

Recent Structural and Administrative Reforms in India's Ministry of Defence: Linkages between Military and Civil Administration

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Abstract

In August 1947 India's independence led to the establishment of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) headed by a cabinet-level union minister with the military firmly under the control of the civilian leadership. In the past, there have been demands for reforms in defense, which had not been fructified for several decades. In the aftermath of the 1999 Kargil conflict, the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) recommended structural reforms in MoD. The Group of Ministers (GoM) analysed the structural and administrative reforms. The Chapter IV of the GoM report titled "Management of Defence" pointed to the need for "far-reaching changes in the structures, process and procedures in defence management." In that context, the structural and administrative reforms of MoD, military affairs, security environment, and defence management have been a great debate since 2001. As India shifts to higher gears of growth and attain its maximum potential, there needs to be administrative reforms in defence as well. This paper will study India's MoD and the patterns or nature of Civil-military relations. The paper also analyses the KRC and GoM which are responding to the great debate for structural and administrative reforms of India's MoD. In particular, it will examine the recent reforms of MoD, the newly created Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and its linkages to the military and civil administration. The methodology will be adopted qualitatively to analyse the debate of reforms and the analytical method would critically examine the KRC report and the recommendation of GoM, which impacted the influence of military and civil administration in the MoD.

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Introduction

India's Ministry of Defence (MoD) is a governmental entity tasked with developing policies and supervising affairs pertaining to the nation's defence and armed forces. The prime objectives of India's MoD are safeguarding national security, modernizing armed forces and upholding the sovereignty of the nation. The Indian military has been under strict civilian command since the country gained independence in August 1947, when a cabinet-level union minister was appointed to run the MoD. The MoD of India has undergone substantial reforms since the country's independence in order to accommodate shifting security dynamics. Following an initial emphasis on developing a nascent defence infrastructure, the country witnessed the emergence of Indigenous-defence industries and research organizations in subsequent decades. The Procurement policies reforms aims to foster self-reliance and modernise the armed forces. Additionally, the MoD underwent structural modifications to improve service coordination and harmonization. In recent times, technological innovation and international cooperation have been prioritized once more as means to confront modern security challenges. The aforementioned modifications emphasize India's dedication to preserving its independence and fortifying its military capacities amidst a swiftly evolving international environment.

After the uprising of 1857, the British Parliament passed the India Act in 1858. This took away administrative power from the East India Company and gave it to the British Parliament., there were changes in the government, and at the same time, the Indian military was reorganized. During the British rule in India, the responsibility for defence rested with military personnel, with the secretary of the department being a military officer until the year 1921 (Venkateswaran, 1967). Subsequently, civilian officers were appointed as the secretary of the department and other senior posts in the secretariat appointed by the Indian Civil Service. Since India gained its independence in 1947, India has frequently been at war with its neighbours. Wars with Pakistan, especially over Jammu and Kashmir, and a conflict with China in 1962 both sprang from territorial disputes. The country of Bangladesh was founded after the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971. The Indian government's MoD oversees the Indian Armed Forces, military procurement, military Research and Development (R&D), and other national security-related matters.

The Indian MoD has traditionally been staffed almost entirely by civilian administrators- rather than active-duty military personnel. Although they lacked the necessary expertise, India's civilian and military leaders were propelled into positions of authority in 1947. K. Subrahmanyam, reviewing the book, '*Defence Organisation in India 1966* by A L Venkateswaran,' came to the conclusion that the poor performance of the senior staff responsible for planning, intelligence assessment, and higher command and control in the years leading up to the 1962 crisis could be traced back to their lack of experience as junior officers in the British Indian Army. The civilian officers in the Department of Defence and the Department of Finance (Defence) were no exception (Subrahmanyam, 1969). The military member was given the complexity of modern security threats, and civilian supremacy with limited experience presented real obstacles, especially in times of crisis. As Anit Mukherjee points out, the MoD was a mature government agency with no long-term plan (Mukherjee, 2022). Although the officer corps may feel less restrained in their domestic political activities due to India's expanding military role, it is unlikely that the military will appropriate the authority of the civil leadership because of the many checks and balances in place (Elkin & Ritzel, 1985).

