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Preface from Chief Editor

India's Foreign Policy @ 70 : A Turn Around?

If we recall the "tryst with destiny" speech of the first Prime Minister of this country, *sans* the emotional overtone, what was expected to emerge was a nation that counted as a significant stakeholder in the relations of nations—of course through trials and errors, though with a keen eye to keep the error counts as low as possible. Implied, therefore, was the imperative to attain the kind of skill and prowess at making sure shots to knock down the roadblocks wherever and whenever they arose. It needed a unique mix of imagination and innovation, sagacity and shrewdness, principled behaviour and the will power to face up to adversarial circumstances. A complete and unbroken grip over the reality around was, of course, no body's expectation since that reality itself continues to be a shifting one, subject to complex interplay of forces as much within as they originate without. Still, given the difficult terrain, one would look for footprints that carried signs of a determined approach. For long seventy years India was hard put not to deflect from what it hoped to achieve. And yet everything hinged on what successive governments thought in their wisdom to be achievable. The three vital parameters that stood out in defining what was achievable were capability assessment, capacity building and confidence to mould the external milieu. The means to be employed were also required to have the necessary degree of variety and flexibility that was not unduly held back by ideological fixations and that would also steer clear of any self-centred and sinister opportunism even as other actors might indulge in that kind of vice. Keeping these things in view, the seven decades of India's management of foreign relations exhibit a stride that was mostly positive and achievement oriented though the confidence level of policy makers must have had its ups and downs. A surge forward was noticed now and again but the moments of sluggishness were not infrequent either.

What was projected as "achievable" in the view of successive administrations comprised no immeasurable range of wish lists but those concrete goals of perceived national interests most of which, though, were not within easy reach because the external milieu was full of obstructions and the internal political community was so often unsure of activating even the essentials. Consequently, India's foreign policy making has had an uneven and chequered trajectory. With passage of time the road map became clearer and possibilities arose of creating new headways where there was none, of widening the passage where access was constricted, of shortening the route where unnecessary detours had to be avoided. These metaphors are but shorthand expressions of a whole series of varied and arduous initiatives. Thus it was felt incumbent upon the newly independent nation to steer clear of a binary construction of world politics, a construction in which emerging nations need not have any interest except in a shallow view of the benefits of conformity.

The net response was critically predicated upon a long and dynamic view of the global scenario—it got the nomenclature of non-alignment, its import a bit hazy at the first sight but progressively self clarifying as it worked on the prevailing state of affairs.With hindsight but no exaggeration, nonalignment does appear to have contributed a lot there. The magnitude of

that contribution cannot be ascribed to the mere enunciation of a doctrine, though conceptually that was strikingly innovative in the prevailing credo (or craze?) for old style power struggle, but more eminently to the art of strategising that doctrine. And the outcome was amazing. Even before nonalignment was officially pronounced as the international posture of an emerging combination of third world nations (by the famous trio Nehru-Nasser-Tito) in the late sixties, the major contending blocks did apprehend the stymied prospects of a frontal conflagration one- on-the-other. Hence they crafted a change in their line, which was to try competitively to assuage, instead of intimidate, an expanding combination of non-obliging nations. Not that intimidation and collusion were to cease completely in a still alive neo-imperialist proclivity but it was increasingly clear to their operatives that those tactics might prove counter-productive. This very sense was continuously driven home to the dominant powers by the collective front of the third world nations, and the former had to see reason.

To India goes the credit of having given an expanded applicability to a policy doctrine that was at once India's and at the same time easily shareable by a host of other similarly placed nations. Did it mean creating a "third block" in the face of the existing two? Although one can quote official disclaimers, the fact remains that this combination, just short of an alliance for the sake of flexibility, did represent a counter-balancing force, numerically overwhelming and not to be dismissed as an insignificant one. Once a pooling began to materialize of whatever resources they had, the rise of a non-western, non-imperialistic, and positively revisionist third force could not be lost sight of. Hence arose such initiatives as the Group of 77 and hence too there grew successive waves of movement for NIEO, North-South dialogue, concessional technology transfer, partly non-discriminatory trade regime, triumph of anti-racialism and, not the least, the imperatives of arms control initiatives. A large part of what was perceived as "achievable" thus showed signs of materializing.

While the defining moments of nonalignment as a doctrine and as an activist stance were thus getting historically tested, India's national leadership had also to cope with the turbulence of regional politics punctuated by three organised aggressions from two of its closest neighbours with the shadow of a nuclear threat looming large. All that acted as a brake on India's primary agenda of "achievables." The sheer need of survival against this insecurity build-up called for a significant alteration of the South Asian balance of power. Nothing short of a bold yet sagacious leadership could venture this, and that was provided by India's first lady Prime Minister. A successful -intervention did away with one flank of this insecurity and consequently raised the status of India as a regional power to reckon with. , the mismatch between a helpful Soviet Union and a myopic US pondering over an "estranged democracies" syndrome put some strain on India's adherence to a text book construction of nonalignment. Evidently, not all nations adhering to non-alignment were equally enthusiastic about cultivating the Soviets. Internally also the political class was exhibiting signs of a left-right discord. Expediency therefore was to outdo loyalty. Soon enough the US proxy war in Afghanistan to thwart Soviet armed intrusion in support of a short-lived socialist uprising there made India see the bottom line of an avowedly equidistant policy. Considerations of expediency held India back from openly vindicating Soviet action, thus not doing a return favour to Moscow's immense help during the 1962 Chinese attack and the Bangladesh war of 1971.Temporarily, it looked as though the Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty was getting reduced to a one-sided bargain. Still New Delhi hoped for an "all weather friendship" from Moscow, which actually was not denied as long as the cold war continued to define US-USSR relationship. The China factor after Beijing's new found relationship with Washington also acted in India's favour.

By and large,therefore, the primary set of policy "achievables" for India was nearly accomplished, and it was a major component indeed. It amounted to inducing a structural change in the post war world order – so as to usher in some sort of a level playing field between the west and the rest. The benign partnership of the Soviet Union counted a lot but New Delhi was

also maturing in handling external affairs more and more independently. The next phase in India's foreign policy was so designed as to serve three distinct and long range objectives, namely, (a) to keep alive an anti-imperialist, anti-West fervour insofar as that would ensure India remaining centre stage in the 'global south', (b) to enhance domestic capability in terms of economic counter-dependency and fast track defence preparedness to meet any security contingency and (c) to vigorously pursue a neighbourhood diplomacy that promised necessary mileage in a rapidly changing global economic scenario. The driving motivation was that of extracting maximum autonomy from the international system, and that entailed a calculated synchronisation of domestic economic reconstruction and the operational aspects of foreign policy. A proper understanding of this synchronisation calls for a fine tuned political economy approach. The art of making both ends, the economic and the political meet in the external context, meant energising diplomatic exertion for   optimising domestic development endeavour. Although the State was still in full grip of the operational mode of a command-control national economy, there still remained the not too easy task of taking a growing private sector into confidence and neutralising some of its ingrained distrust of Statist oversight. Still they were induced to diversify their operations and include the highly receptive socialist block. Additionally, there was conscious experiment with "inter-developing economics" i.e. shared prosperity with other developing countries in varying stages of economic growth. All this was much more comprehensive and intricate than a mere management of foreign aid and investment from diverse sources, as most published works on India's economic diplomacy would have us believe.*

A second major component of the "achievables" was thus taken care of, with a reasonable degree of success. To a considerable extent, India's foreign policy proved its salience and enhanced its effectiveness too. But then the world was not at rest and new challenges arose that further complicated the external milieu. The hegemonic west had received a good deal of shock treatment from the non-western nations,—the oil shock from the Arab world, the discomfiture in Vietnam, retreat from neo-colonial strongholds in the Congo or Namibia, rise of militant movements in Latin America, just to name a few. The world capitalist system suffered serious setback and was badly in need of recovery. Not everything was going quite well with the neo-classically structured arrangement of Global capitalism. Some internal damage control also became imperative in view of strong multi-polarities, if not dissonance, growing within the core group of OECD. On the other hand, the South had put up a few localised zones of prosperity in the form "tiger economies" or petro-dollar affluent Gulf countries, though some parts of the third world were not in good shape with external debt trap nearly crippling them. Greater reliance on export-led growth and spread of intra-south investment could have allowed the middle income countries (India had been inching into this category). But things were not as easy. So far as India was concerned, the leadership, though avowedly anti-hegemonic, did not limit itself to mere anti-imperialist rhetoric, as is often assumed. Consistent with the trappings of a formal democracy, domestic economic advancement had to be synchronised with a fairly autonomous positioning on vital issues of global and regional politics. This indigenous model of foreign policy sought to reconcile the "agent-structure" tensions to some extent but the whole thing stood upon a shifting relationship between an aspirant nation and the irreducible dominance of the richer nations. By the last third of the previous century it was becoming increasingly apparent that the hegemonic powers were contemplating a completely different mode of conducting international relations, in a post-cold war, post-soviet context where the Market got ascendancy over the State.

There we come at a new juncture. By then the West had hit upon its "Washington Consensus" and started reintegrating the world economy, sending the globalization wave far and wide. Amidst a clamour of liberalism's final triumph (fantasyzing 'the end of history'!), all nations on the periphery were required to follow suit. To cope with this intriguing development India needed a strong and decisive policy stance which, under the circumstances, was not

forthcoming. At work were forces of internal political dissensions coupled with the "here and now" urge for liberalisation voiced by the corporate sector, just emerged from the long protective care of a "half socialist-half capitalist" State. Inevitably, there followed a spell of near economic servitude, with acceptance of contingency aid under Fund-Bank dispensation that necessarily carried a whole lot of strings attached. The statist Indian economy was now taking a compulsive U-turn by default, while the rest of the world was either swimming at ease or just struggling to stay afloat with the tide of globalization. It made the country's foreign policy face an external setting considerably different from the post second world war configuration.

The time appeared to have arrived for a sea change in India's erstwhile assessment of the world around. It was said to have become a "flat world" though in reality it was the same planet, perhaps more undulated than was visible. To make foreign policy roadworthy in this terrain it has to be redesigned and fitted with new air cushion. Its philosophy, its precedents, its postures, its priorities and its mode of operation—in short, the entire perspective of the decision making authorities had to undergo far reaching change overnight. The nation was now called upon to stretch all its diplomatic resources to hold its ground while weathering the tempest of a market-driven global order. It is on record how at the Uruguay Round the Indian delegation had to be extremely circumspect of the western game plan and with what great alacrity had to convince the developing south across the board of the urgency to sail or sink together. The efforts proved effective. Much of the emerging regime of liberalised trade in merchandise, services and investment could be bent to the collective pressure orchestrated by India and its allies. A third unforeseen "achievable" got enlisted in the country's advancing external relations.

The resultant scenario was one of India liberalising at home and traversing a hitherto uncharted policy terrain in a globalising world economy—a scenario that is still unfolding.**From what has happened so far on the ground a few significant indicators can be identified. First, notwithstanding hair splitting debates in intellectual circles the political class was not averse to get reconciled with globalization as a compelling phenomenon, though its constituents had different approaches to handle its consequences. Initiated by one national party the liberalising tendency smoothly changed hands and in subsequent rounds the incumbent national party would only give necessary finesse to the new policy approach. Second, in this relay race between the two major formations the commonality that got registered was a clear projection of India's domestic needs many of which were stoutly defended whenever found at odds with the stipulations of the dominant west. Third, full advantage was taken of the basic premise of the WTO charter that it would work in a rule bound manner as the nodal regulatory body for multilateral trade and that no vital decision could be adopted without some prior working consensus among the member nations. The Indian delegation ,therefore, spared no pains to expose the untenability of any proposal that was flawed and or inequitable and pressure the developed west to see reason. Fourth, as a follow up, India's economic diplomacy would instantly engage similarly placed nations for synchronisation of all related action plans— a strategy that proved to be so effective as to make the syndicate of the developed west finally concede their justified demands or else face a logjam. Fifth, the subsequent dialogue in the plenary forum entailed a battle of wits and words, unlike the charged exchanges common to the major organs of the UN. And India with its seasoned team of envoys so often figured as a regular provider of necessary technical guidance to fellow delegates from the South. Indian legal expertise is also of great utility to the latter. For, the emergent system of multilateral trade has umpteen ramifications in terms of protocols and regulations that naturally gives rise to litigations, and their settlement has to be done under a given disputes settlement mechanism.

In this connection reference needs to be made to a tricky issue that arises where the pressing interests of India as a fast growing nation stand far ahead of others' and where some deviation

from the convergence-based collectivised economic diplomacy had to be conceded. While the common interests and common threat perceptions of the developing nations are usually being upheld by India in unison with the rest, their respective growth differentials could not entirely be overlooked. Hence in certain critical issue areas, like trade in processed goods and services or long term investment guarantees or, in the context of global warming, a differential treatment for the sake of industrial progress this general bonding with the less developed countries has yielded place to a positioning that was undeniably in closer alignment with that of the developed nations. Moreover as India has emerged as an important supplier of information technology, energy infrastructure as well as sophisticated defence materials to many a developing nation, the business outlook of the export community at home would weigh heavily on the policy posturing of India. That may create, as it occasionally does now a days, a little hiatus vis-a-vis its less advanced collaborators. It is imperative for the policy establishment to ensure that this does not lead to an unhappy situation where a trust deficit arises and which may encourage a realignment on the latters' part.

The foregoing analysis, mostly based on a political economy approach, must also be matched with a corresponding geo-strategic criticality before we can make any reasonable projection as to where we stand today and what possibly is held in store for us in the foreseeable future. It is here that the answer to the question in the subtitle of this piece lies—a turn around and if so in what direction? To put in a nutshell India's foreign policy experiments for the last seven decades bore fruits wherever the political economy push was buttressed by a resolute national leadership. The former was to provide concrete signs of India surging ahead and the latter a concrete proof that the executive head has the unassailable credential to speak for the nation. This has not happened all the time in the country's political history. But whenever congeries of circumstances produced these two conditions they augured well for enduring accretions to policy success. Instances of such net addition are substantial. A quick retrospect should begin with the dent India made in the obtrusive bipolarity of the post war period followed by periodic re-evaluation of India tending to positivity by Washington, relatively easy acceptance in continental Europe, considerable image recovery post Bangladesh war, robust resilience in the teeth of sanctions imposed by a formidable West and China combination post Pokhran II, a similar unbending stance on CTBT, launching of a long drive together in vital strategic matters culminating in the Indo-US Nuclear Cooperation Agreement and the solid international support for the NSG membership initiative, not conceding any undue relaxation of the N-liability law passed by the Parliament despite US entreaties, roping in China in several projects of common interest (especially emission regime and piracy control} despite Beijing's stiffness in many other areas, and a consistently high appreciation of its peace credentials in the UN.

Coming closer to very recent times, one can go on citing more convincing instances of India rising as a power to reckon with—such as, unprecedented modernization of its defence arsenal, its robust economic health in the face of the global melt down, its innovative drive towards "Act East", "Make in India" or digitized transparency in economic transactions at home, capital account convertibility, SEZ and other incentives to make India investors' destination. Along with these, the 2014 incumbent change in New Delhi could v, for the first time since independence, venture several activist thrusts in regional and extra-regional context—such as a firm positioning on such matters as affirming India's right to send its navy right into the high waves of the South China Sea, nothing less than a total rebuff on Beijing's unreasonable claims on Arunachal Pradesh, an unperturbed go-ahead in reinforcing strategic tie-up with Israel, a sure restitution of long lost relations with Sri Lanka and Myanmar much to the dismay of their erstwhile mentor from the north, a visible upgrading of the previous soft power approach to a positive military assistance commitment to help Afghanistan stabilize its internal security and last but not the least a successful surgical strike to tell that government

of a neighbouring nation in clearest terms that its most reprehensible conduct of deliberate export of terror, unchecked all these decades, is no longer going to go unpunished. To have been able to accomplish so much and many more that could not be enumerated here may be ascribed partly to congeries of circumstances but mainly to the emergence of a resolute national leadership that does not play politics with matters of vital national interest. Expectedly, segments of the domestic political class and their intellectual cohorts may like to produce a different narrative to suit their unchangeable propensities but then it is for the wide world at large to see if India has at long last made it to turn around.

Radharaman Chakrabarti
Chief Editor
JAIR Journal of IR and All India President, JAIR.

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Sino-Indian Economic and Trade Relations: An Exploration Through International Relations (IR) Theory

Avipsu Halder

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calcutta, Kolkata.

ABSTRACT

Political realism has been the dominant trend in the history of Sino-Indian relations. The war of 1962 and Chinese inclination towards Pakistan substantiates this point. Core geopolitical issues have dominated the interaction between them. Against this backdrop, the proposed paper seeks to argue that geo-economics have overtaken geopolitics in envisioning the future trend of Sino-Indian relation. The paper refers to the phenomenon of globalization to elaborate the rationale for this argument. Globalization has stressed the need of cooperation in the economic domain. Hence, economic interdependence has become unavoidable. It becomes evident from the increasing partnership of the multinational corporations of India and China. The paper concludes by arguing that mutual gains of both countries can be assured by adopting the path of liberal institutionalism and strengthening bilateral economic ties.

Keywords: Realism, Geo-politics, Panchsheel, Mixed-economy, Socialism, Liberalization, Interdependence, Geo-economics, Globalization, Capitalism.

Introduction

The historical narrative of the relation between India and China has been far from cordial. Rivalry, mutual suspicion and the dynamics of international politics have punctuated it. Hence, the realist school of thought (Morgenthau 1948: 4) has assumed importance in exploring the dynamics of the interaction between the countries. Besides, the contentious geopolitical issues and the ramification of the Cold War politics have been pivotal in contributing to the prevalence of the realist discourse (Waltz 1979: 95). Attempts of cooperation between these two states mostly aimed at resolving aspects pertaining to military and security. The issues of high politics have received utmost priority (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2008: 133). The perspective of realism in the context of Sino-Indian relations has to be acknowledged. However, it must be remembered that only clinging on to the realist framework may hinder the path of unravelling a subtle analysis of the bilateral ties between Indian and China. The reason for such an argument is not hard to comprehend. The realist school of thought overemphasizes the domain of security. As a consequence, the significance of the economic realm in determining international outcomes fails to receive adequate attention. The analysis of the present paper pivots around this argument. It is divided into two sub-sections. The first section not only reveals the basic premise of realism but also carves out the shortcomings of the realist line of theorization in Sino-Indian relation. In this endeavour, it intends to argue the case of the growing relevance of liberalist logic and possibilities of interdependence between the two states. In other words, the paper focuses on the logic of complex interdependence (Joseph and Nye 2001: 21). In its second section, the paper accords considerable importance to the case of economic ideology of both these countries. In this context, it traces the rationale for the liberalization of their economies. It encapsulates this changing approach of the states towards the market forces

from the theoretical parameters of international political economy (IPE). The paper seeks to establish the notion that geo-economic interests shall no longer be subordinated to its geopolitical counterparts. On the contrary, both possess the potential to complement one another.

Sino-Indian Relations through the lenses of Realism

In this section, the paper contextualizes the realist idea in examining the trends of relation between India and China. The objective is to bring out the shortcomings of this school of thought. However, before undertaking this task, it is pertinent to explore the core tenets of realism. The discourse of international relations has focused on states as the point of departure of their analysis. This holds true both in the context of the realism and its neo- realist counterpart (Waltz 1979: 97). In case of the former, states are perceived as the units for determining international outcomes. The neo-realist argument on the other hand, argues that the anarchic nature of the international system plays a key role in determining the behaviour of the states (Donnelly 2013: 37). It may appear that these variants of the realist school may only be slightly different. However, both of them possess a similar objective – to promote, preserve and secure the interest of the states. In other words, both are state centric in character. This propels us to explore a definition of states. The existing literature on the subject perceives states as a political entity comprising of a definite territorial boundary managed by a legitimate political authority. Hence, the key attributes of a state are — territory, authority, autonomy and control (Baylis, Smith and Owens 2008: 23). These elements confirms to the Westphalian view of conceptualizing states. Let us approach these pillars of states in a critical manner. It must be noted that territory has assumed the centrality in this definition. The existence of authority and its autonomy in taking decisions must be concentrated within a politically demarcated territorial boundary. Hence, idea of exclusion and inclusion are defined in terms of territoriality (Agnew 1994: 56).

The emphasis on territory has paved the way for the emergence of another concept for explaining the relation among states: geopolitics. The term refers to the political significance of a geographical space. In other words, it hinges on the importance of geographical factors such as climate, location as key agents that influences foreign policy decisions. Even Alfred Mackinder's "heartland theory of geopolitics" envisages a country to extend its control over distant landmasses in order to exert its influence vis-vis other states (Tuathail 1998: 18). Acquisition of territory by states serves two important purposes. First, it enables states to become more powerful. Secondly, such an action also contributes a long way in furthering its national interest. These aforementioned features resonates Hans J. Morgenthau's second principles of classical realism: national interest defined in terms of power (1948: 5). Therefore, adopting the realist line of thinking in visualizing Sino-Indian relations seems to be grounded in logic. It becomes evident as we explore the major issues which dominated the relations between them. We focus on three critical issues – border disputes, the war of 1962 and the exile of Dalai Lama. In all these cases, it is noted that territory was the main bone of contention between the conflicting parties. Before we extrapolate a detailed analysis of these events, it must be must explicated that India and China agreed to operate on a cooperative basis. The Sino–Indian treaty of peaceful coexistence, known as the Panchsheel Agreement (1954) substantiates this point (Dutt 2007: 26). The treaty advocated that both parties should respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of one another. Secondly, it urged both the countries to foster the spirit of equality and cooperation for mutual benefit. Thirdly, emphasis was also placed on the idea of non-aggression (Bandyopadhaya 2003: 76; Dutt 2007: 26). In this connection, it is not unnatural to encounter a question. Were these clauses formulated from realist point of view? Or, did they involve a considerable degree of idealism? These queries invoke the "realism versus idealism" debate in international relations (Daddow 2013: 70). The heart of the debate can be effectively explained while analyzing the clauses of the treaty and the contentious issues of India and China.

Interestingly enough, disjuncture existed between clauses of the theory and the policy undertaken by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Chinese premier Zhou EnLai. Neither party made any efforts to adhere to the clauses of the treaty. Let us begin with the issue of territorial integrity. It will project the relevance of geopolitics and the realist quest for power. The MacMahon Line demarcated the territorial frontiers of India and China. The Indian authorities were confident that China would not have much problem in accepting it as the dividing line between the two neighbours. However, the Chinese authorities expressed their aversion in recognizing it. They advocated that the agreement was made when India was under the colonial rule. Therefore, it was impossible for the Chinese government to accord formal recognition to the MacMahon line as India emancipated herself from the colonial regime. China also proclaimed that the treaty regarding Macmahon line was signed in 1914 between British India and local Tibetian authorities. Thus, she was not a party to the treaties (Jain 2004: 255; Panda 2003: 49). Hence, ambiguities remained over the Sino-Indian borders (Garver: 91). Both sides had their own viewpoints. Thus, congruency of opinion was hard to achieve. After repudiating the MacMahon line, China came up with a different version of demarcating the borders. In 1959, the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai explained the Line of Actual Control (LOAC). He communicated this message to his Indian counterpart. Also, Zhou Enlai urged Nehru to follow the LOAC as the line that separates India from China. However, even this arrangement could not bring about any major breakthrough in resolving the boundary problem. The Indian authorities never had any authentic understanding about this arrangement. Moreover, Nehru was not proactive in settling the issue. It can be argued that China effectively exploited the geopolitical reasons for defending its stance during the 1962 Sino-Indian war. The Chinese forged the claim that India cared little for the LOAC and constructed 43 posts in Ladakh. This action was conceived by the Chinese as an intrusion into their territory (Panda 2003: 49).The construction of military basements along the MacMahon line by India was also taken up the China to accuse her neighbour for violating the borders (Rusko and Sasikumar 2007: 101).

This stance of the Chinese government resembles the neo-realist logic. This point deserves to be explained. As per the neorealist assumption, states act as self-help units by virtue of the anarchic nature of the international system. There is a reason for such behaviour. States possess a suspicion that its adversaries might be taking measures to ensure their security and survival. In the parlance of international relations literature, this mindset is being defined as security dilemma (Weigall: 2002: 201). China perceived that by disagreeing with the border issue, she kept her option open for exerting its claims over other disputed territories such as Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. China perceived that accusing India on the MacMahon line would provide them with a greater bargaining power. In addition, this would also ensure their security. The actions of the Chinese state apparatus stood in sharp contradiction with the pillars of the Panchsheel treaty. It violated the ideals of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country. The notion of peaceful coexistence failed to live up to the expectations Dutt 2007: 26). It contributes a great deal in proving that the Panchsheel was not being able to comply with the assumptions of either realism or neo-realism. To put it differently, it was idealistic in character. Likewise, the Indian government's decision to provide asylum to Dalai Lama in Arunachal Pradesh in 1959 can be interpreted as another idealistic action. India's stance can be justified on the grounds of humanitarianism. Also, it touched upon the principle of conventional morality (Bandyopadhaya 2003: 76; Dutt 2007: 29). However, the Chinese response explicated the futility of moral action in international politics. China's perspective had a geopolitical bend. It attempted to use the event as a means to achieve higher geopolitical goals. By claiming Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh as the birthplace of Dalai Lama the seventh, China sent a potential warning to India. China always had a tendency to capture the geographically contiguous territories between herself and India. Its resentment during Sikkim's merger with India in 1974 drives home this point. Thus, the inextricable link between geo-politics and realism can be traced.

The Loopholes in the Realist Viewpoint

Thus far, the paper has exemplified the manner through which the theoretical paradigms of neorealism have explained the geopolitical conflict between India and China. As per this school of thought, the urge to achieve power and security leads to perpetual conflict among states. Hence, any interaction between states results in a zero sum game. These claims can be barely contested. Nevertheless, the realist and the neorealist logic suffer from certain shortcomings. First, the realist scheme of arrangement primarily stresses the domain of politics and security. The political realm becomes the take-off point in their analysis. The argument of cooperation is treated as treated either a cliché or a as myth. Such a stance posits a substantial degree of absoluteness. As a consequence, it may provide a lopsided analysis. In this connection, a point needs to be invoked. We have mentioned in the preceding paragraph that China refuted the clauses pertaining to collaboration in the Panchsheel agreement. The realists associate a stereotype with the meaning of collaboration. It is being perceived only in terms of inter-ministerial dialogues. This conceptualization may appear to be monolithic in nature. Due to their negligence to the economic realm, the fail to believe that countries may work in a cooperative manner only when they have a common and not conflicting interest. In addition, it ought to be remembered that the economic domain of a state is as important as the political one. This is another area where realism fails to come up with any suitable justification. It has subordinated economics to politics. In this section, the paper seeks to forward an alternative analysis. It tries to extrapolate that realists obsession with security has hindered them from exploring the logic of cooperation. In its response, the paper examines economic potential of the two countries. This serves two crucial purposes. First, it facilitates in unravelling the strategy of economic development undertaken by both of them. This endeavour helps us to get a vivid description of the potential areas where India and China can possibly cooperate. It may further enhance the prospects of mutual gains for both. The article seeks to analyze this issue from the class perspective.

In terms of economic strategy, both India and China tried to adopt the socialist model of economic system (Nayar 1989: 123; Varsheny 1998: 33). We begin with the development narratives of India. The colonial history of India played a pivotal role in shaping its development strategy. Since its emancipation from the British rule, Nehru felt the need for development in both agricultural and industrial sectors (Varshney 1998: 31). The political dynamics of the post Second World War (the Cold War) could not be avoided. India tried to mould its economic policy as per the existing norms of the bipolar scenario in international politics. On India's part, she needed assistance from both the superpowers for her economic development. Hence, it adopted a balanced strategy to rebuild her economy. Therefore, India was sensible for neither inclining with the United States nor with the erstwhile Soviet Union (USSR). It can be argued that such a policy emanated from Nehru's idea of Non-Alignment. The existing literature on the subject has defined the policy in terms of realpolitik perspective. However, this same doctrine can be explained from the economic perspective. How? All the third world countries faced economic exploitation when they were being ruled by the colonizers. Economic factors provided the basic stimulant for their anti-colonial struggle. Thus, the economic sphere became the linchpin for visualizing the political strategy. In a similar vein, it can be argued that Non-Alignment also had an economic vision. To put it differently, it had a political economic dimension. This is an area where realism has left a lot to be desired. The realist explanation confines itself to the material domain. As previously mentioned, for them, material sphere focuses on issues geopolitics and military power. However, the paper tries to explain the "material dimension" in a nuanced manner.

It must be remembered that India never hesitated to take economic help from the US and USSR (Mukherji 2014: 56). Interestingly enough, they chalked out a unique strategy for their economy. This is known as the mixed economy. It refers to a form of economic system where both the capitalist and the socialist model would operate in unison. Undoubtedly, this path proved to be beneficial for the Indian economy. However, this is only a part of the entire story. In order to

encapsulate the dynamics of the Indian economic system, a subtle analysis is called for. The Indian model highlights certain distinctive features. First, even though it pressed for heavy industrialization, India was mindful to restrict the dominance of the capitalist mode of production in the economy. Secondly, it threw light on the idea of import substitution industrialization (ISI). It underlined the need to restrict imports thereby minimizing the dependence on foreign capital. On the other hand, it stressed the need to augment domestic production. The idea of self-reliance was embedded in the logic of ISI (Mukherji 2007: 5). In the first three decades of Indian planning, India was hesitant in allowing the free play of foreign capital. It was more eager to give the indigenous industrialist enough leverage for the industrial growth of the country. The introduction of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP) of 1969 and the License Raj (Mukherji 2007: 9) could be cited as evidences. In this connection, an important question needs to be asked. In what manner did the MRTP act revealed the logic of the socialistic pattern of economic growth which India was trying to promote? In response to this interrogation, a vital point shall be noted. Although MRTP was initiated to curb the capitalistic influence into the Indian economy, it ended up in nurturing a domestic dominant class whose interest was identical to that of the capitalist class. Most importantly, this group also succeeded in securing the support of the political masters.

