful analyses of the ideational logics” embedded in complex systems, such as ideological or religious, playing roles in decision making (Fearon and Wendt, 1992: 60). This emphasis on rationalist methods explains, even if partly, why a realist IR shies away from engaging in dialogue with Gandhi. It is, hence, essential that international relations encourage dialogue and a learning process from different cultures and civilizations to distill a kind of supra-inter-subjectivity from the distinct inter-subjectivities of component parts, and this is a lengthy learning process (Cox, 2002: 185). Cox argues there should be a dialogue between different systems of ideas since “mutual comprehension” is “paramount” for harmonious co-existence. In this framework, I make a case for constructive engagement with other cultural traditions and call for a dialogue between the dominant realist IR and Gandhi.

Critical realists (Patomaki, 2002; Linklater, 1998, 2007 and 2010; Kurki, 2007 and 2020; Hamati-Ataya, 2010), inspired by Roy Bhaskar’s work (1978 and 1979), argue beings are relational and changing, and there is “no unmediated access to these beings” (Patomaki, 2002: 9). Human being is an “embodied historical being, the existence of which is made possible by antecedent conditions and structures, both natural and social”, and individuals have “causal powers to change some of these conditions and structures” (Patomaki, 2002: 10). Such a perspective clearly departs from the realist IR and supports a project of “emancipatory humanism”. The Gandhian worldview would concur with this critical realist worldview, though Gandhi did not articulate in these academic terms though his belief in the changing nature of human beings and societies supports a project of emancipatory humanism. Kurki argues critical realism opens up new avenues, previously hidden from dominant positivist IR. It points out that the positivist theory of causation is ontologically and methodologically limited as it lacks “holistic ontological (conceptual) engagement with complex causal environments” (Kurki, 2007: 366).

The positivist theory narrows our understanding of the world as casual factors include a variety of ontological forces including material resources, social structures and norms and discourses. A focus on one side of the human nature undermines other sides of human nature and its prospects cooperation, understanding and change. The positivist approach of the traditional realists, taking an objective, or scientific, view of the human world, runs counter to the approach of the critical realists that there is no objective Science outside of the sciences, of systemic engagement with the world by the worldly beings, and there is no definitive truth that this engagement can provide (Kurki, 2020: 35).

A critical realist project that emphasizes on advancing outlooks and “paying attention to the historical experience of communities outside the West” (Linklater, 2010: 2) squarely matches the call for a dialogue between the realist IR and Gandhi.

Exploring Dialogue

To explore a dialogue between Gandhi and the realist IR, it is crucial, for such an undertaking, to understand in the first place the Gandhian worldview. A case is made here for a dialogue not as an “aggressive and confrontational enterprise” but as an exercise based on the assumption that “dialogue benefits all”. In an interview in 2003, Bhikhu Parekh elaborated that in dialogue, “our aim should be to understand each other, become aware of our own and others’ biases, and to arrive at a view that withstands critical scrutiny and is broadly acceptable to all involved” (Booth, Erskine and Wheeler, 2004: 394-395). Linklater echoes Parekh, a “dialogue may produce a change in the societies which denied the moral relevance of cultural differences in the first place”, and while societies “may hope that dialogue will confer transcultural status on their position, they have to accept that they may be won over by the argument of the other. This possibility is inherent in any approach to dialogue which is anxious to transcend ethnocentrism” (Linklater, 1998: 87). A dialogue is attempted here between the realist IR and Gandhi and demonstrate that Gandhi’s ideas are relevant for security and peace, the goals which traditional realists emphasize. In this section, the Gandhian method and practice is examined first and then his IR. While doing so, the core assumptions of the realist IR is juxtaposed with the Gandhian IR.

Gandhian Method and Practice

In a debate on morality and international politics, the traditional realists would emphasize that a state must eschew moral principles as a pursuit of interests is incompatible with moral principles. Machiavelli articulated this incompatibility in the *Prince*, “a man who wishes to act entirely up to his professions of virtue soon meets with what destroys him...” (2016: 38). Further, a ruler should not fear “the reputation of being mean, for in time he will come to be more considered than if liberal, seeing that with his economy his revenues are enough, that he can defend himself against all attacks...” (p. 39). Gandhi would abhor such a notion of politics as for him ends and means are ‘obverse and reverse’ of the same “metallic disc”.

While the realist tradition would conceive this debate on means and ends in dualistic terms and argue ends justify means, Gandhi would consider them in

non-dualistic terms by arguing means are equivalent to the end one desires to bring about. For him, politics, domestic and international, and goals, small and big, operate in the same social milieu. Even if one accepts politics is power politics, it does not necessarily follow that it must translate into “might is right”, and while “self-interest will continue to guide individuals and groups, self-interest need not be synonymous with selfishness” (Booth 1991: 545). The dualism of the traditional realist school collapses in Gandhi. Booth argues, “in the traditional realist/Machiavellian formulation they (ends and means) remain essentially separate, but in the traditional non-dualistic/Gandhian formulation the idealism/realism ideal-types can be conceived as collapsing into each other” (Booth, 2008: 517).

In a debate on morality, whether an individual has a moral obligation to other individuals, Gandhi would argue, as a moral and peace agent, an individual has the obligation to ensure peaceful resolution of conflicts. Such an argument has two elements: “the first is that the soldier or statesman as a moral agent rather than as a role performer has obligations to the individual of other states which may ‘transcend the national obligation of obedience’, and the second is that the states ‘are responsible to the international community for the fair treatment of their citizens’” (Linklater, 1972: 313-314). Gandhi considered himself a moral agent and transformed the Indian freedom struggle by pursuing non-violent methods. His method of non-violence, undergirded by his belief in universal morality, and his goal, peace, reinforce each other – there can be peace without violence, and non-violence requires a moral agent who champions peace. It needs more courage, he asserted, to be a “soldier of peace” than to be a wielder of weapons. He wrote in 1921, during the famous non-cooperation movement against the British rule, “As our movement is avowedly peaceful, it is much better even to drop sticks (weapons). Soldiers of peace that we are, we should copy the ordinary soldier as little as possible whether in point of uniform or otherwise” (Gandhi, *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, 2015 (hereafter CWMG), 21, 2015: 243). The term “soldier of peace” may appear paradoxical in a realist IR lexicon but in the Gandhian lexicon, it implies peace can be pursued as aggressively as war. Gandhi would not accept any other method, except non-violence, to realize peace, whether at an individual level or at the state or international level.

Non-violence is not the weapon of a coward or weak, but the weapon of the courageous, Gandhi would argue. He would prefer to engage in violent action than remaining a mute spectator of violence or meekly submitting to violence and oppression. He was a “revolutionist” (Linklater, 2010: 2) in that sense, or one can argue that his approach towards non-violence was radical and rooted in

his conviction that non-violence anytime is better than violence. For Gandhi, violent conflict is devastating and enervating, whereas a non-violent conflict is empowering and transforming. The discoverers of non-violence, he would claim, were geniuses because knowing the futility of violence they gave up violence. In an interview with the American journalist, Drew Pearson, in 1924, he argued (CWMG, 23, 2015: 197):

By non-violence I do not mean cowardice. I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence...I am not pleading for India to practice non-violence because she is weak, but because she is conscious of her power and strength...who discovered the law of nonviolence were greater geniuses.... Having themselves known the use of arms, they realized their uselessness and taught a weary world that its salvation lay not through violence, but through non-violence. Therefore, I respectfully invite Americans to study carefully the Indian National Movement and they will therein find an effective substitute for war.

Non-violence is often considered synonymous with terms like ‘passive’, ‘weak’, and ‘pacifist’, making it unappealing to a traditional realist (Schock, 2003). Non-violence, for Gandhi, was not passive resistance, but rather ‘active fighting’. It is not a denial of reality of conflicts. Discarding violent means of conflict resolution is not to negate the existence of conflict but to resist actively the wrong, as a matter of principle, not as expediency. British journalist, H. N. Brailsford, who interviewed Gandhi in 1946, argued, ‘amid our preoccupations over military perils, he stands aloof and repeats with unshaken faith his creed that safety is attainable, only when men learn to treat each other as brothers and equals. No lesser means will avail’ (CWMG, 83: 279). Gandhi was indeed ‘aloof’ in his time.

When the leaders in the different parts of the world, one could think of Lenin, Stalin and Mao, were leading violent movements, Gandhi was the lone crusader of the non-violence method. It was in later decades that one could come across Gandhi-inspired movements across globe (Scalmer, 2011). Cortright elaborated how Gandhian ideas influenced the peace movement in the United States (1997). Martin Luther King, Jr., Nelson Mandela, Dalai Lama of Tibet, and Nkrumah were inspired by Gandhi. King, Jr. called Gandhi “the guiding light of...nonviolent social change” (Weber, 2004: 171). Recent protest movements like Extinction Rebellion, a global environmental movement, drew from Gandhian method. According to Roger Hallam, a founder of the movement, “Extinction Rebellion is humbly following in the tradition of Gandhi and Martin Luther King” (Toynbee, 2019).

In Gandhian world, the levels of analysis collapses into a single ontological reference point that he would call Truth, which is universal and context free, and which can be realized only through the means of non-violence. It must be, as evidenced by his experience in his freedom struggle in India, long and arduous. So, he cautions, "...non-violence has to be patient...he (the practitioner of non-violence) takes risks and conceives plans...which may mean civil disobedience and the like. His patience is never exhausted" (CWMG, 42, 2015: 452). As the nonviolent worker "engages his opponent in constructive conflict...every response from the opponent be accepted as genuine and that all undertakings of the opponent be considered to have given in good faith" (Bondurant, 1967: 107). Gandhi would prefer non-violent conflict resolution and argue, "I do justify entire non-violence and consider it possible in relations between man and man and nations and nations", but it is not "a resignation from all real fighting against wickedness. On the contrary, the non-violence of my conception is a more active and more real fighting against wickedness than retaliation..." (CWMG, 28, 2015: 305).

For Gandhi, violence manifests in multiple forms, in the form of racism, colonialism, resource plunder and imperialism. There cannot be peace among states unless the root causes of war – violence at multiple levels – are addressed. Actions directed to stop war would prove fruitless as long as the root causes of war are not understood and radically dealt with. For him, war is essentially a degrading thing, and it only proves one's "power of destruction is stronger" (CWMG, 73, 2015: 253). He further argued (CWMG, 31, 2015: 142):

The science of war leads one to dictatorship, pure and simple... The states that are today nominally democratic have either to become frankly totalitarian or, if they are to become truly democratic, they must become courageously non-violent. Power is of two kinds. One is obtained by fear of punishment and the other by arts of love. Power based on love is thousand times more effective and permanent than power derived from fear of punishment... .

This is a classic contrast between traditional realism and Gandhian moral realism. While for Gandhi "power based on love" is thousand times more effective and permanent, a traditional realist like Machiavelli would advise the ruler to be loved as a contingent principle, but when the situation demands he must be feared than loved. In a realist world, states "fear each other" (Mearsheimer, 2001: 29), regard each other with suspicion, and worry that war might be in the offing. In such a world, "there is little room for trust among states" (Mearsheimer, 2001: 32). But in a Gandhian scheme of international

relations, fear and mistrust would have no place or be moderated under higher moral considerations; and it is not conflict of interests but harmony of interests that would guide the conduct of states.

Gandhi followed his nonviolence principle during his struggle in South Africa and India as for him a principle has no meaning unless it is practiced. While documenting the evolution of Gandhian technique of nonviolent resistance in South Africa, Gangal emphasized the Gandhian belief that a principle practiced in one place could be practiced in other places (1992). The Noncooperation Movement in 1920-22 and Salt March in 1930 are the testimonies of this Gandhian belief. The American journalist, Webb Miller, who covered the Salt March, vividly described how the followers of Gandhi practiced nonviolence in the face of police brutality. Miller reported (quoted in Gregg, 1960: 25-26):

In eighteen years of reporting in twenty-two countries, during which I have witnessed innumerable civil disturbances, riots, and rebellions, I have never witnessed such harrowing scenes as at Dharasana (a site of the march). It was astonishing and baffling to the western mind accustomed to see violence met with violence, to expect a blow to be returned. My reaction was of revulsion akin to the emotion one feels when seen a dumb animal beaten: partly anger partly humiliation. Sometimes the scenes were so painful, I had to turn away momentarily. One surprising feature was the discipline of the volunteers. It seemed they were thoroughly imbued with Gandhi's nonviolence creed, and the leaders constantly stood in front of the ranks imploring them to remember that Gandhi's soul was with them.

For a mind "accustomed to see violence met with violence", as Miller observed, it would be understandably difficult to fathom the Gandhian worldview.

Moral Realism and International Relations

As international relations 'stands uniquely at the nexus of the great issues of peace and war' (Booth, 1991, p. 528), Gandhi has much to offer. He would make the case that these issues of war and peace must first factor in the arena of domestic policy making before factored in the international policy making. He believed that India, his home country and field of action, should emerge a moral exemplar and play an active role in international relations by following a peaceful foreign policy. Once India is free, Gandhi would envisage, it must advocate through peaceful means the end of colonialism in other parts of the world. In an interview with Louis Fischer in 1941, about six years before India's independence, he said, "I won't say we (India) have become international, but

we have taken up forlorn causes, e. g., the cause of the exploited nations, because we are ourselves the chief exploited nation” (CWMG, 85, 2015: 10). India’s moral obligation, for Gandhi, hence, does not end at its freedom but by championing freedom for other oppressed nations.

