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Journal of International Relations

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Sl.No.	Contents	Page No.
	<i>Acknowledgements</i>	<i>iv-iv</i>
	<i>A Preface from Chief Editor</i>	<i>v-vii</i>
	<i>Author Information Guide for Publication in the Jair Journal of International Relations</i>	<i>viii-x</i>
1.	Indigenous Struggle, Neoliberalism, and Politics in Ecuador <i>Arnab Chakrabarty</i>	1-13
2.	Problems of Drug Trafficking in Central Asia <i>Bijaya Kumar Das</i>	14-18
3.	Environment and India's Foreign Policy: The Past and the Future <i>Piyali Dutta</i>	19-25
4.	Afghanistan: Prioritizing America's 'Other' War <i>Moutusi Paul Choudhury (Naskar)</i>	26-35
5.	'4 Dimension' Policy Initiative of the Contemporary Government of India: Is India Making a Move as a Leading Global Power? <i>Roshni Chaudhuri</i>	36-44
6.	Moving Beyond the Anarchy Problematique? Explaining the Dynamics of Contemporary IR Through the Dominant Paradigms in IR Theory <i>Prosenjit Pal</i>	45-52
7.	The Changing Dynamics of Indo-Japanese Security Partnership in the Post-Cold War Era: An Overview <i>Debjani Ghosal</i>	53-67
	Comments	
8.	Stepping Stones for Cross-Border Engagement: The Case of Zowkhathar-Rhi <i>Pratnashree Basu</i>	68-71

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From Chief Editor's Desk

The latest issue of JIR (Vol 3 No 2: July-December 2016) of JAIR 2016 is now reaching its numerous subscribers and interested readers, thanks to the dedicated efforts of all concerned. It carries a fairly good number of research papers and articles on varied subjects of contemporary interest. That certainly addresses some of the engaging issues occupying the empirical space of the IR discipline. The meaning conveyed by the expression “contemporary” is, however, not confined to what is happening here and now. Rather it should be taken as stretchable so that what is located in the transitory present does not get delinked from its roots, usually, in the recent past. IR studies must necessarily follow the historical track, and that has been the general practice for most learned pursuits in the field. At the same time, the approach should neither be pedestrian nor susceptible to the lure of the story line. We are not supposed to appropriate the task of the historian but only save our fact base from going a-historical under any methodological stress, whether of positivist or any other origin. There is always the possibility of losing track or choosing the wrong one at the crossroads, and the reasons are often surprisingly tied up with the dominant trends in the IR discipline itself—surprising because we get imperceptibly, if not consciously, carried away by the stipulations of those trends. Of course it is alright if one is sufficiently convinced about the acceptability of those stipulations and hence may very well carry on without much distraction. That apart there is still some reason why it is necessary to take a little extra care while investigating and generalising on empirical data which have a distinctly non-western origin.

The point is not that there has to be a discernible territorial authentication for every IR study with a local or regional context. Witness physical sciences where the tested laws do not go by any national name but only acknowledge the celebrity scientist as an individual discoverer. This is not because physical laws are by definition universally valid but also because the methodology involved is also universally acknowledged as valid and proper. For the discipline of IR *as a whole* the yard stick of validity for any research cannot and need not be nationalised or regionalised. The investigative procedure and methodology adopted must conform to some generally accepted standard, although the investigator should have every freedom to decide which data are to be accorded what kind of methodological treatment. As things stand now, fewer and fewer IR research in non-western context is tied to the western ways of thinking or argumentative pattern. In western scholarship too there has been a distinct turnaround from the old time rationalisation of approaches that were uncritical and biased. They are consciously and increasingly now in a self-critical mood, with significant debates surrounding ontology, epistemology, positivist scientism and many a construct built on them. As post modernist noises from different corners are reaching a high decibel there has been a revisionist trend— more rational, more inclusive, more sensitised to the injustice meted out to the “other”. The net effect in terms of changing outlook has been considerable.

In synch with that self-correcting trend one may seriously consider if IR scholarship in the non-western world can now shed some of their old academic phobia of getting marginalised or even denied a right of hearing in international forums. Honestly speaking, a great motivating factor for generating the erstwhile defensive-offensive mode among Asian-African-Latin American scholars in social sciences and some of their invariable assertiveness to hold on to one's guns was largely an extended manifestation of anti-imperialist hangover. This was again coupled with the tendency in post colonial societies to either re-establish, if not blow up, or disown, if not denigrate, the national cultural-intellectual heritage which in any case is ontologically entwined with the public psyche and hence could not be wished away. The intellectual upper crust having institutional eminence may have tried to underrate and neutralise this 'swadeshiana' but have in the process actually exposed the organic weaknesses of both nationalising and de-nationalising bents of mind. Time has arrived to free oneself from these basically self-defeating postures and enter with a free mind in the arena of academic discourse with sufficient honesty to call a spade a spade. One does not have to wear any ideological tag for seeking the truth, but should have more of the broadness of mind that allows one to accept any proven limitation of one's academic conviction. Logically speaking, one cannot endorse such unsustainable typology, like say, a Spanish IR as distinguished from a Scandinavian one or an Indian IR as distinguished from an Iranian one. At the most what is normal in territorially adjusting one's academic start-up is to emphasize the factual significance that is due to the local specifics, be it the regional environment or national political economy or a stratified political culture. In each of these dimensions there is for the national actor some distinct opportunities and also unavoidable stresses that may not be present elsewhere. Hence each study would also carry a distinct local flavour of its own— not because it had to be presented as a locally branded product but as a work empirically grounded in non-western milieu and yet genuinely in conformity with the accepted requisites of scientific investigation. There cannot really be a complete breach with the established modes of analysis, dominant paradigms, methodological nuances and similar other necessary thought structures that have achieved general acceptability in the IR community.

Mention has been made in the foregoing paragraph of the kind of critical rethinking that has been going on in western scholarly circles. In respect of IR it may be useful to take a look at what Robert O Keohane defines as "Six Big Questions in the Study of World Politics" followed by what Steve Smith presents as "Six Wishes for a More Relevant Discipline of International Relations" – both appearing in the *Oxford Handbook of Political Science* (Oxford University Press, New York, 2009, pp769-782). Of the six questions three seem to be more germane to the changing contours of IR. Scholars are already seized with the other three (relating to the impact of social churning within the state including gender rebalancing, implications of cyber technology for world politics and the possible ways to regulate the increasing stress on global environment) and therefore we can wait and see what emerges from their thinking. The more problematic three are reproduced verbatim below:

[1] How has politics been affected by the expansion of force, through technological change, and its dispersion? [2]. How has world politics been affected by changes in capitalism? and [3] Is there any plausible sense in which progress has taken place in International relations and if so is this progress due to intellectual or moral advances in human thinking?

(vii)

Similarly, the six wishes of Professor Smith can be abridged into most engaging three such as:

[1] IR has to become less of an American discipline, [2] IR has to reject its current privileging of a specific, culturally entailed social scientific approach, and [3] IR needs to focus on the relationship between the material and the ideational, with the much needed restoration of the core Marxist philosophical orientation in this regard.

These are thoughts that are representative of the growing consciousness among leading scholars about what can be called self inflicted impairment of the discipline as practised in the west and also about the urgency of adopting correctives which call for an across the board intellectual engagement. Hopefully, there should be some significant participation of IR scholars in it from this part of the world as well, not so much in a bid to outdo or negate what the others have already started doing elsewhere as in a display of willing contribution from the non western scholars. Intellectual resources wherever they are and in whatever state need to be opened up and shared to the fullest extent especially when there has been a recognition, not too late, of the need to redesign the mode of “doing” IR and realign its content priorities.

Although the foregoing observations from the chief editor’s desk did not result from any prior clearance within the JAIR fold, I think it would not be out of accord with the basic thrust of this journal known already for its trend setting openness, to expect these to act as a curtain raiser for wider deliberation with feedback coming from the seriously inclined.

Radharaman Chakrabarti

Author Information Guide for Publication in the JAIR Journal of International Relations

Criteria for Publication

The principal criteria for publication of papers (Articles) in **JAIR Journal of International Relations** are that they:

- report original research (the main results and conclusions must not have been Published or submitted elsewhere)
- Are of outstanding importance in the field of International Relations/related social Sciences
- reach a conclusion of interest to an inter disciplinary readership.

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To reduce delays, authors should ensure that the level, length and format conform to JAIR Journal of International Relations' requirements, at submission and each revision stage. Submissions should be accompanied by a cover letter stating briefly why the conclusion is an important international advance and the author's case for the work being published in the JAIR Journal of International Relations. Authors are strongly encouraged to attempt two 100-150-word summaries, one to encapsulate the significance of the work for readers of the journal, mainly the social scientists; and the other to explain the conclusions at an understandable level for the general public.

The cover letter should also specify the number of words in the text of the paper, the number of display items (figures and tables), the number of attachments (manuscript, figures, Supplementary Information if any, supporting manuscripts), and their formats.

What happens to a submitted Article?

The first stage for a newly submitted Article is that the editorial staff considers whether to send it for peer-review. On submission, the manuscript is assigned to an editor covering the subject area, who seeks informal advice from academic advisors and editorial colleagues, and who makes this initial decision. The preliminary judgment is not a reflection on the qualitative validity of the work described, or on its importance to people in the same field. Once the decision has been made to peer-review the paper, the choice of referees is made by the editor who has been assigned the manuscript. Most papers are sent to two or three referees, but some are sent to more or, occasionally, just to one.

Format of Writing an Article

Articles are original reports whose conclusions represent a substantial advance in understanding of an important problem and have immediate, far-reaching implications. They do not normally exceed 8 pages and have no more than 50 references. (One page of undiluted text is about 1,300 words.)