In order to describe this phenomenon, Pranab Bardhan (2012: 42, 54) coined a term– the dominant coalition. It referred to three groups, namely – the industrial class, the rich peasantry and the bureaucratic/technocratic class. Not only did they share an interdependent relationships but also operated in a unified fashion. A harmony of interest existed among them. All these groups played a key role in determining the economic policies of the government in an indirect manner. This point need to be substantiated. The business lobby used to pressurize the governments for obtaining licences. On many occasions, they resorted to unfair means to achieve their ends. Likewise, the peasants lobby often flexed their muscles in their efforts to secure subsidies. Finally, the bureaucrats bargained with the government on numerous issues. The intensity of the demands of these lobbies was such that the government never had much choice but to comply with them. Thus, the norms of the MRTP Act were used as means by the members of the dominant coalition for promoting their objectives. Therefore, it can be argued that the socialistic planning model sowed the seed for the growth of capitalism. The Indian state wanted to control the commanding heights of the economy (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: 212). There is rationale behind this protectionist line of thought. The government felt that the domestic industries needed to be properly nurtured before they became well-equipped to face the challenges posed by the foreign industrial states. The Indian state viewed that by doing so, the foreign capitalist influences could be checked and the potential of the mixed economic pattern would be realized. Unfortunately, this vision could not materialize. The 'mixed economy' provided the ideal foundation for the emergence of the capitalistic trends in the economy. Eventually, India opened itself to the world economy in 1991 by initiating a set of reforms (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar 2000: 31). The paper shall discuss its move towards economic reforms later. Now, we will portray a detailed discussion of the Chinese economy during its formative years since 1949. This will provide an opportunity for getting a comparative picture of the economy of both countries in the pre-liberalization phase (Mukherji 2014: 9).

China also made conscious effort to implement a socialist model in their economic development. Opposition to the capitalist pattern of economy was the main reason behind choosing this path. Both Chinese and Indian economy shared a common feature. The economy was primarily agrarian in character. However, this does not imply that China overlooked the case of industrialization. It tired to give equal emphasis on both the sectors. China had to face the twin problem of lack of cultivable land and limited industrial development. In its quest to follow the line of socialism, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) undertook certain necessary measures. It ensured governmental control over the key sectors of the economy. The nationalization of the industry and the elimination of the private sector could be cited as classic illustrations. In addition, the process of land reforms was prompt. It attempted to do away with the landed class and endorsed the case of equitable redistribution of land among the common masses (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2005: 354). The

path towards socialism was not devoid of ideological contradictions. This does not indicate that socialism had to face opposition from any diametrically opposite ideology. In the Chinese context, a different version of the leftist ideology was gradually trying to make its mark in defining the political economic trajectory of the country.

Mao Zedong envisaged an alternative explanation of the socialistic ideology. Till then, China had been following the Soviet style of socialism. However, Mao was sceptical about the prospects of the socialistic system inspired on the lines of the Soviet Union. He believed that institutionalizing the Soviet system possess the risk of over-bureaucratization. Such a structure might posses the risk of exploitation of the masses. This would definitely impede the emancipation of the masses. Thus, Mao envisioned the need for channelizing the energy of the masses in an effective way in agricultural and the industrial arena. This strategy was popularly known as the 'Great Leap Forward' (1957) (McWilliams and Piotroski 2005:355). At the heart of this project laid the intention for rapid industrialization. Mao encouraged the process of mass mobilization of the masses from agricultural collectives into large communes for refashioning the industrial activities on a massive scale. Unfortunately for Mao, this method failed to live up to its expectations. In addition, Soviet Union was upset with Mao's approach. It became prominent when USSR suspended all forms of economic and technological assistance to China (Mansbach and Taylor 2014: 166). This is the broad historiography of the Chinese economic development during its first two decades. The path of socialism had certain inherent problems. Hence, these events paved the ground for China to detach itself from the socialistic vision.

The blueprint of economic development of India and China is more different and less similar. Despite visualizing socialism as the cornerstone of their developmental strategy, both of them failed to execute their plans in a manner that would have brightened chances for realizing its meaning both in letter and spirit. In the Indian case, it can be claimed that mixed pattern was distantly related to socialist notion of egalitarianism. The Indian planners failed to realize that capitalist tendencies penetrated the economy even during the heydays of socialism. The capitalist classes of India cared little for the development of the country. On the contrary, they were focussed on fulfilling their own individual goals. Capitalism failed to generate the desired level of economic growth. They misused the support rendered to them by the government. Hence, India's step of opening up of the economy to invite foreign capital can be attributed to the failure of its domestic capitalist class. The story of China is different. They were more rigid as compared to India when it came in tackling the forces of capitalism. China opted for capitalist development only when Mao's policy proved to be futile. In the pre Deng Xiaoping period, the presence of capitalists influence could not be traced. Also, the timing of liberalizing the economy of both India and China deserves to be critically examined. It will provide a clear idea regarding the existing configuration of international politics.

The Political Economy of Liberalization and Sino-Indian Cooperation

In the 1980's Margaret Thatcher elaborated the benefits that a country could enjoy through liberalization of it economy. The prevailing scenario of world politics at that point of time also helped to popularize the idea. In this context, the respective perceptions of India and China about political configurations during the closing stages of the Cold War ought to be elaborated. The Sino-Soviet relationship received a major setback after the 1969 Ussuri river conflict (Bannerjee 2010: 71). At that point of time, the economy of the United States (U.S) manifested an upward trend of growth. Moreover, China was in search of finance and technology to carry out its process of industrialization. Against this backdrop, aligning with the United States was a plausible option. Therefore, the Chinese tilt towards the capitalist market forces became obvious. These thoughts found expression through Deng Xiaoping's economic policy in the early 1980s (Mansbach and Taylor 2014: 167). India's case was slightly different. India opted for liberal economic measures

in the 1990s, a decade later than China. Question can be raised as to why India waited till 1990 to open up its economy? India's pursuance of the non-aligned policy has already been dealt with. Moreover, its relation with the United States was not as cordial as it was with the Soviet Union. Hence, it had little availability of options. Two issues gave impetus to the process of economic reforms. First, the Soviet model gradually lost its appeal among the policy makers. Secondly, two concurrent events took place – the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the rise of United States politically as well as economically. Also, India observed that China and the East Asian counties have economically prospered after adopting a liberal economic approach. Let us now enunciate the key features of economic liberalization of both these countries.

Let us explore the series of reforms which Deng Xiaoping initiated in the Chinese economy. He highlighted four key features – agriculture, industry, science and technology (McWilliams and Piotrowski 2005: 365). Deng Xiaoping's approach marked a shift from socialist perspective of self-sufficient economy. On the contrary, it underlined the notion of export-led growth. In other words, promotion of exports received greater priority. Besides, China welcomed the entry of foreign direct investment into their economy. Its growth rate revealed positive signals. The percentage of capital inflows also plummeted (Mansbach and Taylor 2014: 167; Nayar 2005: 184,185). Thus, economic stance of China took a paradigm shift. The Indian strive towards economic reforms got underway with the revoking of the MRTP Act. The stringent regulatory mechanism of the economy was relaxed. The deregulation of the economy aimed to attract foreign capital. India consciously made efforts to promote exports as it faced serious balance of payment crises (Ghosh and Chandrasekhar 2000: 128). The withdrawal of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) could be cited as a classic example (Mukherji 2014: 20). India was equally mindful of removing the barriers to trade (tariff and other related trade barriers) (Mukherji 2014:17).

In the preceding paragraph, we have delineated the interface of the economies of India and China with the forces of capitalism. The 1990s witnessed the phenomenon of globalization with greater intensity. Neither India nor China could deny it. Both countries faced the economic consequences of globalization. In this context, a question becomes inevitable in the post cold war scenario. What has been the impact of globalization on the state machinery of these countries? For tackling this query, we will have to take recourse to the theoretical debates that explore the ramifications of globalizing tendencies on the state. This exercise would help us to get a detailed picture of the existing equations in international political economy. We can then refer to its arguments in the context of economic relations between India and China.

It has to be admitted that the existing literature on globalization is being riddled with competing explanation. As per one school of thought, states are no longer relevant in the globalized era. The market forces have become more powerful vis-a-vis states. Globalization has resulted into a borderless world (Ohmae 2005: 20). However, such radical viewpoint have been countered by an different stance claiming that states are controlling the market forces (Hirst and Thompson 2000: 79). However, these notions seems to be too absolutist in character. We need to take a subtle approach in our analysis. In a similar vein, the paper tries to argue that neither states nor markets shall be viewed as antagonistic entities (Rodrik 2009: 264). Conceiving their interaction as a zero sum game may not be desirable. Both entities have many positives to offer to one another. Also, globalization has underlined the case of interdependence among various actors in the international forum (Keohane and Nye 2001: 21). States and markets can operate in a complementary manner. Hence, states have not become redundant in the global age. They still possess substantial degree of significance. However, it ought to be acknowledged that an alteration have taken place in the functioning of states. The meaning of this statement requires some elaboration. It does not imply that the traditional functions of states have been replaced by new responsibilities. On the contrary, it seeks to convey the idea that states have taken up certain new functions alongside their conventional ones. The operational dynamics of states have undergone a transformation in order to meet the exigencies of the globalizing agents (Shaw 1997: 498; Sassen 2003: 7, 10).

States have to be proactive while responding to the political economy of globalization. An efficient state will certainly be able to reap greater benefits of the globalizing process. To put it differently, state acts as a catalyst or a facilitator globalization. These arguments can be used to elucidate the position of India and China. Both states have understood that the influx of capitalist trends would be positive for their economic growth and development. Hence, it can be argued that India and China shares congruence of interest. They can act in an interdependent manner. However, this concept needs to be critically discussed as the dynamic of globalization has thrown up several unavoidable challenges. Let us first explain the conventional idea of interdependence. It emphasizes the case for cooperation among countries. Secondly, it forwards the concept of multiple channels of cooperation among nations. It implies that alongside states, non-state actors play an equally instrumental role in determining the contours of international outcomes (Keohane and Nye 2001: 22). The emergence of multinational corporations (MNCs) (Evans and Mooney 2007: 236) can be cited to drive home this claim. These entities have forwarded an alternative understanding of interaction among states. In the contemporary era, interactions are not longer restricted within the ministerial level. In other words, intergovernmental exchanges have been complemented by collaboration between multinational firms and the higher echelons of the governmental authority. In addition, agreements among the MNCs are becoming a common practice. Therefore, in the contemporary scenario, we witness state-firm diplomacy as well as firm-firm diplomacy (Strange 1992: 10, 11).

Interdependence has posed a potential challenge to the certain core assumptions of classical realism (Morgenthau 1948: 4). First, the relationship between power and politics has been reversed. The relevance of economics in defining the parameters of power has received importance. As a consequence, the stereotypes about the prioritization of military power by states began to be revisited. This practice has spelled an important transformation in approaching international politics. States have shifted their focus from acquiring political power to gaining economic power (Strange 2000: 149). Geo-economics is becoming an increasingly popular policy option among states. This has strengthened the logic of cooperation. Hence, India and China have revealed the urge to promote bilateral collaborative measures in the contemporary era. The paper seeks to elaborate the policy stance of India and China through the help of empirical evidences.

Before we undertake this task, it is pertinent to explicate an issue. It has been observed that both parties have shown an urgency to try and resolve disputes over certain geographical territories so that economic relations between the two countries remain unhindered. The Nathula pass in Sikkim is an important trade route for both these countries (Hence, with realization of the potential benefits of trade, China has moved away from making any claims on the Indian territory of Sikkim. Such behaviour was unthinkable during the Cold War era) (Rusko and Sasikumar 2007: 114). The opening up of the border trade route at Lipulekh in 1991 was the first major positive signals for the improvement of the trading relations. Another major breakthrough came in 1993 when both parties agreed to conduct trade through the Shipki La pass (Mansingh 1994: 292). On the economic front, both countries have shown keenness to export a variety of goods with one another. The trade across the Sino-Indian borders are being carried out primarily through the Kolkata Port and the Chinese port at Shanghai. It must be notified that certain regions of India and China have played a key role in facilitating the intensity of trade. The Indian North Eastern regions and the South Western part of the Chinese landmass have been the prime trading zones (Karackattu 2013: 694). This rapid growth in trade can have a positive effect in the overall development of these two regions. There is rationale for making this statement. As both countries are interested in trading relations, they will naturally be eager to develop those areas from where the bulk of the trade takes place (Karackattu 2013: 705).

The narratives on India-China trade have often argued the issue of asymmetry. It implies that levels of trade are higher for China as compared to India. It has often been argued that China exports more goods to India than the latter does it to its neighbours. Although this is not entirely

incorrect, however, in a cooperative set up we should always try and focus on the concept of absolute gains rather than relative gains (Grififths, O'Callaghan and Roach 2015: 306,307). It is undeniable that China is economically powerful than India. Nevertheless, the logic of liberal trade provides an opportunity for both of them to improve in the economic domain. India and China has been emphasising on intra-industry as well as inter-industry trade. The latter pattern of trade has a larger share than intra-industry trade. Inter-industry trade can occur in sectors such as electronic goods, textiles and merchandise products. Chinese export of the merchandise product has recorded a growth rate of 44% in the first decade after the conclusion of the Cold War (Devadason 2012: 60). On the other hand, Indian exports to China comprise mainly of cotton yarns, iron ore, steel, plastic goods (Devadason 2012: 64) and pharmaceuticals (Boillot and Labbouz 2006: 2899). On certain occasions, India has overshadowed China in terms of growth of exports. In 2004, India's export grew as high as 80.5 % viz-a-viz the Chinese progress of 77.2 % (Acharya 2005: 1423).

Therefore, both nations have taken steps to operate in tandem for furthering the cause of their economy. It becomes evident as the state owned oil companies of India and China, Oil and natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) and the Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) respectively jointly won a bid for acquiring 37% stake of Petro-Canada in the oilfields of Syria (Zhu 2011: 5). There are plenty of areas where China and India can work in joint venture. In addition, the economic forces of India and China can complement one another. India's ever increasing forces of skilled labour force has greater appreciation in the Chinese circle. The car parts, cell phones and the computer codes for digital television for the Chinese factories are designed by the Indian engineers (Devadason 2012: 73). The Information technology sector also stands out as a classic illustration (Boillot and Labbouz 2006: 2899). Leading Indian companies such as Infosys, Wipro and Birlas also operates in China. Likewise, the Chinese influence on the Indian economy shall not be overlooked. Around 35% of the power plants in India are being manufactured by the Chinese companies. The shares of Chinese Telecom companies are also somewhat similar (Mukherji 2014: 86). The growth and consolidation of the Sino-Indian economic ties will help to materialize the vision of the free trade area (FTA) between them (Acharya 2005: 1424).

Concluding Observations

The paper has figured out those issues in Sino-Indian relations where cooperative action can be possible from sides. In this endeavour, it has performed an important task. The article seeks to promote the idea that issues which had been viewed through the prism of realism can also be studied from the perspective of liberalism. Hence, attempt has been to chalk out the deficiencies of the realist logic. Secondly, in order to substantiate the case for economic cooperation between India and China, the paper has undertaken an evolutionary approach of traversing the historical trajectories of the political economy of development in these two countries. Such line of thinking has provided to establish the rationale for liberalizing their economy. Also, it indicates the relevance of economic interdependence between the two countries. The article has effectively encapsulated the significance of geo-economics and the possibility of a win-win situation which may usher in between India and China in the contemporary context. Although the paper has explained the dynamics of India-China cooperation through theoretical means, it has also given ample empirical evidences in support of its theoretical standpoint. The paper foresees that the spirit of collaboration will be the theme for Sino-Indian relations in 2015 and thereafter.

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Emerging Strategic Equations in West Asia: Impact on India's Energy Security

Arnab Dasgupta

Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Chandernagore College, Chandannagar, Hooghly, West Bengal.

ABSTRACT

The international energy market is undergoing transcendental changes by virtue of a number of factors. The most volatile has been the situation in West Asia. This hotbed of international politics boasts huge hydrocarbon resources. Therefore, any upheaval in the regional matrix may prove to be disastrous for the oil importing countries as evident in the wake of the 'Arab Spring'. India draws maximum of its supplies from the West Asian producers. In the aftermath of the Iranian nuclear deal, there are signs that the entire regional strategic calculus may undergo potential changes. This paper seeks to address the possible changes in the strategic contours in West Asia and their impact on India's energy security.

Keywords: *West Asia, India, Energy Security, Arab-Spring, Price-volatility, OPEC, Vulnerability*

Introduction

The regional geopolitical matrix in West Asia is undergoing a significant change. The West Asian region boasts major energy producers as well as the largest deposits of hydrocarbons in the world. The broader region has been plagued with a civilizational conflict between Iran and the Arab states since 1979 in addition to the perennial Arab-Israel conflict. The Arab uprisings in 2011 induced practical and notional regime changes and thereby impacted the overall energy politics in the region. Those radical changes created much apprehension about the physical viability of the energy supplies. Now that apprehension has dissipated, the chances of radical power shifts are still there due to the prevailing socio-political inequalities in some major producing countries.[1] Consequently, the region's producers are seemingly following a *Look East* policy in terms of preferring new Asian markets over the American and European buyers. The Gulf producers have no other option but to appease their Asian buyers. The crisis with regard to the notorious Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (henceforth, the ISIS) further compounded the already complex regional balance in West Asia. [2] Such political and macro-economic instability have cast a deep shadow on the prospect of the overall energy sector in the region as is evident from a 2013 report of the World Bank titled 'MENA: Investing in Turbulent Times'.[3] On the other hand, it was hardly anyone's guess that the oil prices would be falling rapidly to reach $thirty-two per barrel. The main reason behind this sudden decline in prices is the brewing struggle between the Saudis and Russians over the dominance of international energy market. This has been manifest in the struggle between the Syrian government-led forces and the rebels. This is also partly a struggle for regional preponderance between Riyadh and Tehran. The Yemeni crisis is an instance of the rising Shiite-Sunni divide, at the behest of the Saudi-Iran rivalry, in the region.

The role of the United States of America (henceforth, the US) in the overall regional matrix of West Asia has been very crucial since the post-WW-II days. Ever since the emergence of the US

as one of the formidable superpowers, West Asia, by virtue of its vast energy resources, has always been a focal point of the US foreign policy agenda. However, the sudden rise in shale production has created chances for the US to emerge as a potential energy exporter in the days to come. The possibility of Persian-American rapprochement, in the wake of the long-drawn negotiations over Iran's uranium enrichment programme, has made the traditional Gulf monarchies jittery about the changed US position on West Asia. The rise of Iran can very well jeopardize the entire strategic calculus of the already complex regional struggle. Iran has also shown keen interest to emerge as a potential energy supplier on the global scale. The rebalancing of the regional strategic space has made the Saudis, the leading energy producer, to opt for what has been termed as 'oil weapons'. Therefore, the Russo-Saudi rivalry over energy market has a strong regional connection.

West Asian Energy Profile

According to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2016, at the end of 2015, the combined proved reserves of the total Middle East countries[4] stood at 108.7 thousand million tons; that constituted 47.3 per cent of the global total reserves with an R/P ratio[5] of 73.1 per cent.[6] In 2015, the region produced 32.4 per cent of the total global production, with a 5.4 per cent growth over the previous year; on the contrary, the region consumed only 9.8 per cent of the total global consumption and has only 9.6 per cent of the world's refinery capacity. In 2015, Middle East and North Africa[7] exported forty-four per cent and three per cent of the total crude exports respectively. Thus, in terms of proven reserves and actual production, the West Asian region is leading in the world; accordingly, the region has huge potential of exports in view of higher R/P ratio and lower refinery capacity and consumption rates.

Not surprisingly, the West Asia and North Africa (henceforth, the WANA) region has a sizeable gas reserves as well; the region boasts 42.8 per cent of the total proven gas reserves in the world at the end of 2015 with an R/P ratio of 129.5, the highest in the world. Accordingly, the region produced 17.4 per cent of the world total in 2015; in comparison, the rate of consumption was stable, 14.1 per cent of the total world consumption. There has been a prominent and rising trend worldwide of choosing the gas as a cleaner fuel source. The fear of disrupted supplies as well as shale revolution has been the other reasons. Alongside, Qatar, Oman, the United Arab Emirates (henceforth, the UAE) and Yemen together supply almost forty per cent of the total Liquefied Natural Gas (henceforth, the LNG) supplies in the world. The increasing demand since the late 2000s has had a deep impact and there emerged a sort of gas shortage in the region.

The 'Arab Spring'

The heavy reliance on the rentier economy in West Asia has deprived common masses from opportunities of democratic representation.[8] These have resulted in suppressed discontent and crave for democratic rights. Thus, the 'Arab Spring' in 2011 was no surprise but a much-warned outcome for the broader region. The rising population and unemployment were other prominent reasons behind growing discontent.[9] The socio-cultural imbalance has led to the concentration of youth population around the capital cities in the WANA region which further intensified urban protests against the ruling regimes. This was more evident from the role the social media played in spreading the discontent. The Gulf monarchies were quick to respond to the suppressed discontent in the wake of regime changes in the region. They promised to bring about liberal reforms and more balanced allocation of the oil revenue to appease the masses. This regime change has created uncertainties as to whether the earlier energy ties should be continued with the new regimes. This was followed by an apparent price war between the Arab OPEC producers and the US shale producers the ulterior motive of which was to punish an assertive and interfering Russia.[10] Disruptions, actual and probable, in the regional flow of energy have created much tensions and led to rising oil and gas prices in the immediate aftermath of the Arab protests. This has also led

to the rise in the insurance cost of the ship and cargo and the risk premium added extra burden on the overall price; for instance, the rate of increase was from $150,000 to a whopping $450,000 for a trip for a super-taker and that added some fifteen cents to the price per barrel; moreover, this was for the ship only and not the cargo. The suppliers responded by using traditional routes like Suez Canal for safety reasons. Thus, enhanced risks, increased insurance premium, market speculation and rerouting of tankers have added some extra premium over the region's energy supplies; thus, the region stood a chance of losing its edge to other energy-importing regions like the sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. The prices, as a result, would also be hurt for a considerable time in the future. There have already been many a fault lines among the Arab OPEC members; those with smaller reserves are in favour of higher prices in the short run and those with larger reserves prefer stable prices over a long span of time; there are some who are pro-US and prefer US dollar as the medium of exchange and others who prefer an alternative such as Euro; there are some who can easily meet the OPEC quota with additional/ swing capacity like the Saudis and those who have to struggle to meet the same. Thus, the 'Revolution' which was more of evolution rather than anything more radical[11], made those ruptures more clear as the region awaited a further grave situation, that is the low oil price in the international market.

Low Price Situation

Alongside, the recent decline in the price of hydrocarbons (crude oil and gas) in the international market has created havoc for both the producers and suppliers. The rich producers in West Asia would, howsoever, manage the tide as the cost of oil extraction there is really very low. During the last price fall-down in the 2010s, buyers like China benefitted by signing long-term contracts with the producers. Earlier it was thought that the American shale oil glut would make the existing producers lose their productive edge over the buyers. At the same time, it has to be borne in mind that the production cost in West Asia is about $three-four per barrel whereas the fracking technology is very costly. On an average, this would require the oil price to be at $sixty per barrel. Therefore, shale production can continue only in a higher price situation. The banks which have provided loans to the shale-producing companies are now reviewing the situation.[12] The same applies to other such alternative energy sources like the Canadian oil sands or the Venezuelan heavy oil. The Saudis as well as the OPEC countries are actually crossing their fingers so that the low oil prices in the international market render the shale oil production in the US cost-ineffective. Nevertheless, the US has always been keen to find an alternative to its dependence on West Asian energy reserves and the corresponding strategic burden.

The falling crude price has further been abated by the OPEC decision to retain the current rate of production. The OPEC is facing a tough challenge in the wake of the low oil prices. In the semi-annual meeting in Vienna on December 4, 2015, the OPEC members decided to retain their rate of production and, at the same time, legitimized their overproduction amidst low prices. This was because the OPEC in general and the Saudis in particular, wanted to hold their market vis-à-vis the new shale producers in the US. Among the members, it is Saudi Arabia which has a surplus or swing production capacity. Leaving aside the rich West Asian producers, the other members like Algeria, Ecuador and Venezuela have been hard-hit under this situation. Even, the West Asian producers are also facing the revenue crunch lately. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia has offered the highest concession in terms of crude price in the last ten years. This has apparently triggered a price war among the producers in the region. Again, the population growth has led to increased energy consumption by household and power generation sectors, leading to lesser exports. Kuwait, for instance, has sought to rely on imported LNG to generate electricity during the peak season. However, there are distinct political reasons to it as well. A sharp sixty per cent downfall in the oil prices have created havoc for the ISIS as well as the Russians. The US strategy of containing Putin's Russia, thereby, drying out the assistance to Assad's Syria, was another reason. The lifting of the Iranian sanctions also had a negative effect on the region's oil supplies

and prices. However, the Saudis are of the opinion that the other producers, both within and outside the OPEC, have to come to a unanimous decision on that count. Producers like Iran and Russia have rejected such a proposal for different reasons.[13] Nonetheless, in February, 2016, four major producers, namely, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Qatar and Venezuela have reached an agreement to freeze production at the January levels. Although, this decision created some hope and oil prices recovered to some extent the ultimate result is yet to come.

Emerging Strategic Equation: Shale Revolution and Saudi Calculations

Shale oil and gas production in the US in the recent past has jolted the international energy market for a number of reasons. The very possibility of emergence of the US as an energy-sufficient country would deal a crude blow to the West Asian producers. The US imports from West Asia has already been falling down due to the policy of import-source diversification. A further decline would have tremendous implications for the entire region. First of all, the lessening of the American interest would entail a corresponding downgrading in the American strategic assertiveness. That might eventually create a power vacuum in the greater region. Besides, the US has so far been the net-security-provider in West Asia. The possibility of rapprochement between the US and Iran has already rung the alarm bells in the region. This might usher in a new strategic calculus thereby replacing the Saudis with the Iranians.[14] The strategic stronghold that the US has enjoyed in the region would not be easily filled up by any other power in the near future.

The stand of Saudi Arabia is also very important in this regard. After the second Oil Shock in 1979, in the wake of the Iranian Revolution, the international oil market witnessed new jolts. In order to make up the losses during that period, Saudi Arabia expanded its production capacity in 1985-1986 thereby recapturing a large share of the global energy market from Russia. This was done not only keeping the energy interests in mind. The US was supposedly prodding the Saudis to take such steps in order to weaken the Russian economy which was heavily dependent on the oil revenue. That time also, the Russian support for the Iranian regime annoyed the Saudis and threatened their regional interests. The Saudis, therefore, sought to counter that threat by aligning more with the US and used that oil weapon against Russia. The Russian economy faced severe constraints due to the low oil price in the international market and this was one of the prime reasons behind the fall of the Soviet economy and a resulting political collapse.[15] The Saudis have been pragmatic enough to bury their petty regional differences in order to secure their broader energy interests.[16] Nonetheless, the Saudis were not able to regain a suitable price until the First Gulf War of 1990-1991. The same situation is again being witnessed whereby the Saudis are instigating on a prolonged low price regime so that it will weaken their enemies in the greater region. Not only oil, but the Russian gas exports to the European market are also going to be affected in this connection. The question therefore remains as to how long the Saudis can withstand this low oil price situation. The previous experience in the mid-1980s has shown that Riyadh could sustain such a pressure defying the general and universal supply and demand equations. Thus, the Saudi decision has equally affected the Russian producers and American shale producers.[17] Hence, it is clear that the region is undergoing certain significant changes, both positive and negative; the old strategic calculations are being replaced by the newer ones. These will have a definite impact on international energy market in general and on India in particular.

India's Options for Energy Security

Since the early 1990s, India has been on the growth trajectory and, accordingly, is poised to recast its foreign policy priorities in terms of emerging geo-economic calculations. India has been the main driver of non- OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) oil demand growth in 2015. Consequently, India is poised to become the second largest oil consumer in Asia. This development is partly caused by the low international oil price since June, 2014

which has also brought measureable financial relief. Moreover, India's Gross Domestic Product (henceforth, the GDP) growth of 7.2 per cent has surpassed China's 6.9 per cent growth in 2015; India's GDP growth is even going to be comparatively high and stable. Domestic passenger car and two-wheeler sales have caused the rise in energy demand. The demand for Liquefied Petroleum Gas (henceforth, the LPG) and electricity has also been on the rise[18], caused by increasing urbanization and shift in household fuel use pattern.[19] In September, 2014, the government has started a new policy initiative, named 'Make in India', with an aim to enhance the share of manufacturing in the GDP from the existing fifteen per cent to twenty-five per cent.[20] Hence, manufacturing and the household sectors would account for the greatest share in future Indian energy map. Moreover, improved road freight and a further mechanized and productive agricultural sector would also require huge energy supplies.[21]

On the contrary, the domestic production of crude oil in 2013-2014 was 37.80 Million Metric Tons (henceforth, the MMT. The total refining capacity in that year was 215.07 MT.[22] India's crude oil output will continue to fall in the next quarter century despite good government efforts in this regard. India's import dependence increased from forty-three per cent in 1990 to seventy-one per cent in 2012.[23] The International Energy Agency in its report 'India Energy Outlook' has predicted that India's import dependence would rise to ninety per cent by 2040 most of which will be sourced from West Asia. During the same period, India's crude oil production will fall 3.5 per cent annually whereas its crude oil demand will grow at 4.6 per cent per annum. According to a report by the global financing services major, Goldman Sachs, India's annual energy import bill would jump from the current $120 billion to $230 billion by the Financial Year 2023. The government has a vision to cut the oil import from seventy-six per cent in 2013-2014 to sixty-six per cent; half of the cut will be achieved through increasing use of gas as a cleaner fuel.[24] There is supposed to be a sizeable gap between demand and production of natural gas by 2040, especially, in the wake of the Paris negotiations; this will have to be met through imports.[25] Additionally, despite a reverse trend in some sectors, India has been a net petroleum products exporter in the recent past.[26] That is why India needs more supplies even beyond its national consumption needs. Therefore, the option remains to strategize the overseas energy supplies. In case of India, the energy pipelines are still not a viable option given the troubled situation prevalent in the immediate neighbourhood.[27]

Thus, these factors have made it imperative for the country to adopt a policy similar to China's 'going out' strategy. Accordingly, Indian public sector oil and gas companies have been put in the forefront in search for the overseas energy assets. The Indian National Oil Companies (henceforth, the NOCs) face tremendous competition from other stake-holders and often end up investing in risky destinations. On their part, they argue that they are actually salvaging each barrel of prohibited oil from the so-called *rogue* states and thereby making the international market immune from any possible constraints. Given India's lackluster strategic culture of dealing with problems only head-on, it is quite natural that India is now only looking for ways to securitize the energy supply lines instead of acting on those plans. Nonetheless, the Indian NOCs have seemed to miss the opportunity of cheap oil price. They do have some restrictions and are not financially self-sufficient. Under the current market scenario, China, an aggressive player in overseas acquisition, has also changed its policy of direct acquisition of overseas energy assets and has, in turn, engaged into long-term supply contracts.