As there is no difference between domestic and international as they operate in the same social milieu, Gandhi would be interested to apply lessons learnt from Indian theatre to international theatre. His lessons in peaceful conflict resolution while addressing Hindu-Muslim conflicts, he believed, could be applied to resolving conflicts between states. He wrote in 1947, “Lord Wavell was very impressed with the non-violent way in which the communal troubles between Hindus and Muslims had been tackled by us. They (Wavell and Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of British India) both hoped that our ideologies of non-violence and pacifism would be understood by the peoples of the world and practised by all in solving international disputes” (CWMG, 90, 2015: 166). The stamp of Gandhi on India’s foreign policy in its initial years was visible. Jawaharlal Nehru, a disciple of Gandhi, took charge of India as first prime minister and stewarded India’s foreign policy, and committed to “looking at everything in the international light instead of the parochial” (CWMG, 83, 2015: 285).

Even before India’s independence, Gandhi wrote in 1946, “India, weak physically and materially but strong ethically and numerically, has proclaimed from the house-tops that her independence would be a threat to no one and no nation, but will be a help to noble effort throughout the world and a promise of relief to all its exploited peoples” (CWMG, 83, 2015: 285). The same year, the Congress Working Committee, working under the stewardship of Gandhi, stated in one of its resolutions, “Any support from any quarter to imperialist designs in Indonesia, Indo-China and elsewhere is resented throughout Asia as culpable violation of the professed aims of the United Nations (UN) and the undeniable right of Asian nationals. This will destroy the chance of international understanding and the very basis of any future world organization” (CWMG, 83, 2015: 417).

Before the San Francisco deliberations on the UN took place in April 1945, Gandhi in a press statement, aimed at the participating countries in the conference, called for following just canons for morality in building the international organization. For him, this organization must represent universal morality, not subject to a country’s, or a group of countries’, exclusivist agendas. He reasoned that the Second World War happened because of mistrust and fear and unless they are addressed the war machine would not stop. Unless the

victorious and defeated nations “shed their belief in the efficacy of war and its accompanying terrible deception and fraud” and are “determined to hammer out real peace based on freedom and equality of all races and nations” exploitation and domination will continue (CWMG, 79, 2015: 389). He urged the victorious Allied powers particularly the United States and Great Britain to translate their democratic culture to international politics by not humiliating defeated countries like Germany and Japan, and but by according them equal status as the “Allies can prove their democracy by no other means” (CWMG, 95, 2015: 119).

For Gandhi, democracy at home must be applied to international relations. He would also apply this logic not only to the UN but also to other international organizations or such ideas. To the suggestion of Sir Evelyn Wrench, the founder of the Royal Over-Seas League and the English-Speaking Union, to form a British Commonwealth, Gandhi broached the idea of Commonwealth of all nations (CWMG, 95, 2015: 119). To a question whether “nations will cooperate inside an international organization, or will we reject internationalism and have some more wars”, Gandhi expressed his concern against the rise of “gigantic States”, and fear that such states might “accumulate much power and suppress freedom” (CWMG, 76, 2015: 444), thus retaining the seeds of violence and war.

Gandhi suspected international treaties and their effectiveness towards promoting international peace. “Ordered violence”, by which he implied large scale violence organized by states, “hides itself often behind camouflage and hypocrisy” and works “through the declarations of good intentions, commissions, conferences and the like, or even through measures conceived as tending to the public benefit” (CWMG, 42, 2015: 452), but in reality benefits the organizers of the ordered violence. Peace treaties emerging from bargains, for Gandhi, are primarily punitive and vindictive, and akin to a superstructure built on a weak foundation. Such forced peace retains the seeds of hostility and revenge that lead to even worse violence. This Gandhian moral realism would tell us that the unequal terms of the Treaty of Versailles at the end of the world First World War led to the Second World War. This also explains the failure of pacts like the Kellogg-Briand Pact during inter-war years, in which parties renounced war in their pronouncements, while preparing for war and exploiting weak parties. The failure of the League of Nations and its mediated peace treaties, in fact, contributed to realist pessimism. But Gandhi remained unshaken in his faith that a peaceful change is possible, but for this to happen, half-baked, half-hearted, relative gains-driven treaties must be given up. Such treaties might, for a period, lead to absence of direct fighting and overt violence and help bring about a

truce, or delay war temporarily but not for long. Real peace can be realized when the states share the fruits of peace. An armed peace, imposing peace upon the forcibly disarmed, would retain seeds of deceit and fraud.

The establishment of an international organization per se is not an end itself, Gandhi argued, but a means to ensure peace, security and progress. While ensuring end of oppression of weaker nations by stronger nations, the organization would work for disarmament as “national armies, navies and air forces would no longer be necessary”, as the international force created under the federation would keep the world peace and prevent aggression (CWMG, 79, 2015: 391). Gandhi hesitantly supported an international police force to maintain international peace. He would call this force counterintuitively “non-violent army”. This army would not fight but work for peace. This may sound absurd for a realist undertaking of politics, but possible in a Gandhian world. Though Gandhi coined this term to refer non-violent activists during the Indian freedom struggle, it is relevant for a discussion on international police force or the UN peacekeeping force. Gandhi elaborated, “a non-violent army acts unlike armed men.... Theirs will be the duty of seeking occasions for bringing warring communities together, carrying on peace propaganda” (CWMG, 66, 2015: 407). He would, hence, approve the idea of international police as a “concession to human weakness, not by any means an emblem of peace” (CWMG, 79, 2015: 390).

A worth mentioning dilemma concerning moral imperatives and realism emerged during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The crisis raised moral concerns in the realm of the American foreign policy and reminded policymakers of the Pearl Harbor attack of 1941, which pushed the United States to join formally the Second World War. Then Under Secretary of State, George Ball, made a case against an attack on Cuba as such an action, “far from establishing our moral strength” would, “in fact, alienate a great part of the civilized world by behaving in a manner wholly contrary to our traditions, by pursuing a course of action that would cut directly athwart everything I have stood for during our national history, and condemn us as hypocrites in the opinion of the world” (quoted in Tierney, 2007: 63). Ball’s argument and other similar arguments, linking America’s traditions and history and moral considerations, weighed in and the US preferred diplomatic negotiations. While a realist would support such an action on the ground of contingent morality (war is not a good policy this time), Gandhi would support this action on the ground of universal morality (war is not good policy any time). Gandhi would have drawn solace in the fact that no major wars were waged since the Second World War and war as a rational policy choice witnessed a receding trend, but “wars of third kind” (Holsti, 1996:

19-40) could have puzzled him and the moral realist in him could have pleaded and worked tirelessly for a peaceful world.

Conclusion

In a dialogue between Gandhi and the traditional realist IR, both similarities and contrasts can be found. Though similarities are a few, they are, nevertheless, significant. Gandhi, like a traditional realist, would not deny that state is a major actor in international relations, though he would not subscribe to the assumption that the state is the only actor. He would have no problem in states pursuing national interests. He would even approve international treaties and agreements, as far as they are founded on trust, to promote national interests. The pursuit of national interests per se is not evil in Gandhian IR, but the narrowness, selfishness, exploitation, greed and prejudices are the evils. Gandhi might support the realist assumption of anarchical world order as there is no higher authority over the state, but in his framework, anarchy would not be unmediated anarchy, nor would it be rigid nor the final summit in the evolution of international relations. He would repose his faith in the evolution of the current international system towards a global society of nations. In this belief, Gandhi is closer to the English school than the traditional realist school.

The contrasts are more pronounced. This is most pronounced in a debate on ends and means. For Gandhi, ends and means form a single continuum, for the realists they are separate. For Gandhi, means justify ends, for the realists ends justify means. Where does morality play a role in this means and ends debate? Gandhi's argument on morality is ontological, it proceeds from his belief that life and morality are inseparable and this inseparability form the core of human existence, a life sans morality is a life solitary and brutal. The realist argument on morality, on the other hand, is teleological. If morality helps serve interest then it is worth following, if it does not then it is worth discarding. For Gandhi, morality is absolute and public, for the realist, morality is relative and private. The realist would not denounce morality in the individual or domestic interactions but disavow such practices in international interactions. Gandhi's morality is context-free, for the realists it is context-specific. This distinction of private vs. public morality is absent in a Gandhian world, in which the universal moral principle governs the life of the individual, state and world, though their operationally would vary. It may baffle a mind 'accustomed to see violence met with violence' to appreciate Gandhi's moral realism that calls for an optimistic engagement in a project of moral and peaceful international relations.

A realist would use treaties and agreements as means to realize relative gains, but Gandhi would discourage their use to realize those gains. The realist

instruments such as balance of power would have no place in a Gandhian world as he would consider them as mechanisms by powerful states to oppress the weaker states. International organizations like the United Nations would generate hope in Gandhi, but its working would generate pessimism in him. He hoped that the UN would emerge a beacon for peace and future world federation but feared its working would be subject to power politics. Gandhi died within three years of the establishment of the UN, but his fear was not unfounded. Studies demonstrate how the UN has become an arena of power politics (Lowe, et al., 2008; Cronin and Hurd, 2008; Barnett, 1997; Mahapatra, 2016). In his study of the Rwandan conflict in the 1990s, Barnett observed a failure of a foundational principle that the UN Security Council members ‘should avoid starkly self-interested strategies and pursue more enlightened policies’ (1997: 571).

Another study on conflict in Syria demonstrated how the Council members failed to address the conflict as their interests clashed (Mahapatra, 2016). This failure in Rwanda and Syria happened due to a tension between state interests, which the traditional realist would prioritize, and obligation to international community, which Gandhi, the moral realist, would prioritize. Despite Gandhian methods and practices inspiring numerous global protest movements including the recent Extinction Rebellion, his methods and practices and their relevance for international peace are not yet mainstreamed in international relations. The twenty-first century international issues such as the increase in the number of nuclear weapon states, intra-state conflicts, religious fundamentalism and terrorism, “global jihadi war” (Juergensmeyer, 2007: 30), environmental crisis, call for a reassessment of Gandhian methods of conflict resolution for peaceful international relations.

A realist worldview that sees war as a rational policy choice is unsustainable, Gandhi would argue and plead the states must transcend the policy framework that considers international system as a “war system.” He would concur with a transformative worldview and make a case for decentralizing power towards building global society (Booth, 1991: 540). The recent studies in global governance, a rising field in political science, have made a case for such decentralization of power in international bodies (Giandomenico, et al., 2001; Rosenau, 1995; Moller, 2000; Baratta, 1999; Falk, 2006; Thakur and Weiss, 1999). For example, Falk makes the case for a Global People’s Assembly, in which non-state actors and their concerns can be represented. Thakur and Weiss talk about three UNs adding one (comprising actors not formally part of the UN but are closely associated with it) to Inis Claude’s two UNs: comprising of member states, and comprising of secretariats. Gandhi would welcome such

ideas and developments that move the international organization away from war-centric rationalism.

Gandhi can be called a moral realist, and his international relations, moral realism. Gandhi is not a utopian realist as his realism proceeded not only from his belief in moral principles but also from his practice of those principles. If IR is about “peace and war”, then Gandhi has much to offer. It cannot be claimed that Gandhi provides answer to all problems in international relations. A selective approach must be encouraged to explore Gandhian principles and methods. They are worth exploring not only because they evolved in a non-Western setting but also because they are useful to re-examine dominant paradigms in IR towards addressing “moral poverty” (Wight, 1960: 38) of the discipline.

While acknowledging that Gandhian thought has limitations, it can be useful to re-evaluate dominant IR postulations on war and peace towards enriching the discipline and making it eclectic. Dialogue with Gandhi and other perspectives on war and peace will provide alternate pathways to address and transform conflictual engagement among nations. There are fledgling attempts in this regard, and they need to be broadened. In this direction, a robust exploration of Gandhian ideas towards making IR inclusive and international relations peaceful is warranted.

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‘Bhoodan Movement’ in Odisha and Nabakrushna Choudhury

Abstract

‘Bhoodan Movement’, initiated by Acharya Vinoba Bhave in 1951, had influenced so many mass leaders, youth, politicians and common people who considered peaceful and voluntary land donation as a means to eradicate land inequality issues of landless poor people. Nabakrushna Choudhury, the then Chief Minister of Odisha, was one among them who had strong commitment for land reform. He was the one and only Chief Minister of in India who resigned from his post to actively participate in the movement. He had made legislative measures to facilitate the movement when he was in power. His resignation had major impacts on the Bhoodan Movement of Odisha. Subsequently he also disassociated with the movement. Here an attempt is made to analyze and critically evaluate the role of Nabakrushna Choudhury in Bhoodan Movement in Odisha.

Keywords: *Bhoodan movement, Nabakrushna Choudhury, Vinoba Bhave, agrarian reform, Odisha*

Introduction

‘Bhoodan Movement’ or land gift movement was an attempt to provide lands to the landless by adopting the Gandhian methods of non-violence and peace. Acharya Vinoba Bhave, an ardent follower of Mahatma Gandhi was the chief architect of this movement which is also known as the Bloodless Revolution. As this movement was the brainchild of Acharya Vinoba, he is also called as the father of Bhoodan Movement. Odisha was one among the Indian provinces where the land gift movement had its effect to a great extent. During the initial years of Bhoodan Movement Nabakrushna Choudhury was the Chief Minister

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of Odisha who had welcomed the effort of Acharya wholeheartedly and tried to support the movement not only when he was in power but also beyond his political stint. He was the one and only Chief Minister in India who had resigned from his post to actively participate in the movement. Therefore, it is important to analyze the role of Nabakrushna Choudhury in such a unique movement in India's agrarian history.