Articles have a summary, separate from the main text, of up to 150 words, which does not have references, and does not contain numbers, abbreviations, acronyms or measurements unless essential. It is aimed at readers outside the discipline. This summary contains a paragraph (2-3 sentences) of basic-level introduction to the field; a brief account of the background and rationale of the work; a statement of the main conclusions (introduced by the phrase 'Here we show' or its equivalent); and finally, 2-3 sentences putting the main findings into general context so it is clear how the results described in the paper have moved the field forwards.

Articles are typically 5,000-8000 words of text

The text may contain a few short subheadings (not more than six in total) of no more than 40 characters each (less than one line of text in length). Articles typically may have not more than 5 or 6 display items (figures or tables).

The rest of the text is typically about 1,500 words long. Any discussion at the end of the text should be as succinct as possible, not repeating previous summary/introduction material, to briefly convey the general relevance of the work.

Word counts refer to the text of the paper. References, title, author list and acknowledgements do not have to be included in total word counts.

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1. Use Microsoft word document for writing the paper.
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3. Use 12 pt. Bold for sub headings.
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For Books

One author

1. Michael Pollan, *The Omnivore's Dilemma: A Natural History of Four Meals* (New York: Penguin, 2006), pp. 99-100.

Two or more authors

2. Geoffrey C. Ward and Ken Burns, *The War: An Intimate History, 1941-1945* (New York: Knopf, 2007), p.52.

Journal article

Article in a print journal

In a note, list the specific page numbers consulted, if any. In the bibliography, list the page range for the whole article.

Joshua I. Weinstein, "The Market in Plato's Republic," *Classical Philology*, No.104 (2009), p.440.

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Indigenous Struggle, Neoliberalism, and Politics in Ecuador

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ABSTRACT

Like most Latin American states, Ecuador is a country rich in natural resources and also has a sizeable indigenous population. Colonisation and exploitation wiped out most of the indigenous population and those who survived experienced an independent nation which disregarded them. Carrying forward the colonial legacy of resources exploitation, Ecuador has denied the indigenous people their legitimate rights. Indigenous demands for rights include territorial autonomy, preservation of culture and equal opportunity in decision making. Drawing up on indigeneity and cultural differences, various indigenous organisations have challenged the state. From simple protests to collaborating with the government they have carved a niche in the political space. This paper will examine the indigenous movements and the response of the state. It will seek to answer if these organisations have been successful in achieving their quests or if, the state has been able to co-opt them and dilute their struggle ensuring only partial success.

Keywords: *Indigenous, Neoliberalism, CONAIE, Pachakutik, Colonialism, Rafael Correa, Mestizo.*

Since 1990 with the advent of neoliberalism in Ecuador, there has been a spurt in foreign investments mostly in the extraction of natural resources. The state believed that this would help in economic development and prosperity of the people. Some criticise such policies to lead to a lop-sided development, with most of the dividends being siphoned off by the wealthier class. Such policies inevitably lead to greater state control over indigenous lands and resources and as a result the indigenous people of Ecuador have consistently demanded equal rights, including autonomy and control over their lands. According to them, control over indigenous lands must be vested with the *Comuna*, which is a parallel form of indigenous governance and economic decisions must be taken in tandem with the desires of the indigenous people. In short, the exploitation of indigenous lands, economic impositions from capitalist countries such as the United States and the maintenance of American forces in Ecuador must end¹. The U.S. Department of State comments that Ecuador is relatively open to foreign investment even though at times arbitrary actions have been taken against foreign companies. Access to mining is easier than petroleum and various foreign companies operate in Ecuador. The state is the main arbitrator between various foreign and state owned companies and all natural resources belong to the state. The U.S. Department of State also declares that even though politically Ecuador is stable, there are instances of minor violence, protests and demonstrations against resource exploitation by indigenous communities which severely hamper the process of resource extraction². In this context, the threats posed by neoliberalism and resource extraction to the indigenous people needs to be understood. Furthermore, it is also imperative to understand the indigenous movements against the state as well as the response of the state towards it.

Neoliberalism and the Denial of Indigenous Rights

Most non-indigenous scholars and literature suggest that indigenous rights must be within the framework of the concept of liberal rights. It is hard for them to understand that indigenous people throughout in the Americas have suffered a lot under the hands of the colonial powers and the modern nation states, which follow the same axioms of rule and legitimacy. Colonialism spurred a growth in justifying the forcible occupation of indigenous lands, claiming that such subjects had no real control over their lands. The doctrine of discovery³ was applied liberally by which the indigenous ownership of land was delegitimised and all were forced to come under the ambit of a colonial notion of ownership of land. In one stroke, all traces of indigenous history were wiped out and the establishment of modern nation states such as Ecuador did not leave any room for the indigenous people to find their own voice. Common ownership of land and resources, sharing of resources, the sacredness of land were alien concepts to the colonial masters. As many Latin American states achieved independence these indigenous concepts were not heeded and such territories including natural resources came under the ambit of the state. Furthermore, in many cases indigenous people were forcibly removed from their lands in order to facilitate the extraction of resources. The entire pattern of production of these post-colonial states was tweaked to produce for the global economy and indeed terror was used liberally to subjugate the rebelling indigenous masses and like others, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement is a response to the continuous exploitation of the indigenous people⁴.

Land has thus been one of the most contentious subjects when defining relations between the indigenous people and the state. Whereas land is seen as an economic unit by the modern capitalist state, whose resources should be extracted to put it to better use, the indigenous people view land as a source of spirituality, existence and an expression of their ethnic identity. Indeed, this goes against the Lockean concept of land, which says that the ownership of land should be awarded to those who could exploit it⁵. For instance in 1964 and further in 1973, Ecuador passed land laws that encouraged settlement on unclaimed lands. The 1964 Law of the Fallow lands (*Ley de Tierras Baldías*) designated certain lands as uncultivated or uninhabited, making it legal to be occupied by the state or lease it. As a result of which indigenous lands were very soon under large scale colonisation by foreign companies, settler communities and outsiders⁶. The rationale behind categorising uninhabited and uncultivated land as fallow, and thus allowing their occupation by outsiders stems from the colonial notion of land ownership. These lands related laws were passed by the state in consultation with the IERAC (*Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma y Colonización*); and this agency did not take the indigenous people into confidence and deliberately ignored their concerns. In the backdrop of the Cold War and rising Marxist influence in the Ecuadorian society, these laws were aimed at clipping the wings of vocal indigenous demands. Although these laws abolished bonded labour, feudalism and the *Huasipungo*⁷, land distribution was not what it aimed, rather it allowed internal colonisation and welcomed free market adventurers and settlers to occupy indigenous lands⁸. Indigenous claims to land and resources are collective in nature, which makes it difficult for the state to accommodate them. It also becomes increasingly difficult for the state to balance between its policy of development based on extraction of natural resources and allowing indigenous people rights over lands and resources. It fears that such rights could harm the larger interest of the economy and could jeopardise its development and growth. The moral problem between economic development and indigenous rights is what concerns the state the most, as it is very difficult to maintain a near perfect balance between the two⁹.

The neoliberal free market economy is characterised by unequal terms of trade where developing countries depend on extraction and sale of natural resources in exchange for finished goods, which come at higher prices. Thus it is a new form of dependency in the present world order where countries such as Ecuador are mainly involved in the export of raw materials in exchange for sophisticated products. Most Ecuadorian government officials claim that Ecuador has the moral obligation to supply the world's markets with minerals and other resources which are

available in plenty. Not doing so, would mean losing out on economic opportunities and prosperity. However, such an economic system functions on the idea of unequal terms of trade, market fluctuations and the denial of a possibility of creating a diverse economy. As a result of which, the concerns of the indigenous people are set aside for achieving short term gains from an extractive economy¹⁰. For instance, the Amazonian region of Ecuador known as the *Oriente* was found to have massive deposits of petroleum which caused an increase in the price of land. Added to the newly found treasure, this region has been a place of conflicts between the state and the indigenous people due to agricultural reforms and settlements by outsiders. Foreign consortiums were invited and were given concessions to prospect for oil. The resulting revenues propelled the economic growth of Ecuador and for a short period, it seemed to be beneficial to the nascent economy of the state. In addition to that employment was generated which bode well for the country and offered a breathing space to the struggling economy of Ecuador. However, the indigenous people were at the receiving end of such economic policies. The revenues generated went mainly to the urban areas and mostly to the elites. The effects such as health issues, contamination, deforestation, uprooting of settlements were borne by the indigenous people, without adequate compensation from the state¹¹.

The indigenous people have repeatedly stated that they are unable to accept the arrival of outsiders on these lands which they consider sacred and cannot sacrifice the last vestiges of their identity and survival¹². Neoliberalism and the extraction of resources has been the main bone of contention between the state and the indigenous organisations. Successive governments have been unable to reject neoliberal economic models due to the high price of natural resources, the sale of which can help the economy. On the other hand the indigenous people complain that the sale of natural resources inevitably means the occupation of indigenous lands by foreign and multinational companies which goes against the idea of autonomy of indigenous territories and is detrimental to their unique lifestyle and survival.