The Indian crude import basket comprises seventy-three per cent medium-light and sour-grade Dubai and Oman crude and the balance in sweet-grade Brent.[28] Alongside, India exports a huge quantity of secondary petro-products than merely petrol and diesel. The Indian refineries specialize in that and, hence, the Indian import basket comprises mainly the West Asian sour grades. In 2015, the Indian state companies have lifted about 250,000 barrels of oil per day (henceforth, the BPD) from Kuwait, about 514,000 BPD from the Saudis and about 214,000 from the UAE.[29] The Indian refiners mainly rely on the annual supply contracts. The public-private collaboration in

case of crude import is also being looked into this. Alongside, India is already the fourth largest importer of LNG in the world. India further seeks to divert its supply sources. Since LNG price is fixed on the basis of crude prices the former would be disturbed should there be any turmoil in West Asia. The next section would deal with India's the energy engagements with the region.

India's Energy Engagements with West Asia

Currently, India imports crude oil and gas from twenty-five countries with two-thirds of the supplies coming from the West Asian producers. West Asian energy supplies accounted for 63.9 per cent of India's total imports in 2012-2013. India's dependence on the West Asian energy reserves is much more compared to the other major importers in the world. Moreover, the region is also a leading trade partner of India. The three major oil embargoes in West Asia from 1951 to 1974 slowed down Indian economy by 0.3 per cent and the inflation rate was pushed 20.2 per cent upward. [30] The things got tightened ever since the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the resulting oil price hike.[31] The combined effect of diversion of the hard-earned foreign reserves towards crude export and the comprehensive impact of price hike on the Indian society led to protests against the establishment in 1975. Within one year of the 1973 oil shock, India was able to clinch two crude supply deals with Iran and Iraq. Nevertheless, the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the outbreak of Iraq-Iran War forced the Indian Government to opt for diversifying supply-sources. New oil contracts were signed with the UAE, Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Mexico and Venezuela. Therefore, the diversification tactics is not that new. The discovery off the Bombay High in 1974 further eased the situation. However, in 1980, the Government opened up the domestic energy fields for minor international participation. This was a major shift from the self-reliance model. Another economic strategy has been to encourage the skilled and unskilled labourers to provide their services in the overseas markets, especially in the oil-rich West Asian states and send back remittances. Indian participation in the civil construction in the Gulf countries as well as capital investments in the Indian infrastructure by the Gulf States had also been encouraged.

In January, 2016, imports from Saudi Arabia and Iraq to India have outsmarted the Latin American supplies due to competitive prices and shorter shipping distance. The Brent's rise over the Dubai grade has made the latter cheaper and attractive to the Indian customers.[32] India has also sought Saudi investments in the downstream projects. Alongside, India is in talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to procure crude in exchange of Basmati rice and wheat. Among these countries, the UAE accounts for an average nine per cent of India's crude imports and was the sixth largest supplier to India in 2014-2015.[33] In the recent past, Iraq emerged as India's second largest oil supplier (twelve per cent of the total need), after Saudi Arabia, replacing a sanction-hit Iran. The Indian Oil Corporation Limited, followed by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, is the largest importer of Iraqi crude. India and Iraq agreed to enhance their cooperation in the fields of petrochemicals and other downstream industries. The Indian Oil Corporation has provided training to the Iraqi personnel engaged in the downstream industry.[34] India's private Reliance India Limited entered into a long-term supply contract with Iraq to buy the Basra Heavy crude. Experts also hail the move as the nearer markets like West Asia would diminish the chances of volatility. In the wake of the ongoing crisis in Iraq, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has asked the oil marketing companies to prepare alternative strategies to cope up with the possible energy crunch; however, the main crude supply line to India from Iraq is sourced from the southern oilfields in Iraq and crude cargos are loaded for the Indian voyage from Basra. Concerned authorities in India are in talks with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for additional stocks.

Meanwhile, Iran is poised to emerge as an energy behemoth in the post-sanctions era.[35] India is the second largest customer of Iranian crude after China. The Indian state-owned Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited (henceforth, the MRPL) is the main buyer of the Iranian oil cargoes. India's energy engagement with Iran is not new. Iran approached India for collaboration

in the oil industry in the 1950s and early 1960s.[36] The Indians refrained from taking part due to technical as well political reasons. Eventually, the Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (henceforth, the ONGC) participated in an offshore lease, along with the National Iranian Oil Company (henceforth, the NIOC). The New Delhi Declaration, 2003 recognized the hydrocarbons sector as one of the key component of the bilateral relations.[37] Recently, Iran has offered production sharing contracts (henceforth, the PSCs) to three Indian companies, namely, the ONGC Videsh Limited, Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Oil India Limited, for developing the prolific Farzad-B gas field in the Farsi Block which they discovered in 2008. Apart from this, Iran has also offered to ship LNG to India through Oman. Notably, this is the first time since 1979 that Iran has offered PSCs; earlier, only buy-back arrangements with NIOC, with fifteen per cent fixed returns, were allowed. Presumably, this policy change was done in view of India's decreasing energy imports in the face of western sanctions. Even after the sanctions were lifted, Iran has reassured India about the development rights for the Farzad-B gas field and has not put the block for auction. The Indian delegation visiting Iran in July, 2015 was told that the Iranian authorities were mulling a new PSC for the field; that would be a mix of production sharing and service contract. The delegation has also talked about renewing the unsuccessful LNG purchase deal of 2005.[38] The Indian Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas has also pleaded for the Indian consortium during his visit to Iran on April 9-10, 2016.[39] The produced gas would be liquefied and then would be transported to India either via Pakistan or a sub-sea pipeline. Nevertheless, Iran has to get over with its rising gas demands before being able to become a potential exporter.[40] On the other hand, India's Petronet LNG Limited (henceforth, the PLL) has signed a revised contract with the RasGas of Qatar. The PLL has had an agreement of 7.5 MMTPA FOB[41] LNG for twenty-five years commencing in 2004. The price of LNG has been reduced from $twelve to $five per million British thermal unit (henceforth, the MMBtu).[42] India will also buy an additional one million ton every year till the contract expires in 2028. A price ban has also been formulated to keep in pace with the future fluctuations. India, along with other major Asian gas buyers, is trying to form a gas-buyers' forum in view of the fact that the global gas market is turning into buyers' market. It will be a timely innovation in the face of attempts to form a gas-OPEC. The members can also opt for cargo swaps; before that, domestic gas sector in India needs urgent reforms.

In the wake of low crude price, India has reaped some benefits from price rivalry among the Gulf producers. For instance, Iran has offered free shipping of crude cargo to India; Iraq, Iran and Kuwait have all offered term contracts on extended credit conditions, up to ninety days in order to secure larger markets like India. This might imply an urge among the West Asian states to prove and project their Asian-ness which was till recent past considered as Middle East and not West Asia. The whole paradigm is undergoing a change this way. The Indian refiners for the first time are jointly negotiating the crude purchase deals with the OPEC countries. Although, the producers have not yet shown any willingness to give discounts in case of the long-term price benchmark or in the official selling price, they might give concessions in loan terms, choice of grade, lay days, relaxation in opening of the letters of credit and shipping charges. Moreover, the impact of Iranian sanctions would vouch for the importance of West Asian energy supplies to India.

Iranian Problems

Iran has, from time to time, threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz to counter any Western offensive.[43] The Iranian navy has been holding military drills in the Strait in an apparent show of naval capabilities. However, that would turn out to be disastrous for Iran as well. Quite obviously, India would not remain unhurt in such a scenario. Besides, India's energy relationship with Iran has not been a smooth sailing. It was due to Tehran's intransigence that New Delhi could not clinch the LNG deal in 2005. This was perhaps due to India's vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency against Iran; a disgruntled Iran granted development rights in the Yadavaran field to the Chinese in place of the Indians.[44] Iran also accused Indians of kowtowing under

Western pressure and of delaying the Farsi block deal. So far as the India-Pakistan-Iran gas pipeline is concerned, there are considerable uncertainties over security and price. Thus, there have been hiccups and this has created admissible doubts about Iran's reliability as the major supplier. On the Indian, side, the more important was the strategic advantage of the imminent Indo-US strategic partnership via the civilian nuclear deal; for that, the closer energy collaboration with Iran was worth sacrificing. Such ties can be revived as evident in case of the LNG deal or Farzad-B gas field.

The Western sanctions in 2012 dealt a shattering blow to the Iranian energy industry. The US sanctions punished those dealing with the Bank Markazi, the Iranian Central Bank. The EU sanctions, on the other, restricted insurance claims on the tankers carrying Iranian crude. Consequently, India had to cut its crude imports from Iran from 10.5 per cent of the total imports in 2011-2012 to 7.2 per cent in 2012-13.[45] It must be pointed out here that it was only India among the three main Asian importers of Iranian energy which reduced its import from the country drastically, acquiescing to US sanctions. The other two, namely, China and Japan, went unabated, only, bothering minimally for the western sanctions. Subsequently, India was awarded a sanction waiver by the US administration, albeit for 180 days. The Western pressure compelled the Irano-Hind Shipping Company, founded in 1974 for the purpose of carrying the Iranian crude to India, to stop its operations. The National Iranian Tanker Company, the public tanker operator of Iran, expressed its willingness to provide guarantees to the ships it controls; however, almost half of its tanker fleet is engaged in storing the surplus crude.[46] As a way out, India sought for additional Saudi supplies. Moreover, Iran has also become a large market for India's petroleum products export. According to a 2010 US Congressional Research Service Report, India's RIL was the largest supplier of gasoline to Iran. That too came down in the wake of the Western threats.[47] The problem was further complicated in the wake of pending huge payment for Iranian crude. This was so because the option of Asian Clearing Union (henceforth, the ACU) was no longer available due to a decision of the Reserve Bank of India (henceforth, the RBI) in that respect in 2010. As a way out, the Indian refineries have made an arrangement through which payments up to forty-five per cent of the total value of the crude exports would be made in rupees while the rest would be paid in Euros through the Turkish Halkbank. The Ministry of Finance also agreed to exempt the Indian importers of Iranian crude from paying the forty per cent withholding tax. It is only during the visit of Prime Minister Modi to Iran in May, 2016 that the problem has been resolved. The RBI has sought concurrence from the Department of Economic Affairs for bringing Iran under the ACU mechanism as the latter has requested RBI to do so. However, actual settlement through the ACU mechanism hinges on the availability of international Euro channels.[48]

West Asian Energy Supplies: A Risky Addiction

Earlier, India's energy security entailed only securing the oil supplies from the Gulf. Now, it has become inclusive of a complex structure of policies and multi-faceted strategies, ad hoc as well as long-term.[49] Nevertheless, the essential economies and significance of the West Asian energy supplies is still not lost to the Indian policy-makers. It is only in order to avoid fierce competition in the mainstream energy hotspots like West Asia or Central Asia that India has opted for overseas energy assets. There is a general belief that West Asian energy resources present a unique case of Geopolitical Market Concentration (henceforth, the GMC) risk.[50] Therefore, diversification has been suggested as a way out from supply disruption due to market concentration. Nevertheless, the GMC analysis finds that diverting the import-source from West Asia to South America would not be very helpful because of the geographical distance as well as increased freight charges. Similarly, African, Central Asian and Russian sources have almost identical problems. Thus, if in a worst-case scenario, supplies from West Asia totally stop, then India would have no other option but to depend on Africa which offers by far a riskier environment. Therefore, the general perception of West Asia as the GMC risk zone does not necessarily corroborate to the empirical fact. After taking those criteria like proven reserves, R/P ratio, distance from the Indian ports,

transit time, etc. into consideration, West Asia still remains a good import-source for India.

Thus, it becomes clear that West Asian region is of greater significance to India predominantly for energy security along with a host of other reasons. There is no way India can do away with this fact and should better try to cope up. Certain recommendations can be put forward in this regard. *First* and foremost, India's energy-dependence on West Asia should not be viewed only in terms of vulnerability; rather it should be considered as an encouragement to improve relations with the West Asian states. That would not only diminish vulnerabilities in terms of energy security but also in other sectors like the Diasporas and overall trade with the region. *Secondly*, India can also opt for more direct buying of the crude stock from the international oil market to fill up its target for the strategic petroleum reserves, especially in the wake of the low oil price situation. This has been done by China in the previous decade and can be replicated with due caution. *Thirdly*, The Indian government is contemplating to form its own Protection and Indemnity (henceforth, the P&I) insurance company and provide insurance guarantees. This would boost up the number of Indian shippers. The Indian domestic reinsurer, the General Insurance Corporation-Re, also promised an amount as guarantee but that constituted only a fraction of the total P&I coverage. Apart from that, the Indian purchasers have expressed preference for lifting cargo on cost-insurance-freight rather than the prevalent system freight-on-board. This would allow the Iranian shippers to provide insurance cover.[51] *Fourthly*, both active strategies of diversification as well as passive strategies of diplomatic endeavours must be engaged with. [52] Iran continued energy supplies to India even during its war with Iraq. Nevertheless, supplies from Kuwait were stopped in the wake of the Iraqi invasion in 1991. The difference can be explained through New Delhi's passive strategy of keeping a warm relationship with Tehran. *Fifthly*, India is also exploring the possibilities of importing gas from the extended neighbourhood through cross-country pipelines. The much-touted TAPI is moving at a slow pace. Nonetheless, these projects have remained over-hyped by virtue of their peace dividend than actual economic value. Intra-regional energy cooperation is another option. There was a proposal for GAIL to supply lean gas to Pakistan.[53] ; however, no progress has yet been made. *Sixthly*, there is a provision for multi-lateral cooperative mechanism under the auspices of the International North-South Transport Corridor. This corridor envisages India, Iran and Russia as three connecting points via seamless rail, road and transport corridor from Bandar Abbas to St. Petersburg.[54] This can bolster India's chances of energy security. *Seventhly*, from the perspective of the regional players, complex regional politics has lent its shadow upon the energy insecurities emanating from the region. The players perhaps need to move beyond the region, as has been done by Qatar and thereby defeat the challenge of energy politics being boxed in the region. [55] *Finally*, by improving energy efficiency at a rate of fifteen per cent over the next decade India could save $thirty-two billion per annum by Financial Year 2023. Reducing transmission and distribution losses, using more efficient appliances and following a stricter conservation standard in the long term would help India in that respect.

Conclusion

Thus, irrespective of emerging strategic equations, India has to keep a constant vigil on the constant ripples in West Asian region. In any possible scenario, the region is still going to be a source of ready, even if not secured, supplies for the Asian consumers like India. India's rising financial clout has created a reputation which has further bolstered relations with the regional players. A stable and productive West Asia serves Indian interests the most and, hence, India has to keep a fine balance between active engagement with the region and passive support to the ruling regimes. In future, it is highly possible that India's national security will also entail securing the overseas energy assets as well as maritime supply lines by sheer means of force projection and force deployment. Therefore, the very distinction between the *national* and *beyond-national* domains of security is being constantly challenged in today's world. Perhaps, there lies the blurring point of confluence of geopolitics and geo-economics. It is from this perspective that India's engagement with the region is to be vindicated.

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1. Sevilla, p. 95.

2. Dadwal (2016), p. 216.

3. World Bank, p. ii.

4. Here Total Middle East countries primarily includes Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE, Yemen and excludes the North African countries.

5. **Reserves to Production Ratio (R/P Ratio**) - if the reserves remaining at the end of the year are divided by the production in that year, the result is the length of time that those remaining reserves would last if production were to continue at that rate.

6. BP, p. 6.

7. North Africa includes Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

8. Ghoble, p. 126.

9. *ibid*, pp. 128-129.

10. *ibid*, p. 137.

11. *ibid*, p. 141.

12. Collins, 2015.

13. Tully, 2015.

14. Kibria, p.56.

15. Collins and Erickson, 2015.

16. Stevens, p. 13.

17. Collins, 2015, *op. cit.*.

18. This can further be explained by the energy ladder hypothesis; that implies that when a family or economic unit moves up the income ladder it consumes more of the same fuel and also, uses new and better fuels; for instance, moving from kerosene to LPG for cooking; See Sen & Sen, p. 8.

19. IEA, 2015, p. 67.

20. Sen & Sen, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

21. IEA, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

22. Lok Sabha, 2014.

23. Pandey, p. 7.

24. Business Standard, March 22, 2016.

25. IEA, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

26. Sen & Sen, *op.cit.*, p. 20.

27. Nathan, p. 148.

28. There are three primary crude benchmarks or crude markers, namely, the West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the Brent Blend and the Dubai Crude. Crude markers are used as reference price for buyers and sellers. There are also others benchmarks, e.g., the OPEC Reference Basket, Tapis Crude of Singapore, Bonny Light of Nigeria, Urals oil in Russia and Isthmus of Mexico. The WTI is light and sweet and, therefore, suitable for refineries and cleaner gasoline. It is mainly used in the US. The Brent Crude is used primarily in Europe. The Dubai Crude, also known as the Fateh, is produced in the UAE. It is a light, sour crude oil. Initially, it was the primary benchmark for the West Asian crude. Lately, the Oman crude has also been used alongside the Dubai Crude.

29. Verma, February 23, 2016.

30. Chatterjee, p. 146.

31. Thomas, p. 36.

32. Verma, February 20, 2016.

33. Business Standard, March 11, 2016.

34. MEA, June 2015.

35. Under the 'thunder' scenario which is basically a condition combining stable consumption and high production; See Payam, pp. 616-617.

36. Madan, p. 13.

37. MEA, January 25, 2003.

38. Live Mint, August 23, 2015.

39. Verma, March 22, 2016.

40. Tasnim News Agency, November 6, 2013.

41. FOB or Freight on Board is a trade term which requires the seller to deliver goods on board a vessel designated by the buyer.

42. Lok Sabha, 2016.

43. Shuja, p.1.

44. Madan, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-15.

45. Mehdudia, July 14, 2013.

46. Dadwal (2012), p. 5.

47. Kumaraswamy, p. 31.

48. Lok Sabha, 2016.

49. Sachdeva, p. 55.

50. Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

51. Dadwal (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 5.

52. Chatterjee, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

53. Lok Sabha, 2014.

54. Sakhuja, p. 6.

55. Pant, p. 182.

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Present Sino-Srilanka Relation and the Strategic Disadvantage of India

Ishita Datta Ray

Associate Professor, Institute of Leadership, Entrepreneurship and Development, Kolkata.

ABSTRACT

The "String of Pearls" and "Maritime Silk Route policies of China have identified Srilanka as one of the important strategic locations to increase the former's control in the waters of Indian Ocean. During the last five years there is a steady increase in the FDI inflow from China to Srilanka, and China has invested huge amount of money in Hambantota and Colombo ports of Srilanka. Moreover, Chinese firms are actively participating in important strategic sectors in Srilanaka like construction of highways, expressways, railways, power generation and oil exploration. The volume of visible and invisible trade has also increased significantly between these two countries in recent years. On the other hand, none of the bilateral trade agreements between India and Srilanka benefitted Srilanka in terms of her trade balance, which created a negative impact on the relationship between these two neighbours of close proximity, and signing of the proposed "Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement" has been postponed. "String of Pearls" policy of China is completely encircling the Indian coastline which will have far reached consequences on Indian national security as well as maritime trade and related business.

Keywords: Sino-Srilanka, Strategy, Disadvantage, India, History.

Introduction

Srilanka possesses a strategic location with her1340 km longcoastline near major Indian Ocean sea lanes. Starting from trade to maritime security Srilanka has gained major significance in the Indian Ocean region of late. Srilanka has taken several measures to set its foot in international container cargo market business by changing its capacity from a feeder port to a container port eyeing to give Singapore, which is a titanin this field, a tough competition in South Asian water. Her growing importance as a shipping and logistic hub is inducing her neighbours to make strategic alliance with Srilanka, which is gradually shifting the global economic and geo-political balance in South East Asia. In recent years China has emerged probably as the most important ally of Srilanka in terms of trade, investments and aid. The launch of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in January 2016 in Beijing indicates a substantialleap forward on the part of China towards enforcing its financial authority over the region of South Asia and the Far East.

Sino-Srilanka Socio-Economic Relation – A Brief Historical Perspective

The relation between China and Sri Lanka was established during the rule of King Buddhadasa who reigned in Srilanka between 337 C E. and 365 C.E.During the period 405 to 418 C.E. a delegation carrying an image of Lord Buddha from the king of Sri Lanka to the Emperor Hiao-ou-ti of the Tsin dynasty arrived in China. The famous traveler and monk Faxian(Fa Hien) in the early fifth century set foot in Srilanka in search of Buddhist scriptures. Apart from cultural and religious exchange between these two countries, trade was also one important aspect in this relationship. Srilanka was one of the important lynchpins of the ancient Silk Route, it used to act as the distribution hub of various merchandise between East and West Asia. The trade and

cultural relation between these two countries was breeched in the mid eighth century during the reign of the Malay Empire of Sri Vijaya in Srilanka (Bastiampillai, 1990). After that for many a year there was no cultural or trade exchange between Srilanka and China. In 1405, during the Ming rule, the "*Treasure Fleet*" from China led by Admiral Zheng He(alias Cheng Ho) tried to control Srilankan coastal waters. This first voyage was resisted by King Alakeshvaraof Kotte kingdom, but he was later defeated by Admiral Zheng He in the year 1411, and the Sinhalese dynasty,which was overthrown by King Alakeshvara, got itself re-established which started to maintain a good relationship with China that continued for years (Dreyer, 2007).In fact, Sri Lanka was among the first countries to recognize the People's Republic of China. In 1952 the two signed thefamous rubber-rice agreement that provided Sri Lanka with supply of low priced rice that she badly needed in exchange of her rubber export to China, which the latter could not import from Malya following the UN sanction against its newly formed Communist government (Kelegama, 2002).The Srilanka-China maritime agreement was signed in 1963. The first meeting of Sino-Srilanka Joint Trade Committee was held in Beijing in November 1984 with the objective to promote bilateral trade. In June 1994 the Srilanka – China Business Cooperation Council was established to promote and enhance mutual interactions between the private sectors of the two countries. Another trade agreement was signed in 2005, and in 2009 an *Investment Facilitation Agreement* was signed between the central bank of Srilanka and China Development Bank to initiate long term economic ties between these two nations.Furthermore, in the year 2010, six new agreements were signed in the areas of information technology, maritime ports, economic & technological cooperation and transportation development - the Exim Bank of China provided a loan of 100 million USD for the last category (Dhanapala et al, 2012). During the period 2002 to 2008 the total trade turnover between Srilanka and China increased by almost 500 percent. The FDI inflow from China to Srilanka increased steadily from 6.543 million USD in the year 2003 to 16.780 million USD in the year 2008 (Samaranayake, 2011).China maintained only a moderate trade and diplomatic relationship with Srilanka since the latter was granted autonomy as the *Dominion of Ceylon*in the year 1948 within the British Commonwealth. But China aggressively started to increase trade, investments and grants towards Srilanka during the latter half of the Srilankan Civil War (the inter-ethnic armed conflict initiated by LTTE).

Present Scenario

Srilankan Civil War (1983 – 2009) was an imperative phenomenon not only from the point of view of the country but from the perspective of her international relationship as well. The Western world and the neighbouring countries of Srilanka accused Srilankan governmentof violating human rights during the civil war and economic sanctions against Srilanka were imposed. This volatile situation created agapin Srilanka's international economic relations that prompted China to take the opportunity toextendits moral supportfor Srilankan governmentthrough exercising her veto power in UN Security Council. Furthermore, China sent sophisticated military equipments to Srilanka to combat the civil war that strengthened the bond between these two countries (De Silva, 2015).Sri Lanka received USD 75 million worth of Chinese arms shipments in 2008, which was only USD 10 million in 2006 (Perera, 2013). Since 2009, China made huge investments in the reconstruction works of the Northern and the Eastern Provinceof Srilanka.For a long time China was eyeing to establish its economic and military dominance in the periphery of Indian Oceanand beyond,that gave birth to the terms like "*String of Pearls*" and "*Maritime Silk Route (MSR)*". *String of Pearls* indicatesChina's growing geopolitical influence in the region starting from Chinese Mainland to Port Sudan that includes Pakistan, Srilanka, Bangladesh, Maldives and Somalia. In the words of Major General P. P. De Silva of Ministry of Defence, Srilanka, "Sri Lankan geo-strategic importance has increased due to at least a few factors - Sri Lanka's proximity to the busiest international maritime route, as well as epicentre of key choke points of Indian Ocean region namely Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Aden, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Sunda, Strait of Lombok, Strait of Madagascar and Arabian Sea".

One of the major investments made by China in recent years is in Hambantota which is situated in the Southern Province of Srilanka. Hambantota is being developed as a *Special Economic Zone*and a major transshipment hub that will include an international container port, a bunkering system, an oil refinery, an international airport and other related facilities. The estimated cost is USD $1 billion out of whichExim Bank of China is financing 85% of the project(at a fixed interest rate of 6.3%) and the rest by the Srilanka Ports Authority.The work was started in the year 2008 which is supposed to be completed by 2018.The first phase of the port was opened for operation in November 2010, which was five months ahead of schedule. In September 2014, Sri Lanka granted China Merchants Holdings International and CCCC (Chinese state-owned companies) operating rights to four berths at the Hambantota Port, providing them with nearly 65% share in the project.The port willcover 16 square kilometers of land and willbe able to berth 33 vessels at a time after completion of all the phases, which would make it the biggest container port in South and South East Asia and serve ships travelling along one of world's busiest shipping lines - the east-west shipping route.Here it is to be noted that the largest fleets by flag of registration in 2014 are Panama, followed by Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Hong Kong (China) and Singapore. Together these top five registries account for 56.5 per cent of the world tonnage. Singapore is the world's second largest container terminal after Shanghai in terms of throughput (UNCTAD, 2014).Chinese company China Huanqiu Contracting and Construction Corporation has been given the contract to build an USD80 million liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) terminal for Sri Lanka's Laugfs Gas at Hambantota port – the terminal will have storage capacity of 30,000 tons with provision to expand up to 45,000 tons and to accommodate very large gas carriers.The terminal can serve some of the largest emerging LPG markets like Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, and East Africa.

Another equally important China funded project, which is eventually the largest foreign funded investment in the records of Srilanka, is the "Colombo Port City Project", the estimated cost of which is USD 1.4 billion. For this venture 233 Hectares of land was given on free hold basis to *China Harbor Engineering Corporation*by the previous Srilankan government of former President Mahinda Rajapaksha, which created a lot of uproar and negative criticism within Srilanka and the project got suspended. However, the newly elected government of Srilanka revived the project by changing the land ownership clause by offering the land on a 99-year lease. In August 2013 China opened the Colombo International Container Terminal, a $500 million port of which 85% is owned by a Chinese merchant company, to serve as a hub between Singapore and Dubai. This project will help Colombo to handle the transshipment traditionally performed by ports in Malaysia, Singapore and Dubai.

Chinese construction firms are actively participating in the development of Srilanaka's highways and expressways. The E03 expressway is built by China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC). EXIM Bank of China funded USD 248.2 million of the total cost of the project which is USD 292 million, whereas the government of Srilanka funded only USD 45 million. MCC is also constructing the 9.2 km third phase of the E02 expressway.The EXIM bank of China also provided a loan of USD 278.2 million for the construction of Matara-Kataragama via Hambantota Rail Track Project in the year 2012.

Sri Lanka offered block licenses to China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for oil explorationat Mannar Basin and the work has started.A 900 MW coal-fired power plant was established at Norocholai in Srilanka with Chinese collaboration. The Srilankan Ministry of Power and Energy stated that the first phase of the 300 MW Unit was funded by the EXIM Bank of China by providing a loan of USD 450 million of which USD 300 million was at 2% interest rate and the rest was at 6% interest rate, whereas the Sri Lankan government contributed USD 36.28 Million as its contribution to the project. The second stage of the project comprising two further 300MW units was estimated to cost USD 891 Million, which was also funded by a soft loan from EXIM Bank of China. The plant experienced repeated technical faults and shutdowns and was at the height of controversy.China

National Aero Technology Import-Export Corporation is helping the Srilankan government to create an Aircraft Maintenance Centre, the possible location may be either Katunayake or Mattala or Trincomalee.Apart from funding highly capital intensive strategic infrastructure development, China has also extended financial assistance for establishment of various centres of social importance. Beijing Institute of Architectural Design designed an internationally acclaimed auditorium Nelum Pokuna (inaugurated in 2011),the construction of which amounted to USD 2.05 Million, and it was entirely funded by Chinese government.

Indo-Srilanka Economic Relation

India maintained a moderate economic relation with Srilanka since independence of both the countries. The recent data reflects that among the South Asian countries to which India exports, the share of export to Srilanka is highest. In the year 2014-15 the volume of export of India to her South Asian neighbours was 6.3 percent among which the percentage share of Srilanka was 2.1 (Economic Survey, 2014-15). Another important economic-relationship indicator is the flow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between countries.The trend of FDI flow from India to Srilanka has shown more or less increasing trend from USD 18 million to USD 52 million during the period 2005 to 2014. It showed a sharp increase in the year 2008 that sustained till the year 2012, but it took a plunge since 2013. The following table shows the same.

Table 1: FDI Flow from India to Srilanka

Year	USD (in million)
2005	18
2006	27
2007	43
2008	126
2009	78
2010	110
2011	147
2012	160
2013	51
2014	52

Source: Central Bank of Srilanka

During the period 1978 to 1995 the largest source of FDI to Srilanka was South Korea followed by Hong Kong and Japan. After 1995 Malaysia, UK and India took the lead and in the year 2010 India became the most prominent figure (Sahoo et al, 2014). Till 2010 the major components of FDI inflow in Srilanka was for Manufacturing, Infrastructure, Telecommunication and Service sectors. The situation started to change from 2010-11 and the FDI inflow from China to Srilanka showed a considerable rise that amounted to 24 percent of Srilanka's total FDI receipt (World Investment Report, 2015). The major part of the Chinese investment came for developing transport sector and ports. It is evident that China is investing in the strategic sectors in Srilanka which are very important to establish the former's military power in South Asian regions and controlling the maritime trade. As Indian ports are mostly shallow and lack the infrastructure for larger ships, they handle the boxes carried by feeder ships to and from these hubs, where bigger vessels dock. Colombo's new capacity to handle large ships allows it to cater to the bulk of Indian cargo as it is closest to the vast South Asian markets. The nearest Indian port is 175 nautical miles away from Colombo port.