Emergence of Bhoodan Movement

India's independence marked the beginning of a new era. Two hundred years of British rule had shattered India's society and economy in many ways. It was a formidable challenge for India to organize and strengthening its socio-economic status in a competitive world. The economy of India was at the cross-roads and two alternative paths were available: the leftist path of socialistic economic development and rightist path of capitalist economic development. But India had chosen the middle path to development: the democratic planning and cooperative endeavor (democratic socialism). However, prevailing landlordism was a great hindrance in the chosen development process as majority of population were deprived of land.

Landlessness of the poor people was the result of accumulation of many lands in the hands of landlords. The feudal system had badly affected the Indian economy. When Indian National Congress came to power, it abolished feudal system. Many states passed the Zamindari Abolition Acts. The government had its goal to reorganize rural economy and rescue the poor landless from the exploitation of landlords. But only abolition of feudal system did not reduce the plight of landless people. A new class of exploiters, known as 'Rentiers', emerged because abolition of the intermediaries did not abolish the rent receiving class. They do not contribute in the production process but they claim the output. The private possession of land was recognized and the old intermediaries had been converted into the so called "self-cultivating" agriculturalists. The government was silent regarding abolition of private property. The agrarian policy of government did not secure the poor peasants from exploitation of the landlords. The major problems like food production and self-sufficiency were unaddressed.

The rural India therefore warranted a radical reform in the agrarian sector, especially abolition of private ownership of means of production, i.e. land. The followers of Gandhian philosophy felt that a new awareness from within is needed to organize agrarian economy and to strengthening the cultivators. They felt that until and unless the peoples' minds and hearts are changed towards larger good what the government legislation can do? It was felt that changing public sentiment is better than enacting laws. Acharya Vinoba Bhave, as the

leader of this group and as a spiritual successor of Mohan Das Karamchand Gandhi, gave a clarion call for “land to the landless” and ensured that the whole process should be based on non-violence. As an ardent follower of Mahatma Gandhi, Vinoba made an attempt to apply non-violence method to uplift and revitalize rural economy; more importantly to protect the poor peasants from the oppression of landlords. Following Gandhi’s footsteps in achieving India’s freedom, Vinoba felt encouraged to apply the same approach to address land re-distribution issue. Vinoba Bhave was not in favor of encouraging any other method to solve land problems.

Bhoodan Movement led by him was in fact a reaction against the Telangana peasant movement where violence was unleashed by the peasants against the local landlords. Vinoba visited the disturbed region of Telangana to establish and spread the message of peace. Vinoba stayed in Pochampally, a village in Nalgonda district of Telangana, consisting of seven hundred families of whom two-third were landless. During his visit to the Harijan Colony, Harijans asked for 80 acres of land, forty acres wet land, forty acres dry for forty families. Then Acharya asked, “If it is not possible to get land from the government, is there not something villagers themselves could do?” There was a strong appeal behind this question of Acharya that is the villagers have to solve the land issues of Harijans instead of waiting for the government to intervene. Realizing this appeal of Vinoba, a villager named V. Ramachandra Reddy made a donation of 100 acres of land on 18 April 1951.

This one incident created a sense of confidence in Vinoba and he was convinced that all people can be motivated for a noble cause. Then he got his second land gift from Vyankat Reddy in Tangalapalli village on 19 April 1951 where for the first time he named the gift as ‘Bhoodan’ and realized that this method could be an excellent solution for India’s age-old land problems. With this hope, he, along with his followers, moved from village to village and persuaded landowners to donate at least one-sixth of their lands as land gift or Bhoodan for the sake of landless people. This campaign in a short span acquired the form of a movement. In the beginning the objective of the movement was to collect voluntary land donations and distribute them among the landless, but in 1952, the movement broadened to “Gramdan” or gift of village and common ownership of land. The impact of Bhoodan-Gramdan movement was felt nationwide.

Nabakrushna Choudhury and Bhoodan Movement in Odisha

During the discussion on Bhoodan Yagna Act in Odisha Assembly on 09 April 1953, Nabakrushna Choudhury explained the reason why he was supporting

Bhoodan. He said, “whatever laws we formulate or administrative rules we change, there will be no solution to this (land) problem until and unless the minds of the people have not changed. If there will be no mental, moral and social changes; if there will be no revolutionary thought and action, there will be no change. Today Vinoba is working for bringing that change in which every party member is joining. Those parties believe in violence, they will oppose it. When people will be ready, and when there will be a strong public opinion in support of the land distribution the law will be formulated. Sankaracharya says ‘Samyak Bibhajanam Danam’. It means ‘whether it is land or anything else, equal distribution of that is the actual meaning of Dana or donation’. Believing in the concept of *dana* or donation by Sankaracharya, Vinoba has started the land distribution movement” (Nayak, 2001).

This was the reason for which Nabakrushna wholeheartedly supported the movement led by Bhave. Simply, the method applied by Vinoba Bhave had impressed him for which he strongly supported the Bhoodan Movement. After Vinoba’s call for a nation-wide Bhoodan movement, a trusted follower of Mahatma Gandhi in Odisha Gopabandhu Choudhury (elder brother of Nabakrushna Choudhury), along with his wife Rama Devi (sister-in-law of Nabakrushna Choudhury), started collection of land for the poor people in Odisha from 07 January 1952. A meeting held in Ramachandrapur village near Bari of Jajpur on the same day. Gopabandhu Choudhury, Rama Devi Choudhury, Acharya Harihar Das, Pandit Krupasindhu Hota, Radharatan Das, Sakti Sekhar Das and a number of such constructive activists were presented in the meeting. That was the induction moment of Bhoodan Movement in Odisha (Pati, 2013). Harapriya Devi an inhabitant of Anandpur village was the first person who made a donation to Bhoodan Movement in Odisha.

The first Bhoodan Yatra continued for 4 months and 22 days which was started from 07 January 1952 and ended in 28 May 1952. The Padyatris covered Cuttack, Puri, Ganjam, Koraput, Kalahandi, Balangir, Sambalpur and Dhenkanal districts and collected 1,626 acres of land from 233 donors. On 05 May 1952, the Padyatra reached Gunupur in Koraput. The Padyatris met the tribal people, construction workers, businessmen and landowners of the local area. With the leadership of Gopabandhu Choudhury, the Padyatris appealed the people to donate land for a noble cause. The Padyatra reached at Kujendri on 08 March 1952 where there was a serious food shortage owing to prevailing drought conditions. As a result oppression of tribal people had increased by the money lenders and land owners.

As response, a Bhoo-Satyagrah Samaj was formed with the leadership of Biswanath Patnaik. The Samaj started a movement called Bhoo-Satyagraha. But that was not a movement to supplement the Bhoodan-Movement of Vinoba Bhave for which Gopabandhu turned away from it. But Nabakrushna Choudhury took interest in the Bhoo-Satyagraha movement. Nabakrushna Choudhury expressed his interest to consider the problems of tribal people by starting dialogues with Bhoo-Satyagrah Samaj. He had strong commitment towards the land reform programs. Even before the Bhoodan Movement, when he was the Revenue Minister of Odisha (23 April 1946 - 23 April 1948), Nabakrushna led the committee on 'Land Tenure and Land Revenue'. This committee recommended for the abolition of Zamindari System and other intermediaries which was a remarkable step towards land reform and removing inequality (Parida, 2015). Finally, during his tenure, the Zamindari system was abolished as well. Nabakrushna Choudhury had concerns towards land issues, and he initiated land reform before the initiation of Bhoodan Movement led by Vinoba.

On 26 January 1955, when Vinoba arrived at Laxmannath in Odisha to encourage the Bhoodan workers and strengthen the movement, Nabakrushna Choudhury along with other Bhoodan activists, was there to welcome Acharya Vinoba Bhave. On 24 December 1952, there was a meeting of Utkal Pradesh Congress Committee where Chief Minister Nabakrushna Choudhury along with his Revenue Minister Radhanath Rath and Development Minister Dinabandhu Sahoo had given their pledges to donate lands to the movement. As the Chief Minister of the State was closely associated with the movement, some government employees, teachers and students were also influenced and cooperated the Bhoodan Movement.

It was under the Chief Ministership of Nabakrushna, the Government of Odisha introduced the Orissa Bhoodan Yagna Bill (1953) in Odisha Legislative Assembly on 09 March 1953 in order to facilitate the donation of lands to the movement and to provide for the distribution of such lands. The act had extended to the whole of the State of Orissa. There was a provision that the act shall come into force at once. The Orissa Bhoodan Act, 1953 had defined 'Bhoodan Yagna' a movement inducted by Vinoba for acquisition of land through voluntary gifts with a noble aim to distribute it to landless poor people. The act also defined the concept of 'Land', 'Landless', and 'Owner'. There was a provision in the act to establish a 'Bhoodan Yagna Samiti' to acquire, hold, administer and transfer both movable and immovable property and to enter into contract.

In October 1956, Nabakrushna Choudhury had resigned from Chief Ministership and joined the movement actively. He wrote a letter to the then

Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, to inform the cause of his resignation. In that letter he wrote, as his whole family was actively participated in Bhoodan Movement, for which he doesn't want to stay disconnected from that movement. In another letter Nabakrushna wrote that the administration is not working as per his wish for which it is necessary to work for spreading consciousness among common people by staying out of administration. The main cause of his resignation was the non-cooperation of Congress party and desire of Harekrushna Mahatab to become the Chief Minister of Odisha. Acharya Vinoba Bhave had compared the resignation of Nabakrushna with that of "Buddha's Singhasan Tyaga" (Mohanty, 1994).

Bhoodan Movement as Part of Sarvodaya Tradition

Nabakrushna had joined so many marches led by Vinoba and travelled with him in different parts of Odisha in order to collect land for the landless. During a march with Bhave, he stayed at Hirakud where, in a group discussion, Nabakrushna talked about '3S' which must be accepted and '3P' which must be abandoned. The 3S are: 'service', 'sacrifice', and 'self-confidence'; and the 3P are: 'power', 'profit', and 'pleasure' (Mohanty, 1994). "It is not possible to wake the 'Lokasakti' or people's power in power politics" – with this belief Nabakrushna bid farewell to power politics and joined the Sarvodaya movement of which Bhoodan movement was a part. Sri Nilamani Routray in his autobiography wrote that "Nabababu was influenced by the ideas of Vinoba to such a great extent that he was moving by keeping a wooden idol of Vinoba" (Mohanty, 1994).

Before the starting Bhoodan movement in Odisha, Nabakrushna Choudhury had also contributed to the Sarvodaya movement by promoting the interest of the peasants in the states. In 1951, in a public meeting, he criticized the landlords who were not giving proper share to peasants as per the law. He denounced those landlords who had given him vote in the election but act against the interest of the peasants. He considered their vote as insult for him. Nabakrushna not only criticized the landlords but also analyzed the cause of peasant's vulnerable condition: discrimination based on caste, religion, and language, and not getting benefits of government schemes. Therefore, one of the objectives of Bhoodan movement was to unify farmers to make them aware.

Bhoodan Movement in Post Nabakrushna Choudhury Era

After the resignation of Nabakrushna Choudhury as Chief Minister, there was anti-Bhoodan movement propaganda in Odisha by Harekrushna Mahatab. He derided Bhoodan or land gift as 'poverty distribution'. When Mahatab became

the Chief Minister, those people who agreed to donate their land out of pressure or without internalizing the purpose of Bhoodan, they didn't give up their land finally. In Koraput where 800 Gramdan took place. Gramdan as an offshoot of Bhoodan movement in which the entire village was donated to the society as a whole, and Manpur was the first village in Odisha which had accepted and implemented the Gramdan in 30 January 1953. Dedicated volunteers spread the consciousness and succeeded in removing fears from the minds of the people. But some officials and moneylenders reportedly tortured the activists of Bhoodan and Gramdan movement. Subsequently a strong exponent of Bhoodan movement in Odisha, Gopabandhu Choudhury died and Nabakrushna Choudhury also didn't show any interest in Koraput as well as Odisha's Bhoodan movement. He rather concentrated on national level Bhoodan movement which weakened the Bhoodan-Gramdan movement in Odisha.

There are two explanations on Nabakrushna Choudhury's disinterest in Bhoodan movement. First, probably he was more drifted towards a national role as President of Sarva Seva Sangh. He served as the President of Sarva Seva Sangh during 1957 to 1960. The goal of Sarva Seva Sangh was to establish a social order with truth and non-violence. It has a noble cause to promote the personality development of human being by making the society free from exploitation and injustice. Choudhury was fully engaged in the national level activities of Sarva Seva Sangh, as a result, Bhoodan movement in Odisha probably was deprived of his guidance and active support. Second, in 1957 there was an all-party meeting at Alabal of Karnataka. Along with Nehru all the Chief Ministers were invited to attend the meeting. There was a proposal to make Bhoodan movement a government program. Chief Minister of Kerala Nampudripad, Chief Minister of West Bengal Vidhan Chandra Ray and Chief Minister of Odisha Harekrushna Mahatab opposed the proposal. Among the non-government participants of the meeting, only Nabakrushna Choudhury opposed the proposal. He expressed that the revolutionary spirit of Bhoodan movement will be lost if it proceeds through government machinery. Wherever government support was taken there were so many disputes happened. Ironically Vinoba was in favour of government support. All the Sarvodaya workers, except Nabakrushna, supported such proposal.

Subsequently owing to non-progress of Bhoodan-Gramdan movement, Vinoba initiated 'Sulabha Gramdan' program as per which any fraction of land (even one-twentieth) is acceptable as a donation. Earlier, under Bhoodan movement it was one-sixth. The day when Vinoba announced this, Nabakrushna was in Madhya Pradesh and opposed Vinoba's decision. Nabakrushna believed that there is no easy way to success; he had great faith in revolutionary method.