Understanding Indigeneity

In order to understand the indigenous social movements against neoliberalism and the state, it is important to understand the concept of indigeneity which is based on the idea of social fragmentation, which implies the division of the society based on race and class. The relationship between different races is based on domination and hierarchy and this has been enforced in colonial Ecuador quite forcibly. Under the colonial rule, various terms were used in order to differentiate between Ecuadorians of indigenous and Spanish heritage. Terms such as *Montubio*, *Cholo*, *Longo*, *Mestizo* (a mixed race group which is ethnically classified as white) and *Indio* were used widely in order to differentiate among various citizens. The *Indios* or indigenous people were classified as the lowest of all groups based on physical appearance and behaviour. They were socially ostracised and shunned from public life until late. Most *Indios* or indigenous people were not educated and did not have access to basic services offered by the state. They had to be content with low paying works that were often fraught with discriminatory policies¹³. The differences were based on race and ethnicity as well as on time period. Those people who existed prior to the colonisation of these lands were considered to be indigenous and had distinct traits when compared to the other groups such as the *Mestizos*.

Like most Latin American states, Ecuador too inherited a fractured society with a lot of social and ethnic cleavages. The modern post-colonial nation state tried to build a national culture, and a system of governance based on established laws, a constitution and a democratic system. In doing so, it disregarded the opinions of the indigenous subjects assuming that they would gradually be incorporated within the dominant culture through education and an assimilation strategy. The idea was to carry forward the agenda of *mestizaje*¹⁴ or to assimilate the indigenous people in the society in order to make them lose their distinctiveness. Till the 1980s, the indigenous people in Ecuador were sidelined from all important aspects in the society. They were considered to be the

lesser subjects, with wild and unpalatable tastes and lifestyles. Communities that lived in the forests were not even included within the national development agenda. Even though indigenous languages were recognised, no attempts were made to promote them. Education, communication and even church services were carried out in Spanish, and all attempts were made to assimilate them.

Despite being widely populated with indigenous people, Ecuador did not produce any literature or thought that kept them as its main concern. Whereas Peru and Mexico had intellectuals such as Mariátegui and Caso who worked on indigenous issues, Ecuador failed to produce such intellectuals. In addition to that most Ecuadorian *indigenistas*¹⁵ believed that the best way to alleviate the socio-economic conditions of the indigenous people would be to offer them education and assimilate them into the dominant culture. The formation of the *Instituto Indigenista Interamericano-III*¹⁶ (Inter-American Indian Institute-III) in Mexico led to a spurt in interest in the affairs of the indigenous people. Sadly, while other countries had leaders who showed some concern towards their indigenous subjects, it lacked in Ecuador to a large extent. This factor led to more misunderstanding between the indigenous and non-indigenous citizens of Ecuador leading to a feeling of alienation. This was one of the main reasons for indigenous mobilisation against the state.

Deborah Yashar believes that the existing race relations and racial hierarchies have created vast insurmountable ethnic cleavages, yet these very existing hierarchies and networks created autonomous zones of indigenous concentration. These zones and autonomous areas led to a sense of unity among the indigenous people and paved the way for indigenous mobilisation. It is also believed that the sense of indigeneity in Ecuador can be seen through the primordial prism. According to this, ethnic ties and loyalties are important in shaping political affiliations and actions. The instrumental view can also be applied which believes that since human beings are rational and seek out the optimum and best results, it leads them to act collectively on racial lines enabling them to find a common voice in order to consolidate their gains¹⁷. The rise of Ecuador's indigenous movement was primarily based on the concept of self-identification, by which the indigenous people became more comfortable in identifying themselves as indigenous. Indeed, in order not to dilute their unique position in the society, they realised that identity is in fact the most coveted form of political representation¹⁸. It is believed that the left and other political parties in tandem with the state tried to impose a peasant identity on them which initially led to a lack of indigenous consciousness among them¹⁹. The imposition of a peasant identity on the indigenous people served two purposes, first of all it did not let them develop an indigenous unity and secondly it also led to formation of organisations and ideologies on the basis of a peasant identity which did not have any special affection for endemic issues faced by the indigenous people.

Despite the attempts to dilute indigenous identities, the rise of indigenous consciousness all across Latin America and particularly in Ecuador can be illustrated by the fact that most indigenous leaders and people do not shy away from explicit display of their cultural behaviours. Such cultural behaviours were previously castigated and chastised during the colonial rule. As of now, the liberal use of indigenous languages, dresses and food habits in public spaces show a form of cultural resistance against the hegemony of the dominant classes. Apart from race, language has also been instrumental in building ethnic alliances based on identity. They are used to foster indigenous identities, to focus on the cultural and historical differences from other communities and to demand for indigenous rights ranging from self-determination to various forms of autonomy.

For example, in Ecuador groups such as the *Zapara*²⁰ have focussed on building community relations and fostered a greater sense of unity based on their language to augment their claims for autonomy and rights within the Ecuadorian state. The assertion of indigenous identity in a modern nation state is also a response against neoliberal assaults and denial of territorial autonomy. However it is also ironical that the advent of neoliberalism in countries such as Ecuador gave rise to new

modes of communication which helped the indigenous movements to gain momentum²¹. Other factors such as their unique culture fostered a greater sense of unity, and added to it was the colonial exploitation the repeat of which started to occur in post-colonial Ecuador leading to a spurt in indigenous self-identification. It also led to an assertion of the indigenous people in occupying political and social space by which they began to struggle against the hegemony of the state and carve out a political niche. Even the mode of assertion has changed, as the earlier demands for civil rights and political concessions has now given way to more complex forms such as bilingual education, recognition of indigenous languages, the right to own land, insertion of special provisions for the indigenous people in the constitution and most important the creation of a plurinational state²².

Trajectories of the Ecuadorian Indigenous Movement

Although majority of Ecuador's leaders claimed that racism did not exist and they expounded the phrase '*Todos somos mestizos*' (we are all *mestizos*), racism towards the indigenous people was deeply rooted in the society. According to the ruling elite, in order to be a model citizen of Ecuador, one had to be a *mestizo* and could not cling on to the indigenous identity anymore²³. Indigenous people were at the best treated as indentured labourers and were expected to work on the lands owned by the white *mestizos*, which resulted in poor pay and no other additional benefits. Such practices were later on criticised by a vast array of intellectuals and government officials. However the political elite, the officials and the national leaders failed to see that such a feature was an after effect of years of colonialism. The solution according to them was to develop and modernise the country for which it was necessary for the indigenous people to abandon their traditional and cultural baggage and embrace the modern nation state. In doing so, the root cause of such backwardness which was persistent colonialism and neo-colonialism was not attacked, but the very lifestyle of the indigenous people was criticised²⁴.

The crux of the matter is that the indigenous people have been forced to be content with abject poverty and lack of social goods. While the *mestizo* urban elites enjoy a greater share of the national wealth and amenities, their indigenous counterparts are forced to live with a ridiculously smaller share²⁵. Some scholars believe that the attempts of the indigenous people to preserve their culture and languages have been misinterpreted by the state to be a sign of willing to live in backwardness. In doing so, the state has also attempted to delegitimise their cultural symbols, and has offered urbanisation and modernisation as the only viable alternative to step out of abject poverty. However, the democratic transition of Ecuador offered a fertile ground for the expansion of an indigenous movement. The 1979 Constitution of Ecuador removed the requirement of literacy for voting, which enabled indigenous people to vote en masse. These reforms were however rolled back by the subsequent administrations of Osvaldo Hurtado in 1981 and then by León Cordero in 1984²⁶. In 1984 under mounting pressure from all corners the Article 1 of the Constitution of Ecuador was amended that led to the recognition of Quechua and other indigenous languages²⁷. The oscillation between sympathy and neglect towards the indigenous people did not bode well for them, and they believed that the progress was too slow, and that their main concerns such as territorial autonomy and protection of their culture were not fulfilled.

Even though the indigenous people were awarded some rights on paper, they were never practiced in reality. Whereas initially self-identification of the indigenous people was lackadaisical due to the ever persistent propagation of *mestizaje*, the figures rose with the democratisation of the country, which led to a sense of empowerment among them and they began to value their culture, thus using it as a political tool for ethnic mobilisation. The rampant sale or lease of indigenous lands to foreign companies, settlement by outsiders, extraction of natural resources and the violence committed against them became the main rallying points for creating an indigenous movement. Democratisation gave rise to political space which was quickly captured by the indigenous people to voice their concerns which were suppressed for so long.

Demands for constitutional reformations, civil and cultural rights were ignored or brutally suppressed. In contrast, many civil rights groups, intellectuals and even military and government officials pressed for the award of several rights to the indigenous citizens. However, due to the slow pace of awarding rights there have been many protests and the forms of protests have varied across Ecuador; at times indigenous tribes have resorted to mindless violence after negotiations have failed and at other times, they have backed upon blocking roads, strikes, vandalism and destruction of government properties. However, of late the indigenous forms of protests have taken a much more concerted shape. Indigenous groups have used their cultural symbols quite explicitly in order to highlight their predicament. Groups have marched in the capital city of Quito wearing their traditional attires, singing in their native tongues in order to attract the attention of the government, international agencies and the local people. They have carefully used the media and the state apparatuses in order to get their demands heard. The key focus has been the collective efforts of the indigenous communities to preserve their heritage and to combat the onslaught of neoliberal economic policies. This they realised would have been only possible, if a collective identity was reinforced among the various indigenous groups.

The indigenous movement began properly in Ecuador in around the 1960s. From disorganised and spontaneous forms of resistance it assumed a shape of larger proportions. Attempts were made to politicise indigenous cultures in order to counter the attempts of the state to delegitimise their unique way of living. Countermeasures were taken to fight back the concepts of modernisation and neoliberal economic development. The movements began with the *Shuar* tribe which spread to other tribes and culminated with the formation of the CONAIE (*Confederación Nacional de Indígenas del Ecuador*) in 1986²⁸. The CONAIE was the first indigenous organisation that had a pan-ethnic support base and provided the much needed resources to fight back. Very soon many indigenous tribes began to affiliate themselves to the CONAIE, earning the organisation much needed legitimacy and the power to represent the people.