India and Sri Lanka signed several bilateral trade agreements over the last 40 years – Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) in 1975, South Asian Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) in

1995 and South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) in 2006. In December 1998 India and Srilanka signed a Free Trade Agreement known as "Indo-Srilanka Free Trade Agreement" (ISFTA) that came into effect on the year 2000.This trade agreement was criticized by Srilankan industrial and service sectors on the ground that it was majorly in favour of India. Between the year 2003 and 2014 the percentage increase of Indian exports (in terms of value) to Srilanka was 269.60, whereas the percentage increase of Srilankan exports to India and world were 159.34 and 115.16 respectively according to the data from Srilanka Export Development Board.None of the three treaties among APTA, SAPTA and SAFTA benefitted Srilanka in terms of her trade balance (Mukherjee, 2013). India further proposed in the year 2008another agreement namely "Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement" (CEPA) in place of ISFTA to liberalize visible and invisible trade, FDI and free movement of labour. But in face of the protest within the country Srilankan governments refused to sign CEPA since 2010.

Conclusion

China is the second largest oil consumer and the largest oil importer of the world, and her oil consumption is growing at an annual rate of approximately 5.8%. Oil is the most important factor to meet China's domestic energy demand and she imports oil majorly (almost 70%) from the Gulf States and Africa.Consequently, Chinatriedto develop oil fields in Iran and to build a pipeline, a refinery, and a port in Sudan for facilitating her oil import. But severe political unrest and profuse corruption in those regions has compelled China to develop alternative infrastructure elsewhere and her attention has been directed towards Srilanka.Srilanka,situated at the strategic position between the Straits of Malacca and Hormuz, lies at the intersection of the important maritime routes for trade and oil in the Indian Ocean region - through which passes 70% of the global oil traffic and 50% of container traffic. The Hambantota port of Srilanka has achieved a lot of importance within a short period of time. On an average thirty six thousand ships including four thousand five hundred oil tankers are catered by this port annually. In fact, port Hambantota in Srilanka and a deep-water port near the mouth of the Persian Gulf at Gwadar in Pakistanare two important strategic locations in China's huge USD 46 billion *China-Pakistan Economic Corridor* project developed in accordance with her "String of Pearls" policy.

Maritime trade through a port is also very important for the financial market of the concerned country as it is directly related with the Maritime Insurance market. According to *Global Marine Trends 2030* published by Lloyds Register, Seaborne trade is projected to double by the year 2030. China is among the top five countries in the world in terms of its share of maritime insurance premium during the period 2008 – 2014 (Oxera, 2015). India will fast loose this market to Srilanka if the former does not upgrade her port facilities to facilitate maritime trade in the Indian Ocean region.

It is evident that a chasm is being created between India and one of her closest neighbours who was once a close ally.Relation between India and Srilanka is strained perennially over the problems related to the fishermen of both the countries fishing in the troubled water of Palk Strait.Moreover, India has raised concern over her naval security as the maritime trade route along the coastline of Srilanka would allow the submarines of China to dock along that route. India has also raised voice against the Aircraft Maintenance Centre proposed to be built by China at the eastern Srilankan port city of Trincomalee (only 277.2 Nautical miles away from Chennai, Tamilnadu), which might pose a national security threat to India.It is high time for India to improve her social, cultural diplomatic and trade relation not only with Srilanka but with all her Indian Ocean neighbours as well. Government of India has initiated the process in recent times, but it should be carried out at a faster pace. There is no time to lose as the "String of Pearls" policy of China is completely encircling the Indian coastline which will have far reached consequences on Indian national security as well as maritime trade and related business.

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The Hermeneutics of the Post 9/11 Neoconservatism and the Issues of Global Justice: A Philosophical Perspective

Kalyanasis Bhattacharya

Assistant Professor of Political Science, Keshiary Government College, West Midnapore, West Bengal.

ABSTRACT

The primary purpose of this article is to show various intricate aspects of U.S foreign policy after 9/11 disaster which moves on a neoconservative promotion of retributive justice and how the violence perpetrated by the American government through the post 9/11 'War against Terror' called forth a wave of sympathy and a clarion call of 'global justice' for the victims from all quarters of the globe. It will be argued that this sympathy and emergence of an international community seeking justice can be read as a sign, in the way that Immanuel Kant read the enthusiasm for the French Revolution. The significance of 9/11 lies in the sympathy it revealed and in the sense of justice that was immediately active in the reaction of people around the globe. Democracy relies on a certain kind of community. That community is at risk more from the steady erosion of its values than from external violence. But this sense of community can suddenly emerge as a robust force due to excessive violation of human rights in certain contexts. This paper will also concentrates on the relation between democracy and community, referring to the aftermaths of 11 September 2001.

Keywords: Neo Conservatism, Global Justice, Philosophy, US.

There are some significant recent works of various contemporary commentators on the U.S foreign policy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the emergence of 'global justice' for the victims from all quarters of the globe after the declaration of the 'war against terror' which must be mentioned in this context. In *Jihad vs. McWorld* (2001) Benjamin Barber explores the alarming repercussions of this potent dialectic and in his new introduction sketches a democratic response to terrorism[1]. Here he compares violent fundamentalism on the one hand, on the other unbridled capitalism. Both are a consequence of globalization; indeed, McWorld is often equated with it. Benjamin Barber's influential analysis of the war between 'McWorld and Jihad' is often cited in the context of post-9/11 violence; but its central concern is actually with the condition of civil society - its mission is to prevent democracy falling victim to either side, or to the war between them. His another book *Fear's Empire: War, Terrorism, and Democracy* (2003) is a hard-hitting but pragmatic new critique of the Bush administration's foreign policy[2]. Benjamin R. Barber exposes in detail the folly of an agenda of preventive war, placing it in the context of two hundred years of American strategic doctrine (including the recent history of deterrence and containment).

Robert Kagan's *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (2003) forces both sides to see themselves through the eyes of the other[3]. Europe, he argues, has moved beyond power into a self-contained world of laws, rules, and negotiation, while America operates in a "Hobbesian" world where rules and laws are unreliable and military force is often necessary. Tracing how this state of affairs came into being over the past fifty years and fearlessly exploring its ramifications for the future, Kagan reveals the shape of the new transatlantic relationship.

While Bruce Lincoln's *Holy Terrors: Thinking about Religion after September 11* (2003) is tempting to regard the perpetrators of the September 11th terrorist attacks as evil incarnate[4]. But their motives, as Bruce Lincoln's acclaimed *Holy Terrors* makes clear, were profoundly and intensely religious. Thus what we need after the events of 9/11, Lincoln argues, is greater clarity about what we take religion to be.

The Spirit of Righteous Struggle and the Spirit of Revenge

Let us begin our discussion by describing a cartoon by Riber Hansson which shows the United Nations Building in New York City with a large airplane in front of it, aimed directly at it, on the verge of smashing into it some ten stories below the top - in fact, precisely as the first airliner struck the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001. On the wing of the airplane is painted an American flag, on the side it reads: "United States of America." The image captures multiple aspects of the disillusion over US foreign policy since 9/11, and particularly in the period leading up to the US invasion of Iraq. Its comparison of that policy with the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center is perhaps tasteless, but it also draws out the causal relations between the two. US foreign policy changed after 9/11, in great part as a result of 9/11, and now seems to reproduce the destruction of international institutions. Citizens of over 80 countries died at the WTC during the attacks, and the building administered trade on a global scale, yet the response was directed exclusively, unilaterally, by the United States. Naming the assault an "attack against America" (as the American media did) marks the first step on the way to unilateralism. The second is President Bush's (2001) injunction: "Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists." The third is the decision, in spite of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's invocation of Article 5, collective self-defence, to fight Operation Enduring Freedom with a "coalition of the willing and able[5]". The fourth is the imprisonment of captured terrorists at Guantanamo Bay where neither the Geneva Conventions nor US law would apply. The culmination of this process is waging war on Iraq in the spring of 2003. The war divided the United Nations' Security Council as well as the NATO. Bush Administration claimed that the U.N's refusal to endorse this 'war on terror' rendered the institution useless. This response raises the question of overreaction. According to Mark Juergensmeyer:

What the perpetrators o f such acts [as 9/11] expect - and indeed welcome, is a response as vicious as the acts themselves. By goading secular authorities into responding to terror with terror, they hope to accomplish two things. First, they want tangible evidence for their claim that the secular enemy is a monster. Second, they hope to bring to the surface the great war - a war that they have told their potential supporters was hidden, but real[6].

The overreaction would be the invasion of Iraq, justified as part of the war against terror but without substantial evidence either that Saddam Hussein supported Al-Qaeda or that his regime had acquired weapons of mass destruction with which to threaten the United States. Arguably, the Third Gulf War had two negative effects: first, it weakened the apparatus of world order; second, it led to increased support for the terrorists. The logic of 9/11 according to this understanding is the logic of the agent provocateur, a revolutionary who uses violence to prepare the ground for the overthrow of the existing order through the (psychological) manipulation of his enemy. Once roused to lust for vengeance, or terrorized into demanding unreasonable guarantees of security, the ancient regime becomes the instrument of its own destruction.

A second question concerns the performance of sovereignty. Bruce Lincoln remarks on the symmetric dualism of President Bush and Osama bin Laden: "Both men constructed a Manichean struggle, where Sons of Light confront Sons of Darkness, and all must enlist on one side or another, without possibility of neutrality, hesitation, or middle ground[7]." The two adversaries are not equals, at least not on the terms normally recognized in the foreign policy of the United States, or in the practices of sovereign states generally. The President speaks for a nation, or at least a state; Bin Laden claims to speak on behalf of a community of believers, the *Umma* that (even if

Bin Laden's claim were accepted) has no formal or legal status within the world of sovereign states (the Westphalian system). President Bush did not accord to the terrorists the status of an equal, not legally and certainly not morally; but his construction of the 'War against Terror' as the central feature of global political life for some time to come does concede near equality in terms of power, and confers on the enemy the prestige of defining the era. Note that President Bush's challenge - "either you are with us or you are with the terrorists" - is addressed to other states. The overwhelming majority of them were not involved in the events of 9/11 and so, according to the logic of the Westphalian system, are under no obligation to become involved in the response. This is curious: that the President of the United States would speak of terrorists as more or less equal but would casually deny the formal equality of sovereignty to other countries. The Bush Administration's argument regarding internment at Guantanamo is also curiously out of step with Westphalian notion of justice. Since neither national nor international law was said to apply to the prisoners, in effect the Bush administration claimed that the base was outside the territorial order of sovereign states. The severity of the situation apparently mandates the suspension of the practices of sovereignty.

International relations was in a state of emergency. While the US government was prepared to set aside the territoriality principle and insisted on maintaining a conservative and aggressive strategy towards everybody and the UNO which plays a major role as a peace making body, failed to prevent 9/11. Hesitant, the Security Council interfered with the conduct of the War against Terror and US foreign policy is stung by the terrorist attacks not into an irrational overreaction but into vigorous action. We can call this the neoconservative perspective. It holds that reform should have been undertaken earlier, might even have prevented 9/11, but at least at this time may be undertaken with sufficient energy to yield results. Terrorist violence, while intended to harm America, has a positive effect: it awakens the spirit of righteous struggle in the American people. The idea of the 'righteous struggle' has been borrowed from Georges Sorel, who in 1906 reflected on violence as the catalyst of revolution. Few ideas are borrowed from Sorel (1941, 88-91) namely the insights as the transformative function of violence on a population that has become complacent.

Revenge as the Source of Violence

Bruce Lincoln reminds that Bin Laden (and Bush) draws on the chiliastic vision of a final confrontation between good and evil. But "Bin Laden was actually quite concrete in identifying his chief grievance"[8]. According to the videotaped address of 7 October 2001: "I swear to God that America will not live in peace before peace reigns in Palestine, and before all the army of infidels depart the land of Muhammad, peace be upon him"[9] and according to the Declaration of War document of Al-Qaeda: "The people of Islam had suffered from aggression, iniquity, and injustice imposed on them by the Zionist-crusaders alliance and their collaborators, to the extent that the Muslims' blood became the cheapest and their wealth as loot in the hands of the enemies[10]." Concretely, the videotaped address identifies the occupation of Palestine by Israel and the presence of US military forces in the Arabian peninsula, or the imposition of infidel rule over the lands of Islam (*dar al-Islam*), as the grievance. 'The Declaration of War' names rather the injustices suffered by the members of the *umma*, the community of believers. The distinction does not imply a contradiction, as the *dar al-Islam* naturally belongs to the *umma*: the 'Declaration' names occupation as one of the main injustices suffered by the community of believers.

The World Trade Center and the Pentagon symbolize more than US foreign policy. According to Benjamin Barber (2001, 205), the opposition between familiar location and "alien" rule or corruption precisely defines Jihad.' Indeed, the Islamists' nemesis resembles McWorld[2];

Jahiliyyah always takes the form of a living movement in a society and has its own leadership, its own concepts and values, and its own traditions, habits, and feelings. It is an organized society and there is a close cooperation and loyalty among its individuals, and it is always ready

and alive to defend its existence, consciously or unconsciously. It crushes all elements that seem to be dangerous to its personality[11].

Jahiliyyah refers to the Arab resistance against Muhammad and Islam. The example of the Prophet and his Companions is a staple of fundamentalism: this is the pure faith which has to be restored in order to redeem the *umma* from its current state of corruption. But Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), a founding father of modem Islamism, also returned to this example in order to discover a political strategy. The first thing to note is that Qutb guards against underestimating his enemy, which he describes as vital in itself. The second, that he externalizes resistance so that it becomes a corporate body of its own rather than a (corrupted) part of the community of the faithful; this suggests that it should be excised rather than cured. The third point of note seems to contradict the second: *Jahiliyyah* exerts a power of persuasion or seduction. The crux is a radical view of apostasy that sees whoever adopts the codes and behaviours of the *jahiliyyah* as having become heathen; such a person leaves the *umma* (and its rights and protections) and joins another society. Nevertheless, if there is "close cooperation and loyalty between its individuals," it is because these - (lapsed) Muslims as well as Westerners - embrace its codes voluntarily. That is to say, *de facto* apostasy is the main problem facing Islam in this era. On the Islamist view, power is the main seduction: the first *Jahiliyyah* consisted of the Meccan elites, its modern counterpart derives its attraction from the successes of Western civilization." So "the United States becomes the contemporary incarnation of *jahiliyyah* ..."[12] .That is, the United States becomes the centre of gravity in two senses. First, it is the source of the greatest attraction. Second, it is the place where the seduction of power is most vulnerable. A victory at the centre of gravity seems designed to end or reduce seduction. It stages a direct confrontation between the faithful and the infidel" in order to inspire the faithful. This is propaganda by deed: "Their (those who planned and executed the attacks of September 11) point was not so much to kill people, destroy buildings, and shatter defences (although their results along those lines were hardly negligible), but to show the world how awesome was the form of power they - and they alone – possessed[13]".

'Realist' Europe versus Neoconservatism of America

Criticism of US foreign policy after 9/11 came both from domestic opponents of the administration and from foreign sources, including traditional allies. Significantly, these criticisms were substantially the same: that a terrorist attack hardly justified an invasion; that a 'War against Terror' conducted as a military operation, or series thereof, would not be effective; that measures to ensure domestic security jeopardized civil liberties; that unilateralism hampered diplomatic efforts to build an anti-terrorist coalition; and that the war against Iraq was unjust and distracted from the struggle against Al-Qaeda. It is likely that domestic critics borrowed insight from foreign commentators and vice versa, and both drew strength from the knowledge of each other's support - just as foreign and domestic defenders of Bush's policies mutually borrowed arguments and evidence. One consequence of these reciprocal relationships is the connection between the parliamentary investigations into the *casus belli* (an act or situation that provokes or justifies a war) in the UK and the US.

At the same time, it appears that the reciprocity is incomplete with regard to the reception of criticisms, especially as understood by the American government and public. Analysts have paid particular attention to criticisms from Europe and to a trans-atlantic rift apparently opening up within NATO. Before 9/11, the Bush administration (to name only the most prominent examples) cancelled a proposed ABM treaty, "unsigned" the Kyoto Protocol, and attempted to place American soldiers beyond the reach of the International Court of Justice. Relations with China, considered a strategic competitor by the Bush administration, came under pressure from a series of incidents related to (alleged) espionage, while trade disputes between the US and the European Union escalated, despite arbitration by the World Trade Organization. In the UN Security Council opposition to intervention in Iraq was led by France and Germany. The same, with Belgium, who also

resisted preparation by NATO or possible Iraqi retaliation against Turkey and developed plans for a European military headquarters in order to reduce military dependence on the United States. In reaction the American Congress renamed French fries "freedom fries" while protesters in Washington DC spilled French wine in the streets. The possibility of a "transatlantic rift" was evident.

European criticism of the US foreign policy is an uncomfortable reminder of   solutions other than war. It would be overly simplistic to characterize Europe as idealist and the United States as realist (as suggested by Kagan's reference to Kant and Hobbes; where in IR theory Kant is usually read as the progenitor of idealism, Hobbes as the quintessential realist). Europeans do not generally deny power politics, nor do Americans disavow aspirations to perpetual peace. To the contrary: American presidents (including Ronald Reagan) have made democratic peace theory the cornerstone of their foreign policies, while French politicians (echoing Fenelon) have regularly expressed a preference for multi-polarity as a matter of power politics. The latter example shows the misrepresentation inherent in painting a "European" perspective; but even allowing for generalization, the image of idealist Europe stands in need of corrective, if only because its alternative to current US foreign policy is badly served by the caricature.

"European idealism" finds its application in cooperation between heterogeneous units. European leaders have learned along the way to distinguish between ideal theory and the tortuous road to achieve what ideal theory prescribes. European unification has meant institutional restraint but also gradual cooptation of diverse polities with varying mores and interests and often at variance with each other. Compromise has been a frequent necessity (witness the institutional structure of the EU), moralizing an obstacle. Now, indeed the means proposed and used by the US in the War against Terror are those that realist theories of international relations emphasize, while the means proposed by most European states (the United Kingdom straddling the divide) fit well within idealist theories. However, the reason Europeans prefer these means is not merely that they are peaceful but that they are deemed more effective in the long run: the reconstruction of Afghan government would remove the anarchy in which Al-Qaeda's terrorist organization thrived; upholding international law would halt aggression; and negotiating non-proliferation would reduce the risk of nonconventional war. European restraint in this case can be read as prudence - where the United States in its rush to reach the best jeopardizes the good that has already, painstakingly, been achieved. The European perspective, then, is realist in the sense that it is not satisfied with universal moral schematics but requires concrete causes subjected to substantial analysis prior to action. Prudence is after all a realist virtue.

Relevance of Political Theory in the Military Age of Neoconservatism

In this context, we can invoke Thomas Hobbes to characterize the American perspective. At first sight, this implies no more than that international relations are in a state of anarchy and that states must tend to their security. "Without a common Power to keep them all in awe," as Hobbes (1996, 88) put it, states are left to fend for themselves:

But thought there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a condition of warre against another; yet in all times. Kings, and Persons of Soveraigne authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdomes; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours, which is a posture of War. But because they uphold thereby, the Industry of their Subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the Liberty of particular men[14].

The last sentence is crucial. Without this assurance, international relations would be in the state of nature, in which there is "worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short"[15]. Without this assurance states, like individuals

before them, should commit to a social contract to install an authority above them. This is precisely Benjamin Barber's (2003, 74) argument in *Fear's Empire*: "In binding us to our own fear, terrorists effectively undo the social contract, bringing us full circle back to the Hobbesian 'state of nature'".

Barber's point is that humanity needs a new global social contract. This vision stands in sharp contrast with the advocates of strength and vigilance, who have misread Hobbes:

As a consequence of its lawless anarchy, the state of nature is for Hobbes above all a state of fear - a condition of constant anxiety and performing warfare where violence and conflict are more or less the whole of the human condition. The remedy is not power, which men have in the state of nature, but law and contract, which they lack[16].

To read Hobbes in this fashion, emphasizing the benefits of government over the means by which it makes itself effective, is a useful corrective to the all too common equation of Hobbes with his dreaded state of nature.

But it is also disingenuous: the Hobbesian bargain is harsh, entailing the creation of an overpowering sovereign in exchange for security. The force at the disposal of the sovereign consists in the pooled power of the men who have joined in the social contract but, contrary to his subjects, the sovereign himself is not under contract or law. Above all, it is by force that the sovereign makes himself useful - that is, through the application and threat of violence: "the terrour of some Power, to cause [the Lawes of Nature] to be observed"[17]. Furthermore, the Hobbesian contract is likely to appeal for wrong reasons, and to the same audience that appreciates strength and vigilance so long as the state of nature endures. Barber, like Hobbes, maintains silence on the question of the selection of a sovereign. His (mostly American) audience, however, is likely to view the United States as the necessary guarantor of the contract, and is encouraged in fact by Barber's emphasis on its historical achievements in this regard. The US, on this account, have a proven track record of heroic leadership, stand ready to defend law, justice and contract, and already possess much of the requisite military force and governmental acumen necessary to lead the world to order. As the candidate that most displays aptitude to use force effectively, the United States might see itself in the role of the sovereign.

Historically, *Leviathan* is a defence of monarchy at a time of civil war. Its reinstatement at the present time also has the risk of becoming an apology for absolutism; more than that: it implies that a global civil war is underway. Indeed, the Hobbesian bargain would not be attractive if the alternative were not 'war of all against all'. This overstates the impact of terror attacks even on the scale of 9/11, which after all left no less than 3000 dead. For Hobbes, every man is a potential aggressor and is to be feared at every moment - the enemy is literally among us. Today's terrorists pose no comparable threat. It is true that in *Leviathan* fear does the work of generating a will to government, but that fear comes from real insecurity; it is a reasonable fear. The fear of terrorism, by contrast, is mediated fear: a psychological effect of televised images which bears only a very tenuous connection to the risk of an attack against oneself or even to the fabric of society. To suggest that the fear of terror could or should now inspire a new social contract, then, is literally unreasonable.

Nevertheless, the invocation of Hobbes by such divergent thinkers as Barber and Kagan (who both have other reasons than terrorism to do so) is significant. Hobbes' state of nature is the most dire that (canonical) political theory has to offer. Certainly the appeal of this image of global affairs is the result of 9/11; if the comparison is unreasonable, that only testifies to the depth of the psychological impact of the attacks.

Securing Global Democracy through the Construction of an International Community

In *Jihad vs. McWorld*, Barber's understanding of democracy becomes clear in the final chapter, "Securing Global Democracy": "Democracy is not a universal prescription for some singularly remarkable form of government, it is an admonition to people to live in a certain fashion: responsibly,

autonomously yet on common ground, in self-determining communities somehow still open to others, with tolerance and mutual respect yet a firm sense of their own values[18]." In terms of political practice, civil society is key, not the fashion of electoral, legislative or executive systems; all these are bound to fail unless inhabited by the spirit of an informed and active public. Perhaps because the West presently supports the export of democracy only in the procedural sense (and combined with an unfettered market which, in Barber's understanding, undermines it), Barber's is a particularly strong version of the argument for civic democracy. Civil society is what must save democracy from the twin threat of McWorld and Jihad.

The partisans of Jihad are right to insist on community, those of McWorld to insist on freedom; but both operate on flawed, even perverse, understandings of the virtues they claim to promote. Barber insists, therefore, on a public which combines their virtues without succumbing to their failures. At the end, Barber's definition answers to the definition of the political condition, namely "a necessity for public action, and thus for reasonable public choice, in the presence of conflict and in the absence of private or independent grounds for judgment[19]". Each of the terms or clauses of this definition merits comment: that public action is broader than government, that reason does not constrict as rationality does, that public choice refers to deliberation as much as to decision-making, that conflict renders politics an art instead of a panacea, that the absence of an independent ground implies an anti-foundationalist philosophy. Let us note, then, that both anti-foundationalism and reason (as opposed to rationality) sit well with Humean scepticism. Barber's, too, is an appeal to an experience rather than to some abstract ideal. If Barber postulates the importance of 'public', Hume starts off from cooperation. Furthermore, the difference is one of emphasis: Barber too like Hume locates politics in the domestic scene as defined by a public that acts and feels as a "we."

Dismantling Distance: Creation of a Global Sense of Community

The American reaction to 9/11 had two striking effects: the first, apparent domestic unity in opposition to a common threat; the second, discord among traditional allies. Domestically, a rally around the flag erased the political divisions over the legitimacy of George W. Bush's election to the presidency. A patriotic consensus allowed President Bush to carry out his program, including sizeable and controversial tax cuts. Under the "USA PATRIOT" Act the powers of police and other government agencies were expanded and the legal rights of suspected terrorists severely limited; at the same time foreigners arrested outside the US were detained at the Guantanamo Bay naval base in order to deny them judicial review, the government arguing before the Supreme Court that the base (on Cuba) was outside the jurisdiction of US courts. Internationally, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on 12 September 2001 invoked Article 5, collective self-defence, for the first time in its 50 year history.

But NATO soon saw itself relegated to the sidelines when the United States opted to fight Operation Enduring Freedom with a "coalition of the willing and able". The Bush Administration's decision to go to war with Iraq during the fall of 2002 and spring of 2003 divided NATO as well as the United Nations' Security Council. The US failed to win the approval of the Security Council, waging war with few allies.

"Democracy," writes Dewey, "is the idea of community life itself[20]" That is, it is to be found in every aspect of public behaviour, in every sphere of activity. Democracy does not arise as a consequence of a particular organization of the public; it is itself the organizing force - the agency behind the passive voice in the description of public and *populus*, the agency also that ensures that officials (whether political or otherwise) serve the community. Precisely: democracy is the idea that renders the public itself capable of organizing as a *populus*. Democracy, then, regulates the formation of the state apparatus, as the second step in the derivation of the state. Properly understood and properly executed, it would also regulate arrangements and institutions in other spheres. To serve these functions, democracy should itself arise during the first step. What this means is that a public should carry the idea of democracy within it already at the point of its emergence out of the mass of individuals indirectly affected by any particular set of transactions.

But what is democracy? Dewey does not let it stand at the rather nondescript "idea of community life itself but equates it with the slogans of the French Revolution; Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, which he defines as follows:

In its just connection with communal experience, fraternity is another name for the consciously appreciated goods which accrue from an association in which all share, and which give direction to the conduct of each. Liberty is that secure release and fulfilment of personal potentialities which take place only in rich and manifold association with others: the power to be an individualized self making a distinctive contribution and enjoying in its own way the fruits of association. Equality denotes the unhampered share which each individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated action. It is equitable because it is measured only by need and capacity to utilize, not by extraneous factors which deprive one in order that another may take and have[21].

Each of these principles refers to the place of the individual in relation to social or communal activity. Dewey's individualism is unmistakable, but so is his emphasis on the community as the locus of individual fulfilment. The keys are associated action, which is not the same as government, and the actualization of personal potentialities, which is not the same as the exercise of individual rights. In certain circumstances a political regime based on the notion of rights can contribute to this goal by freeing the individual from undue constraints; in other circumstances a political regime based on the notion of duty would be more helpful as it induces the individual to productive association. These principles cannot simply be applied politically, then; but they can guide a public in its evaluation of existing and potential officials and institutions by providing standards against which they can be measured. Still, democracy according to this conception, does involve requirements, and does create entitlements, both at the level of the individual and at the level of the public:

From the standpoint of the individual it consists in having a responsible share according to capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to need in the values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint of the groups, it demands liberation of the potentialities of members of a group in harmony with the interests and groups which are common[22].

Now Barber's definition of strong democracy can be read as a neat summation of this ideal, if not as beautifully stated then perhaps more complete with regard to its ontological and epistemological suppositions. (I have already demonstrated Dewey's share in the formulation of these suppositions.) "Strong democracy" approaches, even in its dual formulation, fulfilment of the twin requirements o f the democratic ideal according to Dewey: the process of self-legislation corresponds to the responsible share, the capabilities o f the community to the harmonious liberation of the member's potentialities. Barber seemingly reverses the relation between democracy and the public, stating that strong democracy creates its own public. But Dewey also makes democracy the moving principle of his public; and where the public in Barber is already politicized, when it becomes explicitly politicized as a *populus* in Dewey, it is also already infused with democracy. That is, where Barber uses the term "public" he intends a politicized population which Dewey would call a *populus*, and when, according to Dewey, democracy creates its own *populus*, that collective would now, and according to Barber, be called a public.

Indeed, community consists in this awareness: "Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated as good by all singular persons who take part in it, and where the realization of the good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it, there is in so far a community[23]". Community is here distinct from society, which consists in the mere awareness of indirect consequences and the effort to regulate, as opposed to appreciation and the effort to realize. Yet if community implies the will to association, that only raises the bar for self-awareness: society sticks together, when it does, due to organization to care for indirect consequences; but community sticks together because it wants to stick together.

Globalization radically transforms our social environment. By deterritorializing the interactions among individuals, private and public organizations, it not only complicates the life of existing communities (states) but also calls into being a new community. David Hume taught that justice applies within a cooperative scheme. This cooperative scheme is becoming global rather than domestic now-a-days. Rather than international, it is becoming trans-national. The consequence of globalization is that the citizens of one country increasingly visualize an idea of justice for the subjects of another country that formerly applied only within the boundary of their own nation. This fundamental transformation in political consciousness is already becoming manifest in the form of the alter-globalist (rather than anti-globalist) social movement. Where alter-globalism springs up as a common response to the unintended consequences of globalization, globalization in effect fashions a community in the sense meant by John Dewey. Not yet well established, this community is under threat both from particularist fundamentalism (Islamic jihad) and from the re-imposition of state power (under the banner of "War against Terror"). Nevertheless, the primary reaction of the public around the world to the events of 9/11 has been an outpouring of sympathy that accords with the hypothesis of an emerging global community of justice. The geographical extent of the reaction shows the reach of the global cooperative scheme. The intensity of participation on the side of the victims shows the force of the global community for justice.

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India-Kazakhstan Relations: A Perspective of Integrating Near Abroad Session: India's Engagement with Neighbours

Neelu Khoshla

Assistant Professor, Vivek College of Commerce, Mumbai.