India's civilian leadership and civilian control of the military persist enough though the nature and forms of civil-military relations in India could shift in the coming years. Since the current bureaucratic system has been left unimplemented for over a decade, and since the benefits of implementing a Joint Chiefs of Staff or alternative system are too significant to ignore, the Indian MoD needs to be restructured to give uniformed personnel a greater say in decision-making (Anand, 2001). According to Anit Mukherji, India's MoD prioritized establishing civilian authority over the armed forces. It has achieved this goal by gradually adopting a system of conventions, processes, and protocols in its dealings with the military. However, there is little guarantee that this endeavour will succeed without extensive changes to civilian and military organization (Mukherjee, 2022). A new position was created to improve efficiency, coordination, and coherence in the Armed Forces while cutting down on duplication-

Moreover, defence reforms have been called for since 2000, but no concrete changes have been made. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) proposed the MoD reorganization after the fighting in Kargil in 1999. The experts of the Group of Ministers (GoM) evaluated the new policies and procedures. The need for "far-reaching changes in the structures, process, and procedures in defence management" was highlighted in the GoM report's Chapter IV, "Management of Defence" (Group of Minister on National Security, 2001). Since 2001, there has been about how to best

reorganize the MoD, the armed forces, the security apparatus, and the management of defence.

This paper aims to address some inquiries as initially, it is important to comprehend the historical development of India's MoD and the dynamics of civil-military interactions since the country's Independence. This encompasses examining the structural framework and reforms implemented since the nation's independence, as well as an analysis of the consequences arising from civil-military relations. The paper also discussed, the aspects pertaining to the KRC, GoM and other committees that contribute to the ongoing discourse surrounding structural and administrative reforms of the MoD in India. The paper also analyzed the recent reforms in India's MoD, specifically focusing on the establishment of the newly constituted Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and its linkages to both the military and civil government.

Defence Reforms from Independence to the Kargil Conflict

In 1938, the Department of the Army was renamed the Department of Defence to reflect its expanded purview to include the Navy and Air Force. An act creating the Indian Air Force (IAF) was approved in October 1932, and the Royal Indian Navy (RIN) was established shortly thereafter. The civilian official of Indian descent was given the position of Under-Secretary in the Defence Department in the year 1938 (Venkataraman, 2011). The structure of the Indian Armed Forces had to be revised after August 15, 1947, when India gained its independence, and it was revealed that the department lacked the expertise necessary to deal with the challenges of defence administration, especially in light of the post-partition environment. The Department of Defence is now the MoD, and its highest Cabinet Minister is responsible to the Prime Minister and Parliament (*ibid.*). However, After India's independence, different bodies were established to formalize civilian control over the military. The establishment of distinct political and military committees and the emphasis on the Ministry of Defence indicated a close relationship between India's political leadership and the Ministry. India's political leadership made purposeful reforms to the military's administrative and social role (Ray, 2013).

In India, the MoD and the position of Commander in Chief were elevated from the Department of Defence after independence. The military forces of India and Pakistan have been placed under the leadership of his Excellency Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck. The Supreme Commander established the Armed Forces Rebuilding Committee (AFRC)

to aid in the division and rebuilding of the armed forces. Administrative oversight over all British soldiers serving in both dominions was exercised by the Chief of General Staff (CGS), Commander in Chief of the RIN, and Air Officer Commanding of the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF), who provided assistance to him (ibid.). The MoD Act of 1946 was enacted by the administration of Clement Attlee to establish a MoD under the leadership of a Minister of Defence at the Cabinet level. This decision was made in response to the challenges created by the establishment of three separate organizations which had been founded in 1936 but were subsequently abolished in April 1940, since it hindered effective coordination.