The indigenous people of Ecuador realised that in order to fight for their rights, collective efforts had to be made. In 1984 indigenous organisations began to mobilise ethnic support for their claims. Very soon the *Pachakutik-Nuevo País* movement was launched and in the 1996 national elections the former president of CONAIE and several other activists got elected to the national legislature²⁹. In 1997 the *Pachakutik* again fought the elections which led to the forming of a coalition in 2000 along with some military officers that was led by Colonel Lúcio Gutiérrez; this further led to a coup that toppled President Jamil Mahuad. However, in spite of sharing power, the marriage of convenience did not last long and the government collapsed. In spite of that, it was a high point in indigenous history and political participation in Ecuador because for the first time marginalised indigenous communities got a chance to taste power³⁰. This transition from being ignored to sharing power in the national legislature cannot be written off as a failure, even though the government did not last long due to internal differences.

The CONAIE has been one of the most prolific indigenous organisations in Latin America. In 1988 in collaboration with the ruling Democratic Left Party under President Rodrigo Borja it pressed for a bilingual education programme. However, the 1990 *Levantamiento* (uprising) was the hallmark of the CONAIE. During this uprising, thousands of indigenous people caused a massive shutdown across the country demanding the return of ancestral lands and allowing the indigenous people to own land and natural resources. This movement led a frightened administration to accept most of the indigenous demands, the first ever in a country that has been marked by racism towards the indigenous people. Further in the year 1993, Sixto Durán a conservative president decided to cut down on social spending and eliminate subsidies. Opposition against such economic policies came from all quarters including the military and government circles. However, the turning point was the CONAIE's mass mobilisation which collaborated with other peasant and workers' organisations and forced the rollback of such schemes³¹. Apart from these, in 1992 the CONAIE also participated in the official boycott and March against the official celebration

of Columbus' arrival to the Americas. They viewed the state sponsored celebration as an affront to the dignity of the indigenous people all across Latin America.

The 1992 march led by the CONAIE was in the backdrop of the 500 year celebration of the arrival of Columbus, and was a turning point in the history of Ecuadorian politics³². The indigenous people regard him as the harbinger of misery and subsequent colonisation. Indigenous people from various tribes such as *Quichua*, *Shuar*, *Achuar* and others descended on the capital of the country Quito, to press for titling of 2,000,000 hectares of rainforest land which they claimed belonged to them and also to turn Ecuador into a plurinational state. The March was supported by a variety of smaller indigenous organisations and unions such as the OPIP (*Organizaciones de Pueblos Indígenas de Pastaza*) and the CONFENIAE (*Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana*)³³. The biggest surprise was the sympathy it gained from non-indigenous groups such as the police, press and from common people. Similar to the March organised in 1990, it elicited the required response. For days the country was paralysed and government officials including President Borja met the leaders of the movement and agreed on titling of indigenous lands and for the defence of their rights. In spite of some success, there have been disagreements among the various indigenous organisations based on the methods of protest, the degree of demands as well as the success achieved. Some organisations are more comfortable in identifying themselves as leftist than indigenous, while others discuss the need to collaborate with the state. Many individuals from such communities also believe that there cannot be no ethnic unity due to inherent differences between various tribes.

The main cracks in indigenous unity led by the CONAIE appeared after the 2002 elections in which the political arm of the CONAIE, *Pachakutik* contested the national elections in an alliance with Lieutenant Colonel Lúcio Gutiérrez and formed the government on the basis of seat sharing. Gutiérrez's anti-capitalist and pro-indigenous rhetoric earned him the good faith of the indigenous people and the alliance won. However, soon after the elections he went back on his promises and embraced neoliberalism which earned him the wrath of the CONAIE and very soon the alliance collapsed. This resulted in disenchantment with the CONAIE and also with the government, and the indigenous people believed that the CONAIE was politically immature to deal with political parties and carve out a niche for itself. The difference between the CONAIE and the *Pachakutik* became too evident. Historically the CONAIE has been one of the most powerful and successful of all indigenous organisations in entire Latin America, and the *Pachakutik* has been a political force to reckon with. While the CONAIE does not repose much of its faith in political parties, institutional politics and elections, the *Pachakutik* fights for the rights of the indigenous people by engaging in active politics. The CONAIE is more of a social organisation with a strong grass root support whereas the *Pachakutik* has to depend on the CONAIE to achieve its vote share in elections. The difference is more evident as the CONAIE is an indigenous organisation that represents the demands of the indigenous people only, whereas the *Pachakutik* has to take into account the demands of the non-indigenous population and has to take a constitutional approach for its day to day affairs³⁴.

Far from spontaneous protests, indigenous organisations have also at times been a part of the government. Their strength has grown considerably and is now a force to reckon with which has made it possible for them to bargain and negotiate with the state. Indigenous organisations in Ecuador have an inherent hierarchical formation which has enabled them to work up from the grassroots up to the national level, and have made them potent enough to challenge the diktats of the state. From playing second fiddle at national level politics, these organisations have established their bases at almost all areas of indigenous dominance and have gained countless sympathisers which have made it difficult for the state to ignore their demands for long³⁵. It will be imperative to observe if the state has actually accepted their demands and acted on them or if it has skilfully managed to put them on the backburner.

The State's Response to the Indigenous Movement

The response of the state has varied from repression to co-option, and it realises that the indigenous organisations are strong and therefore at times co-option is the only solution it has in order to pacify them. Regarding co-option the concept of ethno-development has to be understood. The democratisation of Ecuador gave rise to the concept of ethno-development, by which policies and plans were designed in such a way so as to positively affect the indigenous people and to allow them to take control of their own affairs which were however, subjected to the final authority of the state. The process of ethno-development that has taken place in Ecuador follows the concept of a patron-client relation by which the state seeks legitimacy and support in return for subsidies, recognition and any other form of assistance. This does not however imply that the indigenous organisations and the state have a smooth relation. The state applied a policy of ethno-development by creating various agencies in order to look into the affairs of the indigenous people. Since the indigenous movement and identification was quite strong in Ecuador, it was in the best interest of the state to attain a degree of support from the indigenous population. Agencies such as the DINEIB (*Dirección Nacional de Educación Intercultural Bilingüe de Ecuador*) was created in order to promote interculturalism and bilingual education and the CODENPE (*Consejo de Desarrollo de las Nacionalidades y Pueblos del Ecuador*) was also created in order to look into the affairs related to the development of the indigenous people. The DINEIB was created under the leadership of the CONAIE with the active participation of the Ministry of Education and former president Rodrigo Borja transformed it into a semi-autonomous institute. The system was based on a policy of trade-offs by which the state would support such institutions whereas the indigenous organisations had the responsibility to cooperate with the regime. This patron-client relationship suffered a setback during the regime of former president Guitérrez when the CONAIE accused him of going back on his promises and advocating neoliberal economic policies. This kind of a development in Ecuador has negatively affected the indigenous organisations, and in its attempt to tame them, the state has managed not only to weaken them but has also ensured that the indigenous organisations do not possess enough power to openly rebel against it³⁶. As mentioned earlier, the democratisation of Ecuador gave enough space for indigenous mobilisation, albeit in a limited sense.

Legally, the Constitution of Ecuador approved in the year 2008 enforces a series of rights for the indigenous people. Article 56 and 57 offers recognition to the indigenous communities and offers them rights related to prior-consultation, protection of their identity, practice of their religions and use of their languages. Article 57 focuses on the inalienability of ancestral lands, ownership of land and protection of resources. Clause 11 of the Article 57 also states that the indigenous people shall not be forcibly removed from their lands. However, Article 408 states that all the surface and sub-surface resources are property of the state³⁷. Therefore in a carefully drafted constitution, there is a balance between defending indigenous rights and maintaining the supremacy of the state. Even though the constitution does discuss the importance of indigenous rights, most of the times the supremacy of the state has taken precedence especially in terms of resource extraction. The constitution is thus another way of taming the indigenous organisations by making them believe in the benevolence of the state, while engaging in extraction of resources and denying them their crucial rights.

The same argument has been levelled by De la Torre, who says that the state attempted to tame the indigenous movements which had a potential to rebel, while patronising those which were more amicable. By creating institutions which were directly under the state, it attempted to not only tame the indigenous movements but also saw that rebellious indigenous organisations never got a platform to rebel. With the creation of organisations such as the PRODEPINE (*El Proyecto de Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas y Negros del Ecuador*), the state tried to influence the indigenous organisations in accepting the formula of neoliberal capitalism and co-opted them within the system³⁸.

Discussions regarding the intentions of the indigenous people and their organisations are focussed on whether they want to gain autonomy within the ambit of the state, or challenge it and establish self-rule. Lack of attention from the state has done little to alleviate the confidence of the indigenous people. In addition to that, the lack of basic amenities compounded with encroachment upon their lands and culture has certainly demoralised them. The 1992 uprising led by the CONAIE and the OPIP made it clear that the indigenous people do not consider the state to be indivisible and supreme to all and in the 1992 uprising, the OPIP was adamant to claim that self-determination was one of the basic principles on which the march was organised. According to them, Ecuador was not one indivisible state but an amalgamation of states with diverse cultures and identities. The indigenous identity was therefore important to be recognised as a separate entity altogether. This feeling was refurbished with the military and intelligence reports claiming that organisations such as the OPIP had ulterior motives to establish a separate indigenous state based on race and ethnicity and had little to do with genuine indigenous concerns. In fact, during this time the FEDECAP (*Federación de Desarrollo Campesino de Pastaza*)³⁹ organised a counter demonstration against the OPIP claiming that their motives were ulterior and it was an attempt to destroy the sovereignty of the state. Clashes between the state and the indigenous communities always existed since the inception of the modern Ecuadorian state and it is believed that the indigenous people have been able to extract only some concessions from the state. In reality, their core demands such as full control over their territories and the right to own natural resources are still not addressed⁴⁰.