ABSTRACT

*In the age of globalization, there is no other way of ensuring the prosperity of the people than increasing ties with the outside world, especially with the neighbours.It is from this realization that Kazakhstan has always spoken in favour of '**Kazakhstan way**'of political and economic transformation, which would take into account the prevailing ground reality as well as the demands of the people.Since the break-up of the former Soviet Union,each country of the Post-Soviet space was given a chance to shape its own model of nation building.Thus Kazakhstan of today is a dynamically developing,market-oriented, multi-ethnic and secular state whose uniqueness is marked with stability.*

The newly independent nation occupies a strategic position in Central Asia and has actively integrated itself into the world trade system.It is rich in hydrocarbon reserves having nearly 89%of the Central Asian Republics coal, oil and uranium and 30% of its gas resources. Under the leadership of President Nazarbayev,it has emerged as a key player in Eurasia and is adopting a policy of maintaining regional interaction between Central Asia and South Asia.

*India is emerging as a powerful economy and is a **reliable partner** in political and economic field for Kazakhstan not only in the region, but also in the world.The diplomatic relations between both nations was established in 1992,which laid a solid foundation for the successful development of bilateral relations.Relations between the two nations are, of course, ancient and historical. They can be characterized as civilization in scope and content, and range.Both nations have substantive cooperation in the multilateral fora,along with trade relations-*

- *Supporting India's aspiration in UN for permanent membership and*
- *Indian support for Kazakhstan's CICA initiative aimed at establishingconfidence-building mechanism in Asia.*
- *Committed to follow secular policies and*
- *To counter fundamentalism, religious extremism and terrorism.*

The paper is an attempt to understandthe relations between the two nations,where the views of both nations coincide and are similar on major domestic and international issuesby way of analyzing their bilateral trade and investment levels. However the scope is much wider, where India can offer expertise in training and education, defence and management, giving a fillip to the bilateral ties.

***Keywords:** Transformation, Reliable Partner, Fundamentalism, Bilateral Trade, Confidence-Building.*

Introduction

Kazakhstan and India have historical, cultural and social links.In this respect the trade and economic ties between the two has its own significance.India was one of the first nations that extended credit line of about $10 millions as economic assistance soon after it became independent. Among the CAS, Kazakhstan is the largest trading partner of India and there are more than 30 Indian firms

and joint ventures operating in various fields such as pharmaceuticals, energy, chemicals and so on. The fourth visit of President Nazarbayev in 2009 culminated in his being the chief guest at India's Republic Day parade, and also reflects on the importance to strategic ties with Kazakhstan.The custom to invite a head of state on such an occasion is to showcase two facets of India –

   i) to provide a glimpse of vast opportunities that exist in Federal India and

   ii) to demonstrate its military capability and strategic attractiveness as a partner.

This was followed by signing of Agreements & MoUs on Nuclear Power cooperation between India and National Company KazAtomprom,an Agreement between ISRO and National Space Agency of Kazakh and another between ONGC Mittal Energy Ltd and National Kazmunai Gas, for cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas.

The Indian high-level delegates have since 1992 maintained political and economic ties with Kazakh nationals.The visits of PMs Mr. NarsimhaRao(1993) and Mr. Manmohan Singh(2011) are steps to strengthen the ties.The recent visit of Indian PM Narendra Modi in 2015, affirms healthy relations between the two nations,wherein they inked agreements on defence, railways, sports, uranium supply and to continue civil nuclear cooperation. Kazakhstan continues to affirm its support for India's candidature for a permanent seat in UNSC and India reiterated its support for a non-permanent seat in UNSC for Kazakh in the year 2017-18. To expand trade and investment and an initiative for North–South Transport Corridor for enhanced economic and commercial interaction between the two countries in the days ahead. Both the high level dignitaries have insisted upon joint action on 'TejKadam'basis to handle terrorism and work for peace and harmony in the region.Kazakh not only has been able to preserve peace and stability in the country, but equally important, has emerged as a significant economic and political actor in the Central Asianand the CIS region. For cultural exchange, the new youth programs have been launched with six Kazakh Universities.

The paper analyses the dynamics and potential of trade between India and Kazakhstan It attempts to understand state of trade and commercial policies in the two countriesand the extent of trade that takes place as a result of official efforts and consequent trade agreements. The paper focuses on the potential of trade with reference to energy, technology sector and in recent years the supply of mineral resources, with specific mention to uranium. The conclusion highlights the shortage of institutional and logistic infrastructure to facilitate more trade among the nationsto emerge as strong partner in the region and also in the world.As India's economy grows there would be requirement for energy and natural resources.The region is immensely attractive for forging a mutually beneficial cooperative relationship.The foreign policy is based on a shared commitment to open and progressive societies,secularism and democracy.

India and Central Asia

The relations between India and Central Asiain the context of the whole regionhave to be located in geopolitical context of the whole region. The region, from the early 1990's, has faced threats from religious extremism and terrorism. It was also described as a region, where a "new great game" would keep on disturbing stability within and around.Additionally from India's point of view,growing threat of international terrorism and Pakistan's search for "strategic depth"in Afghanistan and Central Asiavis a vis India were synonymous.The stability and territorial integrity of multi-cultural and pluralistic states like Russia,China and Central Asian States is vital to India's national interest,since any instability in those would directly impinge on India's territorial integrity and social harmony.The growing needs of India pushes it to search for energy security, which requires both sources and also routes for transportation.The Central Asian states are important potential partners.In economic field, India finds it ascomplementary to expand tradeand investment ties with the Central Asian nations. India has been active in combating International terrorism right since the days of Taliban in power in Afghanistan. It cooperated with Russia and central Asian nations to sustain the Northern Alliance, which continued to deny the Taliban total control over Afghanistan. The Alliance also helped to create a buffer between Taliban controlled alliance areas and Central Asia.With the defeat of Taliban two of India's major worries have been addressed up to some extent:

- Pakistan's influence over Afghanistan and beyond
- The threat of growing belt of fundamentalism that would sponsor cross-border terrorism.

The area of Wazirastan (an area where by an agreement with Pakistan Government conceded no military activities against Al Qaeeda and the Taliban) allows terrorist to consolidate. Such situations demand greater efforts on part of India to cooperate with CAS in the security sphere. Kazakhstan is the member of both CSTO and SCO could become a vital partner in looking after India's concern. In fact Kazakhstan has been one of the most persuasive factors in moving India closer to the SCO [1].

Since 2002 the relations between the two nations are satisfactory,and both are working together for the progress of Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building measures in Central Asia (CICA). Kazakhstan's initiative indicates a strong desire to involve India in a more integrated security framework as a stabilizing force in Central Asia.

On the economic front despite economic barriers since 2004, Kazakhstan is India's largest trading partner,with two-way trade on the rise.Both are looking for opportunities to develop bilateral trade beyond mechanical, engineering, pharmaceuticals and defence sectors, where cooperation is already growing.India is involved in various constructive projects in the region, both the nations have also established a forum not only to cooperate in fight against terrorism but also for early action in finalizing agreements in military and technical cooperation.This cooperation envisages joint ventures of military hardware suchas torpedoes and heavy gun barrels.Kazakhstan also cooperates in India's space programme by allowing India to the launch of Indian satellite from its territory (Baikanourcosmodrome operated by Russia). In return India agreed to train Kazakh pilots.

The paper is an attempt toIndia's strategic policy towards the CAS should be with a vision of –

- Ensuring access to energy and other resources in neighbourhood,
- Containing and eliminating international terrorism emanating from the region;and
- Strengthening its influence in the region that can deny strategic depth to its potential adversaries.

To achieve these objectives ***India has to carefully calibrate its strategy of involvement in Central Asia.*** Recent visit of PM Modi to Kazakhstan reinstated the need to work together to take economic ties to new levels.

The two sides inked five agreements on- defence, railway, uranium supply, sports and transfer of sentenced prisoners after talks held in July 2015. Kazakhstan is one of the first nations with which India launched Civil Nuclear Cooperation through uranium purchase contract. A second contract is signed indicates that nuclear cooperation is key pillar of partnership. On cooperation in hydrocarbons sector, India has requested foradditional mature blocks for Indian Investments. The two countries unveiled '*a road map*' to identify and implement concrete projects in various sectors for expanding economic partnership and bilateral investments.

Land and People

Kazakhstan is the ninth largest nation in the world,covering an area of 2.7 million sq km and is the largest of Central Asian nation.It borders Turkmenistan,Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to the south,China to the eastand the Russian Federation to the north.It is also one of the economically prosperous Nation in the region due to its massive oil and natural gas reserves and abundance of minerals and metals.It has varied topography made up of dry steppe,semi-desertsand mountain forests. The UstUrtCaspian Depression and the Ural Plateau form the western and northwestern parts of the Republic. The Tien Peak rests in the east and southeast, leading to the central uplands formed by dried-up salt lakes. In the 18th century, the land was conquered by Russia and underwent Russification. The people attempted to be freed from the sway in 1916 and even in 1921 but were defeated.The land became the centre of agricultural experiment (Virgin Lands) and Soviet citizens from all around the nation helped to transform it into wheat fields.It was the largest producer of sheep and wooland sheep farms were large.The people were nomads and even today large number of them live in mountains and tend horses and flock of sheep.They receive traditional education along with understanding for Russian culture.The land is rich in coal,chromium, uranium, iron ore,lead,cobalt, gold etc. It has attracted many foreign partners to develop the existing mines

It contains the main Soviet test area for nuclear weapons. There are 456 nuclear blasts at the Semipalatinsk site. The area was closed in 1991 due to radioactive range.Russia still uses Baykonur Cosmodrome in Kazakhstan,the principal site for Soviet space launches, and the world's oldest and largest spaceport.During the Soviet period it was an agrarian raw material supplier of the former soviet economy where the military industry played the major role. The sites were developed intensively for extraction of all kinds of mineral wealth.The extracted products of mining,smelting and oil and gas were exported from here and the profit, which was needed for the development of people was not returned to Kazakhstan. During the Soviet period it was transformed into a great industrial and agricultural region. Huge centers of energy, metallurgy, fuel, chemical and machine building industry were built. Now it is the biggest producer of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, uranium, oil,cornand products of stockbreeding.The years of Soviet regime were favourable for the development of its economy with regard to the production of these heavy industries.

The people were the last of the Turkic people of Central Asia to be Islamized, influenced by the Tatars, they chose the Sunni faith and within that the Hanafi schooloflaw.The Islam practiced by them is different and have lost touch with fundamentalism and have an affinity with folk Islam i.e combination of superstition andbeliefinjinns.Nearly one half of the people are Russian. As a legacy the Russian and Kazakh economy complement each other.The ethnic groupsand large number of people are followers of Islam and 23 % are orthodox Roman Christians.The people are characterized by diversity,with almost half of them made up of non-Kazakhs.After the collapse of Soviet Union, the country faced recession that destroyed its industrial sectors.

Polity

There has been a tendency for concentration of power in the Presidency, which has compromised the democratic value of horizontal accountability. Kazakhstan has many ethnic groups and promotesthe democratic institutions,representative and accountable government (members of the national assembly Mejilis, have the right to introduce legislation and the same bill becomes law,

if initiated by legislators), close to Panchayati Raj in India.Most the leaders in CAS nations while building institutions of democracy are able to retain popular support and are aggressively fighting corruption.

India –Kazakhstan

After the collapse of Soviet Union, the Central Asian nations including Kazakhstan underwent a period of turmoil but the leadership of President Nazarbayev put the nation on path of progress and development and also preserved peace and stability. It is one of the largest economy in Central Asia and second largest among the CIS after Russian Federation. Relations between India and Kazakhstan are ancient and historical. It signifies the importance of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Kazakhstan with periodic exchanges of high-level visits, working groups and other institutional mechanism to systematically work towards further developing and strengthening bilateral relations. Both nations are multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic, multi-cultural societies to follow secular policies and to counter fundamentalism and extremism.

Historical

Both the nations have historical, culturaland social links.The first Mughal Emperor was from the region of Kazakhstan and even today poems of one of the Mughal princess are sung here. The Sufi music brings the two nations closer.India's history had been substantially influenced by regional developments in Central Asia.Significantly, during c 77-144AD when Kaniska who was of central Asian origin, founded Kushana dynastyand progressed through relations between British India,Czarist Russia, China and USSR.The Government of India in official documents in addition to the Gregorian calendar uses the Shaka era based on AD 78. In addition to Buddhism, Christianity and Judaism travelled to Central Asia.

The ties can be traced far backas 1500BC when the Indo Aryans migrated from Bactria into northern India through the passes in the Hindukush Mountains. Cultural ties and trade flourished with Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, since ancient times mainly along old silk route.Many stupas and monasteries have been found inMerv. Islam was introduced to Central Asia in 7th centuryespeciallyafter the Arab victory at the battle of Talas (Zambul),in modernKazakhstan. The old Buddhist monasteries were revived as khanqahsand dargahas with some becoming madrassas under new religious leaders known as Sheikhs and Sufis. Within the next two hundred years, a flourishing civilization existed in the southern rim of Central Asia—and it was a rich blend combining elements of classical Greece,Nestorian Christianity, Buddhism and Islam.

Exchanges between India and Central Asia went beyond trade and religion to encompass technology, medicine, astrology and mathematics as well. Alberuni an acknowledged intellectual of Central Asia accompanied Mahmud of Ghazni during his regular raids on India, and spent ten years in India to study the country. During his stay he studiedSanskrit and translatedPatanjali into Arabic. In addition he translated the Elements of Euclid and the Almagest by Ptolemey into Sanskrit. He showed keen interest in Indian mathematics,geography and astronomy.The world famous scholar of medicine Ibn-i-Sina (980-1038) showed keen interest in Indian medical practitioners and system of medicine. Indian works such as CharakSamhita and BheSamhita were popular and translated into Central Asian languages.Indian swords were praised by ForkhiMudabbir as 'esteemed in Central Asia for their high quality'.

Czarist Russia-British Imperial

The decline of Central Asia began with the discovery of the sea route to India by Vasco de Gama in 1498,the rise of Safavid dynasty in Iran under the fervent Shi'l Shah Ismail Safavi.This period also witnessed Babar's invasion of India and establishment of the Mughal Empire. Babar raised a strong force, captured Kabul and finally defeated the Delhi Sultan,Ibrahim Lodi at the battle of Panipat.By the time of his death, the Mughal Empire encompassed parts of southern Tajikistan

and Kabul through Punjab right up to the bordersof Bengal.This landmark and other upheavals in Central Asia had great influence on the history of India.Aurangzeb had his area of reign extended beyond Chennai in the south to Bengal in the east and right up to Kabul and Badakshan in the northwest. Discovery of sea route to India and China in 1498 deprived Central Asia of its historic monopoly over transit route.The Old Silk Route,at one time the principal commercial artery between Europe and East Asia,declined and with it Central Asia as well.Later on Mughals became clients of Marathas and British and Mughal rule was finally abolished in 1857 (Battle of Plassey).The 19th century witnessed the beginning of a new confrontation in the region between imperial powers –British through its colony India and Czarist Russia through the gradual colonization of Central Asia.This animosity manifested as 'great game' or the Russian called it 'Tournaments of Shadow".The Chinese consolidated their sway in eastern Turkestan, and were also players in the game.The Soviet interest after the October revolution was to destroy the British rule in India, if theywanted to end capitalist rule.

After Soviet Collapse

Inthe post independence period the links continued through Indo-Russian ties, as the need for regional stability and not ideological similarities was a common causefor Indo-Russian ties.*The historical lessons learnt are to establish a strategic culture and sustain the national interest.* The formal break-up of the USSR in 1991 ushered geo-political changes whose impact is still being felt at global, regional and sub-regional levels. At the global level it signified the end of Cold war, which George Quester of the University of Maryland claims to be a victory for the west [2].The five independent states of CAS are in close proximity to Jammu & Kashmir, making India re-examine the viability of Vakhan Corridoron one hand and the other is Karakoram Pass.India for diplomatic and economic feasibility needs to maintain relations with the Turkic states.The new geopolitical developments could not be ignored by India as it has led to non-traditional threatsto India's borders,like secessionist militancy in Kashmir,smuggling from CAR into India by tourists, arms trade and illegal drugs etc.These cash-strapped CARs are willing to do anything to revive their economies. Once again the old silk route from Central Asiais the conduit for destabilizing factors.The revival of the route can be for legitimate trade and India has no option but to play its role with the wish to win.

Indo–Kazakhstan Relations

Features of Indian foreign policy: Central Asia has been India's door to outside world and has deeply influenced Indian culture and polity.From the geopolitical and security point of view Himalayas have never been Indian frontier.The central Asia connects Asia to Europe but provides shortest route to Europe and a 55 million strong consumer market.Owing to its rich natural endowment it occupies a special place in Indian foreign policy.It is an area of strategic importance for India;not only on account of its geographical proximity but also because of common challenges they face from radicalism,and extremism. It works to improve the lot of common people by similarity of views in fighting terrorism, drug trafficking and in many otherissues of security.Withmany external forces, India's soft power approach to address the concerns of CAR nations strikes a positive chord.

Looking at the centrality of the region's location, in a changing strategic environment and security alignment, India is stepping up diplomatic ties with a careful watch on emerging challenges. New Delhiis making a concerted effort to further existing ties with all the republics with a view to establishing a peaceful and cooperative framework for the future. The CAR nations continue to have expectations that India will play a major role and consider it as a potential balancing factor to all major players in the region.India had good relations with Russia but is a minor player in the region, due to its access to it.The constraints are access to the region. Given the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan's unwillingness to offer transit facilities to India, the traditional

route is blocked. All routes via Iran are unreliableand not optimal. India can however explore the possibility of linking via China; however, it is with its own challenges as China is interested for greater trade and commerce with the region.

Kazakhstan Foreign Policy

It is second largest in the region and is ethnically heterogeneous State with 130 different nationalities.*R.G Gidadhubali calls it as 'Economic powerhouse of Central Asia.'*It maintains political stability, harmonious interethnic relations and is achieving economic growth. The country was able to overcome many of the constraints and bring about qualitative changein the economy as a result of economic reform policies by the leadership of the country. Thus in contrast to other CAS, Kazakhstan under the leadership of the President NursultanNazarbayev, is an attractive destination for FDI. Firstly because of its huge resources and potentialities and also successfully restructuring its centrally planned economy. The major objectives of policies are:

i. To propose privatization ofstate-owned enterprisesin energy,metallurgy and other sectors have been satisfactory,which gave confidence among several foreign investors for investment in the country.

ii. The policy of decentralization was adopted by the state giving autonomy to 14 administrative regions,for economic growth

iii. Made efforts to create modern banking sectors and financial services for facilitating economic growth,

iv. Favourable investment climate was created by right policy decisions, hence the international experts have recognized that Kazakhstan has achieved the status of market economy,

v. Nazarbeyav has brought about in a pragmatic way the transition towards a secular, capitalist society, while maintaining relatively high level of social cohesion.

vi. Initiative by Leadership and positive approach in enlisting regional cooperation and external assistance such as ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization),CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization),EEC (Eurasian Economic Community), SCO(Shanghai Cooperation Organization), and so on.

vii. Strict code of laws on FDI, whereby guaranteeing equality between domestic and foreign investor, and full protection of the investoras well as the investment.

viii. At the global level, the President cherished a desire to assume a rotational chairmanship of OSCE in 2010, enhancing the importance of the nation both in Europe and in the Central Asian region.

ix. During the last about two decades the nation has received economic assistance from WTO through Systematic Transformation Facility to bring about economic transition to market economy through reforms.

Apart from USA, many of the EU nations are major investors in Kazakhstan - Netherland has an investment of $50 US billions followed by Switzerland through Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Russia and China share border with Kazakhstan and playimportant role in Kazakhstan's political, economic and security fields by bilateral and multilateral ties.

Strategic Partnership: The relations are ancient and have always been warm and friendly. In modern times Pt. Nehru along with Indira Gandhi visited Almaty in 1955 and diplomatic relations were established in 1992. A number of high-level visits since then have laid a solid foundation for a friendly and warm relationship. Foreign office Consultations at the level of Deputy Foreign Ministers are held annually to discuss the entire range of bilateral relations and exchange views on international issues. The India-Kazakh Inter-Governmental Commission established in 1992 has been instrumental in developing bilateral trade, economic, scientific, technological, industrial and cultural cooperation.

The two nations actively cooperate under the *aegis of Multi-lateral fronts*-including CICA, SCO and the UN Organizations. CICA (Confidence Building Measures in Asia) is the only Central Asian Forum of which India is the member. India has not only promised to facilitate Kazakh accession to WTO but also offered to provide training facilities to the officials to deal with WTO matters. Kazakh chaired the OSCE (2010) and OIC (2011) and carried the message to the OIC nations on India's role against terrorism.

Space and Military: A significant agreement related to space research was signed between ISRO and National Space Agency of Kazakhstan. Kazakh expects technology transfer from India in space arena.The interest is to strengthen military ties particularly by boosting its arms exports and aerospace collaboration.The Indian navy is currently equipped with hundreds of Torpedoes that were produced in Kazakh during Soviet era. Both nations have established a forum for 'early action' in servicing and modernizing Kazakh military hardware because a majority of the equipment is of Soviet origin.

Bilateral Trade Relations and Investments

India adopted liberal trade policy from 1991 onwards and the transition from socialistic pattern of society to market economy were practiced through economic reforms. Kazakhstan also started a transition from central planning to market economy since 1992 and began to conduct a market oriented economic reform, starting with liberalization of prices, foreign economic activity and institutional transformations. It enabled the government to continue major, but gradual reform of the foreign trade sector.

The main objective of trade agreement between the two is to promote mutually beneficial trade. It will not only lead to strengthening of bilateral and intra-regional cooperation but will also lead to economic development of trade partners.

India has enjoyed warm relations and it is progressing smoothly over the years. Trade and commerce are considered an important component of expanding multi-faceted partnership relations, where both nations offer opportunities to grow trade with each other. Total trade has more than doubled from 2003 onward.

The main exports from Kazakh consist of mineral products, leather and raw materials, while Indian exports include tea, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, plastic, machinery and equipment. Balance of trade is in favour of Kazakhstan, although this is quite recent due to contribution of an Indian company 'ISPAT' operating there in collaboration with 'KARMAT'. In recent years we find *the mention of nuclear reactors, boilers, mechanical appliances and parts in Kazakh's list of imports* from India. In absolute terms it is not a big amount but there is potential for growth.

A close look at the export commodity profile indicates that the share of traditional products, which constitute a large % of India's total exports, declined over the years, while the share of non-traditional items almost doubled. It is of advantage to both as several new items were added during different trade agreements. India is to enter Kazakh computer market in a big way. India is now concentrating on growing needs of Kazakh for chemicals, IT services, telecommunications and electronics, training specialist in healthcare, environmental technology and tourism.

Source: Export-Import Data Bank Version 7.1; Govt. of India, Min. of Commerce

To promote further investment by creating favourable conditions,both have entered into Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement since1996. There is great scope for joint ventures where the resources can be exploited and converted into value added products.India has made progress in areas such as refining of petroleumand gas, advanced medical products,infrastructure, advanced agriculture related products and IT sector. Many Indian companies are present in Kazakh market such as, Ispat,Karmet,Larsen&Tobro,Punj Lloyd, OVL, Punjab National Bank, and Mittal Steel, and most of them are in the field of trade and infrastructure. Kazakh companies including KazStroyservice (infrastructure), kaspian Shelf(oil exploration), TVL (retail equipment), STL (Transportation and logistic) are also entering the Indian market. The INDIA SHOW-2014, held in Almaty, where over 140 Indian companies such as manufacturing, engineering products,garments, food processing industry mining and handicrafts participated.

The visit of Kazakh President gave an impetus to bilateral ties, where ONGC Videsh Ltd and KazMunaiGaz signed an agreement on Satpayev oil block and MoU between NPCIL and Kazatomprom envisaging cooperation including supply of uranium to India, among others was signed. The relations are now institutionalized. Looking at the wide scope for business the National Economic Chamber 'Atamenken Union'and the confederation of Indian Industry signed an agreement for the development of India-Kazakh cooperation to explore, promote and expand bilateral contracts.

Oil	Total Proven Reserves				Thousand Million Barrels
Country/Period	End of 1994	End of 2004	End of 2013	End of 2014	Share of Total %
Azerbaijan	1.2	7	7	7	0.4
Kazakhstan	5.3	9	30	30	1.8
Turkmeinistan	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.6	0
Uzbekistan	0.3	0.6	0.6	0.6	0

Natural Gas	Total Proven Reserves				Trillion Cubic Meters
	End of 1994	End of 2004	End of 2013	End of 2014	Share of Total %
Azerbaijan	Na	0.9	0.9	1.2	0.6
Kazakhstan	Na	1.3	1.5	1.5	0.8
Turkmeinistan	Na	2.3	17.5	17.5	9.3
Uzbekistan	Na	1.2	1.1	1.1	0.6

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy – June 2015

Energy: India attaches immense importance to Kazakh in the fields of energy security. After Russia, Kazakhstan is the only nation, which is endowed to help India meet its energy needs. This includes nuclear fuel and hydrocarbons.it is going to emerge as number one supplier of uranium in the world. The nuclear agreement signed makes India the fourth country besides US, France and Russia to get uranium for civil energy purposes. The Nuclear Power Corp of India takes its supply from France and Russia also besides Kazakh to produce electricity.

Energy cooperation is limited not only to uranium but also to hydrocarbons. India is ranked sixth in the terms of Energy demand, accounting for 3.5% of Energy demand by its vast majority of Indian population, living in semi-urban and rural areas. Availability of and accessibility to Energy forms a major issue in the National Energy Policy. Kazakh has huge hydrocarbon reserves. It has approximately 30 billion barrels of oil reserves (end of 2014),which could well increase substantially further in 2015. India's Energy Policy suggests two ways: a) to increase the use of

alternative energy; and b) to search for new Energy sources in foreign lands by expanding and exploring in the CIS nations. The recent JV Agreement with Kazakhstan has raised the stake of OVL and its partner OMEL (Mittal Energy Ltd) stake in Satpayev oil field in the Caspian Sea from 10% to 25ᵗ%and rest will be retained by kazMunaigas. It is estimated that the three prospective oil fields Satpayev, Eastern Satpayev and Karina of recoverable deposits, which is equivalent to 1.85 million tons contains upto 253 billion barrels.

Hurdles and Way Ahead

The main obstacle in developing relations is the absence of a direct means of transportation. The trade matters between the two countries have not been isolated from social, political, economic and ideological factors. It is important to note that both the countries are heading towards to deal trade affairs under the WTO regime. Against this the following problems are identified:

- Unstable situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan will remain an obstacle to more productive relations between India and Central Asia;

- India has failed to become an important actor in Central Asia, both in strategic and economic domains, even if compared with Turkey, Iran and Japan;

- India's needs for energy are immense, but its entry into the Caspian Basin remains unsuccessful;

- India's interests in Caspian connectivity remains a major obstacle, as it does not have direct borders with any of the CAS. However, the new Silk Road may bring more potential to Indian Trade.

India's economic and security to be analyzed in larger regional complex that includes like China, Russia andIran.Any *idea of cooperation within a "Greater Central Asia"*needs a cooperative framework of inclusive engagement,a must for regional peace and stability. This would create a conducive political atmosphere to advance economic goals.India should take advantage of the integration processes taking shape on a new basis in Eurasia. India is a partner of Russia and its requirements are being addressed by participating in oil and gas sector. It could also look to access Central Asia through the *Chinese Grids.*The on going process of *trilateral relation* between India and Russia and China holds promises. Russia would like to see these as strong cooperative powers and not as competitors.This would help Asian regional security as well as *create a base for a multi–polar world order.*

President Nazarbayevmentioned *'belt of anticipation',* by a vertical definition of the Eurasian space as a horizontal expanse, to put Kazakhstan at the centre of North-South corridor. India also occupies an integral place in the heartland of the region and is an integral part in the global geopolitical imagination of connectivity between South-Central Asia–Eurasia Linkage for trade and economic growth. . The Corridor is conceived as a Union to promote economic space across the territory of the former Soviet Union.It is not the restoration of the Soviet Union but as a post Soviet construct that loosely resembled the European Union.It has a *vision where a North-South linkage was conceptualized as an alternative transport route that would link Russia, India and Iran.* The Corridor is conceived as stretching from ports in India across the Arabian Sea to the Southern Iranian port of Bandar Abbas, where goods would then transit Iran and the Caspian Sea ports in the Russian sector of the Caspian.From there the route stretches along Volga River via Moscow to northern Europe.Along with Russia, India and Iran this project would subsequently join Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan and other CIS Nations.The membership of Afghanistan in the SAARC and implementation of SAFTA will enhance economic relations amongst India, Afghanistan and Kazakhstan. It may positively influence projects as TAPI and IPI.

Conclusion

India and Kazakhstan's relations have their own significance and it might increase as Kazakhstan has adopted a Vector Development approach, and most of the Asian countries are now insisting upon creating land linking arrangements, and important transit services. At best this can be achieved by reviving the legendary Silk Route. It may directly connect India, China and Central Asia. This would improve chances of increasing cooperation between South Asia, Central Asia and China, keeping India at the center. Kazakhstan can play a role in developing the route into a reality, and it has good relations both with China and India.

The new great game is well under way with USA,China,Russian Federation and in the immediate neighbourhood Pakistanand includes other regional playersviz Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia.India willy-nilly is also a player who must play its role to bring about a win-win outcome.

While US idea of developing "greater Central Asia"provides an opportunity to integrate the region closely with some parts of South Asia,India's geopolitical interest doesnot stop at the boundary of Central Asia. It should take advantage of this integration processes taking it to set a new bases in Eurasia.India on one hand maintains strategic partnership with Russia and its energy requirements are being addressed by participating in Russian oil and gas sector.It can also look to access the region through the Chinese route.India is already negotiating with Iran and Pakistan for a gas pipeline (TAPI). India should go ahead with the concept of "Greater Central Asia"integration and look forward to strengthen"South Asia –Eurasia links" that would include Russia, China and Iran (IPI). On the other hand with Indo-US relations becoming stronger, India is expected to contribute to US war on terrorism in Central South Asian Region.

First and foremost, India needs to dispossess itself of Oil and Gas obsession – which most of the external players, barring Japan, suffer from in its dealing with Central Asian Republics – if India is to make a fresh, sustained and determined effort to stimulate a meaningful economic partnership with the Region. It has to be combined with a balanced diversification of economic interests, widening the scope of co-operation in other areas, exploring each other's potentials. India should look to intensify South AsiaEurasia-China–Iran cooperation.This quadrilateral framework could become a driving force for regional security, economic growth and wider Asian security. The SCO could provide such a step and even if some States remain outside SCO, then bilateral and multilateral efforts should focus on strengthening the quadrilateral cooperation.