Also many people called Vinoba a ‘Sarkari Baba’ or government saint. Probably for these reasons Nabakrushna had distanced from Vinoba’s Bhoodan-Gramdan movement and joined the ‘total revolution’ initiated by Jay Prakash Narayan (JP). Subsequently, along with JP, he entered the ‘Congress Hataao’ (1967) and ‘Indira Hataao’ (1977) movement by which he completely disassociated from the Bhoodan-Gramdan Movement.

Bhoodan Movement in Odisha: A Critical Appraisal

From the very beginning Nabakrushna Choudhury played a vital role in the Bhoodan movement though his role is not free from criticism. He made efforts for the success of the movement but his approach seemed unrealistic. He believed that the age-old land issue can simply be solved by the concept of *dana* or donation. He seemed to have overlooked the realistic picture of society where land disputes involving a small piece of land among family members often turn violent. To achieve success in the movement, Nabakrushna idealistically hoped a lot from common people.

Secondly, most of the lands collected through the Bhoodan movement were infertile and farming was impossible. It seems he was over-excited and over-confident when he convinced some land donors but ignored the fact that barren lands will not serve any purpose.

Thirdly, after his resignation as Chief Minister, many landowners who were convinced before to sacrifice their lands, refused to give up finally. It seemed that those donors had agreed to donate under pressure. Probably, Nabakrushna Choudhury did not visualize this sentiment of people.

Fourthly, some scholars viewed Bhoodan movement as a ‘conspiracy’ of the followers of Gandhi to stop and weaken communist movement of Telangana which may have influenced Nabakrushna.

Fifthly, during his chief ministership he viewed to have softly suppressed the Kujendri Bhoo Satyagrah which could be an alternative after Bhoodan-Gramdan movement failed in Odisha.

Sixthly, Nabakrushna while was Chief Minister promulgated Bhoodan Yagna Act (1953) but resigned without working for its proper implementation.

Seventhly, when anti-Bhoodan arguments were advanced by his successor Harekrushna Mahatab, Nabakrushna was absent in Odisha to counter.

Eighthly, when Nabakrushna joined the Sarva Seva Sangh at national level, Odisha’s Bhoodan-Gramdan Movement lost its direction. After the death of Gopabandhu Choudhury, he could have led the movement in Odisha.

Ninthly, after differences with Vinoba, Nabakrushna could have returned to Odisha and focused on state level Bhoodan activities. Instead, he was caught up with national level movements like 'total revolution', 'Congress Hataao' and 'Indira Hataao' back-to-back. Undoubtedly Congress got defeated, Indira Gandhi was defeated but the age-old landlessness problem remained unattended. Last but not the least, it can be said that Nabakrushna could do very less for the salvation of the landless poor except making certain laws.

There are other reasons for which scholars criticized Bhoodan movement as well. For example, the absence of clarity about the aims and objectives of the movement among the masses, one-sided approach to address agrarian issues, the insufficiency of land donated, problem of rehabilitation, problem in mechanized farming and inefficiency of government machinery, etc. contributed to the failure of the movement. Though common people got united in the name of Gandhian philosophy of non-violence to solve agrarian issue, they could not visualize or internalize the objectives of the movement. The followers of Bhoodan movement viewed to have attempted one-sided approach to the agrarian issues: they tried to arrange land to the landless but no solution for semi-landless or those who possess land but still work as wage labourers. When a land reform movement limits itself only to one group and neglects the other vulnerable group in the same society, it cannot bring big difference in society.

Another problem with Bhoodan movement was that the movement could not provide sufficient land to the landless. The receiver of land could neither arrange employment for sustenance for the whole year nor they could raise their income level substantially. In fact, most of the land collected and donated through the movement were unfit for cultivation. The lands donated were barren and not helpful to the poor peasants. Mechanized farming was not possible on the donated lands. More importantly, the Bhoodan Movement was unevenly spread in India probably because Acharya Vinoba Bhave did not follow any strict plan of action or agenda, and subsequently he sifted the movement to Gramdan from Bhoodan.

Gradually the volunteers of the movement got demotivated due to lack of commitment and honesty in the process. As the top echelon or mainstream intellectuals did not give importance to the movement, the experiment to apply Gandhian method to solve the land issue did not take-off. In addition, the sift of Bhoodan movement to Gramdan was proved to be a strategic blunder. Though the land owners were agreeing to donate some land that they held in excess, they were unwilling to sacrifice large holding and live like a commoner. The proponents of Bhoodan movement seems overlooked human psychology

involving private property. Lastly, the inefficiency and apathy of the government machinery to promptly distribute the donated lands among the landless poor also contributed to slow progress of the movement. Therefore, neither the targets of receiving land gifts, nor the targets to distribute donated land was achieved. Allegedly the capitalists and the politicians misused the Bhoodan land for personal interest, and the actual needy did not receive the land.

According to the Odisha Revenue Department report, under the Bhoodan movement during 1960s, about 6.5 lakh thousand acres of land were received in Odisha, out of which 5.8 lakh thousand acres were distributed among 1.52 lakh landless poor. Around 60,000 acres remained to be distributed as per the report published in *The Pioneer* on 10 November 2018. Presently there is no programme of Odisha government to distribute the Bhoodan land collected long ago. The state government has included Bhoodan land in Government's Land Bank for corporate projects and many are encroached. The landless poor who are mostly *dalits*, tribals and other rural poor are allegedly mistreated by the Government officials. The Bhoodan landholders cannot sell or no one can purchase Bhoodan land. If the land is not being used by the receiver for two years it can be taken back as well. Practically, the initiative confused the landless rather than helping them. In some cases, it was seen that the land owners who donated land are not the original owners of the land, and the land which distributed to the landless is not properly recorded by the revenue officers for which disputes occurred later on. It is alleged that some powerful people and organizations illegally occupying the Bhoodan land by building rapport with the revenue officers. As per a report of DNA on 29 March 2010, nearly 178 acres of land worth around Rs 150 crore at Jatani, on the outskirts of Bhubaneswar, was grabbed by land sharks. It is further alleged that the government has given the Bhoodan land to private mining and industrial projects. If true, questions bound to arise on the state government machinery in dealing with issues.

Concluding Remarks

In retrospect, Bhoodan movement in Odisha failed and has no relevance today. However, land inequality and problem of landless people persist in every part of India. Today India's richest 1 percent hold more than four times the wealth held by people who make up for the bottom 70 percent of the country's population (*The Economic Times*, 20 January 2020). One wonders, what extra could have been planned to make the movement a success. Firstly, no donation of land should have been received from those land donors who have less than five acres of land. Secondly, the quality of land should have been checked before

receiving the land gifts. Thirdly, the farmers who received the land should have been provided with necessary equipment to start cultivation on land. Fourthly, proper data on donations and distribution of land should have been maintained efficiently with the revenue department. Sixthly, the government should have promptly and timely distributed the Bhoodan lands to the needy and checked their status in successive intervals.

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The Rise of Taliban 2.0: Implications for the Region

Abstract

This article examines the rise of the Taliban 2.0 regime and its impact on the world. While doing so, it focuses on the domestic and regional implications of the rise of Taliban 2.0. The article is exploratory. The literature sources include research articles, books, websites, and working papers. The discussion reveals that except for some countries like China and Pakistan, all other countries are 'keeping an eagle eye' on the situation in Afghanistan. As far as India is concerned, it will have to wait and watch for the moment—until the opportunity presents itself.

Keywords: *Taliban 2.0, Domestic, Regional, Region, Afghanistan*

1. Introduction

Months after the return of the Taliban in Kabul, the world is still waiting to see how the Taliban 2.0 is likely to govern Afghanistan. As part of the Doha accord, the Taliban had promised an 'inclusive' and 'Islamic' government. However, today, the world remains deeply sceptical of the Taliban and their intent. There are everyday reports of human rights violations, particularly the rights of women and the minorities. Taliban 2.0 is still linked with globally-oriented terror elements like the al-Qaida and ISIS / Daesh (Kaurya 2021). Thus, the current situation in Afghanistan is turning out to be a significant counter-terrorism challenge for the rest of the world. Afghanistan is a multi-ethnic state of approximately 31.4 million people, consisting mostly of Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks. Located at the cusp of Central, South, West Asia and the

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historic silk route, it is of great geo-strategic significance. No wonder, Afghanistan has witnessed the Great Game of the big powers: the U.S., Soviet Union/ Russia, and now the ‘rising’ China (Najibullah 2021).

1.1 Research Questions

This article examines the following most important questions:

- What does the return of the Taliban 2.0 regime to Kabul in August 2021 mean for the region?
- What would be the impact of this regime on the world at large?

2. Review of History and Origins of the Taliban

Afghanistan has witnessed a series of wars and conflict from 1978 till day. The Taliban, which ruled Afghanistan in the mid-1990s under the totalitarian regime of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, was ousted after 9/11 al Qaida attacks by the US-led International Coalition in 2001. In December 2001, the UN Security Council (UNSC) commissioned the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to maintain security and the new Afghan government headed by Hamid Karzai was instituted. It is this 20-year rule which ended with the withdrawal of the US forces and Taliban 2.0 takeover of Afghanistan on 15 August 2021.

Before the Taliban takeover in the nineties, Afghanistan was known as a member of the United Nations, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Group 77, SAARC, the Organization of Economic Cooperation, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Afghanistan’s economy ranked 112th in the world according to the International Monetary Fund estimates for 2020 with a GDP of \$ 19.006 billion (IP2GEOLOCATION.COM)¹.

2.1 Civil Wars

In 1992, Afghanistan witnessed many events. Each has profoundly impacted the future of this land and its people. One of the events was the fall of Najib-government in April 1992, and the subsequent beginning of the civil war between various Mujahidin groups. During Najib’s presidency, the Soviet Union began withdrawing its troops. Najib adopted a policy of compromise with the jihadist parties. Although military aid to Najib -government was cut-off after the Soviet withdrawal, the Soviets continued to support the regime with economic and military assistance, while the United States and Pakistan supported the Mujahidin. Najib’s tenure witnessed a new ‘Afghan nationalism’: away from communism, abolition of one-party system and letting the non-communists enter into politics through national reconciliation reforms.

The 1990 Constitution removed all references to communism, declared Islam the official religion, and invited the earlier exiled Afghan traders to enter into Afghanistan. Such reforms should have ideally received considerable support, however the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, changed the entire scenario. Najibullah was left without a foreign counterpart, and following the defection of general Abdul Rashid Dostum; the Najib -government was forced to resign in April 1992. This also marked the rise of jihadist parties in Afghanistan.

With the overthrowing of Najib's government, the prominent leaders of the Afghan Mujahidin agreed in Peshawar to form a new government called the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. However, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – a Pashtun warlord, who had been appointed Prime Minister; opposed this division of power. He entered into a war against the forces of Hezb-e-Wahdat (Wahdat Party) led by Abdul Ali Mazari from Hazara community, Shora-e-Nezar (the Nezar Council) led by Ahmad Shah Masood, Hezb-e-Jamiat Islami (the Islamic Jamiat of Afghanistan) led by Burhan Uddin Rabbani from Tajik community, and Hezb-e-Jonbesh Milli Islami, led by Abdul Rashid Dostum. Meanwhile, disagreements between the various Mujahidin groups over the division of power marked the beginning of a new phase of the Afghan civil war, which was accompanied by successive wars by rival groups and the bombing of cities and residential areas. During this period, different political and military groups controlled various parts of the country, and the city of Kabul and its suburbs were divided between different groups of Mujahidin.

The rivalry between regional powers also turned the Afghan civil war into a proxy war. Pakistan, which was dissatisfied with the new Mujahidin government, provided military, operational, and financial support to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Pashtun Islamic Party (Hezb-e-Islami). Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could not have destroyed half of Kabul without the logistical support and rockets of the Pakistani Army. Saudi Arabia also supported Hezb-e-Dawat led by Rasul Sayyaf. Iran also supported its allies in the battle to secure its regional hegemony. Iran was assisting Shora-e-Nezar, led by Ahmad Shah Masood, and the Islamic Jamiat of Afghanistan, led by Burhan Uddin Rabbani Tajik, to increase their military power and political influence. The differences between the two groups quickly turned into a full-blown and bloody war that involved other Mujahidin groups as well. Uzbekistan also supported the forces of the (Hezb-e-Jonbesh) of Afghanistan, led by Abdul Rashid Dostum, so that the group could take control of the northern parts of Afghanistan.

Hezb-e-Wahdat from Hazaras (Shia community/ Muslims), led by Abdul Ali Mazari, who had occasionally clashed with Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan

and Shora-e-Nezar during the war with Sayyaf forces, left the government in the early winter of 1992 and allied with Hekmatyar Pashtun's Hezb-e-Islami. At the same time, Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, who was appointed president of the transitional government, was replaced by Burhan Uddin Rabbani, leader of the Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan. Rabbani was the second non-Pashtun leader in Afghanistan's political history after Sultan Ali Keshtmand Hazara.

Hekmatyar, whose main reason for his opposition was the presence of former communists, especially General Dostum, in the new government, allied with General Dostum in the winter of 1994, and the Hezb-e-Wahdat of Hazaras, Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hezb-e-Jonbesh Milli of Uzbek against Masood Tajik forces to form the government of Burhan Uddin Rabbani. With this coalition, Hezb-e-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could also use Hezb-e-Jonbesh Milli of Abdul Rashid Dostum's air force to bomb enemy positions and supply its own forces.