Rafael Correa's Presidency and Indigenous People

Even in recent times, the Ecuadorian indigenous movement has run into trouble with the state and its apparatuses. In spite of being one of the most widely heralded movements in Latin America, it has lost considerable support of the people whom they claim to lead. On the other hand, the gradual concessions rolled out by the state for the indigenous people have managed to wean them away from exclusively supporting indigenous organisations and parties such as the *Pachakutik*. Although the indigenous organisations cannot be written off completely, the state has appropriated a lot of their agendas. Many indigenous organisations such as the CONAIE believe that the state has attempted to woo the indigenous people by appropriating the goals of such organisations, and have tried to sideline them.

The election of Rafael Correa, a left leaning politician as the president proved to be a blessing for the indigenous people. His anti-privatization and anti-capitalist speeches coupled with the concerns for the indigenous people made him the ultimate choice for many. After his election, it seemed that the indigenous groups could at last rely on a president who genuinely wished to heed them. However, Correa viewed the indigenous movements and their demands as collectivist in outlook and considered it to be on the contrary to individual rights and freedom. As a left leaning president, he believed that Ecuador needed a Peoples' revolution akin to other left dominated states and his basic focus was on individual rights rather than communal rights. His idea of a Citizens' revolution and participatory form of government did not have any scope for indigenous politics and he tried to decrease their influence. He was criticised of being insensitive and going back on his promises, by enforcing neoliberalism and delimiting the freedom of the indigenous organisations. In his attempt to foster a national and economic unity it seemed that he did not have any special measures to safeguard the interests of the indigenous communities. At this juncture, it seemed that the demands of equality and a plurinational state combined with autonomy over land and resources would be the best way for Correa to boost his pro-indigenous and leftist credentials⁴¹. The CONAIE and other indigenous groups however asserted that they had never given Correa the right to delegitimise them and that he was attempting to occupy their socio-political spaces. They accused him of hijacking the agendas of the indigenous movements such as the formation of a new constitution and the inclusion of the concept of a plurinational state and *sumak kawsay* ⁴²(well-being).

In 2007, it was evident that a move had begun in the direction of forming a new constitution that would give more rights to the indigenous people. Indigenous leaders such as Humberto Cholango of the ECUARUNARI (*Confederación de Pueblos de la Nacionalidad Kichwa Del Ecuador*) believed that this was the most important phase in the history of Ecuador's indigenous struggle by which they could constitutionally guarantee their rights. The upcoming elections to the constituent assembly were led by the *Alianza País* which was a loose conglomeration of NGOs, indigenous politicians and others. Partly, the success was due to the fact that many indigenous leaders contested from the *Alianza País* believing that it would be better to function from within the government rather than from the *Pachakutik*. In fact the *Pachakutik* won only four seats and it was written off as an ineffective political party that could not muster even indigenous votes. Non-indigenous leaders such as Alberto Acosta who gained the most votes from the *Alianza País* remained firm on his commitment to work for the indigenous people, vowing to crush capitalism and uplift the indigenous communities. The mandate of the elections to the constituent assembly fractured the indigenous outlook, while some appreciated Correa's outlook, others were critical of his stance accusing him of attempting to be a personality cult leader. While Correa commented that only those who could win elections had the right to rule, many indigenous leaders such as Guillermo Almeyra argued that even though the government could function as a legitimate authority, the power must belong to the people on the streets and that protests and mobilizations were vital for ensuring that the government functioned properly⁴³.

It seemed later on that Correa was trying to go back on his promises, when he tried to sign lucrative deals with foreign and multinational oil and mineral companies for exploiting natural resources. In 2008, Correa tried to pass a water bill which would privatize water, which led to protests from all the indigenous quarters. In 2010, the ECUARUNARI led by its president Delfín Tenesaca decided to walk out of talks between the government and other indigenous groups alleging Correa's lack of sympathy with the indigenous cause. Such incidents led to more tensions between the indigenous organisations and the state⁴⁴. Other scholars have argued that due to constant pressure from the indigenous groups and from other civil rights organisations many Latin American countries such as Ecuador have approved constitutions that offer a larger ambit of rights to the indigenous people. The Constitution of Ecuador promotes cultural understanding of the indigenous people, it offers them the right to use their own language and live in their own cultural surroundings. Furthermore, it also declares Ecuador to be a plurinational state and allows them territorial autonomy over their lands. Indeed constitutional reformation in Ecuador with the help of indigenous groups initially promised for a better future. Demands of indigenous people were recognised on a wider scale which also led to recognition of the indigenous people as political actors and legitimate citizens of the country. Increased state intervention in important industries and agriculture, promotion of marginalised forms of trade and production as well as autonomy to the indigenous people in deciding their own affairs were some of the important landmarks that were accomplished. However, as many scholars point out, at best these reforms were on paper and not in spirit. The pressure of the global economy is too difficult to ignore. A country like Ecuador which does not have a well diversified economy is still based on extraction and export of natural resources, and the process infringes the territorial rights of the indigenous citizens of the country⁴⁵.

Correa's government has been criticised of being a talking shop that offers placebo solutions to the indigenous people but denies addressing the real concerns. Correa has reiterated that extraction of natural resources cannot end as it is the main source of finance in the country. Regarding this, the income generated by the export of natural resources are used to fund development projects, a major share of which goes to the indigenous people. Therefore, the state is torn between complete protection of indigenous rights and reforming the extractive industries which are critical to the economic wellbeing of the state. Scholars such as Pablo Dávalos and Eduardo Gudynas term the new regime as a brown left, which though is not radical is nevertheless progressive than the

previous governments, even though the economic approach which they undertake is categorised as neo-extractivism. Even though Rafael Correa approved *sumak kawsay* and *Buen Vivir* (Good living) as alternative forms of economic approach, the reality is far from true. The state in all capacity is unable to abandon resource extraction as the main source of income⁴⁶.

As late as 2011, various left-wing parties and indigenous organisations have become more vocal in criticising Correa, for his failure to live up to the expectations of the indigenous people. In a meet in Quito the CONAIE held Correa responsible for deliberately going back on his promise to defend the rights of the indigenous people. He was accused of falling prey to the designs of various foreign and multinational companies and capitulating to them. His neo-extractivism model was severely criticised which led to a spurt in foreign investments. In fact they accused the Correa administration of deliberately not inviting the CONAIE, to a conference in Bolivia under the banner of the ALBA (*Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América*) to discuss affairs related to indigenous rights. In fact indigenous leaders such as Luis Macas openly declared that the Correa administration considers the indigenous population to be obstacles to development⁴⁷. In fact a late as 2011, the indigenous leaders of the CONIAE had accused Correa of trivialising indigenous cultures as something exotic for tourists and had also accused him of jailing indigenous activities. It is believed that over two hundred indigenous activities were jailed by the Correa administration on various charges that ranged from sabotage to treason⁴⁸. Correa also weakened the CONAIE's power over prior consultation regarding mining and also charged the Director of the CODENPE, Lourdes Tiban of siphoning off state funds; this ultimately led to a decrease in funds earmarked for such organisations. In addition to that the autonomy and decision making power of the CODEPNE and the DINEIB were decreased⁴⁹.

It can be ascertained that the Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa has utilised a balanced approach towards indigenous rights. On one hand, constitutional rights are awarded to them which are an incremental improvement, but on the other hand any form of rebellion is not tolerated. It implies that the Correa administration is open to improve relations with the indigenous people but will not compromise on resource extraction and indigenous territorial autonomy.

Conclusion

It is understood that the rise of indigenous consciousness was instrumental in the formation of indigenous organisations such as the CONAIE and the OPIP which has allowed the indigenous people to carve a niche within the political space of Ecuador. The continued resource extraction and occupation of indigenous lands as well as the neoliberal assaults have been strongly resisted. However here we see that even though the indigenous movement has been successful to some extent, it has fallen short of its core goals. Neoliberalism has become fully entrenched within the economy and the state owns the lands and resources while only allowing some constitutional concessions to the indigenous people. Therefore, the state has managed not only to enforce neoliberal economic policies; it has also managed to limit the success of the indigenous organisations. At best, these organisations have tasted only partial success and are no match for an overbearing and powerful state.

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Problems of Drug Trafficking in Central Asia

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ABSTRACT

The article examines the threat posed by drugs production and its trafficking from Afghanistan to Greater Central Asia, over the time. Particularly, the Greater Central Asian region from the mid-1990s onward saw a rapid increase of drugs trafficking. Within several years, this had created huge social and political problems. On the societal level, addiction levels grew rapidly, exacerbating an already precarious social situation. More alarmingly, non-state violent actors across the region managed to consolidate their position by financial gain from involvement in the drug trade and other emerging criminal operations, endangering the very survival of several states and weakening of others institutions. In parallel, state institutions in every state of the region, were affected by criminal infiltration through corruption or the more serious practice of state capture, the willful takeover of state institutions by individuals or groups connected to organized crime. There is no easy solution for drug trafficking from Afghanistan, whether in terms of its impact on public health or the shadow economy it generates. The states of Central Asia cannot fight the problem alone. Regional efforts by regional powers through constructive engagement in the form of bilateral and Multi-lateral negotiations are need of the hour. Besides, international efforts to deal with the problems will be helpful to stabilize the Central Asian region.