The recent visit of PM Narendra Modito CAS in July 2015 as part of New Delhi "extended neighbourhood" policy,where high-level officials have signed many MoUs with all CAS for regional security and trade partnership. Specifically,India and Kazakhstan inked a deal for a renewal of long term supply of natural uranium and a wide ranging defence cooperation besides a railway cooperation agreement to boost connectivity to realize full economic potential.

The address by President Nazarbayev insisting (2007) closer integration among CIS nations seeks to "New Kazakhstan in the new world", as a precondition of prosperity for all CAS nations, with keenness to create a business savvy climate in the region, facilitating investments, remove red tape and other barriers in the movement of capital and labor.It indicated Business-to-Business ties between South Asia and Central Asia.In modern world,people to people contacts hold key to success of cooperation.India enjoys tremendous popular support. Kazakhstan finds India as a reliable political and economic partner not only in the region but also in the world.SoIndia is changing its attitude towards joining regional security and adopt a cooperative mechanism involving Central Asian states and move strategically in that direction towards a peaceful world order.

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Examination of the Political Reform Process and the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar

Salini Das

M.Phil Scholar, Center for Indo-Pacific Studies (CIPS), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

ABSTRACT

The process of Democratization in Myanmar can be traced back to 1948, when Myanmar received its independence and entered into democracy under the leadership of General Aung San. This period of democracy was short-lived due to the instability of the government that made the country suffer from poor economic conditions and intense political problems. In 1962, General U Ne Win staged a coup d'état and Myanmar traversed the path of socialism and military rule. Thereafter, the country has undergone several changes with the 8th of August 1988, when a mass defiance against military regime took place and the date remained as a landmark in the history of Myanmar as 8888. Later the election of 1990 is considered to be the second landmark event that pushed Myanmar an inch towards democratization. Further, the 'Roadmap for Myanmar' was announced by General Khin Nyunt, who remained in power as a Prime Minister until his approved retirement in 2004, which is another landmark year for Myanmar, followed by the framing of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar. The country of Myanmar has undergone several changes in the past five years, i.e. from 2010-2015. This paper would therefore aim to look into the steps of reform that have been taken in order to push the country into democracy within this time frame. Further, it will also focus on the examination of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar so that the fault lines of the Constitution are identified which does not support the prevalence of democracy along with the fact that the present reform process made by the military and praised by Suu Kyi is merely to prove the benevolent nature of the military and not the actual bold step to move the country in democracy.

Keywords: *Myanmar's Political Reforms, NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi, Constitution of 2008, USDP.*

Introduction

Political reforms triggered inside Myanmar since 2007 with the Saffron Revolution. However, the state suppression of the 2007 uprising indicated that the military junta would retain control of the democratization process. Following this incident, the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council) announced that an election was required for peaceful, modern, developed and disciplined democratic nation that would take place in 2010. According to Sean Turnell 2011 and Nick Cheesman 2010, the November 7, 2010 election was marred by innumerable instances of fraud, violence and voter-turnout. The state media however stated that the percentage of voter-turnout was around 76% whereas the actual percentage claimed by the independent sources was as low as 30%. Prior to the polls, the process that led up to the election excluded political parties and some important individuals from contesting the election. Further, after the disgraceful election took place, the icon of democracy in Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi was released from house arrest. With the 2010 election and the release of Suu Kyi, there was a ray of hope for political reforms and democracy in Myanmar. The erstwhile junta was dissolved and power was finally handed over

to the new civilian government with the convening of the new parliament in 2011. Further, the 2008 Constitution was approved by an overwhelming majority that not only upholds the military control over the state, but also excludes Aung San Suu Kyi from being the head of the state. According to the 2008 Constitution of the Republic of Myanmar, the head of the state or the President should be an indigenous Burmese. The article 59 e and f of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar states that, the head of the state or the President should be a person who has lived in the country continuously for at least 20 years at the time of the election of the State President. Further, the candidate should ensure that his/her parents, spouse, or children should not be a foreign citizen or a person under the influence of a foreign government. (Constitution of Myanmar 2008) (P. Popham, 2012). This aspect of the Constitution allows a space for debate, as it curbs Aung San Suu Kyi from contesting in the Presidential elections. Moreover, the other principle that has been placed in the Constitution under Article 436 is the amendment procedure that requires a 2/3rd's majority or 75% of the votes. Amendment of the Constitution remains to be another major problem due to the fact that the majority of the Hluttaw consists of military personnel and therefore the Hluttaw would not entertain any changes in the Constitution that would bring down their rule from the face of Myanmar Sean Turnell (2011), David I. Steinberg (2011) Tin Maung Maung Than (2011), Nick Cheesman 2010.

In such a situation, if an amendment of the Constitution has to be made, the procedure will be next to impossible because of primarily two reasons,

1. Given the fact that 25% of the seats are reserved for the military personnel.
2. Secondly, 75% of the votes would be cast by the military personnel who would invariably veto any amendment of the Constitution.

Moreover, the President or the head of the state also has to be from the military. Therefore, the army retains control over the important ministries such as defense, economy and border affairs (article 232 (b) ii) (Myanmar Constitution 2008). Further, the Article 418 of the Constitution of 2008 allows the Commander-in-chief of the Defense Services to exercise sovereign powers in a situation of state emergency, declared by the President.

In accordance with the above discussion, the present paper would examine the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar along with the role of mass media and also trace the political reform process that occurred since 2010 till 2015.

The 2010 Election

The 2010 election was the crucial fifth step of the Seven-point Roadmap to Democracy, as declared by the military junta in the year 2003. According to the Amnesty International 2010, there were several events that favored the regime and its allies. The electoral administration was appointed by the regime that heavily supported the military, the Union Election Commission did not have independence, the political parties had to face serious hurdles while registering with the Union Election Commission due to the fact that the election laws were framed by the junta that prohibited the opponents of the regime from participating in the election. Further, the Political Parties Registration Law, framed by the junta prior to the November 2010 election barred Aung San Suu Kyi from contesting the election. The strategy that the junta played to bar Suu Kyi from contesting the election was by initiating a law, where anyone convicted of a crime had to be expelled from the party if that party wanted to register itself for contesting the election. Following this law, if NLD had to register itself, the party had to expel Suu Kyi from the party. Further, the junta laid another strategy where they opened around 300 NLD offices so that the election seemed free and fair. The playing of these two strategies meant that the junta wanted a weak NLD to participate in the 2010 election, devoid of Suu Kyi. The NLD was left under a dilemma where they were failing to decide whether to boycott the election or to contest without Suu Kyi. Finally, failing to register, the NLD was not able to contest the election of 2010 (Amnesty International, 2010).

The 2010 election was although held after twenty years, paved the path for democratic reforms in the country. However, the victory of the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and its allies painted a different picture, which expressed that, the chances for the political reform process was feeble. Moreover, the opposition was weak and the NLD being out of the picture, the junta cleverly consolidated their powers behind the civilian mask. On the flip side, if one observes the situation from the standpoint of the junta, it can be observed that the military wanted to bring in democratic reforms inside the country and that is the reason why the military regime achieved a multi-party elected parliament for the first time in 50 years. In contrast to the standpoint of the junta, Trevor Wilson 2010 rightly remarks that the military had brought in a certain extent of reform in the government; however, the functioning of the regional assemblies that was newly framed was still not clear. The 2010 election had brought in several debates over the fact that whether the country was at all moving towards democracy or not. The prerequisite of any country in order to bring in democracy is to have a government and its administrative machinery which would effectively sail the country through the path of democracy. In the New Light 2010, a prediction was made where after the election, it was predicted that democracy would usher in due to the fact that signs of improvement in the voting behavior and the government system were observed. The daily reported that a close to 99% of eligible voters cast their votes in the election and the constitution has been approved by almost 93% of the eligible voters. These observations made by the daily clearly indicated that the country would move into democracy.

In contrast to the observation made by New Light, Shan Herald 2011 makes an intricate observation of the government system. There has been a tussle between the military and the civilians since the democratic reform process started altogether in 1980's however, in the current context, i.e. right after the 2010 election, the tussle has not only been observed between the military and the civilians but also has percolated inside the government system as well.

The author clearly denotes that there is a clear emergence of a tussle between two sets of leaders, i.e. the hardliners and the reformists. Herald believes that Tin Aung Myint Oo, who is the vice president, the Upper House Speaker Khin Aung Myint; the Information Minister Kyaw Hsan; and the Finance Minister Hla Tun frame the hardliners who were in support of the previous regime. However, the President Thein Sein; the Lower House Speaker Thura Shwe Mann; the Railway Transport Minister Aung Min; and the Industry Minister Soe Thein constitute the group of reformists who are in favor of the reform process of the country. Since the onset of the Thein Sein regime in 2011, the hard-liners have become concerned about the fact that their anti-reformist agendas have been marred to quite an extent because the junta-pro USDP[1] could manage a meager one seat out of 45. In line with the above fact, the Irrawady 2012 also mentioned that the vice president of Myanmar was also in favor of the reform process and aimed for substantial changes in the country. After 2011, it has been observed that the entire ministry has been re-framed where the ministers are in favor of the reform process. Further, the Thein Sein government aimed at peaceful negotiations with the ethnic groups inside the country (The Washington Post, 2013). One of the most important steps taken by the government was the ceasefire agreement with the KIO[2] (BBC, 2013).

Democracy and Aung San Suu Kyi

The long-drawn cold relation between the NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi and the military was put to an end when her party was allowed to participate in the 2012 by-election. According to The Diplomat although the 2008 constitution of Myanmar reserves 25% of the seats and some important cabinet ministries for the military in order to consolidate the powers of the junta and demands a constitutional amendment of 75% of the votes in the Parliament, the above mentioned cordial relations with Suu Kyi and the military was completely unexpected (The Diplomat, 8th December 2014). However, in contrast to the above, it can be mentioned that the change in the ministry became a boon for the country, where the leaders, primarily Thein Sein and others were

in favor of substantial changes in the country. Therefore, such an association is not completely unexpected given the fact that both Suu Kyi and Thein Sein's agendas were the same with regard to the political reform process. In the 2012 by-election, the NLD registered a landslide victory[3].

During the Thein Sein regime, several political prisoners were released along with the fact that the censure of the press was eased. The 3.6 billion USD controversial Chinese Myitsone dam project was turned down by Thein Sein government which proved for the first time that the regime was willing to listen to the will of the people. Tin Maung Maung Than 2012; suggested that after the victory of NLD in the 2012 by-election, it was important for the party to transform into a critical player so as to trigger the reform process inside the country. Although Myanmar's legislature had 664 seats, more than 80% of which were still held by lawmakers aligned with the military-backed ruling party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) (CNN, 2012). The author believes that if the NLD strategically puts forward the demands within the current political flow, it is likely that the NLD will be victorious in the 2015 election. Further, the author adds that if the NLD becomes victorious in the 2015 election, it is expected that the party along with the ethnic groups will amend the 2008 constitution of the country and lower the control of the military over the government system.

The Article of the 2008 Constitution that reserves 25% of the seats for the military personnel has become a critical concern for the country, especially for Aung San Suu Kyi and her NLD. After series of pressure put forward by NLD and Suu Kyi, it was finally decided by the Union Parliament in 2013 that a committee would be set up to review the junta pro 2008 constitution. The second Article that bars Suu Kyi from being the head of the state is another hurdle in the path of democracy. NLD, which is pro political reform, is almost impossible to imagine without the active role of Suu Kyi. The 2010 election is a classic example where the party failed to register itself for the election due to the non presence of Suu Kyi as the backbone of the party. In this regard, if the reform process has to survive, the role of Suu Kyi has to be prominent. Therefore, after the onset of the Thein Sein regime, Suu Kyi and her NLD decided to join hands with the reformist military junta. It is a fact that one quarter of the seats in the parliament is filled with military personnel which is enough to bar any constitutional amendment. Thus, Suu Kyi had tactically joined hands with the military in order to push the government to move towards a change. This strategic relationship has opened a new avenue for not only Suu Kyi and her NLD but also for the people who have longed for substantial changes in the country (Reuters 2012).

The role of Suu Kyi's NLD has become enhanced right after the by-parliament election in 2012. The 6.4% seats won by the party along with the strategic relationship between Suu Kyi and the junta government has allowed the party to influence public policy from within. The widespread popularity of the NLD after the by-parliament election has attracted the support of various ethnic political parties that has increased the confidence in the entire opposition. According to Reuters, the agenda of Suu Kyi after the 2012 by-parliament election was not only to work for political reform process, but also to attract other political parties so as to create a democratic environment in Myanmar.

Reform Process and the Thein Sein Regime

With the onset of the Thein Sein regime, a reformist attitude has grown within the country rapidly that has aimed at the fundamental rights of the people and freedom. Thein Sein had particularly emphasized on the terms such as 'democratic practices' and 'good governance'[4]. The primary aim of the government was to promote democracy, not only within the parliament, but also within the people of the country. Further, the agenda of the government was also to re-shape the administrative machinery and remove corruption from the country so as to move towards democracy at a faster pace. The most important of all agendas was the building of a new relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi who has been the icon of democracy for years. With the

onset of the new relationship between Suu Kyi and the junta, the international isolation of Myanmar has slowly withered away. International communities, especially EU and the UNO have praised the country's political reform process. In the economic front, the country focused to improve both agriculture and industrialization. With the aid and advice of the IMF, the country has been able to effectively handle inflation and also provided social security and economic welfare of the workers and laborers. The health care sector along with education and environmental issues has been rightly addressed by the government and signs of growth and improvement have been observed since 2011. Further, one of the most important steps that the Thein Sein regime had taken was the release of the 200 political prisoners along with more than 6,000 other prisoners in 2011 (Thuzar 2012).

According to Wade (2011), Lintner (2011) and Kinnock (2011), the liberalization of mass media was observed from the 2011election onwards. Prior to the election, the government blocked the websites of the exile media. These websites were made accessible in 2011. International news websites including BBC, Democratic Voice of Burma, Voice of America, Burmese language broadcasts of Radio Free Asia were unblocked by the government on the democracy day 15th of September 2011 (Jagan 2012) (a). Interestingly, after 2011, it was possible to display and sell pictures of Suu Kyi, an activity which could result into jail sentence prior to the 2011 election (Khin Zaw Yin 2011). In spite of the liberalization of the mass media after 2011, recent incident of the arrest of few journalists violating the 1923 Burma State Secrets Act that debars anyone from leaking state's closed door information in the press, created havoc in the country. In this regard, Thein Sein not only resolved the issue, but also gave freedom to the mass media to address sensitive issues and allowed the media to play a substantial role in the reform process.

Economic Developments since 2010

Fundamental political and economic reforms in Myanmar focused at increasing openness and empowerment by the beginning of 2011. Previously the country was landlocked with no reform processes, till up to the end of the rule of Than Shwe. During Than Shwe's rule, according to Lex Rieffel (2012), market-based economy was restored; strengthening of the balance of payments by exporting natural gas to Thailand was carried out. At the same time the house arrest of Suu Kyi during his time attracted global criticisms along with western sanctions.

From the commencement of the President of Thein Sein, there has been a dramatic increase of political and civil liberties. At the same time, new tensions and challenges have emerged, including the outbreaks of violence in minority ethnic areas.

The World Bank reports (2015), despite such outbreaks of violence in the country, there are a lot of opportunities of the country that can deepen the reform, including in the 2015 upcoming parliamentary elections. Myanmar's economy grew at 8.5 percent in real terms in 2014/15 but growth will slightly turn out to be moderate in 2015/16 due to floods and slowing investments.

Economic reforms since 2010 have supported consumer and investor confidence despite socio-political changes.

The strengthening of US Dollar has put pressure on Myanmar's exchange rate. According the Asian Development Bank (2015), Myanmar Kyat depreciated against the US dollar by 24% from MK965 in April 2014 to MK1, 275 in early September 2015. Rapid growth in credit to the private sector has fueled monetary expansion. Inflation is estimated to have reached over 10 percent from this year to July 2015. Asian Development Bank (2015) report has estimated the inflation acceleration to 8 percent till May 2015. Therefore, according the World Bank (2015), Medium term economic growth prospects remain strong assuming continued progress on reforms.

Analysis of the Transition

According to the works of Huntington (1991), the inevitable form of transition from the military rule to a democracy is transformation. This transformation takes place when the military regime itself initiates the transition to a democratic rule. Such a transition is often considered to be an impermanent one because according to Larry Diamond (2000), the military tries to retain its capacities and power through non-democratic means. This is particularly true in the case of Myanmar, when the military changed their military robes into a civilian one in the 1990's. After the change took place, the military could not resist themselves from acquiring power. As a result of which, after the election of 1990, the military junta got back to their previous form and placed Suu Kyi under house arrest after her NLD's victory, lest the military power and capacities were lost. To stand by the views of Diamond, it can be stated that, the transformation of the military minds to step into democracy is possible only when there is a change in the top leadership of the military. According to Huntington, there is one factor that plays a vital role in the transition and transformation process, i.e. the cooperation of the opposition in the process of transition. This stage of transformation has been observed clearly in the recent times in Myanmar, when Thein Sein decided to officially join hands with Suu Kyi. The historic moment of the military joining hands with the civilians is one step towards the transition towards democracy.

In clearly understanding the military's transition to democracy, two analyses can be drawn to explain Myanmar's case

Firstly, according to Jagan (2012) (b) the Chinese dominance over the economy and infrastructure building in Myanmar has not only antagonized the country but has also affected the sovereignty of the country. As a result of this, the military uses this transition as a tool to not only to generate rapprochement with the West but also to set up a western interest in economic engagement with Myanmar.

Secondly, according to Maung Thann (2012) Thein Sein have a genuine wish to reform the country, where the people of Myanmar will enjoy better political and economic lives. On 12th March 2012, Suu Kyi on the occasion of being awarded the honorary doctorate degree by the Carleton University in Canada remarked "it was not China, not the US" but Thein Sein "and the will of the people of Myanmar" that urged the country to change (Maung Thann 2012).

Challenges of Political Reforms

For decades Myanmar had been controlled by military personnel who brought in political repression, human rights abuse and economic distress. Further, the national army had tried to control the ethnic rebels inside the country, but the problem still seems to linger to a certain extent. With the advent of the Thein Sein regime, a lot of these ethnic rebel issues have been resolved where the president has framed small cadre of progressives who would keep a check on the military quarter (The Diplomat 2014). Further, the Tatmadaw has successfully come under the control of the civilian government after years of strangulated control over the country.

In spite of the overall success of the Thein Sein government, there still remains a host of hurdles in the path of the reform process of the country. In this regard, three primary challenges can be discussed that bar the political reform process of the country:

Firstly, according to the Chapter IV, Articles 109 (b) and 141 (b) of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar, 25% of the seats are reserved for the military in the Parliament. In addition to this, Chapter XII, Article 436, mentions that a constitutional amendment requires a 75 percent vote of the members of the Parliament present and voting. The Diplomat 2014 suggests that the latter precedes the former; the logic being that "if the opposition is to curb the influence of the military by revoking some of the quota of its seats, it first must gather enough support to amend Section 436"(The Diplomat, 8th December, 2014). Aung San Suu Kyi has supported the amendment of the

Article 436 in order to curb the virtual veto power of the military. In this regard, Suu Kyi has also mobilized the people across the country. Further, the NLD has also received the support of a five million signatory petition for the amendment of the Article 436.

However, the logic that has been put forward by Suu Kyi and her NLD does not stand correct because if the Constitutional amendment has to be made, then Article 436 does not stand as a barrier rather Articles 109 (b) and 141(b) curbs the amendment process due to the fact that during the amendment process the people who would be present in the Parliament and cast their vote will be from the military. Further, the junta would not entertain any Constitutional amendment that would affect their consolidated powers

Secondly, in the line of the above discussion, another Article of the Constitution that has created a serious hurdle in the path of the political reform process is the Article 59 (f) of the 2008 Constitution of Myanmar that curbs any individual of foreign origin or having a spouse of foreign origin from being the head of the state (M.C Williams, 2015, p. 6). Brigadier General U Tin San, head of the military MPs in the lower house had accused Suu Kyi of having selfish motives, stating that the reason for her petition against Article 436 is to clear her way for her own presidency (The Diplomat 8th December 2014). In this statement of General U Tin San, the logic is completely absent due to the fact that the Constitution itself bars Suu Kyi from being the head of the state and therefore, in the 2015 election it is quite unlikely that Suu Kyi will be able to achieve the presidency. Further, as suggested by The Diplomat 2014, the national Constitutional Amendment Implementation Committee had turned down the amendment of the Article 59 (f).

Thirdly, the ethnic issue, for a long period of time, had been one of the most important stumbles in the path of political reforms in Myanmar. After the onset of the Thein Sein regime, most ministers, including Thein Sein himself and Aung Min (minister for Rail Transportation)[5] have gained the trust of the ethnic rebels (The Diplomat 2014). Interestingly, they reported that the Karen National Union (KNU)[6] who had countered the central government for more than 60 years had expressed their desire to work with Thein Sein. The point that is striking in the daily report is that the KNU expects that Thein Sein would serve another term as the president after the 2015 election because of the reason that, if there is a change in the leadership in 2015, the negotiations will have to be repeated from the scratch (The Diplomat 8th December 2014).

This striking expectation of the KNU is however incorrect due to two primary reasons. Firstly, Thein Sein has brought the country into a transitional phase where Myanmar is moving from junta domination to democracy, therefore, his leadership can be termed as 'transitional-leader' and not a purely democratic one. Secondly, the KNU is mistaking the worth of democracy where negotiations will be faster and concrete. The KNU's expectations of maintaining the relationship between the government and the ethnic organizations is a step towards building democracy inside the country. In spite of the justifications, it is expected that ethnic organizations must support the value and the spirit of a true democracy rather than only the transitional phase (M. C Williams, 2015, p. 7).

Fourthly, as the country is moving from the phase of junta domination towards democracy, the nation is expected to conduct multiparty elections for the first time in 2015 since 2010 when there was a transfer of power to parliamentary democracy. The Parliament has decided to adopt proportional representation system[7] in the upper house. However, the single-member district plurality vote system[8] has been retained in the lower house. The new proportional representation system that has been adopted by the parliament has been strictly opposed by the NLD along with the ethnic political parties. The reason for their opposition is because the earlier system was beneficial for them. The NLD would have swept a large number of votes in the upcoming election if the earlier system was retained. Similarly, the ethnic parties have also realized the loss of seats owing to the new system. Further, the ethnic parties have always gained an advantage of the support of their home constituencies. However, if there is a shift to national party vote under the

new proportional representation system, the ethnic parties will invariably lose their support from their home constituencies (M. C Williams, 2015, p. 6).

It is clear from the above discussion that the junta seems to consolidate its powers by adopting the proportional representation system. The reason for the shifting from the single-member district plurality vote system to the proportional representation system is due to the fact that the junta-pro USDP would have swept a majority. A November 2014 report of the BBC suggested that the proportional representation system was turned down by the Hluttaw due to the reason that it was unconstitutional. The Speaker of the Hluttaw has entered the picture of serious controversies owing to his pro-Suu Kyi verdicts. The report suggested that any amendments to the clause that restricts Suu Kyi from being the president was kept aside, while the adoption of the new law of proportional representation was turned down (BBC, 21st November, 2014). The debate that has initiated from the act of the Speaker is that, since Shwe Mann happens to be from the pro-junta USDP, why did he then turn down the new system? There are two possible reasons for the act of the Speaker:

Firstly, the Speaker tries to put before the people of Myanmar that he is pro-democracy and therefore he is not entertaining any unconstitutional changes.

Secondly, with the retention of the old system, the NLD is likely to win a large majority of seats. Further, there will be a leadership vacuum which the Speaker has indirectly created by not entertaining the amendment of the clause that restricts Suu Kyi from being the head of the state. In this situation, the Speaker has felt that due to the leadership vacuum, the NLD would look for another choice as the head of the nation if the party wins a majority in the upcoming 2015 election.

The question that remains important is that, whether Suu Kyi and her NLD will endorse a former general as the president of the state. If that is so, then the country would be endorsing the consolidation of powers of the junta once again and the true spirit of democracy that was long awaited would be marred.

2015 Elections: Is it a Beginning of a new era?

Post November 8, 2015 election, a dramatic change occurred inside Myanmar with the landslide victory of the NLD. Now that Myanmar held a free and fair election and the NLD received a marvelous victory and embraced democracy, a question still remains, is Myanmar truly democratic? (Ostwald and Schuler, 2015: 7). Criticisms have flowed in from the Human Rights Watch, where Myanmar has failed to discontinue the repression of the political prisoners (*Ibid*). The 2015 elections is not an election where Myanmar has truly embraced democracy, but it can be termed as a transition from a non-democratic regime to a new born democracy. Further, one needs to understand that only the election of 2015 cannot change the face of the country. A thorough reformation of the 2008 Constitution has to be made in order to lift the barriers (as discussed in the above section) in order to show signs of being a true democracy. Therefore, the NLD-government would need to be even more inclusive and conciliatory than the USDP has ever been, as the constitutional odds are still stacked against too abrupt a change. It is thus important for the different principals in Myanmar's political game to start discussing a practical modus vivendi. The 2015 elections is thus not the be all and end all of Myanmar's political reformation process. The role of the NLD is therefore very important in this context because it has to be observed that in the coming years how the NLD functions to negotiate with its supporters and turns the government to revise the 2008 Constitution. Further, it should be noted that the Thein Sein regime had already included technocrats and experts to be part of the executive. This particular act of the former regime had set the tone for the NLD to function at a smoother pace at present (Thuzar 2015: 8). At present, the NLD has committed to have a representative mix of ethnic members and technocrats in its executive set-up (*Ibid*).

Conclusion and Future Prospects of the New Government

Myanmar entered a new era of democracy and civilian rule after the 2010 election. With the commencement of the civilian rule after the 2010 election, there were three views that emerged within the scholars.

The first view is that the Pragmatists believed that if anyone needed to do anything for the progress of Myanmar, military aid was invariably needed. On the other hand, the Idealists refused to accept the face of the new civilian regime. In this regard, Aung San Suu Kyi herself mentioned that there is a trust deficit in the Parliament. This is exactly the reason why most investors refused to invest in the country. Suu Kyi mentioned that if Myanmar wants substantial investment from the foreign nations, there should be enough unity and trust in the country. With the pressure coming in from the opposition, the government approved a new foreign investment bill in order to gain the support of the foreign investors.

The second view that can be pointed out is that ethnic problem within the country has added to the tension. As mentioned in the earlier section of this paper that the Karens have agreed to cooperate with the government on one condition, that Thein Sein enjoys another term of his presidency which is most unlikely and not desired by the majority masses inside the country. Further, tensions in the Kachin state, communal violence in the Rakhine state and the Rohingya issues have altogether created a serious stumble in the path of political reforms (M. C William, 2015, pp. 7-9). In this situation, it would be interesting to watch how the Thein Sein regime and the largest opposition party manages to strategically gain trust from the ethnic groups to fulfill the country's dream for a true democracy during and after the 2015 election.

The third issue is that of the future presidency. As discussed in the above section of this paper that with the Article 59 (f) Suu Kyi remained barred from being the President of the country, there seems to be a power vacuum in the top leadership of the NLD. Although the speaker of the Hluttaw has tactically cleared his path to fill the vacuum, but the question still lies as to whether the NLD or the people of Myanmar will accept a former general as the President of the country once again? In this situation, it would be again interesting to know as to how the NLD manages to fill the gap in the top leadership without hampering the true spirit of democracy.

Finally, According to Steinberg, 'reforms are never immediate, rarely complete, often misdirected, and subject to all the ills' (D. I Steinberg, 2014). However, if one looks into the picture of political progress in Myanmar, it is true that the reform process is subjected 'to all the ills'. In spite of the 'ills', there has been a substantial progress of the country within the span of almost five years. The 'ills' that have been mentioned throughout the paper has been partially overcome due to the fact that 'reforms are never immediate'.

After examining the 2015 elections of Myanmar, it has to be noted that the country has a wide range of tasks that needs to be fulfilled in the near future:

1. The new government in power should continue the framework made by the former government (as discussed in the above section) or improvise if necessary in order to enrich the democratic essence.

2. Instill democratic habits in order to eradicate the effect of the authoritarian rule that was there for decades.

3. Accelerate the regional role and reach of the country (Thuzar, 2015: 9).

In addition to the above tasks that the new government has to fulfill, there are a number of internal challenges for the expansion of this newly framed democracy:

1. The role of NLD in the future decades is uncertain due to the fact that the pivotal role of this party is played primarily by Suu Kyi.

2. Several interest groups along with the military continue to influence Suu Kyi which might affect the functioning of the newly framed democracy.

3. Ethnic tensions remain inside the country as a serious matter of concern for the country and have to be dealt with, by the new government delicately.

4. With all the efforts put in by the present regime and the opposition, it is expected that the newly framed democratic government would strategically take steps in order to accelerate the political reform process and also concentrate upon the strong revision of the 2008 Constitution.

Endnotes

1. Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) was initially framed as a civil society organization Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). This civil society organization was later registered as a political party in 2010 which was headed by President Thein Sein and the headquarters are in Naypyidaw (Mizzima News 2010).

2. The Kachin Independence organization (KIO) was framed in 1961 after the Kachin leaders tried to get their rights promised in the Panglong Agreement (Free Kachin Campaign).

3. The National league for Democracy (NLD) swept 43 out of 44 seats in the 2012 by-election. The other seat went to the Shan Party of the Shan state of Myanmar (CNN, 2012)

4. "Good governance, or efficient and transparent conduct of public affairs and management of public resources, is more fundamental to economic development than any specific policy intervention. Good governance can be thought of as the creation of an environment in which beneficial policy can be formulated and implemented in a socially inclusive manner" (Cullen Hendrix and M Noland 2015).

5. Aung Min is a former Major General who served as Rail Transportation Minister under the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) from February 2003 to March 2011. He maintained that position until August 2012, when President Thein Sein appointed him as President's Office Minister (ALTSEAN-BURMA, 2012).

6. The Karen National Union (KNU) was framed in 1947 keeping in mind the expectations of the Karen people inside Myanmar. It is estimated that approximately 7 million Karen people reside inside the country. The organization was also created for supporting peace, democracy and human rights in Myanmar (Karen National Union.net).

7. "Proportional representation is a type of electoral system that decides the make-up of a parliament by allocating seats on the basis of the number of votes each party received" (Electoral Reform Society).

8. In the single-member district plurality vote system, the state is divided into various electoral districts (commonly known as districts, constituencies) which is equal to the number of legislative seats that are to be filled. The voters vote for one candidate from each of the constituencies because each party can nominate only one candidate. The concept of Plurality means that the candidate who receives the maximum number of votes wins the seat (myweb.astate.edu).