India's military became independent of the central government after independence. The service Head Quarter (HQ), which acts as Operational Command and other planning staff (for long-term military strategy creation), employs forces and plans resources. Even though these are government functions that cannot be executed without the service HQ being part of the government, a seemingly innocent government note named the armed forces HQ an "attached office" of the defence ministry on May 27, 1952. The central Secretariat states that ministries formulate policy and its "attached offices" implement it (ibid). General K.M. Cariappa and H.M. Patel, had a contentious relationship because of this (Mukherjee, 2022). Thus, Cariappa, India's first Field Marshal, led the army from 1949 to 1953, and Thimayya maintained the situation from 1957 to 1961 as before the 1962 India-China war. Krishna Menon, as defence minister from 1957 to 1962, is the most contentious in Indian history, notably given his conflict with Chief of Army Staff General Thimayya, a professional military officer. The debate and differences were confined to the government's higher echelons and didn't change the basic nature of civil-military relations in India. The 1962 Sino-Indian Conflict awakened the government to defence, and in 1964, real attempts were undertaken to formalize a defensive strategy (Kanwal, 2018). During that time, India's Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, worked hard to make India's economy more industrialized, and political leaders wanted to raise the standard of living that started a mixed-economy plan as soon as possible. However, the defence issues didn't get much attention, and civilians had tight control over how much money was spent on defence. Very strict controls were put on defence spending by the civilian government and defence spending averaged no more than two per cent of the Gross National Product (GNP) (Ray, 2013).

The Department of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) established planning Units in 1958 to increase military autonomy by developing new defensive technologies and systems. The Department of Defence Production (DDP) was founded in November 1962 to build defence weapons, systems, platforms, and industrial equipment. In the MoD civilian officials couldn't resolve service disputes. They could only link service needs without investigating. Services Headquarters established perspective planning directorates in the late 1970s. To integrate and unify defence planning, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) established the Directorate General of Defence Planning Staff (DG DPS) in 1986.

In January 1966, India's First Administrative Reform Commission (ARC) was established under the leadership of Morarji Desai, which made a number of suggestions to improve the efficiency and organization of the MoD. The commission did not have jurisdiction over defence administration, but in November 1966, it appointed a study team led by Ali Yavar Jung and including members Mrs. Sharda Mukharjee, S R Rane, Gen. Srinagesh, and Dr. Nagendra Singh to investigate various facets of defence management (Venkataraman, 2011). The first ARC in 1969 had listed nine Standing Committees of the Cabinet of which the DCC was also one while it was practically rendered defunct almost a decade prior to this (ibid.). In 1980s, the Indian civil-military relations began to change with the Rajiv Gandhi government pushing for military modernization due to because of Pakistan's rearmament and nuclear program (Cohen & Dasgupta, 2013). Over the past two decades since the May 1998 tests, Indian civilian leadership has moved rapidly to put in place a civilian-led command and control structure for the nuclear arsenal (Mitra, 2023). India declared nuclear power after testing in Rajasthan's Thar Desert's Pokhran Test Range on May 11 and 13, 1998. These tests were dubbed 'Operation Shakti' which regional security concerns and external pressures prompted India's nuclear testing.

Defence Reforms After the Kargil Conflict

In the prior 1999, Pakistani soldiers and armed militants entered Indian-administered Kargil. They set up strongholds along the de facto boundary between Indian and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, known as the Line of Control (LoC). Indian and Pakistani forces fought the 1999 Kargil War. The KRC and GoM Committee were created in reaction to public outcry over the conflict, which surprised Indian soldiers. The panels' months-long discussions likely addressed several subjects. As shown

below, civilian and military bureaucracy blocked change while acknowledging the difficulties. Shortly after the conflict, the committee was set up to look into what happened to let Pakistani troops and militants into Indian territory and to find ways that India's defence and intelligence systems could be improved. Following the Kargil Conflict, the Indian government established a number of committees to assess the nation's national security. Detailed below are the committees.