However, at the end of 1994, Masood Tajik succeeded in expelling all his opponents from Kabul city. On the other hand, Dostum's Uzbek and Abdul Ali Mazari forces managed to drive the Jamiat-e-Islami forces out of Mazar-e-Sharif and took control of this important city in northern Afghanistan. The central areas and the city of Bamyan were under the control of Abdul Ali Mazari's forces too. Kandahar was also divided during this period between three Pashtun leaders, Golagha Sherzai, Mullah Naqibullah, and Amr Lalai, who each fought to consolidate their position.

The war between the Mujahidin groups began when the new Afghan government had not yet been able to form its own administrative departments, police units and judiciary, and in such a situation the brutal behaviour of some members of the various mujahidin groups had turned Kabul into an unruly chaotic city. Due to this turbulent situation, many Mujahidin leaders too had no control over their subordinate commanders, and murder, extortion, and rape had become commonplace.

2.2 Causes and Factors of Emergence and Growth of the Taliban

Political transformation after the Soviet withdrawal, the inability of jihadi leaders to establish an inclusive government, and the spread of divisions among various jihadist groups affected the emergence of the Taliban within Afghan society. In this turbulent situation and with the continuing fierce clashes between Mujahidin groups in different cities and provinces, in September 1994, a group of students in Pakistani religious schools called "Islamic Tehreek-e-Taliban" led by Mullah Mohammad Omar Mujahid emerged with the aim of "fighting evil and Corruption and establishing an "Islamic system based on Hanafi jurisprudence"

from the border of Spin Boldak in Kandahar province in the south of the country and quickly expanded their influence. (The Hanafi School is built upon the teaching of Abu Hanifa in d. 767. The institute is acknowledged as one of the four primary institutes of Sunni Islamic legal reasoning and repositories of positive law.)

The Taliban captured the capital of Kandahar province in a surprise attack on 03 October 1994, and by 1995 managed to seize the strategic province of Herat on the Iranian-Turkmen border. The group also gained control of 12 Afghan provinces and laid siege to Kabul in early 1995 (Khalilzad, 2016).

On the evening of Friday, 27 September 1996, the Taliban entered Kabul and raised the “Islamic Emirate” white flag over the tower of the Presidential Palace and took control of all parts of the capital. Very soon, more than 90 percent of Afghanistan’s territory was under the control of this group, and resistance by the Mujahidin forces, known as the Northern Alliance, continued against the Taliban in the Panjshir, Takhar, Badakhshan, and Samangan provinces. From Moradi’s point of view, as mentioned in his book *Afghanistan in the Twentieth Century: State and Society in Conflict*, the Taliban entered Afghan politics with the support of Pakistan. The rise of the Taliban was aided by the then Pakistan PM Benazir Bhutto. Pakistan began supporting the movement immediately after organizing the Taliban. The country supported the Taliban in the international arena with the unparalleled leadership of Bhutto. After her, Nawaz Sharif continued to support the Taliban, convincing the United States that the Taliban was “the best among the bad guys” (Moradi, Chapter Four, 2010).

2.3 Taliban’s Support for Terrorism

The regime established by the Taliban in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001 was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. During this period, a Saudi billionaire Osama bin Laden organized some of the foreign fighters fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s into an “international terrorist network” called al Qaeda. Militants loyal to bin Laden fought alongside the Taliban and took part in attacks on civilians. In December 2000, the UNSC decided to punish the Taliban regime for using areas under its control in Afghanistan to train international terrorists and harbouring al-Qaeda leader bin Laden.

2.4 9/11 and U.S. Occupation

After the 9/11 terror strike at the World Trade Center in New York by al Qaida, the United States launched the Operation Enduring Freedom on 07 October


2001 to overthrow the Taliban (Choudhary et al., 2011). Anti-Taliban forces occupied large provinces one after another under the umbrella of the US-led coalition and the Northern Alliance. On 13 November, the Taliban withdrew from the capital Kabul, and Kandahar, their stronghold in the early days, and was overthrown by US-led coalition airstrikes. Afghan Leaders gathered after the overthrow of the Taliban Regime at the Bonn Conference in Germany in December 2001, appointed Hamid Karzai, who was later elected President of the Provisional Government of Afghanistan, in the fall of December. Later, legislative elections were also held.

9/11 attacks on the US marked a turning point in Afghanistan, leading to a global coalition against the Taliban regime. Post-Taliban overthrow in 2001, Afghanistan achieved almost sustainable peace, people's participation in the political mechanism, constitutional rights, civil freedoms, positive discrimination for women, reconstruction and capacity building (Khalilzad 2016).

3. The Re-Emergence of the Taliban

The Taliban's return was predicted after the United States signed a withdrawal agreement with the Taliban in Doha in February 2020. It was neither a surrender document, nor a proclamation of victory for the world's most formidable military power. The Doha Accord only opened the path for the withdrawal of foreign forces, ending America's most prolonged conflict. Following the 9/11 attacks on the American territory, the U.S. entered Afghanistan in 2001 with vengeance, but having little knowledge of the country. It was an unwinnable struggle from the start, but they could hide their failure behind illusions. For nearly two decades, successive American administrations lied to their citizens about a war that had gone wrong. Even some of the highest-ranking American military and civilian officials later admitted of having "no idea" about what they were doing in Afghanistan. In a conflict that cost nearly a trillion dollars, tens of thousands of Afghans were slain (Hussain, 2021). Over 775,000 US troops have been deployed in Afghanistan since 2001. However, they were unable to put down the insurgency.

On 14 April 2021, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced the withdrawal of troops by the coalition forces. Following the withdrawal of NATO forces, the Taliban launched a swift offensive against government forces in Afghanistan. On 15 August 2021, after the Taliban regained control of most of Afghanistan, the Taliban began occupying Kabul and removing many civilians, government officials, and foreign diplomats. President Ghani fled Afghanistan the same day. The Taliban did not expect to capture Kabul easily and without heavy fighting. Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid admitted in his first



Source: Created by CRS. Boundaries from U.S. State Department, GADM, and Esri.

Figure 1. Taliban Control of Provincial Capitals, August 6-15, 2021

press conference, held on 17 August, after the capture of Kabul, that “our units were supposed to remain at the city gate.” But the departure of President Ashraf Ghani from the country effectively shattered the backbone of the government, and the Taliban entered Kabul on the pretext that chaos should be avoided (Najibullah, 2021).

Until a few days ago, however, Western security agencies assessed that government forces would be able to defend Kabul and prevent the Taliban from entering it for several months, or at least several weeks. However, the fall of Kabul within a few hours raised the big question of how this happened and why the “300,000-strong Afghan army” did not put up the slightest resistance. A simple and basic explanation being that the Afghan military and security forces had lost the motivation to defend and confront the Taliban due to the rapid loss of other states and districts to Taliban and doubts about the management and

legitimacy of the Ghani government. And it was an army that the Americans had spent \$ 83 billion on equipment and training since 2001, immediately after the Taliban ousted them until the day it retook control of Kabul.

Eventually, after the Taliban regained power on 15 August 2021, Taliban-backed officials, re-opened secondary schools for boys only. The 20-year-legacy in aspects of peace, sustainable development, democracy, elections, human rights, protection of women's gender equality, the empowerment of women and girls, and the capacity building of Afghanistan was destroyed again with the coming of Taliban.

4. Will the Rise of the Taliban Destabilize the Region?

The return of the Taliban will threaten Afghanistan's domestic constituency or the so-called ordinary Afghans and have implications for the region and international strategic environment. Not to forget that the sole purpose of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan post 9/11 was to dismantle the terror infrastructure, which had the patronage of the then Taliban regime.

However, as pointed out in the 28th report of Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the United Nations, submitted to the Security Council on 21 July 2021, al Qaeda and its affiliates remain present in at least 15 Afghan provinces. And, thus, even after the Doha deal, the security situation in Afghanistan "remains fragile, with uncertainty surrounding the peace process and a risk of further deterioration" (*Economic Times*, 25 July 2021). From New Delhi's point of view, it is equally concerning that Pakistan-based terror outfits have joined in aiding the Taliban's takeover. No wonder Pakistan's deep state has always backed the Taliban and its likes to seek and expand Islamabad's strategic depth vis-à-vis India. And, therefore, has used terrorists to obtain its primary foreign policy objectives. The world is right to conclude that the Taliban's victory is considered a win-win for Pakistan. And it vindicates Islamabad's long-held Afghan policy. No wonder, Taliban would be enthusiastic about working on many key projects linking Afghanistan closely with Pakistan (Kaura 2021).

It is also understood that the U.S. drawdown from Afghanistan gives Beijing an opportunity to exert its influence in its western neighbourhood. China has wanted to extend China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan for some time now. And, the Taliban takeover now is an opportunity. Remember that Indian investment in Afghanistan has earned a good reputation there. Since the fall of the Taliban regime, India has become Afghanistan's largest regional donor, providing more than the US\$ 2 billion for development works. It includes infrastructures and transportation, energy, dams, assembly constructions, countryside advancement, education, and many more.

While India's intentions in Afghanistan are to strengthen the democratic institutions and its overall development, China is guided by its economic and strategic interests. China's financial aid to Afghanistan is likely to increase shortly. Thus, China seeks to counter and limit India's economic influence and dominance in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal. China sees India as a geopolitical rival. At the same time, due to the long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan, India considers Afghanistan a noteworthy nation that provides access to the Central Asian republics. India's effective use of Afghanistan has jeopardized China's geopolitical motivations, and India's expanding ties with the United States have raised apprehensions in China (Manish & Kaushik, 2019).

The withdrawal of the US troops from Afghanistan has also shocked intelligence services, including Israeli and British. They believe that geopolitical games are about to begin here. The West is worried that China and Russia will try to "control" Afghanistan. Already on August 19, E.U. Joseph Borrell, the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, warned: "We cannot allow China and Russia to control the situation in Afghanistan." The American news agency Fox News cited the Republican Congressman Charles Chabert, saying that "President Biden's departure would strengthen China's position in the region and weaken U.S. interest abroad. It will benefit China". "The German weekly Focus reports that the United States and the European Union are not ready to give up their geopolitical influence in the region. Regional powers – Iran, Russia, China, and Pakistan – have allied themselves with the Taliban with the common goal of driving the United States out of the region and protecting its interests" (Swami, 2021).

5. Conclusion

Actively supported by Pakistan, the Taliban movement arose through an internal crisis in Afghanistan and amidst a fierce rivalry between major regional and neighboring powers. The movement was armed and highly political from the beginning. Historical analysis of the causes of the underlying crises goes back to the ethnic-racial and religious composition of the Afghan people. The main reason for the concern in the internal situation in Afghanistan was the invasion by the Soviet Army. As a result of the strategic alliance between the West and Saudi Arabia, the counterattack began through Pakistan. Eventually, it led to the victory of the Afghan Mujahidin and the acceleration of the collapse of the Soviet Union. As a result, Islamism grew.

Eventually, the Taliban was suppressed by direct US military intervention and the International Coalition in 2001. Afghan leaders rallied after the overthrow of the Taliban regime at the Bonn Conference in December 2001 in Germany,

electing Hamid Karzai. He was later elected president, brought to the presidency of the Provisional Government of Afghanistan. However, US attacks on the Taliban and the defeat of the Taliban did not end the war in Afghanistan because they still controlled a significant part of the country. In recent years, the withdrawal of US troops saw the Taliban intensifying its attacks around Afghanistan. The twenty-year war and reconstruction effort ended with the Taliban invasion in 2021 and the subsequent fall of Kabul that brought the Taliban 2.0 to power.

Throughout these years, India worked on helping the Afghans in various ways—by building their parliament building, highways and dams, and schools and hospitals. Today, all that work and effort seems at risk. As India tiptoes around a humanitarian crisis and waits to see how the Taliban settles into its second phase in power, China readies itself to enter the great game with all its might. New Delhi needs to introspect whether it will choose to engage with a group it abhors for tactical reasons, or whether it can attempt to step in and fill the vacuum America leaves behind instead of leaving it to Beijing (and by proxy, Islamabad) to do so. The future, though, isn't quite so sure.

Ever since 9/11, India has invested some \$2 billion in aid to Afghanistan—no significant amount, it's true, compared to the over \$2 trillion the United States sank in, but no small change, either, given that even America's spending on governance and development was just about \$36 bn. The major investments include the Salma Dam in western Afghanistan, the Delaram-Zaranj highway, and Afghanistan's—now useless—Parliament building. Some of those investments, made in the Chabahar port in Iran, the hub of a trade route that freed Afghanistan from the chokehold of Karachi, may provide New Delhi with a degree of leverage. The Taliban, for obvious reasons, won't want to be utterly dependent on Pakistan.

For now, though, New Delhi is isolated. Prior to 2001, India funded the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance but could only do so because of an alliance with Iran and Russia. Today, those countries are on the other side. India's support to anti-Taliban forces also earned the terrorist organization's ire, which reflected in the Taliban's support for the terrorists who hijacked an Indian Airlines flight taking it to Kandahar. Now, New Delhi's wisest course of action might be to sit on the sidelines and watch the match—until the opportunity presents itself.

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Divya Anand**

The Political-Economy of Sino-Pakistan Cooperation under CPEC: Development Game Changer or Advantage Military?

Abstract

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has generated a great deal of interest in the academic and policy community. Its various aspects have been widely debated and discussed. A key aspect of CPEC is its very nature of reinforcing the existing power relations within the political economy of Pakistan. This paper argues that CPEC reproduces and reiterates the dominance of Pakistani military over security and economy of the country by marginalizing not just civilian actors but economic actors as well. It further argues that such a reproduction of existing power equations works in China's favour and hence the dependency of China on Pakistan's military is mutual.