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Social Identity & Transboundary River Conflicts: A Comparative Case Study of Select Indian Cases

Sulagna Maitra

Lecturer in Humanitarian Action, Centre for Humanitarian Action, School of Agriculture and Food Science, University College Dublin, Ireland.

Pat Gibbons

Director- UCD Centre for Humanitarian Action, School of Agriculture and Food Science, University College Dublin, Ireland.

Anne Markey

Lecturer- Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development, School of Agriculture and Food Science, University College Dublin, Ireland.

"A river is more than water…

It is also an integral part of human settlements, their lives, landscape, society, history and culture & religion"

(Iyer R., 2014)

ABSTRACT

Water disputes in the context of water scarcity have led to protracted conflicts and acute violence all over the globe. A unidimensional extractive perception of river as a channel carrying water results in inherent competition between uses and users which in turn results in otherization among the riparian parties instead of treating rivers as a collective resource. This perception of water and the sense of entitlement that goes with it are at the heart of most contemporary transboundary conflicts and a key determinant in relations between upper vs. lower riparians. The contest between riparian parties increases in intensity as demand for water grows. In this context, this paper explores the relationship between actor identity and conflict-cooperation intensity within the conflict resolution process and the impact of this relationship on the sustainability of resolution outcomes. Through a comparative analysis of three protracted transboundary river water conflicts in India that were adjudicated under the exclusive Inter-State Water Dispute Act (ISWD)2002, the paper offers suggestions increasing the effectiveness of the existing conflict resolution system.

Keywords: *Social Identity, River, Conflicts, India.*

Transboundary river conflicts in India are usually analysed within the context of centre-state relations (Chauhan, 1992; Iyer, 1994; Jain et al., 1971 in (D'Souza, 2002, p. 255)). Prevalent views see the root cause of transboundary conflicts in the superimposition of political boundaries of provincial states over the natural boundaries of a river basin(Gautam, 1976; Shah, 1987; D'Souza, 2002; Gosain & Singh, 2004). Legal studies on inter-state river conflicts in Indiatend to focus on division of powers between provincial states and the Centre especially with respect to distribution of power to undertake, finance and implement river basin development programmes (D'Souza,

2002). Further, as water laws are framed on the assumption of the provincial state' as a unified entity (Singh C. , 1992; Guha, 1997)these studies are pre-occupied with the internal schism between inter-(provincial) state conflicts and larger federal conditions of water regulation. Anotherconsequence of this assumption of state as a unified entity is that federal legal relations structurally delink conflict management issues from other constituents of spatial relations such as social identity, political dynamics,and environment by designating them as 'state subjects'(D'Souza, 2002).

As noted by eminent scholar, the Late Prof. Iyer (2014), rivers are intrinsically linked to lives, livelihoods, and socio-political culture of communities which in turn makes any contestation highly emotive and volatile. River watersalso tend to evoke maximalist demands from its users. This gives very little room to democratically elected political leadership representing the river basin populations to adopt a conciliatory position in such conflicts. A solution imposed 'from above' with the use of or with the threat of legal force is also precarious and inefficient as contesting parties actively or passively attempt to thwart the unfavourable aspects of the imposed solution. Sustainable conflict resolution thus necessitates that inter-state river conflicts be analysed within a general theoretical framework on conflict resolution that can capture the impact of societal factors on resolution outcomes. Systematic analysis of the interplay of social identities that shape actor interests and positions in river conflicts (*us vs them)* provide much needed insight into conflict bottlenecks and cooperation challenges that lie beyond the scope of current formal institutional conflict resolution mechanism in India.

In this context, the paper compares the role of social identity in inter-state river conflicts in three cases in India that were adjudicated under the Inter-State River Disputes Act (1956, 2002). Recognizing the need for a general, actor focused analytical framework for investigating conflict dynamics in river conflicts, this paper applies Galtung's[2]ABC conflict dynamics model to identify how social identity shapes actor attitudes (A), behaviour (B) and contradictions (C) in a conflict.For analytical convenience, the paper is divided into four sections. It begins by critiquing the existing Inter-State River Water Dispute (ISWD) Resolution mechanism in India and identifying structural bottlenecks. The second section of the paper explores key concepts and adapts Galtung's ABC conflict dynamics model in order to develop a framework for analysing social identity in river conflict resolution. The third part of the paper discusses the key findings from a comparative analysis of the role of identity in Ravi Beas, Krishna, and Cauvery conflict dynamics. Building on these findings, the paper concludes with a discussion on the structural incongruences created by a single identity based conflict resolution system that limits its capacity to address attitudes and positions of conflict parties.

Situating the ISWD Act within its Operational Environment

India is known as the land of many rivers. All twelve major rivers in India are transboundary rivers and they cover a total of 252.8 million hectares of the country(Ministry of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvination, 2014). From the very outset, the founding fathers of the Indian Constitution recognized that efficient conflict management of transboundary rivers was fundamental to harnessing freshwater resources to nurture the country's fledgling agriculture, industry and service sectors. Effective conflict resolution mechanisms were also necessary to avoid polarization of the masses over in a newly formed multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. Thus, the issue of transboundary river water conflict resolution is not only tied to the overall social, economic and political wellbeing of the country it is also an intrinsic part of the country's imagination as a federal nation. The challenges faced in the arena of transboundary river water relationsare in many ways symptomatic of the larger socio-economic and political conflicts in the country as they all represent a constant struggle to weave multiple social identities into a shared national identity that would allow for mutually beneficial cooperative solutions to competition between uses and users of resources.

Article 262 of the Indian Constitution deals specifically with '*adjudication of disputes relating to waters of inter-State rivers or river valley*' (Sankaran, 2009)and is therefore recognition of the importance of resolving inter-State rivers conflicts within the parameters of Centre-State relations. Acting vide this provision, the Parliament instituted the Inter State Water Disputes Act in 1956 for speedy and effective resolution of transboundary river disputes in India.The Act as been amended a few times, most significantly in 1989 to accommodate the resolution of Ravi Beas conflict and in 2002. The most recent amendments have been tabled on 14th March 2017 by the Union Minister of Water Resources, River Development and Ganga Rejuvenation. The Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2017 introduces several measures to purportedly revolutionise resolution of river disputes(Press Information Bureau, 2017)

ISWD Act provides a frameworkto approach any river conflict in a four-pronged manner-negotiations, mediation, arbitration or adjudication. It is important to note that the resolution process might be single-track or multi-track. In single track processes, negotiations would be followed by mediation and if that fails, then arbitration or adjudication. In multi-track processes (like the one allowed in the ISWD Act), negotiations may take place parallel to the arbitration or adjudication process. Scholars like Iyer (2003)insist that the ISWD Act provides adequate scope conflict resolution within its framework. He points out that the "routes of negotiation, mediation and conciliation are open and can be tried either before, or even alongside of, a recourse to adjudication(Iyer R. R., 2003). Other like D'Souza point out that the Amendments introduced in 2002 restrict the freedoms and liberal space guaranteed by the Constitution and encourage almost impractical military type enforcement by the Union government(D'Souza, 2002).The amendments proposed in the 2017 Bill include creation of a Single Standing Tribunal (with multiple benches), appointment of Assessors to provide technical support to the Tribunal, establishment of a Dispute Resolution Committee (DRC) comprising of experts and a central agency for transparent collection and maintenance of river basin information system(Press Information Bureau, 2017).

The efficacy of the ISWD Act has been challenged on several occasions to the extent that some have even advocated its abolition(Nariman, 2009). It is often commented that while the country has been reasonably successful in managing transboundary river conflicts with its neighbouring countries (even with Pakistan with whom it has fought three wars), it seems to have failed to resolve internal transboundary conflicts simmering within the federal structure (Iyer, 2007).Scholars such as Richards and Singh (2002; 1996)opine that a speedy resolution of small technical disputes is not necessarily an adequate indicator of the efficacy of a conflict resolution mechanism and may be counter-productive in the long run, if larger structural issues continue to be unresolved. Protracted river conflicts are a function of "governance or state failures, weak institutions and policy-making processes, ethnic fractionalization, aid dependence, corruption and various historical and geographical factors that can worsen inequalities in societies. Natural resource ownership issues then become triggers to escalate conflicts"(Nariman, 2009).

In India regional actors and politicized identities exercise considerable influence within the multiparty electoral federal political system. They can forge cooperative alliances to facilitate democratic governance or equally stoke political chaos and secessionist tendencies. By only allowing the Centre and provincial states to appear as contesting parties, the ISWD mechanism creates a disconnect between the institutional structure for conflict resolution and its operational environment that is playground for identity mobilization which shape conflict party interest, position, attitudes and behaviour. The fact that identity issues and inter-state river conflicts are intertwined is acknowledged in the literature but not systematically analysed (Maitra, 2007; Venot, Bharati, Giordano, & Molles, 2010).

Since independence, the ISWD Act has been invoked for eight cases as presented in Table 1. In each case preliminary negotiations failed to yield results and a tribunal had to be constituted for adjudication. Ravi Beas, Krishna and Cauvery conflicts are three of the most prominent, protracted cases adjudicated under the ISWD Act. Together, the three river conflicts cover a range of riparian

and non-riparian issues that mobilized masses from eleven constituent states and caused constitutional crises on several occasions. The Ravi Beas conflict was closely linked to the Sikh ethno-nationalist movement(Singh K. , 1999). Cauvery river conflict saw violence against the Tamils living in the state of Karnataka and was closely associated with the linguistic movement against Hindi as the national language(India Today, 2012). Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister NT Rama Rao used Telugu identity to mobilize for the Telugu Ganga project, and then through it to build a "Southern Council of Chief Ministers". Sharing of water from the Krishna river was a key factor in shaping the Telangana movement for statehood. Thus, all three cases have social identity undertones that found manifestation in mass mobilizations and eventually shaped regional and national politics in India. Further, identity politics, such as the Sikh ethno-nationalist movement, the linguistic movement and reorganization of states also impacted the conflict dynamics in these river basins. A comparative analysis of these three cases thus provides a strong foundation to the discussion on the role of identity in transboundary river water conflict resolution and indicators as to how such issues may be managed within the institutional conflict resolution structure.

Studying Identity in River Conflict Resolution Mechanishms: A Framework for Analysis

Before proceeding further, it is imperative to clarify key concepts and their usage in this paper. First, it is interesting to note that there is reluctance among some scholars, political leaders and bureaucrats to refer to contested entitlements over water as a conflict and they prefer the term dispute instead. Kalpakian(2004) comments that, "there is a tendency to equate water disputes with serious conflicts". According to him, 'serious conflict' means war, tense diplomatic standoffs, insurgencies and openly hostile diplomatic relations. Water disputes can and often do occur between states that have no serious conflicts with each other." He refers to "water dispute as disagreement between two states or sub-state territorial factions over utilization of the water resources of a river basin as such the dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia" He also analyses the India- Pakistan 'quarrel' over the Indus Water Treaty to 'gauge the effects of settlement of water disputes on the propensity of states to engage in serious conflicts against each other. Kalpakian's(2004) argument is instructive in the sense that it is true that contested entitlements of water resources only seldom have led to full scale wars, at least in the recent past(Postel & Wolf, 2001). Other scholars however, disagree. As Zeitoun (2008) succinctly points out: "*We need to make a distinction between violent conflict and conflict itself… There are no examples of states engaging in violent conflict strictly over water resources. But water is often an element in violent conflicts, and there are conflicts that fall short of war. Absence of war does not mean absence of conflict….*".

Conflict Intensity		Cooperation Intensity				
		Low				High
		Confrontation of issue	Ad hoc	Technical	Risk-Averting	Risk-Taking
Low	Non-politicized					
	Politicized					
	Securitized/ Opportunistic					
High	Violized					

Figure 1: TWINS Framework for Transboundary Conflict Interaction

There has been a conscious effort among scholars to move away from the conflict-cooperation dichotomy when it comes to transboundary river relations. Zeitoun and Mirumachi's (2008) propose usage of the term *interaction* to denote the simultaneous co-existence of conflict and cooperation in transboundary rivers. Further, they firmly establish that transboundary water interaction is first and foremost a political process subject to the larger political context and all its eccentricities (Zeitoun & Mirumachi, 2008; Lowi, 1993). Thus they posit the TWINS orTransboundary Waters Interaction Nexus – a two dimensional 5X4 matrix that allows for a scale of conflict and cooperation (figure 1).

This paper understands conflict as a "social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources (Wallensteen, 2007). It follows that conflict resolution is used here as a generic term (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2005). It refers to a situation "where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other's continued existence as parties and cease all violent action against each other" (Wallensteen, 2007).Galtung[3](1971)in his seminal work on the Middle East posits that all conflicts invariably exhibit three dimensions- contradictions, negative attitude of conflict parties towards each other and coercive or violent behaviour. *Contradictions (C)* may be further described as the incompatible issues or goals that motivate actor behaviour


Figure 2: Galtung's ABC Conflict Triangle

and define their positions in a conflict. These incompatibilities can emerge out of scarcity, differences in values and policies and/or structural inequalities. Contradictions according to Galtung (1971) is one of the main drivers of conflict dynamics. Escalation in conflict *behaviour (B)* such as increased physical acts of violence, verbal violence, impact of conflict such as refugees etc. can add to the incompatibilities and make a conflict intractable. *Attitudinal (A)*processes run almost parallel to the conflict process. They involve certain symmetrical and asymmetrical tendencies. Typically, the symmetrical tendencies involve the following: (a) belittling the achievement of others, (b) explaining one's own failures and attributing them to outsiders, (c) rejection of conciliatory offers by the other party or an external as tricks, (d) claiming that there is no conflict with the people and the conflict is only with the leaders of the other party, (e) Allegation that the leaders of the other conflict party need the conflict to strengthen their regime. The asymmetries can relate to – (a) difference or perceived differences in power ("topdog- underdog"), (b) different perceptions of the future (especially where aparticular outcome means hope and victory for one party and spells doom for the other), and (c)different attitudes towards the conflict resolution process (Galtung, 1971). The TWINS framework and Galtung's conflict triangle together provide an invaluable framework to analyse transboundary river water conflict dynamics. While the TWINS framework

helps to map conflict interaction between parties longitudinally, Galtung's ABC helps to go beyond the conflict interaction and tease out contesting parties' incompatibilities, attitudes towards each other and mutual behaviour.

Finally, usage of the term social identity needs to be clarified in order to understand what role, if any, does identity play in shaping contesting parties' attitudes, contradictions (interests and positions) and behaviours. Social identities are formed, mobilized and polarized during conflicts as a result of in-group out-group attitudes and behaviours[4]. Ghai (2000) explains the transformation of identity affiliations into politicized identity as when identity markers[5] cease to be mere means of social distinctions, and become the basis of political identity and claims to a specific role in the political process or power. Donald L. Horowitz (1985) however cautions that politics is not simply reducible to the common denominator of identity ties and nor does a particular identity affiliation govern behaviour in all situations. However, where identity is mobilized, such as in conflict situations, issues of routine administration can assume a central place on the political agenda(Horowitz, 1985).

A wide range of competing definitions of identity exists in the academic literature in terms of political, social, ascribed, manufactured etc. Building on social identity theory, the analytical framework for this paper identifies the   conflict parties' (group and individuals, both State and non-State) social groups and their respective social purposes. The social identities of conflict actors influence their interest, position and power by looking at prioritization of identities by actors during the conflict resolution process and scope of an actor's social identity to influence the resolution process. The interests and positions in turn inform the conflict dynamics i.e. attitude,


Figure 3: Framework for Analysing the Role of Identity in River Water Conflict

behaviour and contradictions. The linkage between the determinants of riparian conflict and identity is cross-cutting and interlinked. The position of an actor (upstream or downstream) is part of the identity (type identity) of the actors. The bargaining power or influence that an actor enjoys can also be a function of role identity or the power a group enjoys. The interest or stake of an actor in the contested transboundary river may emanate from their identity (role or social purpose). The interest, position and influence of the actors are instrumental in creating the conflict dynamics. Here again the linkages are cross-cutting. So, conflicting interests create the contradiction and become the source of the conflict. The position and the influence or bargaining power impact the attitude and conflict behaviour. These reinforce each other to create and sustain the conflict dynamics. This analytical framework makes it possible identify the role of social identity in complex conflict and resolution dynamics with regard to river water.

Identity in Transboundary River Conflict Resolution: A Comparative Analysis

This paper uses parliamentary debates, key informant unstructured interviews, central and state government internal and published policy papers, tribunal reports, civil society group publications and presentations and a sample of approximately 4000 national newspaper entries to create conflict interaction narratives for Krishna, Ravi Beas and Cauvery rivers. This section discusses the key findings from an analysis of the data.

Trans-boundary river water conflict in India today are a result of convergence of political, ethnic (linguistic) identities with socio-economic interests. This creates the chauvinistic attitudes *vis a vis* water which has been identified in the existing literature(Anand P. B., 2004). Key informant interview data collected corroborates this as actors articulated the conflict in terms of 'Karnataka's water being given away to the Tamils who have enjoyed it for centuries' or 'the farmers in Cauvery and Krishna Delta being unnecessarily and unjustifiably punished for developing irrigation earlier than their upstream counterparts'. The Ravi Beas conflict denotes a similar construction of state identity though on a different conflict issue (riparian vs. non-riparian). Here too, as the key informant interviews suggest, the construction is along the lines that 'Punjab's water is being given away freely to neighbouring countries and states who not even riparian states are.' Scholars like Anand (2004) point to the instrumentalization of identity in transboundary river water conflicts stating that "river water disputes present state governments with opportunities to link river-water claims to identity and thereby enhance their own legitimacy as protectors of the rights of the people. River-water disputes are likely to become aggravated when the disputant riparian states have respective populations with distinct identities (based on language and ethnicity) which the respective State governments can use to create political space for themselves". However, stakeholders such as a farmers' leader from Karnataka stress the need to view the conflict in the historical context. The leader observes in the context of the Cauvery conflict, that the Agreement of 1924 on Cauvery water sharing has no place in independent India because it "*was not among equals[6]... After independence…all these agreements should have been abrogated… They should have gone for a new agreement as equal states.*"

Role of Macro Forces in Shaping Social Identity, Interest and Positions of Conflict Parties

Historically, development of river basins typically in Krishna, Ravi Beas and Cauvery began under the British. After independence, the planned projects were continued with adjustments made for the new political boundaries. The changes in the planned projects were largely technical and did not account for changes in stakeholder identities. The linguistic reorganization of states in 1956 and 1966 created "single-identity" States such as Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Punjab based on their claims of distinctive language and culture (Majeed, 2003). The official articulation of the formation of the states as well as key informant interview responses express feelings of gain and loss due to the reorganization of boundaries[7].

In the case of Krishna River immediately after independent the States of Bombay, Mysore, Hyderabad and Madras became the riparian states in the river basin and planning for development of utilization of water began at the State and the National levels. The initial post-independence agreement brokered by the Centre in July 1951 was rejected by State of Mysore. In 1960, the Central Water and Power Commission drew up an alternative agreement for utilization of Krishna waters which was also not accepted by the riparian parties. Simultaneously however, both the states and the Centre continued to develop and sanction projects to utilize Krishna waters the aggregate demand of which was in excess of the available supply.A tribunal was constituted under the ISWD Act in 1969 though the actual resolution was reached politically between the Chief Ministers. Conflict over Krishna waters was referred to another ISWD Tribunal in 2004 when the prior agreement expired and was under review. The tribunal delivered its decision in 2010.

The key bottleneck in the Ravi Beas case is the construction of a Sutlej Yamuna Link (SYL) canal that would allow Haryana to utilize Ravi Beas waters from Punjab. The origins of the Ravi Beas conflict may be found in the partition of India when both India and Pakistan made competing claims on the Indus water system[8]. The state reorganization process has led Punjab to claim that "*Since Haryana was no longer a riparian after the division, there was no question of dividing the waters.*"(Senior advisor to the government of Punjab, 2012)[9]. Since conflict over Ravi Beas waters was at the heart of the Sikh ethno-nationalist movement, the Tribunal for adjudicating on the conflict was originally a part of the Punjab Settlement (peace) Accord of 1985. It was subsequently brought under the ISWD Act by an Amendment. Even though the Tribunal gave its interimreport in 1987, it was never implemented and all states sought clarifications. In 2004, the Punjab Legislative Assembly unanimously passed The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004 which terminated all agreements relating to the Ravi Beas Waters including the 1981 Agreement(Ministry of Water Resources, 2011). The Act however stated that the current and actual utilizations of all States will remain protected and unaffected. The Act vide Clause 7 barred any Civil Court from adjudicating or entertaining any proceedings arising under or connected with the Act (The Punjab Termination of Agreements Act, 2004). Subsequently, the Supreme Court referred the matter for Presidential Reference to determine the legality of the Punjab Termination Act. After twelve years, in November 2016, the Supreme Court Bench ruled the Act to be illegal sparking immediate protests in Punjab(The Supreme Court of India, 2016)

In the case of Cauvery, the 1924 and 1892 Agreements on water sharing continued to exist after India's independence since they were permanent agreements by law. Meanwhile, the territorial reorganization of States resulted in the Princely State of Mysore and adjacent areas to be merged to create the State of Karnataka. Madras Presidency was re-organized as the state of Tamil Nadu. Presently, the Cauvery basin is spreads over four States- Karnataka (Coorg and Mysore), Tamil Nadu (Madras and Pudukottai), Kerala (Travancore) and Union Territory of Pondicherry. Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are the co-riparian States. As a result of this re-organization, the State of Tamil Nadu had a reduced basin area compared to the erstwhile State of Madras. On the other hand, the State of Mysore's, now Karnataka's, basin area increased. Since its creation, Karnataka as the upper riparian began constructing dams and reservoirs without permission from the Planning Commission, Central Water Commission or consent of the State of Tamil Nadu. This was deemed to be in violation of the 1924 and 1892 Agreements by Tamil Nadu. The Cauvery Tribunal was formed in 1990 after many failed attempts at negotiations. In February 2013, the Centre, on the directive of the Supreme Court published an "extraordinary" notification of the final award of the Cauvery Tribunal making it binding on all parties from the date of the publication of the award(The Hindu, 2013). The notification was marked by sporadic violence in the Mysore region while farmers in the Cauvery delta welcomed the decision.

The state reorganization led to regional identities being subsumed by the dominant linguistic identity (Majeed, 2003). The linguistic reorganization of States, despite muted protests from certain regions, fused the cultural and the political boundaries into one legitimate constitutional identity

of the State. This combined with deep rooted feeling of historical deprivation or perceived threat to existing livelihood structures created a State identity that is far more complex than a shared political and socio-cultural territory.

Actors and their Positions in River Conflict Resolution Process

A stakeholder analysis showed that mostly high level State actors are involved in the ISWD conflict resolution process. High level political leadership (Chief Ministers) represent the issue on public platforms while the legal process is handled by a high level legal team supported by State department technocrats- mainly engineers from the department of irrigation. Further there are severalnon-state actors who significantly influence the conflict resolution process. The expert witnesses are drawn from academia and a pool of retired technocrats who have experience on the conflict. The representation from the Centre varies depending on the conflict intensity and political configuration. Usually, it is the Ministry of Water Resources and its agency the Central Water Commission that conducts initial negotiations and technical briefings. If negotiations fail, then the Ministry of Water Resources can establish a Tribunal on behalf of the Union government. However, several points in the conflict timeline of intractable cases like Cauvery and Ravi Beas, have warranted the intervention of the Prime Minister for (1) negotiating a temporary solution (Cauvery, Krishna), (2) to issue a directive to grant temporary relief to a downstream State (PM as the head of Cauvery River Authority) (3) to formally end a conflict (Rajiv Longawal Accord) (4) to highlight the importance of a national perspective on rivers and the human side of river conflicts (Cauvery rivers). Ironically, though there is a recognition of the ubiquity of water conflicts at all levels and its linkage to water stress, the study found very little inter-departmental or intra-departmental cooperation (or joined up thinking) directly linking efficient water management and irrigation policies with transboundary river water conflict resolution.

In all the three cases, there was remarkable uniformity in the behaviour political parties. First, there is all party unity in a State when it comes to intra-State transboundary river water conflicts. The regional parties are more strident and vocal about the issues. The state wings of the national parties also take a regional/ state view on river water conflicts. In the Ravi Beas case, even though the Congress was in power in the Centre, and in both Haryana and Punjab, Captain Amarinder Singh (Congress, Chief Minister) abrogated all treaties with regard to rivers of Punjab. The Central government or the Congress mechanisms were unable to prevent it and have not been able to effectively resolve the issue through negotiations. The reason for this can be explained to a great extent when one analyses the intra-State party systems. Though united at the inter-State level, within the State there is high level of political bickering and what Prof. Janakrajan termed as 'competitive populism'. It is highest in States where political power is concentrated in a few parties- like in Tamil Nadu or Punjab where power alternates between AIADMK and DMK and Shiromani Akali Dal and the Congress respectively.

The number of civil society actors or non-party political actors directly associated with the conflict and the resolution process differs from case to case. Sampled news reports and secondary data suggests the Cauvery conflict involves the highest number of civil society actors among the three. There are quite a few number of farmers' organizations in both Karnataka and Tamil Nadu who do not just exert pressure on their political leaders but they have also evolved mechanisms for cross-border people-to-people meetings. On the other hand in Punjab, though farmers are the principal constituents there were very few to no records of farmers' organization participating in the conflict resolution process, directly or indirectly. As has been suggested, this is partially due to the fact that these organizations are mainly farmers' wings of national or regional parties. In Krishna, there is comparatively little public participation of farmers' associations and other civil society organizations. The main media reports pertain to the Telangana activists fighting for statehood. However, key informant interviews revealed a considerable number of associations of

technocrats who were helping their respective states to collect data on the conflict and its impacts. These organizations largely catered to the local regional interests.

The politicization of the farmers and the farmers' groups emerged in all three cases, though the degree varied. It was also revealed that the farmers prioritise their political party affiliations over their membership of vocational associations on most issues. Though they participate enthusiastically in social movements to secure their water and land rights, they vote according to their party affiliations in elections thus denying civil society river related organizations the mandate to operate in legal and political circles. The only organisation that has been able to translate a popular political movement on land and water issues into electoral votes was the Communist Party in the Cauvery Delta. The Dradiva Kazagham movement on linguistic and cultural rights of the Tamils and the Shiromani Akali Dal championing the rights of the Sikhs have also metamorphosed into powerful regional political parties with stakes in the Central coalition governments. These parties aggressively advocate the cause of their respective States in securing river water.

Finally there is a major implied role of leadership in government, politics and civil society. On a regular basis, the role of the administrators in the Ministry of Water Resources and the Chief Secretaries of the State are crucial in resolving the technical issues. The Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers can play a critical role in averting disasters such as floods or in diffusing a highly emotive conflict situation. The criticality of political will and statesmanship in negotiating an amicable solution has been stressed by every key informant. In the civil society, three types of leadership roles have emerged- (1) farmers leaders who represent the interests of their regions. A majority of them are also important affiliates of political parties in the State. (2) the educated elite, primarily technocrats, retired bureaucrats and legal experts who either in their individual capacity or as part of an association advise their State governments on how best to articulate the State's interests and (3) the educated elite, mainly belonging to academia who are directly involved in providing an apolitical, broad-based multi-stakeholder dialogue on transboundary river water conflicts at the national and the regional levels.

Bottlenecks in Intra-State Single Identity ISWD River Conflict Resolution Process

A comparative analysis of the formal conflict resolution procedure and the role played by the state actors, political parties and civil society organizations reveal certain commonalities. First, under the existing system, it is possible to avail of multiple channels simultaneously to try and secure a favourable solution. Thus, negotiations run parallel to Tribunal proceedings and Supreme Court appeals are used to get interim redress. This has been commonly criticized in the academic and policy circles as causing inordinate delays. However, key informant interviews have shown that it is important for the States and their political and civil leadership to demonstrate that all options have been exhausted before an inch of compromise is reached. Otherwise, given the emotiveness of the issue, no legal instrument or decision can be implemented. Second, there is a deliberate ambiguity in the law on the principles of river water distribution and the relative weightage of factors such as protection of existing usage, socio-economic backwardness of a region, alternate resources available – the criteria used for equitable utilisation of water. Thus the parties are free to claim different principles of transboundary river water sharing to justify their claims. A corollary to this is that it is difficult for the political leadership of a party state to accept a principle of distribution that does not best suit the interests of the state. The third conclusion that may be drawn from the analysis of the ISWD Act and the conflict cases is that the intra-State transboundary mechanism is embedded within the political, federal and social environment and cannot be immune to it. This makes a purely legal or management based approach impractical and at times counter-productive.

Identity, particularly non-State identity is not recognized as a variable under the existing intra-State transboundary river water conflict resolution process established under the ISWD Act- either

in the law or by the executive operating it. A review of the Parliamentary debates both preceding the Act of1956 and the Amendment Act 2002 reveals that the purpose of the Act was to provide a dedicated, efficient and time-saving mechanism for States to resolve their transboundary disputes with the help of the Centre –through negotiation or adjudication. During the framing of the ISWD Act in 1956, it was assumed that large-scale development of water resources was integral to national development. Hence, basin-wide river management through river boards and a conflict resolution procedure exclusively for transboundary river issues were to provide an efficient water management system for the entire nation. Though the issue of ubiquity of water conflicts was raised, the political executive argued that (1) all regional and sub-regional issues internal to a State's territory could be resolved by the State itself, (2) the diverse interests within these territories are aggregated by the States. It was subsumed that non-State identities can be clearly divided along the binary of State vs. State. Thus, the question of recognizing or allowing non-State stakeholders as actors in the conflict resolution process did not arise.

A related assumption or assertion of the Act was that the long-standing (since before independence) intractable conflicting interests of States could be resolved through the good offices of the Centre. If this failed, then it could be adjudicated by a Tribunal that had the same stature as the apex Court in India by virtue of the fact that it was presided over by a Supreme Court judge. In the discussions on the Amendment of the Act as well, the general opinion was that establishing time limits and not allowing a Supreme Court appeal i.e. limiting manoeuvrability of the States and the possibility of procrastination by the Centre would increase the effectiveness of the mechanism. Thus, the possibility of non-resolution of a conflict due to non-compliance or the recurrence of a conflict or part of a conflict was not accounted for in the system.