Kargil Review Committee (KRC)

The Kargil review group looked closely at how the MoD and the military worked together. The report talked about how having a separate defence ministry is bad and said that India might be the only big democracy where the Armed Forces Headquarters are not part of the top level of government (Kargil Review Committee Report, 2000). The report then called for "structural reforms" that would help the MoD and the services work together more closely and in a more positive way. The KRC was established in May 1999 after the war ended. The committee was charged with examining the conflict's origins. Strategic affairs analyst and defence expert K. Subrahmanyam led the committee. Journalist B.G. Verghese and diplomat Satish Chandra were also members. The KRC investigated the intelligence failure that led to the Pakistani invasion. The committee also evaluated India's defence and security during the conflict.

The KRC gave the government its report in February 2000. The report highlighted the war's causes, intelligence failures, and defence and security recommendations for India. Post-war India's defence and security strategies were shaped by the KRC Report. Indian defence reforms and modernization followed the report's recommendations. India implemented significant defence and intelligence changes based on the KRC's recommendations. As Vinod Anand pointed out in his piece, the KRC reportedly noted that India is the only major democracy in which the military forces HQ is located outside of the highest government structure. He argues that many of the KRC and GoM's recommendations have been implemented, but several critical ones that would have greatly improved armed forces' jointness and integration have not. Even bureaucrats admit that the MoD's IDS and Services integration is superficial (Anand, 2009).

Group of Ministers (GoM)

The Cabinet Committee on Security has established a GoM with the purpose of reviewing the outcomes of the KRC and providing recommendations for their implementation. L.K. Advani assumed leadership of the GoM, comprising Defence Minister George Fernandes, Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh, Minister of Finance Yashwant Sinha, and Brijesh Mishra (National Security Advisor). Task forces comprised of members of the Group of Experts on Intelligence Reform, Internal Security, Border Management, and Military Management examined national security management (Kanwal, 2018). Despite this, the GoM used the "erroneous perception that the Armed Forces Headquarters do not participate in policy formulation..." to justify not proposing an integrated military ministry. To remove this myth, the Service Headquarters may become the Ministry of Defense's "Integrated Headquarters" (GoM Report on National Security, 2001).

The GoM held 27 meetings in ten months to fulfil a much broader mandate than the KRC with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) serving it and the National Security Advisor as a special invitee. "The GoM formed four task forces to study the four major dimensions of national security: Intelligence Apparatus headed by G C Saxena (former Chief of R&AW); Internal Security headed by N N Vohra (former Home Secretary, Defence Secretary, and Principal Secretary to the PM); Border Management headed by Dr Madhav Godbole (former Home Secretary); and Defence Management headed by Shri Arun Singh (former Minister of Defence)" (ibid.). According to the GoM report, the current system governing defence acquisitions is plagued by issues like poor integration of planning and weak ties between budgets and plans as well as a lengthy administrative, technical, and financial evaluation process and an unprepared MoD (MoD) procurement team (Venkataraman, 2011).

Naresh Chandra Committee

After the Kargil war, the government established the Naresh Chandra Committee to review defence reforms. This committee also made two important Defence ministry recommendations despite its broad mandate. First, they suggested a civil service defence corp. This was to solve expertise issues. Additionally, it was suggested that officers be cross-posted between service headquarters and the MoD. This facilitated collaboration between the two bureaucratic entities. Both pieces of legislation were

disregarded, and the administration appeared disinterested in implementing defence changes (Joshi, 2014).

Naresh Chandra, a former Cabinet Secretary, and US Ambassador, was in charge of the group of 13 people. It will take the group six months to finish its report. The report was sent to the government on May 23, 2012. In order to solicit feedback from the various government agencies in India, the study was disseminated around the country. At the same time, under the direction of former secretary Ravindra Gupta, the government established a second Task Force to assess the prerequisites for defence modernization and autonomy. This Committee report on Indian defence reforms underscored the need for change and the hollowness of national security decision-making.