Keywords: *Belt and Road Initiative, CPEC, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China-Pakistan relations, Political Economy, Pakistani Military, Gilgit-Baltistan, Balochistan*

Introduction

The China-sponsored economic project China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is considered as a game changer by Pakistan due to its implications for the economic development and balance of power equation in South Asia.¹ It is part of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, formally articulated and announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in Astana (Kazakhstan), in September 2013 comprising of “Silk Road Economic Belt” and twenty-first century “Maritime Silk Road.” This multi-billion-dollar project is considered to have a neo-colonialist orientation.² OBOR, reformulated as Belt & Road

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Initiative (BRI), aims to connect China with the world and seeks to enable its rise as a dominant rule-setting global power. BRI's flagship project – CPEC will enable China to emerge as a global soft power by increasing its ability, “to get what it wants through attraction rather than coercion.”³

However, the disguised geo-strategic ambition of China to be a militarily expansionist global power has also come to fore where scholars move beyond its projected economic benefits to discuss its implications for China's hard power.⁵ In this article, an attempt is made to unravel how the successful implementation of CPEC depends on China's perpetuating of Pakistan's structural imbalance in favour of its military rule. It further highlights the untouched aspect as to how China is actively supporting the Pakistani military domestically and externally in formulating/reformulating its role by sneaking into Pakistani society at large including its security and economy discretely.

CPEC: A Developmental Project or a Security Pursuit?

Pakistan as a state has always mired in crisis including political, social, and economic ever since it emerged as an independent state in 1947. Born out of a deep sense of “insecurity” vis a vis India, it self-inflicted on itself anxiety and fear against what it communally branded as a “Hindu India”. Pakistan has consistently suffered from a lack of a popular political culture (with no single political party having mass based political support), a sound economic base, and institutional structures; constitutional limbo; ambiguities related to its strong devotion to Islamist ideology; and the increasing resentment of forcefully clutched ethno-nationalist, sectarian, and minority groups. Such myriad complexities provided space to the Pakistan's military establishment which became the self-appointed guardian of the Pakistani state and its ideological borders (in the name of Islam). Gradually, military establishment's role sustained both in domestic and foreign policy as well as security affairs.

The military's thinking in dealing with foreign policy and security issues has always been reflective of its hostility towards India. The garnishing of its foreign policy by seeking support from regional and foreign powers to enhance its security and economic capacity is mainly to counter India. By carrying the ever-present anti-India baggage, the Pakistani military has defined/redefined security to entrench its own dominance moving beyond political to economic and societal arena. This also reflects in its approach towards CPEC that consists of a tinged intermingling of economic (development) and security issues.

Protagonists of CPEC in China and Pakistan propound the economic benefits of the state-controlled project consisting of highways, railways, energy,

infrastructure, telecommunication, space and technology, agriculture, banking projects. It is propagated that CPEC which was signed with the initial cost of \$46 billion with an estimation of its increase to \$63 billion will help in creating 700,000 jobs in Pakistan while adding 2-2.5 percent to its overall GDP on completion.⁵ CPEC has widely been appreciated in Pakistan, with its focus on crucial areas including-Gwadar Port, transport, infrastructure, energy, and industrial cooperation facilitating a boost to Pakistan's stagnating and investment- starved economy.

Among a number of China sponsored projects under CPEC, the four tangible highway routes to link less developed areas with the developed ones in the name of economic development include: a western pathway through Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa; an eastern route running through Sindh and Punjab provinces; a central route coursing across the country; a northern route (3000 km corridor) passing through Pakistan Occupied Northern Areas via Karakoram highway linking Gwadar in Pakistan on the Arabian Sea to Kashgar in Xinjiang province of China. There have been proposals to set up Special Economic Zones, industrial parks, and energy projects fixed along these routes. Supplementing it, around \$33.8 billion have been given to power generation plants and \$11.8 billion for infrastructure development.⁶

China is known to have facilitated funds of around \$35 billion to refurbish infrastructure and to direct its investments in natural gas, coal, solar, and hydropower projects leading to increase Pakistan's installed capacity and generate nearly 70,000 MW of energy. It is alleged that Chinese funds allotted in CPEC amount to one-fifth of Pakistan's per annum GDP and outweigh double the amount of entire FDI in Pakistan since 2008.⁷ Such a grandeur Chinese strategic-economic investment in Pakistan has undermined an important fact that CPEC is not a generous gesture by Pakistan's "all weather" ally to help overcome its receding economy but rather a way out to maximise China's own economic benefit under the larger BRI project. It is a known fact that China's investment in Pakistan is done by giving commercial loans to enable it to pay to Chinese enterprises and facilitate other indigenous private players to invest, which in turn have to be reimbursed with interest charged on it.

However, the paramount economic benefit China would entail is illustrated in the following example- China's state-owned enterprise (China Overseas Port Holding Company, COPHC) – is involved in funding, constructing, and developing a warm water, deep seaport at Gwadar that would carry a total traffic of around three hundred to four hundred million tons annually. The strategic location of Gwadar has drawn significant attention of China, as it is located

extremely close to the Strait of Hormuz, located at the mouth of Persian Gulf. It is the region through which 20 percent of the world's oil passes.⁸ Gwadar's location provides an easy access into the markets of Oil-rich Middle East, South Asia, Central Asia, and Europe fostering regional economic connectivity and development. Most importantly for China, it provides an alternative route in contrast to its over dependence on Straits of Malacca route for trade. Around 80 percent of oil coming from West Asia and Africa passes through this route.⁹ CPEC at large and Gwadar in specific enables China to overcome the Malacca predicament. In fact, National Logistics Cell, a logistics company run by the Pakistani Army has also spotted a commercial opportunity in CPEC. It has sought to help China ease its trade through the Gwadar-Kashgar route, which will resolve the "Malacca Dilemma" of the Chinese and in the process, create rich dividends for NLC.¹⁰

The supporters of CPEC have justified their claims by primarily focussing on development that the project would bring in by benefitting the country at large. They maintain that this development would serve as a means to overcome poor socio-economic conditions, which have enabled a large number of recruits from such strata of society driving them towards militancy. The connections formed by linking development to achieve security at domestic, regional, and global levels is a disbelief that security (at all levels) can mainly be achieved by bringing in development in the underdeveloped/developing countries/region/areas. As an example, China seems in procuring security in its restive semi-autonomous western province of Xinjiang by bringing in only economic development by creating more jobs, generating public resources by suppressing down the actual grievances of its Turkic-speaking Muslim ethnic minority Uighur community clamouring to preserve its ethnic identity. Such economic efforts to deal with ethno-nationalist aspirations have not deterred Islamist militant groups such as Uighur's East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), posing a security challenge to repressive Chinese state.

Similarly, Pakistan's call for development for instance in case of natural resources rich, underdeveloped Balochistan province (end point of CPEC) and Gwadar in particular, according to the military establishment's projection, will help alleviate its socio-economic backwardness thus reducing the scope of attraction of the youth towards militancy. It has rather enabled the Army to suppress the genuine ethno-nationalist demands of the Baloch nationalist groups. Not only this, the Army and its death squads-usurper and restrainer of basic civil human rights has allegedly since 2003 carried out forceful disappearances of more than 23,000 civilians in Balochistan.¹¹ Adding to it is the issue of transparency in the foreign-funded multi-billion project. It became evident when

Pakistan's central bank governor publicly on record said, "he does not understand the composition of financing for the projects, we have a real problem."¹² The linkage between development and security has led to the achievement of security, which however, is engineered as based on the secrecy of the design.

The developmental approach to CPEC has undermined the actual geopolitical perspective underlining Chinese broader strategic expansion and ambitions of having its military presence across the globe. China, "all weather friend of Pakistan" has leveraged Pakistan's geo-strategic location to achieve its aggressive and expansionist foreign policy agenda similar to that of Pakistan vis a vis India. Through CPEC, both China and Pakistan have reinforced their aggressive anti-India stance by breaching its sovereign claims by passing the main arm of CPEC through Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK), which is a part of Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. The running of the economic corridor through northern part of POK, mainly Gilgit Baltistan (the entry point of CPEC) reinforces the long-established beneficial relationship between them as a strategic insurance against India. Substantiating it, Husain Haqqani in Council on Foreign Relations report, "China-Pakistan Relations" mentions, "For China, Pakistan is a low-cost secondary deterrent to India.... For Pakistan, China is a value guarantor of security against India."¹³

Such a consensual ever present anti-India factor between Pakistan and China has always presented Pakistan, especially its military establishment (always supported by China) with an opportunity to continue to hold its old fashioned narrative- projecting India as a "military threat" to its state's survival, an approach taken from the traditionalist realist school of security studies. To overcome the perceived "military" threat, Pakistan's game changer relationship with China through CPEC, according to some reports, led to the deployment of 1800 Chinese troops on the CPEC corridor.¹⁴ A number of them have been stationed in the POK, posing a major security threat to India.¹⁵ It is seen as an attempt on the part of China in collaboration with the Pakistan Army to redefine the geographic frontiers by collusion of their military strength to physically encircle India by allegedly usurping its sovereignty in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.

In addition to strengthening of military bases in the POK, China-Pakistan economic venture has served as a strategic gambit for China to aggressively pursue its expansive geo-strategic as well as maritime strategy. A part of Beijing's malafide intention of establishing itself as a hegemon in its Sino-Centric Asian strategy became evident when China took over the complete operation of the Gwadar port (end point of CPEC) in militancy stuck Balochistan province. China's bid in the development of the port is not restricted to economic benefits

but is mainly to enable it to work as a naval base. Such intentions came to fore in 2011, Ahmed Mukhtar, Pakistan's then defence minister disclosed that Pakistan had proposed China to begin building a naval base at Gwadar.¹⁶ "We would be grateful to the Chinese government if a naval base is constructed at the site of Gwadar."¹⁷ The naval base will work as a refuelling and work station for Chinese submarines to militarise the Indian Ocean.¹⁸ It would add to the overall military strength of China eyeing the Indian Ocean in an attempt to encircle India in the South, adding to its success as it already controls Chinese built port at Hambantota (Sri Lanka) in a 99 year lease agreement. It adds a step forward in its endgame "to muscle its way onto coastal territories that could become prime military assets—much as it did when it started militarizing contested Islands in the South China Sea...it may soon become a forward military base for China's growing blue-water navy."¹⁹ Pakistan will draw benefits out of China's geo-strategic regional connectivity project as both intend to "counterbalance India."

The already established defence and security cooperation between Pakistan and China got further boost under CPEC. It is important here to mention that the Pakistan's Air Force and Chinese officials, in a secret proposal finalised the expansion of Pakistan's building of Chinese military equipment including military jetliners and ammunitions.

A step further in Pakistan's military strategic relationship with China is also evident in their friendship expanding to the space domain. It is reported that Pakistan is the only country in the world that has an access to China's Beidou satellite navigation system's military service to have specific and accurate guidance for missiles, ships, and aircraft.²⁰ This heightened military aspect of CPEC brings to fore the pre-eminence of Pakistani military in the geo-strategic project bargained with China and technological cum military adventurism on part of both Pakistan and China rendering space and territorial sovereignty breached. The clout of the Pakistani Army in China-Pakistan relations overall and in economic project in particular was reiterated by Chinese Foreign minister Wang Yi in his talks with the Pakistan Army Chief General Qamar Jawed Bajwa in China in September 2018, where he praised the Pakistani Army saying that "it is a staunch guardian of China-Pakistan friendship."²¹ He further stated "China-Pakistan military relations are an important part of China-Pakistan all-weather strategic cooperative partnership and also a symbol of the high-level political trust between the two countries."²²

It once again highlights the fragile civil-military balance, where the Pakistani establishment holds sway over domestic, foreign policy, and security related

issues. By focussing only on economic benefits of CPEC, what is being ignored is the already imbalanced political dynamics further tilting towards military institution by embedding and extending its leeway in the country. A heightened military's role is highlighted with a case in point to make CPEC a successful arrangement; there emerges a large-scale militarisation of the already securitised impoverished Balochistan province, mainly its coastal region. By inter mixing development and security objectives, the Pakistani military has instructed the presence of a Special Security Division comprising of 15,580 army workforce and the Maritime security personnel along with a scores of police and paramilitary forces in Balochistan.²³ In addition, in enlarging military's role, local private security companies linked with the Pakistani Army in collaboration with the Chinese private security companies provide security.²⁴ For instance, the Chinese Overseas security group has moved into collaborative undertaking with a Pakistani private security company with links to the Pakistani Navy.²⁵ It has resulted in the presence of not only Chinese private security companies in Pakistan but is also reinforcing military's divergent ways to increase its presence at large.

Here, it is important to highlight the chicanery of the Pakistani military, which by its subterfuge practices has increased its autocratic presence in militancy-ridden Balochistan. On one end of the spectrum, the Army has sustained its efforts to employ state-manufactured "strategic assets" i.e. proxy forces to suppress genuine ethno-nationalist sentiments and movements; and on the other end, the Army has followed heavy handed-militaristic approach in the form of military operations, recently concluded as "Operation Radd-ul-Fassad," to synthesize the "success" of the previous military operations. Such a duality on part of the Pakistani Army to achieve a semblance of unity by "abrading" terror infrastructure and militancy in Balochistan and Pakistan overall can be seen as "connective and corrective" measure for the successful functioning of CPEC. There have been continuous attempts by the military to project CPEC as a successful premonition in Balochistan. The garb of CPEC has allowed the Army to increase its presence in a subdued manner in the province fomenting a steep rise in local resentment and alienation. The Army and its intelligence wing primarily do this by conducting strict security surveillance and command over the locals thereby infringing the individual's dignity and damaging the specificities of its socio-cultural composition.