Keywords: *Central Asia, Drug Trafficking, Organised Crime, Trans National Crime, Crime Politics Nexus, Mini Security Complex.*

Introduction

At the beginning of the third millennium, the world community faces an entire complex of new threats to security. These problems include International terrorism, religious radicalism and illicit drug trafficking as well as other form of transnational organised crimes. As Turkey and Iran increased their efforts to stop drug trafficking across their borders, organised transnational criminal groups began to actively seek new route through the republic of Central Asia to Russian and European markets.

As the post-2014 regional order in Afghanistan and Central Asia picks up speed, the fight against drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Central Asia is evolving as a key security challenges before the national governments and international donor's involvement in the region. This security challenges facilitated major area of cooperation among key actors involved in this process. Initially it was perceived by international community that, the sudden demise of Soviet Union in 1991 would invite a kind of traditional security threat in terms of territorial defense against external aggression emanating primarily from conflicts in Tajikistam and Afghanistan and military threats coming from the major neighbouring regional powers especially Russia and China. In contrast, the end of 1990s, witnessed a broader consensus among the members international community emphasizing the security concerns and challenges in terms of non-traditional security threats in the form of transnational activities such as drug trafficking, arms trafficking and terrorism.

Nature and extent of Trafficking of Drugs

Among the array of challenges facing the Central Asian Region, illicit drugs have since the mid-1990s gradually risen to prominence. With continuously increasing opium production in Afghanistan and an increasing share of that production transited northward through Central Asia, impact of the drugs trade on the region is worsening. The implications of drugs trade are multi-faceted: thorough addiction, epidemics, and related crime, affects public health and societal security. Through its profit margin and sheer financial weight, it affects the economies of the region. By exacerbating and deepening political corruption and due to ensuing damage to the national and international legitimacy of governments, it affects political stability. Further through its role in financing of terrorism and insurgency, it affects national security. Drugs trafficking therefore pose a clean and persistent danger to the security of the states, societies and individuals in this region. Through its linkages to insurgency and terrorism, the drug trade is an increasing threat to regional and international security in most traditional military sense.¹ As such the drug trade affects both 'hard' and 'soft' security.² Central Asia has emerged as major international drug trafficking centre. According to United Nations drug Control experts, 80 percent of heroine consumed in Western Europe originates in Afghanistan and Pakistan.³ One half of drug travels to Europe via Central Asia, a dangerous cargo to pass along the revived ancient Great Silk Road. The presence of drugs brings with it organised crime. It also created unexpanded drug problem among Central Asian population. The growing drug problem put further burden on government budgets diminished public safety, raises level of domestic violence, child abuse, stimulates the rapid spread of several deadly infectious diseases and decreases economic productivity. What is more problematic is that Central Asian States lack the funds and technical expertise to wage a successful war against drugs and drug trafficking. Most of the states in this region also lack political will power to do so. This paper analyses the situation in the region aimed to raise international awareness of the seriousness of the problem. Emphasis has been given for a concerted effort within the region through regional initiatives and external help to fight this evil.

The post-Soviet Central Asian states lie between the main destination countries for trafficking goods and peoples to East Asia, the Middle East and Europe. The collapse of Soviet Union created an open corridor for uncontrolled transit migration of goods and peoples. Besides, Central Asia's contribution to this problem in the form of drugs production has been highly emphasized. The Russian sources estimate that opium poppy is growing on roughly 300,000 acres of land in Central Asia. This figure would rank Central Asia with Myanmar as the two largest opium poppy growers in the world.⁴

What is more alarming in this context is that, in addition to the locally produced prohibited drugs, large quantity of opium, heroin and hashish are trafficked into Central Asia from Afghanistan mainly across the border in the barely controlled mountainous Gorno-Badakhshan provinces of Tajikistan and across Afghanistan's border with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan.

As the five newly independent countries of Central Asia have become major drug production and trafficking centre, for which the area is increasingly in the danger of being a new Colombia.⁵

There are various reasons for drugs trafficking in Central Asian republics porous borders, poverty, mass unemployment, and lack of resources to manage migration flows have created new sources and markets for various kind of trafficking. A rising number of Central Asians forced into the drug trade due to their failure to find legitimate means of living in their shattered economics many peasants cultivate narcotic for their economic prosperity. The problem of unemployment paves the way for criminality causing more social and political instability.

The most important source of heroin in the world is illegal opium from the countries of the golden crescent (Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran). Before 1991 most of the narcotics from these region travelled to Russia and Europe through the various branches of the Balkan route. However since the dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991, a lot of trade has been rerouted through the newly

independent states of Central Asia. Drugs are first brought from South-West Asia to Tajikstn, but then turns west ward to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and then across the Caspian Sea to the Caucasian republics and from there to Turkey. In fact, the legendary 'Silk Road' of Central Asia now becomes a major opium smuggling route which feeds global market. The Silk Road is gradually becoming the 'heroin road'.

The dramatic increase of illicit drug trafficking operation in Central Asian region endangers not only the health of local populations but also brings about negative implications for law-order situation, political economic not social stability and the process of democratic reforms.

There are various problems which negate or slow down considerably efforts taken by government at the national level. Problems such as lack of resources, growing corruptions among the law-enforcement officers facilitate the activities of both drug traffickers and organised crime networks. The government of the Central Asian republics are handicapped by thin own pressing economic problems, and therefore, unable to allocate funding and man powers commensurate with the nature of the problems.

Need for an International Approach

From the perspectives of international organizations the issue of drug trafficking has been considered as an immediate and negative threat to global community. As a result, more attention has been given by international community by providing financial and technical know-how to deal with the problems of drug trafficking. According to UNODC the linkages between the drug trades in Central Asia with other areas of organized crime have increased over the past several years.⁶

Further, the international community's concern has been on the negative impact of drug trade on the stability and development of the Central Asian states. They fear of the implications of drug trafficking as exemplified by happening in different regions of the world. For example, as seen in states such as Columbia which destabilizes states and civil society and in fact, damage long-term economic development with compromising the rule of law.

International organization has played the greatest role in attempting to securities the drug trafficking in Central Asia. International Organizations have outlined numerous policies and initiated many programmes to counter narcotic trafficking in the region. The major international institutions which have attempted at various degree to securities narcotic trafficking in Central Asia are: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and more recently the European Union (EU).

Drugs Transportation Routes and Facilities

Before going into details about the nature and extent of drug trafficking aspects particularly the transportation routes is concerned, affecting the countries of Central Asia, it is very important to take into consideration of three important factors. The first factor is that the states of Central Asia and weak states. The second factor is that Central Asia is an unstructured security region and a mini complex, which serves as an insulator between the regional security complexes of East Asia, South Asia and the Middle East as well as the security complex Russia is attempting to build around itself.⁷ The third factor is that unsurprisingly, Central Asia also serves as a transit zone for drug, human and women trafficking. Afghanistan is the key to understanding the conditions that foster the manifestations of international terrorism which can currently be seen in the Central Asian region as the security dynamic in Afghanistan and Central Asia are closely related. Thus, some of the countries in the Central Asian "mini complex" are particularly influenced by the security dynamic within Afghanistan. In fact, most bilateral ties between Central Asia and Afghanistan are influenced by the inherent weaknesses of the Central Asian countries and the fragmentation of Afghanistan. The links are created by sub-state and transnational actors, such as criminal

network involving with drug trafficking; ethnic and sub-ethnic groups and religious movements. Central Asia's geographical proximity to Afghanistan is the most significant factor affecting regional drug trafficking. Factor that affect drug smuggling in the region and promote drug transit in Central Asian countries include the long common border between Afghanistan and countries of Central Asia and the increase in the demand for narcotics in Central Asia and Russia. Drug trafficking routes in this region tend to connect settlement and pass along common transportation corridors.⁸

Presently drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Tajikistan proceeds through areas bordering shuroabad, Moskovskiz, Pang and Shaartuz region. These areas have relatively flat topography and well-developed transportation corridors. Narcotics from Tajikistan come into Kyrgyzstan from different directions, including the Khorugh-Osh border, through the Pamir and the Zaalayskiy mountain range to the Alayskaya valley of the Osh region and via the Khujan main road to the Batken region and Farghana valley of Uzbekistan and on to the Osh region. Again narcotics from Afghanistan transit into Uzbekistan through Tenmez. Further, narcotics mostly come into Turkmenistan from Afghanistan and to a lesser degree from the Khorazm district of Uzbekistan. The drug transit from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan tends to follow through the checkpoints at Gushgy and the Takhata Bazar of the many district, and through the checkpoint at Imammazar in the Lebap district.

Narcotics smuggled into Kazakhstan primarily from the bordering country of Kyrgyzstan. Cannabis tends to come from Karakol in Kyrgyzstan and transit through to Almaty. The main drug trafficking routes pass through the Southern, Central and Western Kazakhstan and from there to Russia, ultimately destined for Europe. However, synthetic narcotics tend to follow the opposite direction, coming from Western Europe to Kazakhstan then transit to China.

Individual and States Perceptions about Trafficking of Drugs

The past decade witnessed a rapid increase of trafficking of drugs business as a result of diminishing of farming and agriculture, more people have turned to the drug business or trade for employment and the number of drug-users has substantially increased. There is also concern that the increase in drugs trafficking and in-kind payment to drug couriers is leading to the rapid spread of drug abash throughout Central Asia. There are approximately 720 drugs addicts for every 100,000 inhabitants in Central Asia as a whole, and highest being in Kyrgyzstan.⁹

Medical infrastructure in the region is highly inadequate and unable to address population's growing need for addiction treatment and rehabilitation. The spread of HIV/AIDS has increased among the population and the targeting of women as couriers has led to an array of new social problems.¹⁰ But these human security issues have been ignored in comparison to the issues of crime and trafficking in Central Asia.