Recent Reforms in India's Ministry of Defence

A notice in the gazette from the Cabinet Secretariat on December 30, 2019, changes the government of India (Allocation of Business) 353 amendment rules 2019. With the right given by clause (3) of article 77 of the constitution, the president can change the 1961 rules for allocating business by the government of India. In order to follow the rules, set by the Indian government in 1961, the following sub-heading should be added to the First Schedule plan under the Ministry of Defence (Cabinet Secretariat, 2019). These department currents are —

- i. “Department of Defence (Raksha Vibhag)
- ii. Department of Military Affairs (Sainya Karya Vibhag)
- iii. Department of Defence Production (Raksha Utpadan Vibhag)
- iv. Department of Defence Research and Development (Raksha Anusandhan our Vikas Vibhag)
- v. Department of Ex-Servicemen Welfare (Poorva Senani Kalyan Vibhag)”

However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi unexpectedly announced the creation of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) in his Independence Day address in August 2019. Thus, India's defence machinery's "twin transformation" began, meeting military reform proponents' longstanding request. The relationship between the CDS and the Army, Air Force, and Navy Service Chiefs is changing. The administration is considering a major military reform to create joint theatre commands and the military is the main

focus here. The second change involves the MoD, CDS, and services relationship. The MoD's DMA has made this possible, and it may change the civilian-military relationship (Mukherjee, 2022). The Defence Ministry and the military have launched a number of changes to increase cooperation and coordination between the branches. When the MoD doesn't release information, interested parties might look to the reports of the relevant parliamentary committees. Unfortunately, these tend to concentrate, and rightfully so, on monetary and budgetary concerns, while covering other policy issues only in passing (Mitra, 2023). The establishment of the CDS and the DMA under MoD, both of which were significant reforms implemented by the Indian Government, brought about particular transformations in the nature of civil-military relations. The other reforms were also initiated by the government to counter the emerging threats. These reforms are as follows —

Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)

In June 1982, the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. K. V. Krishna Rao, proposed to appoint a CDS to improve inter-service interactions and make quick decision-making in the crisis. However, the former defence minister R. Venkataraman was not happy with this idea and said the present system functioned well (Elkin & Ritezel, 1984). The recommendation of the GoM in 2001, which occurred following the Kargil battle, resulted in the appointment of CDS. This recommendation was made by the Task Force on Management of Defence, headed by Mr. Arun Singh. It was proposed that CDS be appointed because the COSC had supposedly fallen short of expectations. Some have raised concerns about the length of time it has taken to name a CDS, but others have argued that the COSC is not a failing body. Both COSC and CDS perspectives and debates are included. With the CDS's eventual arrival seemingly unavoidable, it will be more difficult than ever to define his function within the broader context of Jointness, unified commands, and integrated decision-making. The Union Cabinet formally selected General Bipin Rawat as CDS on December 24, 2019. DMA improves civil-military ties, and the CDS role was created to cut down on inefficiency and improve coordination between the military's many branches (Economic Times, 2021).

The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) will hold a position of primacy while also ensuring equality among other stakeholders. The CDS will engage in consultation and seek input from the other services, although the ultimate decision-making authority will reside solely with the CDS. Additionally, he will assume the role of the principal military advisor to the

defence minister (Pant & Bommakanti, 2020). Admiral Arun Prakash, a former chief of the Indian Navy, concurs with the notion that the establishment of the DMA and the subsequent appointment of a CDS represent the most noteworthy advancement in the realm of national security since India's independence (Prakash, 2020). Moreover, the political decision to designate a CDS was crucial to reform. However, the DMA leadership must be military members who provide single-point advice to the government. The Vice CDS as Secretary would have cut the CDS out of the official decision loop unless the rules of business were cleverly re-engineered to include a category other than the Minister and the Secretary (Mitra, 2023).

On August 15, 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly announced the reforms of the current national defence system by establishing a Chief of Defence Staff. This position would be responsible for coordinating activities between the armed forces under the Ministry of Defence. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's address to the nation on 15 August 2019 said:

“Our country has been debating for a long about reforms in Armed Forces and many commissions and their reports underline the same. To further sharpen coordination between the forces, India will have Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), CDS which will make the forces even more effective” (Prime Minister Office, 2019).