Pakistan Army's intruding acts made locals think of development as a threat to their identity, security, and overall existence. Hence, it is not the perceived military threat of another country posing a security challenge to Pakistan but the actual role played by the Deep state i.e. the Army within Pakistan in dealing with various societal challenges. It should serve as a stark reminder to the

Pakistani Army to redefine their hard-line notion of state centred external “Indian threat” to enter into internal unravelled realm of their actions. As it has embedded itself deep in the politico-security fabric of the Pakistani society in the name of “development” by dominating the political-security discourse, scuttling the civilian dissent, suppressing genuine ethno-nationalist aspirations among others, a reassessment of its role as an economic actor is also necessary.

Military’s Involvement in Pakistan’s Economy: CPEC as a Tool of Entrenchment

The control of the military over security and societal aspects in Pakistan extends to the domain of economy as well. Here military has evolved not just as an economic actor with its own commercial interests to fulfil but it also dominates economic decision-making both domestically and externally and leads to marginalization of other economic actors. The first sign of military’s involvement in commercial activities dates back to 1954 when it utilized Pakistan’s share of Post War Services Reconstruction Fund to set up a foundation for the welfare of armed-personnel known as the Fauji Foundation.²⁶ Since then the commercial interest of the military has expanded to involve more than 50 commercial entities across Pakistan.²⁷ It is a consequence of military appointing itself as a “national saviour and organ of national development” by claiming superiority over “other actors” in the domain of economy in order to fulfil greed of the military personnel by exploiting existing machinery.²⁸

The commercial interests of the military have expanded to a wider range with various foundations coming into existence such as the Shaheen Foundation (Pakistani Air Force) and Bahria Foundation (Pakistani Navy) and the creation of a National Logistics Cell (NLC). NLC is now the largest transportation company in the country with involvement in construction of roads, bridges, wheat storage facilities, etc.²⁹ The expansion of military’s commercial interest has encouraged crony capitalism in the country where the private sector also does not question military’s commercial interests because it benefits from the same patronage in a semi-authoritarian political system.³⁰

The commercial interest of Pakistani military is so deeply embedded that it now controls a large share of capital domestically. Fauji Foundation which was started with a humble capitalization of US\$ 0.2 Million has grown into a US\$ 432 Billion conglomerate with interest in cement, fertilizer, food, petroleum, and banking sectors.³¹ The Pakistani military through its various other organizations owns businesses worth over US\$ 20 Billion with commercial entities such as petrol pumps, huge industrial plants, banks, schools and cement plants running under its ambit.³² This control over capital overlaps with military’s

control over economic policymaking as evident in the placement of military officials in key positions in the ministry of finance.³³

CPEC has been publicized as a game-changer for the country's wavering economy. But here also, the initiative has been appropriated by the military establishment to consolidate its own commercial interest. The argument asserted in Siddiq (2017)'s work that military establishment styles itself as superior to other actors in executing the goal of national development has played out in debates related to CPEC as well. Hence military has not only sought a greater role for itself in the security aspect for protecting CPEC-related infrastructure and activities but through its various organizations, it is also furthering its commercial interests through the corridor initiative. The link between CPEC and military's own commercial interest can be observed at multiple levels. The nature of the projects in CPEC is such that three organizations of the armed-forces are "tailor-made" to execute them which include the National Logistics Cell (NLC), Frontiers Work Organization (FWO) and Special Communications Organization (SCO).³⁴

The collaboration between FWO and China goes back to 1960s when a military organization was created to construct Karakoram Highway, a task that it executed with assistance from the Chinese military engineers. Today, FWO is a major science and technology command of the Pakistani Army headed by an officer of Major-General rank. It has expanded its role in the "Gilgit-Baltistan" region through infrastructure to a greater extent leading the Gilgit Director General to remark that it should be renamed as Gilgit-Baltistan Work Organization.³⁵ It is here that the strategic and commercial interests of the military establishment overlap where despite strong objections from India, Pakistan continues to construct infrastructure in illegally occupied territory.

China has also shown a clear preference for a greater role of these organizations in CPEC. In 2018, Ambassador Yao Jing expressed concerns regarding the financial and political uncertainty in Pakistan leading to a "go slow" approach from China with respect to CPEC projects. It is in this context that he urged that organizations such as the FWO, NLC and Fauji Foundation should be encouraged to participate in the connectivity initiative.³⁶ The preference also translates on the ground level during the awarding of sub-contracts for CPEC-related work where contractors are Chinese but the sub-contractors belong to military or political favourites.³⁷ The process of awarding the contracts is sometimes aborted or new guidelines are issued over allegations of corruption which are nothing but a ploy to make sure that military's construction and engineering firms bag those contracts.

These firms also benefit from their monopolistic practices due to lack of a competitor. The Special Communications Organization is the only internet service-provider in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. It was entrusted with the laying of a 509-mile long optical fibre in the region for alternative concavity with China. However, as the only player in absence of any competition, it will not only benefit from CPEC-related tele-connectivity but it will also increase the dependence of the local population on the military-led commercial services.³⁸ Thus, leading to strategic repercussions as well.

The link between CPEC and military's own commercial interest also exists at a deeper level where the two are cross-investing in each other's projects. Case in point is the Thar Coalfield power project. In 1991, coal deposits were discovered in Thar desert which were seen as a welcome development in the direction of energy-independence for Pakistan. Now the project to develop electricity from the coal field has been absorbed under the CPEC. A consortium was set up including the Hub Power Company and Chinese firm, China Machinery Engineering Corporation. In 2018, Fauji Fertilizer Company, a subsidiary of Fauji Foundation invested an amount of US\$ 39 Million in the consortium becoming a 30 percent partner in Thar Energy Limited.³⁹ The cooperation between Fauji Foundation and Chinese firms under CPEC also extends to the domain of agriculture. CPEC is popularly perceived as a transit trade enterprise while its involvement in the agriculture sector of Pakistan hasn't received much attention.⁴⁰ However, agriculture has become an important area of cooperation with key Chinese investments in research and development sector such as the setting up of Sino-Pakistan Hybrid Rice Research Center. Chinese enterprises are also looking to invest in agrarian ventures as well. North China-based Yili Industrial Group has expressed interest in acquiring 51 percent stake in Fauji Foods, a sub-affiliate of the Fauji Fertilizers group.⁴¹ Fauji Foods was incorporated in 1966 as a public limited company and is the owner of popular brand, 'Nurpur' famous for its dairy products and packaged juices in the country.

The implementation of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor is happening at a time when Pakistan's economy is under a great crisis. The country's economy continues to be plagued with serious problems such as mounting foreign debt, unemployment, high levels of population growth, low level of domestic productivity, negative net exports, increasing levels of inflation and a consistently large informal economy.⁴² While on one hand, its neighbours such as Bangladesh and India have marched ahead economically, Pakistan's exports have come down and the export basket continues to be dominated by primary products.⁴³ The country has also fared poorly in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI). Between 2010 to 2017, FDI in Pakistan has just averaged US\$ 2807.85.⁴⁴

In such a scenario, the elite in the country are placing hopes on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor where China has committed its resources to construct growth-critical infrastructure such as power plants, roads and ports.⁴⁵ In a recognition of CPEC's role for country's economy, ex-Pakistan Interior Minister Ahsan Iqbal noted that after 9/11, no foreign investor was willing to invest in Pakistan citing security considerations and negative ratings when China proved a "real friend" and initiated the CPEC project.⁴⁶ While the role of CPEC in attracting investments from other sources for Pakistan is a matter of debate.⁴⁷ The initiative has helped the country's elite bypass serious reforms in exchange for the momentary consolation of development that CPEC might bring. CPEC has led to an interesting turn in country's political economy where civilian and military leaders are trying to have a share in the pie. However, CPEC can be mapped onto the existing political economy of Pakistan where military has a veto over country's foreign especially regional policy. The military's preference for CPEC is also a zone of comfort for China as it provides insulation to its investments in terms of time and money.

CPEC might be promoted within and outside the country as a game-changer but CPEC has further deteriorated the "unhealthy civil-military relations" in the country.⁴⁸ It has created a new space for the old power tussle between civilian (democratically elected) and military institutions in Pakistan.⁴⁹

A controversy over ownership of the project has erupted in the country with General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf to civilian leaders such as former President Asif Ali Zardari and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif claiming at various instances that CPEC is their brainchild.⁵⁰ However, it is important to note that the idea of an economic corridor between Gwadar and Kashgar was first conceived by General Pervez Musharraf in 2006. In an exclusive interview to *China Daily*,⁵¹ Musharraf suggested developing a trade and energy corridor which would serve as a shorter alternative to the route via Strait of Malacca financed by the Chinese. This was the same time when United States invaded Afghanistan, Iraq and erected military bases in some Central Asian republics. Since the American hegemony was on its peak, China preferred to wait for a more conducive window and silently started shaping its ambitious plan by working on Makran Coastal Highway, upgrading Karakoram Highway, constructing roads in Gilgit-Baltistan and conducting feasibility study of some related projects in the meanwhile.⁵²

A viewpoint exists that agrees with Musharraf's claim that CPEC was his brainchild.⁵³ It was during his regime that key groundwork for CPEC was laid including signing of agreements to develop Gwadar as a deep-sea port city, energy cooperation agreement between China and Pakistan, a free trade

agreement between the two, upgradation of the Karakoram Highway etc. This was a part of the Pakistan-China Strategic Economic Partnership/Cooperation proposed by Pakistan and discussed between the two countries between 2004-2007.⁵⁴ It was around the same time period that Chinese Vice Premier Wu Bang Guo visited Pakistan in 2002 to attend the ground-breaking ceremony at Gwadar which has now become a central piece of CPEC.

A counter claim to Musharraf has been made by former President Zardari who claims that it was his party, Pakistan People's Party (PPP) that pioneered the idea of CPEC. According to him this idea goes back to as early as 1968 when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto first expressed it and suggested China as the only country that can help Pakistan execute it.⁵⁵ The decision to transfer operational control over Gwadar port to China from Singapore was taken by his government in 2013. Zardari also played an active role in ensuring Chinese cooperation for the project in his capacity as the president of the country.⁵⁶ It must also be noted that as soon as the PPP formed the government in 2008, Zardari proposed a plan comprising 70 mega projects with an estimated cost of \$60 Billion to western donors for the development of Pakistan and as a possible solution to the menace of terrorism at the Friends of Democratic Pakistan Conference in Tokyo.⁵⁷ While the western donors expressed disinterest in the plan, this proposal coincided with a Chinese willingness to launch a "shared development plan" now known as the BRI initiative of which CPEC became a flagship project. In 2013, during the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and President Zardari signed several important documents related to the long-term plan of an economic corridor. Zardari completed his term in September 2013. After this, the political ownership of the CPEC was appropriated by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. The formal negotiations to execute CPEC was one of the first things that Nawaz Sharif undertook after assuming charge as Prime Minister of the country in 2013. He made a visit to Beijing in July 2013 when China and Pakistan set up a joint cooperation committee and appointed National Development and Reforms Commission of China and Planning and Development Ministry of Pakistan as the two nodal ministries.⁵⁸ The CPEC was finally launched in 2015 during the first state visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Pakistan.⁵⁹

During PM Nawaz's tenure, there were proposals to hand over a formal role to the military by the Chinese in order to ensure a smooth execution of projects by cutting down tedious process of multiple approvals from various ministries. The Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan discussed the matter at length with Chief of Army Staff, General Raheel Sharif. According to a report in Pakistani Newspaper Dawn, military also expressed interest in such a proposal by pointing towards its manpower and expertise to execute an ambitious initiative

such as CPEC.⁶⁰ However, this proposal to set up a CPEC Development Authority didn't materialize with Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms still retaining its status as the nodal agency.⁶¹ Despite this, the military has still inserted itself in the implementation of the projects through apex committees set up at the provincial level.⁶² These apex committees were formed to implement a National Action Plan formulated in the aftermath of Peshawar terror attack.⁶³ These committees are formally headed by the Chief Minister but local corps commander is also included. It is a known fact that the writ of the corps commander runs in the apex committees.⁶⁴ Thus, it became just another example of military using the security card to have a deeper role in the country's political and economic affairs.