So far as the perception of the Central Asian states are concerned, they shares the feelings of International organizations about the implications of drugs trafficking and its impact on the stability and integrity of their states and the potential resulting damage to long-term economic development. In most cases regional economics are becoming increasingly criminalized and controlled by drug money. It is worth mentioning that the drug trade in Central Asia is currently expanding in areas which are weak or in conflict with Central Asian governments such Tajikistan, Southern Kyrgyzstan and part of Xingjiang region in China. Therefore, the states of Central Asia has been confronted with serious security threats coming from the supply of Narcotics in Afghanistan, and the demand for these narcotics from the West.

However, Central Asian states do not have clear-cut motivations to securitization issue of trafficking of drugs. For them, both drugs trafficking and human trafficking are 'ambiguous threats' that may also have positive elements or benefits. In Tajikistan for example, approximately thirty percent of the population is estimated to be financially dependent on the illicit drug business. Further, a

significant percentage of the state budget of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan comes from narcotics trafficking. This certainly makes it difficult for the states to securitise narcotics trafficking business. This relationship also leads to a clash between global governance which focuses on state and international cooperation, and the Central Asian states which themselves are part of the problems. Some of the Central Asian states in fact, seem to be developing what Roy Godson has called a "political-criminal nexus" in which there is a symbolic relation between criminals and politics where they provide each other with mutual benefits.

Conclusion

Resolving drug trafficking problems requires consolidated efforts between Central Asian states. In additions, Afghanistan can actively participate in multilateral cooperation to combat against drug trafficking .Facilitating dialogue and exchange intelligence service at the bilateral, regional and international level along with the promotion of international conventions, standards and best practices should be the main priority for Central Asian countries that have common borders with Afghanistan. The main objective of this cooperation must be concentrated for common aims such as preventing illicit trafficking and border management, HIV control, and control of crimes. State cooperation is the main key to fight against this phenomenon through northern route. This cooperation should be based on the cooperative agreement especially on intelligence sharing and common law enforcement measures. Lack of strategic trust between governments could cause a gap in intelligence sharing and multi-level interactions in law enforcement efforts, despite positive statements that the signing of bilateral agreements between countries for fight against narcotics production and its trafficking. Sustainable and comprehensive alternative economic development programmes are essential for long-term success in the war against Central Asia drugs trafficking. International organistaions have a constructive role in building confidence and enhancing cooperation on issues of common concern and must also play a role by doing more to assist in the fight against illicit drugs and its trafficking.

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Environment and India's Foreign Policy: The Past and the Future

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ABSTRACT

The history of India's foreign policy is marked with varying experiences. Environmental references in Indian foreign policy have most commonly arose from India's geography, making water sharing, for example, one of the pivotal factors in its foreign relations. In India, the history of environmentalism dates back to the Chipko movement of the year 1973, India's first environmental movement. The erstwhile focus of Indian foreign policy making has gradually started shifting from stereotypical conventional areas border disputes, territorial dominance, economic growth, political relations to non conventional areas such as terrorism, environmental security and climate change. Recent climate related negotiations and environmental awareness around the world made, what is called as 'Green GDP' significant for India too. That non-conventional threats equally act as threats to internal peace is evident by the dynamics of climate change and the subsequent environmentalism gradually taking a stronghold on the Indian grounds. This paper intends to throw light upon the role played by environmentalism in Indian foreign policy making and its ensuing relevance for the Indian future.

Keywords: *Environment, Chipko Movement, Foreign Policy, Water Sharing Development.*

'Policy' in politics is a very intriguing as well as a fundamental terminology. In fact policy and politics both in meaning and usage deems to be inseparable and most often feeds off each other. Actions by men often said to be interest driven are actually the product of policies or strategies. That man is a political animal have attracted widespread debate and discussions over Aristotle and his philosophy for centuries. The quasi historical account of man and his society as given by Aristotle compels us to reflect upon our present day that clarifies the image that centuries ago Aristotle tried to portray. Aristotle in his thoughts on men and his natural environment said that any particular thing around us exists either by nature or by craft and never by both. Hence we see that man who by nature is a political being now crafts his actions to survive in the society of which he is a member.

Foreign policy of states may undoubtedly be called as strategies planned and formed to serve the interest of a state. Rather foreign policies can be called as nothing but statecraft. Here again, craft being an art and statecraft meaning the art of governing and diplomacy. Foreign policy or the external relations and activities of nation-states as distinguished from their domestic policies are driven by the urge to gain in power and position on the global platform. As mentioned above, foreign policies are such policies that lay out courses of actions for government and its leadership consisting of aims and objectives that are carefully crafted according to a pre-considered plan of actions with the goal to serve the foreign interests and concerns in particular of the state. The Ministry of External Affairs, Public Diplomacy Division, Government of India states that "*foreign relations are no longer just an instrument for interaction at diplomatic level but are now a means for procuring sinews for development and progress in trade and commerce, science and technology, education and agriculture and various other fields like energy, climate change, etc*".¹ The academic context of foreign policies is usually defined by theories and approaches whereas in practice it is the changing

global environment that shapes and formulates the foreign policies of one and all nation-states. Here, 'global environment' as different from environment and ecology is the incessant processes of changes that mark the international politics, whereas the reference of 'environment and ecology' induces a thought about this apparently new phenomena knocking on the doors of almost all states.

The history of India's foreign policy is marked with varying experiences. From working in an international environment marked with bipolarism to the present day transformed multipolar world, from managing in an increasingly unstable neighbourhood to consistently carrying forward the legacy of democracy, Indian foreign policy and its study can take us to a long tour pertaining to the rule books of a successful foreign policy making. From an unstable neighbourhood and some key players of this globalized world India has unintentionally shifted the focus of its foreign policy from the conventional to the non conventional security fronts. The newest addition being the environmental security that has drawn widespread attention and stirred up immediate responses from almost every corner of the world. The recent ventures to meet the Chinese President Xi Jinping on the 18th of September, 2014 by the Modi government which is led by the single majority party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) also known to have accelerated the seldom-witnessed fast and high economic growth rate in the state of Gujarat, shows that the conventional focus on the United States and Japan as foreign policy partners has shifted to China, identified as a potential and valued foreign policy player for India. Similarly the conventional security imperatives rising from a turbulent neighbourhood posed by states like Pakistan and Afghanistan has shifted to certain non conventional security fronts like human security, environmental security and food security. The states in developing and less developing categories and particularly those with low lying geography are the ones with most vulnerability requiring urgent response to such newer kinds of predicaments posed by environmental changes. Terms like 'Green GDP' have started to be incorporated into India's official documents as well as several other executive summaries and ministerial speeches. On March 18, 2011, Mr. Jairam Ramesh, Minister of Environment and Forests at the India Today Conclave used the term 'Green GDP' and highlighted its significance for India.²

India's Foreign Policy and Environment: A Background

Since the 1970s environmental concerns were started to be voiced more fiercely from different quarters of the world. In fact, environmentalism in India did not need to wait for a new millennium before it could strike the Indian soil. The Chipko movement in the year 1973 was in fact India's first environmental movement. The word 'chipko' meaning 'embrace' emerged from the organized resistance movement participated by several local village women like Dhoom Singh Negi and Bachni Devi. The Chipko movement was formally led forward by Gandhian philosopher and activist, Mr. Sunderlal Bahuguna. The original Chipko movement or rather a similar resistance effort took birth around 260 years back in the early half of the 18th Century when local women resisted the felling of trees by the Maharaja (King) of Jodhpur.³ Led by a lady called Amrita Devi from the Bishnoi community of Rajasthan, this movement helped save trees of 84 villages of Rajasthan. The chipko slogan coined by Mr. Bahuguna that 'ecology is the permanent economy' bears much relevance even to this day. Called as a patterned nexus by MV Nadkarni, poverty, environment and development is found to be working as a vicious cycle, where one leads to the other and one is both the cause as well as the effect of the other.⁴ The idea behind is that developing and less developing countries depend more on the natural resources gained from the environment. There is further a growing awareness of this close relationship found between poverty and environment, often leading to a relationship between poverty and environmental pollution. The dependence and interrelationship is rather direct unlike those in developed states that generate indirect sources of Greenhouse Gases (GHGs). Likewise it is well founded and accepted that poorer countries are more likely to suffer the consequences of environmental pollution

than other states on both national and international levels. As a result it gave rise to 'environmental justice' seeking legal remedies for disproportionate environmental abuse. And needless to say, when environmental justice comes in, pops in the concept of 'environmental security'.

Environmental references in Indian foreign policy have most commonly arose from India's geography, making water sharing one of the pivotal factors in its foreign relations. India in its foreign policy has identified water, the environmental resource, a transnational resource as a key factor in its foreign relations. Due to the Indo-centric Himalayan geography of the Indian neighbourhood, Indian foreign policy has been dotted by the issue of water sharing with each of its neighbouring countries. Geographically, India has been dictated by its river system coupled with the exposition by the vast South Asian feature, that is, the Himalayas. India is bounded to the southwest by the Arabian Sea, to the southeast by the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean to the south. The Maldives, Sri Lanka and Indonesia are island nations to the south of India while neighbouring country Sri Lanka is separated from India by a narrow channel of sea formed by Palk Strait and the Gulf of Mannar. Amongst other major South Asian country and a neighbouring country to India, Bangladesh is defined by the watershed region of the Indo-Gangetic Plain, the Khasi hills and Mizo hills. The Ganges is the longest river originating in India and forms the Indo-Gangetic Plain. The Ganges-Brahmaputra system occupies most of northern, central and eastern India. The northern frontiers of India are defined largely by the Himalayan mountain range where its political boundaries with China, Bhutan and Nepal lie. Its western borders with Pakistan lie in the Punjab Plain and the Thar Desert. The understanding of the Indian geography is an imperative in order to throw light over the fact that amongst other environmental issues, the prevalence of age old water sharing in India's foreign relations with almost all of its neighbouring countries has marked the environmentalist in India's foreign policy making processes since long.