The Indian government established the office of the CDS, on 30 December 2019, of which General Bipin Rawat was appointed as the first CDS of India. It is important to note that the CDS will play important roles as principal military advisor to the defence minister on tri-service issues. The CDS will hold a position of primacy among the three service chiefs, who are all four- star officers. However, the service chiefs will maintain operational command over their respective forces and the CDS will be appointed to lead the Ministry of Defence's newly formed Department of Military Affairs (DMA).

Department of Military Affairs (DMA)

The DMA was created as part of the MoD as a new organizational structure; its military staff deals with military-related issues, while its civilian staff deals with broader policy concerns. In the past, the ministry's service wings were led by civilian officials, giving them a voice in military

matters. This scenario exhibits the concept of separate realms and the restriction of civilian involvement in military operations from an administrative perspective. The individual designated as the CDS assumed the role of Secretary of the DMA at its inception under the purview of the MoD. The DMA will employ both civilian and military personnel. DMA was established on 01 January 2020 and received about 170 civil service positions in order to begin operations immediately. The Additional Secretary, Joint Secretary, and any other military personnel assigned to the position will take over immediately.

The Allocation of Business Rules of the Second Schedule by the cabinet Secretariat to designate the newly formed Department of Military Affairs under MoD, which is headed by the leadership of the CDS, with its primary responsibility (Cabinet Secretariat, 2019). These are delineated as follows —

- i. “The Armed Forces of the Union, namely, Army, Navy and Air Force.
- ii. The Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence comprises the Army Headquarters, Naval Headquarters, Air Headquarters and Defence Staff Headquarters.
- iii. The Territorial Army.
- iv. Works relating to the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
- v. Procurement exclusive to the Services except for capital acquisitions, as per prevalent rules and procedures.
- vi. Promoting jointness in procurement, training and staffing for the Services through joint planning and integration of their requirements.
- vii. Facilitation of restructuring of Military Commands for optimal utilization of resources by bringing about jointness in operations, including through the establishment of joint/ theatre commands.
- viii. Promoting the use of indigenous equipment by the Services.”

However, the DMA is specifically charged with “Jointness and promoting Indigenous equipment by the services” (Press Information Bureau, 2020). Given the importance placed on developing domestic resources, it is essential to examine defence procurement as a potential area for further changes. The Indian government has taken a lot of heat for the way it has handled the lengthy procurement process, which has slowed down the country's armed forces. The main claim is that the government is unfit to deal with military issues and is too fearful to accelerate the purchase

of weapons. This arrangement will last beyond the DMA, because the DOD still has control over procurements.

Other Reforms

The key reforms that were undertaken by the MoD in the year 2020 were emphasized in an e-booklet that was published on June 7, 2021, in New Delhi. The booklet was released by the Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh (Press Information Bureau, 2021). This report provides an executive summary of the MoD work to strengthen and modernize the armed forces in 2020 through policy shifts, new ideas, and technological advancements. The '*Aatma Nirbhar Bharat*' reforms instituted by Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi placed an emphasis on digital transformation, strengthening border infrastructure, increasing women's participation in the Armed Forces, transforming R&D to boost innovation, expanding the National Civilian Corps to remote locations, and aiding the civil administration (Press Information Bureau, 2021). It was announced in December 2019 that the MoD in India would be getting its own DMA. A CDS will now lead this department in its turn. The CDS also has an expansive mandate to restructure the military. Therefore, India is attempting a 'dual makeover' of its MoD and its armed forces at the same time (Mukherjee, 2022).

Several departments within the MoD have recently made the transition to digital operations. The Armed Forces Tribunal held its first digital hearing in August of 2020, and in May of the same year, the Directorate General of Quality Assurance (DGQA) introduced an online Pre-Delivery inspection to cope with security issues. The Department of Defence (Defence Estates), the Department of Canteen Stores (Cantonment), the MoD Pension Office, and the National Cadet Corps (NCC) all went online to better serve their customers (Press Information Bureau, 2021).