This, as the review of the cases show creates certain problems. Constitutionally as a Union of States with a unitary bias (Johari, 1974), the recourse in the case of non-compliance by a State is the imposition of State Emergency (Article 356)- which is of course an extreme measure. As the Cauvery and Ravi Beas cases demonstrate, there have been demands by party States to impose Emergency Law on Karanataka and Punjab respectively on account of non-compliance to Centre and Supreme Court directives. However, these requests have not been acted upon by the Centre. The Krishna and the Cauvery cases demonstrate how non-resolution or an open-ended resolution of the conflict or certain parts of the conflict can lead to its re-emergence or prevent the implementation of the award.

In the absence of compliance by the State parties to a Centre, Tribunal or Supreme Court directive and given the unwillingness (and perhaps impracticability) of imposing Article 356 in cases related to water disputes, there is no mechanism within the Act to impose or effect a solution. This is contradictory to the Act per se, which assumes resolution as inevitable.

Needless to say, there are grey areas within this resolution-non-resolution spectrum. As mentioned in the academic literature, alluded to by Government officials and alleged by activists and interest groups; States (even after the Amendments introduced in 2002) take recourse to various measures such as filing Special Leave Petitions, exerting political pressure to delay or avoid implementing an unfavourable decision (Iyer R. R., 2003; The Inter- State Water Disputes (Amendment) Act, 2002, 2002; Nariman, 2009; Richards & Singh, 2002). This was epitomized in the Punjab Termination Act of 2004 which abrogated all treaties with regard to Ravi Beas waters. The long pending Presidential reference also indicates the inability or the incapacity of the Centre to take coercive action in case of defiance by the States. The statement by Mr. Puttaniah (Leader, KRRS, Karnataka) after the Cauvery Tribunal Award was notified in February 2013 is also telling. He mentioned that notification of the Award was a far cry from the implementation of the Award.

The conflict resolution mechanism on the other hand (since imposing President's Rule vide Article 356 is not an option) can take recourse to negotiations only between the State parties which are already engaged in a zero-sum game. Further, after the amendment, due to imposed time limits, there is limited room for negotiations. Instead of resolving the conflict, this vicious circle of legal

appeals and hardline positions perpetuates and reinforces, (borrowing Galtung's terminologies) the conflict attitudes and behaviour between the State parties. The delay in resolution further intensifies the conflict issues (e.g. the demand on water increases with increasing uses and users) thus making the conflict intractable. Thus, the very rationale that prompted the leaders to have a single-state- based identity conflict resolution mechanism today serves as an impediment to conflict resolution.

The analysis presented in this paper shows that there is a need for recognition of other identity bases in intra-State Transboundary river water conflict resolution process, than doing away with the State-based conflict resolution model. This would also provide the conflict resolution mechanism with multiple channels of negotiations (instead of the current set-up of multiple channels for adjudication) increasing the chances of a negotiated or consensus based solution. Of course implications of this paradigm shift need to be considered at least hypothetically for it may be argued that such a paradigm shift would open a Pandora's Box.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates the shortcomings of a conflict resolution mechanism based on the assumption that state-based identity and State as an entity aggregates all identities within its political territory. It shows that in a democratic federal set-up such as India, non-State identities, though unrecognized, operate within the conflict resolution mechanism and influence resolution outcomes. Political and constitutional efforts to converge social identities (especially ethnic identity) with political State-based identity (such as linguistic re-organization of States) increases chauvinistic attitudes towards river as a resource which severely restricts the space for elected State executives to adopt conciliatory stance on the issue. Further, the emotive nature of water conflicts and its direct link with lives and livelihoods make transboundary river water conflicts a potentially explosive issue. The paper thus, points to the need to create and protect spaces for non-State based groups within the institutional conflict resolution mechanism in order to diffuse the institutionalized binary of state vs state based on a single identity.

Table 1: List of River Conflicts Adjudicated Under ISWD Act since 1956 (Ministry of Water Resources, 2013)

	River	Year (when tribunal was constituted)	State parties	Status
1	Krishna	April 1969	Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka	Award: May 1976
2	Godavari	April 1969	Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa	Award: July 1980
3	Narmada	October 1969	Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujrat, Maharashtra	Award : December 1979
4	Ravi Beas	April 1986	Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Jammu & Kashmir, Delhi	Report 1987, Presidential Reference 2004, decision on November 2016
5	Cauvery	June 1990	Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, UT Pondicherry	Report 2007, Final Award February 2013
6	Krishna	April 2004	Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra	Award: 30 December 2010
7	Mahadayi	December 2009	Goa, Karnataka, Maharashtra	Pending
8	Vansadhara	February 2010	Andhra Pradesh, Orissa	Pending

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Professor Johan Galtung lectures "Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means" at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies via supported distance learning in partnership with the TRANSCEND Peace University (TPU).One of the founders of Peace and Conflict Studies, Professor Galtung also founded the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), and the Journal of Peace Research. He is the recipient of the Right Livelihood Award, the alternative Nobel Peace Prize, and has held chairs in Peace Studies and Peace Research at universities in three continents. He originated many of the key concepts of the subject including structural violence and positive peace. His ideas have been instrumental in transforming conflicts around the world. He has published more than 1,000 articles covering a wide range of fields, including peaceful conflict transformation, deep culture, peace pedagogy, reconciliation, development, peace building and empowerment, global governance, direct structural and cultural peace/violence, peace journalism, and reflections on current events, and more than 100 books translated into dozens of languages.

2. Johan Galtung (1971) in his article *The Middle East and the Theory of Conflict* published in the Journal of Peace Research postulated that conflict may be conceived as moving among a triangle's three corners where corner A refers to conflict attitudes, B to conflict behaviour and C to the conflict or contradiction itself. For him a conflict sequence can begin in any of the 3 corners- A, B, C.

3. Conflict behaviour may involve physical acts of violence, verbal violence or other coercive behaviour. Such behaviour in turn can also lead to creation of new incompatibilities. Thus, escalation in impact of conflict such as refugees etc. can add to the incompatibilities and make a conflict intractable. Attitudinal processes run almost parallel to the conflict process. They involve certain symmetrical and asymmetrical tendencies. Typically, the symmetrical tendencies involve the following: (a) belittling the achievement of others, (b) explaining one's own failures and attributing them to outsiders, (c) rejection of conciliatory offers by the other party or an external as tricks, (d) Claiming that there is no conflict with the people and the conflict is only with the leaders of the other party, (e) Allegation that the leaders of the other conflict party need the conflict to strengthen their regime. The asymmetries can relate to – (a) difference or perceived differences in power ("topdog- underdog"), (b) different perceptions of the future (especially where a particular outcome means hope and victory for one party and spells doom for the other), and (c)different attitudes towards the conflict resolution process (Galtung, 1971)

4. Social identity may be categorised into two non-exclusive categories- role identity- mother, president, taxi driver; and type identity- party affiliation, sexual identity, ethnic identity.

5. He says, "*The mighty Empire and their Presidency Madras and a tiny princely State of Mysore where the ruler was their puppet in the Agreement of 1924*

6. For example, the Government of Tamil Nadu website states, "*With India attaining independence, the Madras Presidency continued in its original form comprising Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and parts of Kerala. However, the agitation for a separate Andhra State compelled the Government of India to bifurcate the Madras Presidency into Andhra with Telugu speaking areas and Andhra with Tamil speaking areas…Under the State Reorganization Act of 1956, Madras lost Malabar district and Kasargod taluk, to the newly formed State of Kerala while Madras gained four taluks of Trivandrum district and Shencottah taluk of Quilon district of Kerala. The new Mysore (Karnataka) absorbed some parts of the old South Kanara district and the Kollegal taluk of Coumbatore district in 1960. 405 miles2 of Chittoor district of Andhra Pradesh was transferred to Madras in exchange for 326 miles2 from Chengalpattu and Salem districts….The Madras State was renamed as 'Tamil Nadu' on 14th January 1967*"(Government of Tamil Nadu, 2003) *The formation of Karnataka is described thus, "Karnataka took its present shape in 1956, when the States of Mysore and Coorg were merged with Kannada-speaking districts of the former States of Bombay, Hyderabad and Madras. Mysore was made up of ten districts…Bellary had been transferred from Madras State to Mysore in 1953, when the new State of Andhra Pradesh was created out of Madras' northern districts." (Department of State Education Research and Training, Karnataka, 2012). The formation of erstwhile Andhra Pradesh also has a chequered history. Andhra Pradesh was the first State within India to be formed on the basis of language. The Government of Andhra Pradesh has articulated the "Struggle for Andhra Pradesh" (Andhra Pradesh Government, 2002) as a "40 years of struggle by the Telugu speaking Andhra people to form Andhra Pradesh which was realized on 1st October 1953". It notes that the aspiration of the Andhra people was always for a Visalandhra with Hyderabad as its capital which would incorporate all the Telugu speaking regions.*

7. The partition of India in 1947 meant that the Indus basin itself was now divided by an international border- the headwaters of the river system lay in India while the lower reaches of the Indus system remained in Pakistan. The international division along communal lines also implied major regional re-organization for the Punjab region. The Indian part of Punjab secured thirteen out of the twenty-nine

districts of undivided Punjab which amounted to 38% of the land area and 47% of the population. Pakistan as the lower riparian expressed apprehensions that India, the upper riparian was in a position to simply cut-off water supply from the Indus basin. There was also continued dispute over the Bhakra Nagal Project on river Sutlej (Report of the Ravi and Beas Water Tribunal, Unpublished). Eventually, the World Bank, who was invested in projects in the basin brokered a water sharing formula allocated all Western Rivers to Pakistan and all Eastern Rivers to India. A transition period was decided when canal projects were undertaken to realise this water sharing arrangement. In anticipation of The Indus Water Treaty (1960) negotiations, both countries were requested to submit proposals for the exclusive use of the Eastern and Western rivers. The Indian government asked the States of Punjab, PEPSU, Jammu and Kashmir and Rajasthan to prepare such proposals for their State. Based on the proposals received from the State governments an integrated system of 3 Eastern rivers was conceived to provide irrigation to the arid areas in the South of the Basin (comprising of southern parts of Punjab and PEPSU). There were two main projects planned- the Bhakra Project and the Beas Project. However, it was left to the constituent States to decide on how best to utilize the water allocated to them.

8. Punjab in its current form emerged only after the Punjab Reorganization Act 1966. Under the State Reorganization Act of 1956, PEPSU was merged with Punjab. Subsequently, via Punjab Reorganization Act of 1966, the State of Haryana, Union Territory of Himachal Pradesh and the Union Territory of Chandigarh were carved out of Punjab (The Punjab Reorganization Act , 1966). The reorganization was in response to complaints of the Punjab government neglecting the southern region of the State and the demand for a Punjab suba or State (The Tribune, 2002). Haryana constituted of the southern Hindi speaking plain districts of former Punjab (with 35.8% of the region and 37.37 % of the population). The Hindi speaking Hill districts in the north constituted Himachal Pradesh with 23% of the territory and 7% of the post-partition population (Kumar, 2005). The remaining Punjabi speaking areas constituted modern Punjab. In terms of religion, Punjab has more than 75% of the total Sikh population in the country and approximately 60% of the State's population is Sikh by religion (Census of India, 2001) . About 36% of the population is Hindu and the rest belong to other religions such as Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Jainism and other religious communities. On the other hand, in Haryana, approximately 88% of the population is Hindu and 6% of the population is Sikh (Census of India, 2001).

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Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relations: Buddhism to Special Strategic Partnership

Amlan Dutta

PhD Candidate, Department of East Asia Studies, Delhi University, New Delhi.

India-Japan relations during the last few decades have deepened as the leadership of the two countries have strengthened relationship in the fields of security, economic and science and technology. It is one of the most talked about relationship in the Asia-Pacific but a comprehensive study on this issue encompassing all the aspects of the relationship was missing on the shelves of our libraries. Shamshad Khan's *Changing Dynamics of India-Japan Relations: Buddhism to Special Strategic Partnership* partially fulfils the gap in the existing literature. As of now it is a comprehensive and more importantly a very up-to-date book in this domain.

What is most impressive about the book is its chapterisation. The book has been divided into 8 chapters viz. 1. India-Japan Relations: Tracing the Cultural & Religious Roots, 2. Prelude to a New Partnership: India-Japan Relations from Meiji Restoration to the End of WWII, 3. India & Japan: The Cold war Shadow on the Two Asian Democratic crescents, 4. India-Japan Relations: Evaluating the Impact of Strategic Partnership, 5. India-Japan Politico-Economic Engagements, 6. India-Japan Cooperation and their Quest for a rule based order, 7. India-Japan Nuclear Cooperation: Between Economic Gains and Ideal Principles, 8. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions.

In all the chapters, the author follows a uniform pattern where he looks into the debate in both India and Japan among administrative as well as academic circles. He then gives out impartial and very independent conclusions in all the chapters commensurate with his expertise in this field. The author suggests that any modern debate and discussion or even evaluation regarding India-Japan relations dwells too much on the strategic and security aspects of the relationship, or even the economic and political aspects for that matter. He questions the veracity of that chain of thought, especially from the Indian side and makes a very relevant observation that "……literature on India-Japan relations from the Indian scholars in recent times has laid more emphasis on political and economic aspects of the relationship. They have either given less importance to cultural/religious factor or have totally missed this factor in their discourse." (Introduction: Page xxiii). He opines that one simply cannot ignore the fact that when India and Japan had almost no links at all during Japan's self-isolation, it were the cultural and religious links (read Buddhism) which kept India alive as a country of rich culture and heritage in the Japanese hearts and minds. It is in this respect that the very first chapter of the book traces the cultural and religious roots of the relationship from which, in his own words, both the countries have evolved into 'Asia's two Democratic Crescents.'

As a reader, I found three aspects in the book very fascinating, viz. a) Japan's help to Indian Revolutionaries during India's freedom struggle, b) The China factor in Indo-Japan Relations, and c) The Nuclear Deal 'conundrum'. The author brings fresh perspectives into all these three facets and challenges the popular media narrative on them. He takes a look into these issues

both historically and in the context of contemporary times and gauges its capacity as to how it impacts ties between the two Asian democracies. He traces the visits of Tagore to Japan which the latter made during 1916 to 1929 and says that "Tagore's writing and speeches in Japan remains an important source to understand the post-Meiji interactions between India and Japan" (Chapter 2, Page 12). The author suggests that Tagore, although in awe of Japanese culture and national sprit, questions Japan's expansionism and even labelled it similar to Western colonialism. "….Tagore proved to be prophetic as Japan's expansionist policies brought disaster for Japan….." (Chapter 2, Page 14). It is a widely accepted view that Japan was assisting Indian underground revolutionaries to uproot the British rule from India. But Khan suggests that Japan too had vested interests to support the Indian cause as it was speculated that Japan wanted to gain foothold in the subcontinent. He says "……Japan considered that to create new order in Asia free from Anglo-American Alliance, it is important to drive out British out of India…." (Chapter 2, Page 36-37).

The author is among that select group of thinkers who refuses to view growing "India-Japan Strategic partnership" only from the prism of the China factor. Japan's renewed interest in India stemmed from the fact that it wanted India to be the protector of its commercial interests in the Indian Ocean, which was marked by the event of India's rescuing its Alondra Rainbow vessel from Pirates in the Indian Ocean. Now with an ever assertive China with whom Japan has been entangled into various conflicts in the East China Sea and the Senkaku islands dispute, Japan wants India to play a bigger role in the region and balance China's hegemony. Of course Japan's 'fear' of China is also aided by diminishing USA's influence in the region which happens to be the core Japan's security policy. However, Khan cautions India's policy makers against joining any Japan led or USA led bandwagon to encircle China, where it is sure to antagonize the Chinese Dragon. He says that "Beijing had viewed Tokyo's security partnership with New Delhi, as a mechanism to 'encircle' China…..The strategic doctrine which gives lots of importance to India…….has deepened Chinese doubts further" (Chapter 4, Page 80). The author points out that there are several issues where both India and China converge, and sometimes even in opposition to Japanese interests. Both India and China want to put an end to American and Western domination of banking and financial institutions and that is why India took active part in the setting up of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which, incidentally, Japan did not join. However, he also acknowledges India's fine balancing act as he says that "There is a tendency, in both Indian media and Chinese media, to overplay the China factor in India-Japan relations, but sufficient attention has not been paid to India's engagement with China and a fine balance its foreign policy planners are trying to maintain vis-à-vis China and Japan" (Chapter 4, Page 72).

The author in this book also questions the efforts of India and Japan in their quest of a 'rules-based order'. He says that "…..there is no uniformity on views among Indian and Japanese strategic thinkers whether to forge a new order with or without China" (Chapter 6, Page 149). He suggests that India and Japan are nowhere equals as Japan is a developed while India is a developing country and urges Japan to do more in respect to bringing India to global high tables like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Asia Pacific Economic-Cooperation, Wassenar Group, etc. India is ready to align itself according to the new global order, but it must take care of its own interests and is seeking greater participation and say in shaping the newly emerging global order. This is where, the author suggests, Japan has to step up its efforts beyond mere 'commitments' and bring India to the high tables.

Lastly, it is Khan's chapter on the Nuclear Agreement between India and Japan which makes the book a standout, as it is a very recent happening with India and Japan having finalized an agreement on November, 2016. Japan is the only country in the world which has faced the wrath of nuclear weapons, and India, being a non-signatory to the NPT, Japan found it extremely

difficult domestically to stitch together any form of nuclear deal with India, albeit civilian. This was seen in Indian quarters as a big achievement and it speaks volumes of the growing trust and the special relationship between the two Asian partners.

In conclusion, it can be said that the author exudes lucidity and fluidity while discussing various aspects of India-Japan relations and this makes the book easy to read and comprehend issues. This book contains various maps, tables and statistics which the readers may find very useful. It can also be said that this book can be useful for academicians, students and even officials as they could get many new perspectives and policy suggestions for further blossoming of Asia's "Win-Win" relationship.

India's Neighbourhood Policy - Pitfalls and Opportunities

Sanchari Ghosh

Department of International Relations, Jadavpur University, Kolkata.

ABSTRACT

The destiny of a country is inseparable from the happenings in its neighbourhood. In defining its key national and security interests, a country's neighbourhood enjoys a place of unquestioned primacy. Consequently, the developments taking place in her neighbourhood have profound impact on India's perceptions and policies. By 'neighbourhood', this paper indicates the immediate neighbourhood spanning the South Asian region. The existential realities of the subcontinent and its strategic location have coaxed India to imbibe major changes in its foreign policy from time to time. This reality consists of unsuccessful democracies, military coups, weak and unstable governments, and interference by major powers. On top of that, India shares disputed land borders with two nuclear armed neighbours, both of which have close strategic collaboration among themselves while sharing a certain animosity towards India. In spite of such a volatile and somewhat hostile neighbourhood, India's policymakers have seldom come up with definite and clear cut policy postures with regard to the region, relying instead on ad-hoc measures and the immediate political exigencies of the hour. Thus, it is impelling to question whether an effective and credible neighbourhood policy per se has existed for India and that what are the factors which have shaped its evolution. This paper would provide a very brief outline of the major tenets of India's so called neighbourhood policy till the Gujral Doctrine before focussing on the Atal Bihari Vajpayee led NDA government which was in power between 1998 and 2004, followed by Manmohan Singh's tenure from 2004 and finally Narendra Modi succeeding him. Finally, the paper would point out the major objectives which India should strive for in the near future, vis-a-vis its neighbourhood.

Keywords: Neighbourhood, Challenge, Foreign Policy, Opportunities.

The Neighbourhood

G.K.Chesterton once said, "The Bible tells us to love our neighbours, and also to love our enemies; probably because generally they are the same people." The neighbourhood policy of a country is usually considered to be a subset of its foreign policy, but the question looms large, how far does India actually have a neighbourhood policy since the time of its independence. During historical times, the whole South Asian region was an integrated entity, bound by a rich tradition of dialogue, trade and cultural exchanges, but today unfortunately the region seems one of the least integrated regions of the world. As far as India's immediate neighbourhood is concerned, scholars argue that for India, achieving the objective of becoming one of the principal powers of Asia will depend entirely on India's ability to manage its own neighbourhood. Moreover, unless a state tackles its immediate neighbourhood, managing the extended one seems completely to be a utopia. In this regard, there have been ample challenges for India vis-a-vis its neighbourhood. India shares land and maritime boundaries with eight countries—Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, the Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Setting aside China, Maldives, and Bhutan—mostly at peace—six countries in India's immediate neighbourhood have been on the boil on and off for many years.[1]

Successive Periods: Lessons to Learn

Though, India's first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and his successors were never short of envisioning close relationships in India's neighbourhood, they failed to translate their ideas into actions. The reasons may be ample, one of them is that they never had the resources required for the effort which acted as an impediment. In other words, the economic underpinnings of their foreign policy ambitions were weak. Furthermore, in the immediate post-independence period, an obvious contradiction in Nehru's foreign policy was always discernible while applying it to India's neighbourhood.[2] While rejecting all vestiges of colonial policy on one hand, he largely followed the British policy towards its immediate neighbours on the other. For instance, he retained the policy of ensuring tranquility along the borders through treaties signed during the British rule to protect India's own security and commercial interest. This was followed by his successors too, with minor exceptions. Nehru underplayed the India-Pakistan problem, often referring to it as 'not too serious', 'a family issue' and even a 'domestic quarrel'. Though he had a broader vision for Asian solidarity, he seemed to have taken the smaller immediate neighbours for granted in this endeavor. So, the dilemma remains whether there was a prominent neighbourhood policy during the Cold War days or not.[3]

In the later period too, in a very indistinguishable manner, despite emphasising India's relationship with its neighbours in its foreign policy pronouncements, no conscious attempt was made to conceptualise the problems confronting India's diplomacy in the neighbourhood and this continued even after the post cold-war days. The obtrusive example of this was the absence of regular high-level bilateral visits to the neighbouring countries, which tended to create an impression of neglect. India's thinking was disproportionately guided by security concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan which reduced India's ability to play regional exemplar. During Indira Gandhi's second tenure, the same contemplation was carried on through an almost solely security prism which was intensified by events like Pakistan backed insurgency in Punjab in the 1980s.[4] When we bring here the personality factor, it is a known fact that individual cognitive processes and belief systems can influence foreign-policy decision-making. [5] So, interestingly, Mrs. Gandhi's personality factor always acted as a spur in framing policies in the neighbourhood. In other words, India's relations with other South Asian nations depended greatly upon the composition of leadership in the neighbouring countries as well as Mrs.Gandhi's personality and policies. Undoubtedly, her personal style of reacting to internal and external threats with massive force had a considerable impact on relations with neighbors. It was during her tenure that Bangladesh emerged as an independent and sovereign state in the East, Sikkim was annexed and absorbed in India and a year after her demise the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was formed. Indira Gandhi did not initiate all these events, although she played a crucial role in their development.[6] Significant changes were noticeable in the neighbourhood policy during the time of I.K.Gujral. The 'Gujral Doctrine' as termed by few analysts exemplified a remarkable policy of accommodation which reflected the persisting security concerns of India that showeda definite, proper "Neighbourhood Policy." The significant achievement of Gujral Doctrine was a conscious decision to make the nation's foreign office less Pakistan-centric. The Policy promised to bring about changes in the security environment of the region, more so, in conformity with the ongoing world-wide changes.[7] The doctrine urged neighbours to participate in India's economy and bind together in peace and prosperity. This was because Gujral's focus was not to make India lead as a torchbearer of the neighbourhood, but as a partner in cooperation.

Moving forward to a definite timeline and keeping the aforementioned analysis as a background, we now move to the NDA government which began with Atal Bihari Vajpayee's coming into power in 1998. The challenge during this phase was to pay equal attention to India's bilateral relations with its neighbours. During this phase the NDA government was too much preoccupied with Indo-Pak relations and as a result, could not devote as much attention to other neighbours. Vajpayee pledged to work towards a 'strong India' that was recognised as an 'autonomous power

centre in the world' and to stop 'bending under pressure' to neighbouring countries and 'big powers. [8] However, if we attentively note the contradiction, we can see that the surprising proclamation of Vajpayee, that India and US were "natural allies" was reason enough to evoke fear among its neighbours to be subjugated by a hegemonic India in the region. So, exigently, the task before the government was to inspire the necessary confidence in its neighbours and to make them feel more secure. Even if there was any room for cooperation, the snag here was that the overwhelming presence of India creates an asymmetry that pushes other, smaller countries, into suspecting hegemony in every proposal for greater cooperation, where the neighbours get united only in their anti-India sentiment. [9] It cannot be overlooked that NDA government during Vajpayee's tenure tried to extend the hand of friendship to the government of Khaleda Zia in Bangladesh. However, balancing the neighbourhood on one hand and maintaining congeniality with the West on the other persisted as an unfinished chore.

Since May 2004, the UPA government led by the Congress party, with Manmohan Singh's coming into power, continued with the policy of inviting the neighbours to share the economic prosperity of India. Despite emphasising on connectivity, and mutual beneficial relation with neighbours, a disproportionate political capital was invested expecting a meaningful South Asian community through India-Pakistan detente and this eventually caused India to neglect other neighbourhood to a large extent. Even if India had put the effort, it was not enough to optimise the relations. Here, what remained unnoticed was that China got the opportunity to make inroads and challenge India's monopoly in the region. China's infrastructure proposals in Srilanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar made it more of a South Asian power. Though India has also attempted to make its presence felt in the Indian Ocean region, the broader picture is far from rosy and in a sense what was actually emerging was the serious challenge to India's oceanic geography. In fact, during this period too, India's challenge at SAARC was about the impact of a rising China on the geopolitics of the subcontinent. There was a dire need to restructure the neighbourhood policy, since given India's problem with all its neighbours, everyone of them had learnt the art of playing China card against Delhi. Assessing Manmohan Singh as an individual decision maker, it becomes discernible that his diminished political authority meant his Sri Lanka policy was hostage to parochial politics in Tamil Nadu, and that he was unable to block West Bengal Chief Minister Mamata Bannerjee's successful campaign to sabotage relations with Bangladesh. Moreover, he was unable to reframe India's policy after the collapse of General Pervez Musharraf's regime, with whom he had made real progress.[10]These challenges remained almost unsolved and given this backdrop, Narendra Modi assumed the prime ministership in 2014. It cannot be denied that Modi brought new energies to these problems. Energy, though, is not policy. So, the question still continues to remain that how far India's 'neighbourhood policy' exists, even today.

Now, if we try to differentiate between the two phases in broader sense, only two added points are visible here- leadership factor and propaganda. Since the strategic interests of a country do not undergo significant change with a change of government, the general thrust of foreign policy engagements remains largely unchanged. Therefore, just as previous governments have realised the link between India's own development to that of its region and thus stressed the importance of improving relationships with neighbouring countries, so has Modi. Keeping this in mind, the most important factor while analysing Modi's neighbourhood policy is his leadership factor, to be very precise-the Modi factor. In level of analysis approach, it shows that leadership can bring about a new emphasis or prioritisation in a country's international agenda, and a leader can influence the timing and manner in which perhaps inevitable conclusions are played out. For instance, with his 'neighbourhood first' policy, Modi has placed fresh ̄and as many argue, much-needed ̄stress on the importance India accords to its neighbourhood. The delivery of weapons to Afghanistan despite Pakistan's apprehensions ̄the first time India has supplied lethal weaponry to Afghan forces; cultivation of ties with countries in East and Southeast Asia in an attempt to balance China, while at the same time making China a critical element of his strategy to accelerate

India's economic progress all bear testimony to this style of engagement.[11] However, India's outreach to its neighbours has certainly not been spared pitfalls and gaps. For instance, Modi's attempts to unilaterally alter the terms of engagement with Pakistan initially, marked by confrontational statements and an increase in the intensity and volume of India's military action along the Line of Control, far from having the desired result created the perception in Pakistan that Modi was not sincere in constructively engaging with it. Furthermore, Modi's decision to call off his planned visit to the Maldives in March 2015 in protest of the subversion of democracy in the island nation—perhaps partly to pursue the active promotion of India's image as a democratic nation proved to be ineffective and in turn pushed Maldives further towards Beijing.[12]

Needless to say that Modi's charismatic personality arouses a lot of hope. For instance, his invitation of SAARC members in the oath taking ceremony was widely applauded, and again we got a glimpse of Modi trying to mend relation through cordial relation when he visited Nawaz Sharif on his birthday. However, these instances hardly had any positive impact. So, what we need to think is beyond the personality factor. More precisely, it should be more about the coherent policy for each country which further implies that refraining from ad-hocism is needful and more than the Modi-factor the onus lies on the "collective" work of the government and the policy makers. Realistically speaking, contagion of the personality cult has contaminated not just the Congress but the political arena generally. It is convenient to remember Indira Gandhi only for the Emergency, but we must also remember that she believed in her "mission", in her indispensability and therefore, became intolerant of criticism and challenge. If this has any resemblance with the current moment, it should make us worry.[13] Since, Modi's decision to skip the South Asian summit in Islamabad is, in essence, about the deteriorating relationship with Pakistan, it also underlines the growing irrelevance of SAARC for India's regionalism. However, in a positive note, search for alternatives to SAARC will now acquire a new momentum that favors us to look into the opportunities.

Prospects and Opportunities

The Modi government has been eager to re-energise the BIMSTEC forum. As part of that commitment, it has invited the BIMSTEC leaders to join the BRICS leaders at the Goa summit.[14] Modi's meetings with the BIMSTEC leaders present a major opportunity to demonstrate that the meltdown of SAARC does not mean India is giving up the ambitions of its neighbourhood first strategy. However, much of the international discourse on South Asia often gets reduced to the India-Pakistan relations; this only helps mask the significance of the other nations in the region. And the reference to them as "smaller nations" of the region is largely inaccurate.[15]India's capacity to address common threats and safeguard regional interests can be enhanced by actively cooperating with its neighbors. India can always make use of its soft power and devise an innovative as well as cooperative economic agenda to convince its smaller neighbours of the advantages of cooperating with India.[16]

Pakistan has consciously embraced China as the strategic economic partner and Pakistan believes that restoring historic economic connectivity with India is a threat to Pakistan. Thus, instead of bemoaning the fact, India always has an option to look forward affirmatively, however, it should be kept in mind that bilateral approach may not always be the solution and so regional forum remains the best option as far as India's neighbourhood is concerned. It is because of the fact that smaller countries sometimes feel that a purely bilateral negotiation with such a huge neighbour would place them at a disadvantage. Precisely, there should not be any hint of hegemonism from India's side which otherwise may remain a threat to India itself and perhaps it could sustain as the biggest unsolved challenge.

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