The attempts made by the military to establish a CPEC authority didn't materialize during Nawaz Sharif's rule. But it is argued that overall the policies started under military rule by Gen. Musharraf continued during the subsequent civilian regimes as well. Here civilian leadership did get more visibility due to the heightened economic cooperation between China and Pakistan but military retained its dominance over decision-making.⁶⁵ This was evident in the case of Nawaz Sharif institutionalizing civilian cooperation with China over CPEC by establishing a China cell and Zardari government ensuring more autonomy at the provincial level to secure progress for CPEC but the domain of internal security and foreign policy remained tightly under the control of military.⁶⁶

The events that unfolded after Nawaz Sharif's ouster from power also indicate the same. Imran Khan's rise to power was aided by the military establishment which wasn't happy with Sharif taking the entire credit for CPEC and decimating its control over the country.⁶⁷ The military was intent on retaining its control over the project. After swearing-in of Imran Khan as the new Prime Minister of the country, a National Development Council (NDC) was set up. This NDC has a provision for the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) as a member, a move which is seen as the expansion of military's control over economic decision-making.⁶⁸ The NDC which is considered a joint forum of civilian and military leadership in Pakistan approved creation of a CPEC authority in August 2019 to speed up the implementation of CPEC projects. A parliamentary panel rejected this proposal. Eventually, a CPEC authority was still set up in October 2019 through the ordinance route bypassing the parliament. The opposition including PML(N) and PPP termed this move as an attempt by military to overtake CPEC and undermine confidence in civilian institutions.⁶⁹

The military's interest in the corridor is deep-rooted was also evident in a controversy that erupted after swearing-in of the new Prime Minister Imran

Khan. During Nawaz Sharif's rule the members of the ruling party Tehreek-e-Insaf Party (PTI) highlighted instances of widespread corruption in the CPEC. After coming in power, Abdul Razak Dawood, a minister in the Imran Khan cabinet expressed his government's intent to renegotiate CPEC in view of the unfair advantage that it gives to Chinese companies.⁷⁰ The interview created tensions between the two countries leading Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Wang Yi visit the "true arbitrator of political power" in Pakistan, Army Chief of Staff General Qamar Javed Bajwa.⁷¹ In order to allay the fears of the Chinese with respect to the future of CPEC, Bajwa issued a statement reiterating, "CPEC is the economic future of Pakistan and its security shall never be compromised."⁷² Thus, the civilian leadership might still be having second thoughts related to CPEC but it is difficult to foresee PTI going after instances of corruption in CPEC provided that the military has taken over its "political ownership" by integrating it with the national security policy.⁷³

Military's quest to take ownership of CPEC from the civilian actors is just a part of its larger say in the country's regional policy. We can understand this by contrasting Pakistan's recent policy with respect to regional level initiatives such as the South Asian Association for Regional Organization and CPEC. India, the largest economy in the South Asian region has granted "Most Favoured Nation" status to Pakistan, but it is yet to reciprocate on the same. Similarly, it also refused to sign the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) motor vehicles agreement saying it needed more time to consult all its province which was more of a dilly-dallying tactic.⁷⁴ Not just this, it has also refused to grant transit facility for India-Afghanistan trade, leading the Afghan government to threaten it with consequences.⁷⁵ The decisions related to regional level policy in Pakistan have been securitized by the military and any decision by the civilian actors to change the regional policy invites punishment.⁷⁶ The democratic institutions such as State Bank of Pakistan regularly publishes reports related to the benefits of increased trade with South Asian countries which is possible only if the state in Pakistan adopts a desecuritized regional policy.⁷⁷ However, the veto over regional policy remains with the military, which continues to focus on security paradigm in reference to a threat from India.⁷⁸ As a result, democratic institutions are stifled in the country. The private sector of the country that can also become a key player in development has been marginalized as there is a limited role of fair play in CPEC.

China's Preference for Military: Lack of Transparency and Ensuring Durability

The political economy of Pakistan is such that the country has an unhealthy

balance in civil and military. However, such imbalance is working in favour of China-led CPEC as it provides the projects with much needed stability and continuity. There is a larger debate that exists over China's preference for authoritarian actors in order to escape democratic scrutiny of projects or critical appraisal of its human rights record with regards to the execution of BRI.⁷⁹ In the case of Pakistan, the preference for the authoritarian military also stems from the certainty and security that military leadership has extended to CPEC. This is evident in Ambassador Wang Yi and his predecessor Sun Weidong's approaching the security establishment at crucial junctures to alleviate any concerns regarding Pakistan's withdrawal from CPEC. It is in return for military's security assurance for CPEC, that it is also drawing commercial benefit from the project through its various organizations such as FWO and NLC.

The case of Pakistan when compared and contrasted with Malaysia provides an interesting insight. In Malaysia, a shift in the country's political atmosphere with the swearing-in of Mahathir Bin Mohamad as the new Prime Minister led to shelving of Belt and Road projects worth \$22 Billion citing fear of a "new colonialism."⁸⁰ In Pakistan, China does not have to worry as construction companies owned by the military continue to win infrastructure bids in the CPEC making sure that the military stays loyal towards the project.⁸¹ This loyalty of military towards CPEC has further aggravated the unhealthy civil-military relations in Pakistan. The investments under CPEC which were sought and well-advertised⁸² by the civilian leadership now has the military taking over the projects with China also showing a preference for the same.⁸³

Conclusion

Pakistan has become a state where military's dominance in policymaking especially in the domains of security, economy and societal interference has affected the potential of the country in achieving welfare goals and a fair degree of democratization. The control of military in matters of security has led to appropriation of a vast amount of societal resources away from welfare to military infrastructure. The current economic crisis facing the country where it is dependent on IMF and other external agencies is a manifestation of the same dominance of military in economic affairs as well. Crony capitalism and favouritism have overruled any possibilities of competition and fair play in the Pakistani economy. The marginalization of other economic actors at the expense of the military has devoided the country of an organic economic growth. Instead of introspection and course correction, Pakistan as a state is now considering CPEC as its saviour.

The very inequalities in power sharing between civilian and military actors is now getting reproduced through the implementation of the CPEC. The execution of projects under CPEC have created visibility for the civilian leadership as noted in the case of Sharif brothers but the overall control over decision-making with regards to CPEC continues to lie with the military as noted in the case of appointment of a CPEC authority with COAS as a member. Military establishment is using security as a pretext to increase its dominance over the project. In view of such a lopsided balance of power between civilian and military leadership, it is difficult to foresee any shift away from these trends. In fact, China itself considers having the Pakistani military as a formidable partner in its own interest.

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Book Reviews

Ananth Krishnan, *India's China Challenge: A Journey Through China's Rise and What It Means for India*, New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2020, Price: Rs. 599.00, Pages: 417.

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Acclaimed journalist and China correspondent of *The Hindu*, Ananth Krishnan's book *India's China Challenge*, is an in-depth analysis of China's rise in the world and how it has imposed a major threat towards India's security and also India's rise. The author has given a detailed description and explanation of China's history, culture, economy, politics, its bilateral relations with India, some internal problems like Xinjiang and Hong Kong. The book is a memoir, as well as a travelogue at the same time as the author stayed in China for ten years and have critically studied China and its people. As Krishnan is proficient in Mandarin, it helped him interact with the natives conveniently. He travelled extensively throughout China, its villages and sensitive areas like Tibet and Xinjiang. He did conduct various interviews of the natives which, in a way has supported him to create an alternative picture of the Chinese society which is quite different from the mainstream picturization of China and its people in the Indian media.

The book consists of 417 pages thematically divided in six parts and a total of 24 chapters. Each chapter provides a detailed analysis of China-India relations under various themes of politics, economy, diplomacy or history. Throughout the book Ananth has argued that India needs to understand China, its need to invest more on Chinese study as it is exceedingly complex in nature. To make readers understand China, the author has looked into the history of China and the lives of Chinese leaders like Mao and Xi Zing Ping. Chinese or the natives of China are extremely passionate in following Mao's ideas and his philosophies on life. He is still being worshipped in places and society is still staying in the

shadow of the Cultural Revolution. Though from 1980 onwards changes have taken place, it seems the revolution has not stopped yet. Xi Jinping is the perfect successor of Mao who is trying to set a new narrative. Krishnan has devoted one whole chapter on Xi's childhood. He has centralized the power and has taken a major shift from his two predecessors. Xi has a project of making China great again which was lost in the post-Mao era. A vacuum has been created in all these years and he is the Messiah who will help the country fulfill Mao's dream. Apart from Xi, the party itself is the lifeline of the state. The Communist Party is everywhere, and it works more than a political party.

China is having the largest economy in the world and the miracle they have done has been mentioned in detail by Krishnan. China is India's largest trading partner and India's economy is largely dependent on China. The success of China's economy lies in the development of its villages. In case of technology too, China is way ahead of India. The success of Alibaba and Baidu has made China reach greater heights.

The most interesting part of the book is the chapter on diplomacy where he has analyzed about the China's plan to write a new world order. Huge economic growth is the basis of China's global ambition. Also, the "century on humiliation" has also created the strong sense of nationalism and resurgence in the world. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the tool which China is using to shape its policies to be a great power and to takeover America. The author has done an in-depth discussion of Xi's brainchild the BRI. India is having major security threat from BRI and so India has always opposed it. Though India feels as a competitor of China, in China's strategic policy India stands nowhere. In terms of economy and defense expenditure India is lagging. China has expanded a lot in its border areas and the Chinese border towns are much more developed than the Indian ones. China has never maintained cordial relations with India, the author has discussed the instance where the great poet of India Rabindranath Tagore has tried thought of a great cultural tie with China, the Chinese intellectual has not much praised this philosophy.

Regarding the border issues with India, Krishnan has showed how China's behavior has changed and China has always been extremely unpredictable. Despite the cordial relation after 1980's and the personal engagement of Xi and Modi border conflict like Doklam and Galwan put a question mark into the diplomatic initiatives of India. The China-Pakistan nexus is obviously a strategic threat towards India's security. China-Pakistan relation has mostly tightened for the deep hostility which they both hold for India. Though, China's and Pakistan's relation has not always "sweeter than honey", but China has skillfully

managed Pakistan. Not only with Pakistan, China has been able to play key role in the domestic politics of many countries like Myanmar or Sri Lanka. So, Krishnan has argued as China is able to shape its plan India don't have to behave like China, but it can create its own world views. Subsequently, the book has looked into the history of the India China border conflict and has argued that it is not possible to re-conquest the territory in the twenty-first century and it would be a realistic decision to settle the border issue.

Ananth had the opportunity to visit Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong, the three areas which are important for China's territorial dream. He interviewed various people from Xinjiang and has given a picture of Chinese oppression. He has lamented that India was not aware of this area and has neglected it for a longer time. Taiwan is still a part of China's vision to incorporate it with the mainland. In the last section of the book the author detailed some account about some people with whom he has interacted and who has given a very different picture of the Chinese society. Cinema; especially Bollywood movies are popular in China and Aamir Khan being a famous as well as a known figure also has a fan club. The final chapter detailed about the China's position after the COVID-19 pandemic. How the Chinese government is behaving in safeguarding the party and trying to be more centralized. As within China people have also criticized the responses of the government regarding the COVID.

The book undoubtedly contains a detailed discussion about China and its dynamics with India, which is mostly known, but it is a good start for any novice. The author has some compassion for the Chinese as he has tried to understand them the way they are. There lies his success in giving a new perspective regarding the China and as an Indian arguing in a realistic sense that India should understand China to manage its rise and the possible threat it is facing.

Rushi Doshi, *The Long Game: China's Grand Strategy to Displace American Order*, USA: Oxford University Press, Price: 2168.00, Pages: 336.

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It is an outright fact amongst the foreign policy analysts that China and USA are under the shadow of 'Thucydides Trap' and for a long time, the Chinese hegemonic uprising is eminent. The book under review digs deep into the phases of Chinese uprising post Qing century of shame.

Nation states, at times, resemble the stature of a dignified human being who can be wronged by others leaving scars on their conscience for which they strive to regain their power and dignity throughout. China has been resembling the same analogy on the global theatre today. The China-US hostility in recent decades is reality but its repercussion is felt in the immediate and far away regions of the world. One example is Sino-Indian tension: due to geographical proximity with China and India's closeness with USA in the post-Cold War period, India's foreign policy has to walk diplomatic tight rope.

While delving into the strategic implications of China's rise, the author uses the primary sources of information collected from the archives of speeches given by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) top leadership, policy documents, foreign policy speeches, Chinese media and literature published by think tanks published or his research. The book starts with nomenclature of CCP, its centralized authority over the decision making in the policy and administration in contrast to US liberal model based on checks and balances in policy making and governance.

Aptly, the author divides the evolution of Chinese polity into three phases: 1979 – when major market reforms were undertaken by opening China to the world and growing its economic base exponentially; 2008 – in the face of global economic crises and following actions reviving its regional dominance against

its immediate neighborhood; and the contemporary times (pre- and post-COVID era), where it continues to dominate the West by growing their merchandise dependency on China and keeping the regional security issues boiling.

This could be possible because of China's focused attempt to spread across the globe when America secured the world and facilitated liberal-capitalism to flourish. Especially in the post-World War II period, when the allied bloc was busy rebuilding Europe and asserting its ideological and economic dominance over Soviet Communist ideology, China was somberly spreading its economic activities. After the 1949 revolution, the newly formed communist party was gathering its feet to form a legible and working government in the face of poverty and famines following the years till the failed Great Leap Forward. The CCP is deeply influenced by Leninism which is reflected in their hardcore centralization in the governance and administration of the country symbolized by a *Red Phone* on the desks of a close-knitted group of people in Politburo. The Red Phone resembles an internal communication structure which is inaccessible to the outside world and the structure where major dialogues with regards to running the *Long Game* are conducted amongst the Chinese leadership.

Subsequently, the so called DIME model of Chinese statecraft i.e., diplomacy, information, military and economic strategy combined, is delivered to the world with a central authority keeping close checks on its creation and implementation; be it in the regional or global politics with the *Long Game* of replacing the *status quo* with a series of confrontation in trade domain, diplomatic security dialogues with existing powers, etc. which can be interpreted as an effort to revive the Marxist-Leninist ideology against the liberal capitalist framework in vogue.

The Grand Strategy is the strategy of a fine blend of economic and political actions that Chinese leadership has been taking on the world stage that at times appear asymmetrical but, at its core, is the uprising dragon against the flying eagle who is ready to get roasted by fire from the dragon's mouth. The rationale and reality of this is subject to introspection but China's dominance is real and the world has to live with it. The book provides a realistic assessment of China's growth as a super power and a must read for the China watchers.

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