Cohesion between Military and Civil Administration

After long debates and discussions through various committees and commissions, the government redesigned the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) as part of a major defence policy change announced on April 18, 2018, and the National Security Adviser (NSA) will chair this committee. Designed as a permanent body, this new institutional mechanism aims to "facilitate a comprehensive and integrated planning for defence matters" as an essential component of defence preparedness that was noticeably absent from the mechanism established in the early 2000s following the Kargil

conflict (Behera, 2018). Possibly the biggest defence change in decades, the new measure is expected to profoundly impact defence preparation and defence planning. The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was long considered to be the ultimate arbitrator of all requirements of the armed forces, including the planning aspects, and the establishment of the DPC is expected to close a significant gap in the current defence planning mechanism.

Moreover, the government of India established a new Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in the Ministry of Defence; the CDS will be able to work with the civilian bureaucracy. As head of the DMA, the CDS will also have a voice in the top decision-making groups, such as the National Security Council, the Defence Planning Committee, and the Cabinet Committee on Security. The Chief of defence Staff & Department of Military Affairs was established with the revolutionary purpose of enabling the defence services to conceptualize, express, plan, and implement changes in the national security system. India has delivered civil-military fusion at a less-than-ideal level, notwithstanding these adjustments.

In a panel discussion on "Civil-Military Fusion in India" on June 14, 2022, the Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA) examined how the civilian sector of the Indian start-up industry has grown more than the military sector. The military sector companies run the danger of dying off unless they accelerate quickly. Major nations like the US, Israel, and China have established a revolving door environment between the civil and military domains, which attracts bright students, professionals, technocrats, and entrepreneurs by leveraging the interaction between the two domains to build a strong defence startup ecosystem (IDSA, 2022).

The defence reforms under the Modi government have rapidly restructured India's national defence. Military leaders are directly involved in the national security decision-making process following the appointment of the CDS and the establishment of the DMA. However, the nature of India's civil-military relations remains one of civilian control over the military. While the CDS serves as a military member and acts as a single-point military advisor to the MoD, participating in various committees and councils, The structural and administrative reforms in India's MoD have certain gains towards effective to counter emerging threats. The reforms from its independence to 1999 have had the gradual transformation of MoD, which reforms in structure with the side-line of the military in the ministry. From India's independence to 2019 KRC and GoM established to review the existing security posture and debate and discuss reforms the border

issue, the establishment of CDS, review of Intelligence and defence management. The Indian government has implemented reforms in MoD since 2019, including the creation of the DMA and the appointment of the CDS within its purview. These advancements have given the CDS administrative duties for force organization, procurement policies, and resource allocation advice. In strategic decision-making, military leaders have tremendous administrative power that helps them wield authority. The current revisions involve merging the HQ and MoD. Additionally, the MoD has pursued changes to boost indigenous capabilities, digitization, and women's representation in organizational structures and administration. Last but not ~~the~~ least, India's military is under civilian control after reorganize the MoD. It is important to note that the CDS is a military member and single-point military advisor to the MoD, participating in numerous committees and councils, while the Secretary of Defence is a civilian bureaucrat and politician with sole power over national defence.

The Secretary of Defence, as a civilian bureaucrat and political, holds sole authority over the country's national defence.

Conclusion

The structural and administrative reforms in India's MoD have certain gains to counter emerging threats. The reforms after India's independence to 1999 has been to gradually transform the MoD structure in line with the military and the ministry. The KRC and GoM established review committees for the existing security posture to debate and discuss the reforms along with the border issue, establishment of CDS, review of Intelligence and defence management. The Indian government has implemented reforms in MoD since 2019, including the creation of the DMA and the appointment of the CDS within its purview. These advancements have given the CDS administrative duties for force organisation, procurement policies, and resource allocation advice. In strategic decision-making, military leaders have tremendous administrative power that helps them to wield authority. The current revisions involve merging the HQ and MoD. Additionally, the MoD has pursued changes to boost indigenous capabilities, digitization, and women's representation in organisational structures and administration. Last but not the least, India's military is under civilian control after reorganise the MoD. It is important to note, that the CDS is a military member and single-point military advisor to the MoD, participating in numerous committees and councils, while the Secretary of Defence is a civilian bureaucrat and politician with sole power over national defence.

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