Myers in 1993 called the environmental sector falling under the 'ultimate security' agenda.⁵ The 1972 Stockholm Conference known as the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) marked the beginning of an era that made environmentalism, a key factor in almost all foreign policy making of countries.

Environmental Issues in India's Foreign Policy

Water sharing

One of the most important environmental resources to mankind has been the natural availability of water. Water and its resources, in any form is a boon to humankind that no one can deny. But unfortunately the availability of water on this earth, since long has been so abundant that man by nature took it for granted. After a history of struggle for independence and thereafter the much apprehended relationship with partitioned country, Pakistan, India back in 1960s addressed the issue of water in its foreign relations for the first time. Before that water or water sharing as an issue in relationship between countries was present in case of several other states such as between Canada and the United States since the American War of Independence. Treaties like the Definitive Treaty of Peace concluded in 1783 between Great Britain and the United States, the 1794 Jay Treaty, the 1817 Rush-Bagot Agreement are all examples of treaties concluded regarding jurisdiction over water. In fact the history of water sharing is located more specifically in and around Europe and the North America since the beginning of nineteenth century.

For India, being the biggest and the most populous South Asian state and having a vast and complex river system, the issue of water sharing is almost interrelated with India's relationship with all of its neighbours and like any other transnational issue, it should be remembered that it can neither be dealt in vacuum. Fresh water sources in the form of rivers have been a bone of contention between countries since long. History has already witnessed wars where water was the prime issue. Examples from the modern historical times where wars were fought by the Babylonian and Assyrian forces as well as the more recent accounts of the conflict between Israel

and Palestine since 1967 holds true to the fact that the future may witness a much more major war that may be fought between countries to the likes of a third world war.

Coming back to India, water sharing as an environmental issue in India's foreign policy may be studied through the example of the Indus Water Treaty signed between India and Pakistan on September 19th, 1960. This treaty was aimed towards the management as well as the use of the Indus River water. For the purpose of the treaty the North Indian Rivers, the Sutlej, the Ravi and the Beas came to be known as the Eastern Rivers whereas the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab taken together came to be known as the Western Rivers. Meticulous in his decision, the then Indian Prime Minister Nehru and Pakistan's President, Field Marshall Mohammad Ayub Khan made their decisions over the distribution, share and use of the river waters. Hence Article II of the treaty says that "*all the waters of the Eastern Rivers shall be available for the unrestricted use of India...Pakistan shall be under an obligation to let flow, and shall not permit any interference with, the waters of the Sutlej Main and the Ravi Main...*" Likewise it is also said, that "*all the waters, while flowing in Pakistan, of any Tributary which, in its natural course, joins the Sutlej Main or the Ravi main after these rivers have finally crossed into Pakistan shall be available for the unrestricted use of Pakistan...*"⁶ The Indus Water treaty also holds significance for Indian foreign policy for another reason. Since its completion it was highly acclaimed as a successful story in the history of conflict resolution. Brokered by the World Bank, the Indus Water treaty has certain provisions relating to the arbitration mechanism mentioned in Article IX and Annexure G. Further the Indian Foreign Policy with other countries like China is again clubbed with water sharing factors. The building of dams by China for hydro electrical power generation of 510 MW known as the Zangmu Dam built on the Gyaca County in the Shannan Prefecture of China's Tibetan Autonomous Region has generated widespread apprehensions amongst Indian policymakers regarding its neighbour's intentions. Similarly with Nepal, it signed the Mahakali Treaty in 1996 designed to provide for the construction of a giant multipurpose project on the Mahakali River. With Bangladesh in 1996, India signed the Ganges Water Treaty between India and Bangladesh to govern the Ganges Water at Farakka by ten day periods from the 1st January to the 31st May of every year. Reciprocity being the first principle governing any foreign policy remains must, particularly in case of water sharing. Water sharing like many other issues in a foreign policy making for India too is designed to upgrade the regional security situations and ameliorate its own global platform vis-à-vis other countries.

Sustainable Development

Approaching environmental issues from all sides and aspects does include the concept of sustainable environment that gained ground in 1972 at the Conference of the Human Environment held in Stockholm and later popularised by the Brundtland Commission in his report known as *Our Common Future* in 1987. The concept of sustainable development was new not only when it was coined but also at a time when environmental issues and governmental and public awareness relating it was only evolving. Sustainable Development is the development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of the future generations to meet their own needs. But it was not until the Rio Summit held in 1992 by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development that sustainable development as a concept to work for and upheld was recognised by the world leaders. For the Indian leader sustainable development is a classic principle to work upon given its growing population clubbed with the divide between the rich and the poor omnipresent in the Indian society. With other environmental problems in India relating to air, water and soil pollution as well as conservation of wildlife and forest cover, environmental management for the Indians must work in the 'sustainable manner'. India that covers around 2.4 percent of the world's land consisting of 16 percent of the world's population, working in the environmental field in the sustainable way does pose strife.⁷ An ever increasing pressure on nature's resources leading ultimately to loss of fertility of the soil, contamination of soil, deforestation, etc in turn gives birth to more and more exploitation of nature's resources

beyond its capacity. While several NGOs are already at work in this field, the new government with its immediate assumption of power, pronounced specifically three dimensions within which it aspires to work towards sustainable development. The three dimensions are electricity generation, land use and the protection of water resources. Underlying the principle of sustainable development, while all the three is a perfect combination for a developing and most populated country like India, the last two in specific serves to answer the call and respond to the needs of an agrarian society like that of India. Prime Minister Narendra Modi setting aside the above three as priorities for the years ahead for India says, he aspires to see an India where all the villages shall have the supply of electricity by 2019. In his much admired recent visit to the United States for five days that started from September 26th, 2014 Prime Minister Modi in India's foreign relations with the United States said the relationship between the world's oldest and largest democracy would definitely bear fruits. Echoing the principles of sustainable development, Prime Minister Modi spoke of having a clean Ganga, and as a reflection of India's growing foreign relations, particularly in the context of the United States, Prime Minister Modi urged the Indian Diaspora at United States to help in his endeavour to have a clean Ganga Water. The Modi government, very recently launched the '*Swachh Bharat*' mission urging every Indian to work for a cleaner India. With his vision of having a clean India with toilets for every Indian amounting to 1.27 billion, the Modi government formulated the new Indian foreign policy for the 21st Century India where he sees the potentiality in India to lead the world of the 21st Century.

Environment, India and the Future

Environmental stress can be found highly exerted on both India's domestic policies as well as foreign policies. In this contemporary age of an open society where public participation and public discussions on almost all issues of both governmental as well as semi governmental nature are invited, where the aim is to achieve a free and fair conclusion by most developed societies, where technology and information has been allowed a free flow by the fruits of the globalized world and above all, where good governance has become a norm for welfare societies, environmentalism not only for India but most countries alike will only intensify. Environmental issues are of such global and transnational nature that it neither remains constrained within political boundaries nor loses significance with the flow of time. The open and free access to public information as well as opportunities for a passable feedback has instilled a public attitude amongst national citizens that shows a huge support for national and international initiatives devised to cope with issues like global warming, environmental as well as climate change. A national survey carried out in the United Kingdom in 2008 showed that 30 percent of respondents were 'very concerned' about climate change whereas 47 percent were 'fairly concerned'.⁸ Due to a history of colonialism by its colonial master, the United Kingdom, it has been said as well as found that India has partly inherited its neighbourhood policies from the British and that its security perceptions extends to countries that are beyond geographical frontiers and issues that can never remain limited to national boundaries. For the Indian scenario, it is an average of 1.2 to 1.4 tonnes of carbon dioxide per year that India emits.⁹ While this is quite below the global average and considerably lower than the United States and Europe, yet the Indian state is accused of hiding behind its cloak of poverty and underdevelopment. Later climate negotiations under the Kyoto mechanism showed that since the year 2009 at the fifteenth session of the Conference of the Parties held in Copenhagen, Denmark lot of focus was laid on emerging countries like India, Brazil, China and South Africa. Here the major decision was taken around financing and assisting such developing countries through the creation of global fund to meet emission reduction targets and mitigation actions. Article 4.3 relating to the *Finance Obligation in the Convention* reads, "*The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with their obligations under Article 12, paragraph 1,*" and Article 4.5 says, "*The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall take all practicable steps to promote,*

facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention"¹⁰ The Indian government on its part is already committed to make full utilization of this fund and presently governmental expenditure towards adaptation to climate change roughly exceeds 2.6 percent of its GDP.¹¹ Further, the Indian Government in both its foreign and domestic policy focuses on agriculture, water resources, health and sanitation, forests, coastal zone infrastructure and extreme events, as particular areas of concern. Under the Indian Government's National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), eight focused national missions in the area of solar energy, enhanced energy efficiency, sustainable agriculture, sustainable habitat, water, Himalayan eco-system, increasing the forest cover and strategic knowledge for climate change has been segregated. Apart from this the Prime Minister's Council Fund was also set up in the year 2007 with the responsibility of monitoring such national missions and actions. India's future in environmentalism lies in these missions and actions, whose institutionalization is not the only thing important but its operationalization too, for a vast and populous country like India. Once in place, these national actions may also guide India's foreign policies. On the South Asian front, India ranks 126 out of 132 countries on environmental performance.¹² This is the lowest of any country in Asia. To list the number of initiatives and mission plans functioning in India, one can go on and on. Another of such organisation is the National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) which is an international environmental organization founded back in 1970 which functioning in India to fight climate change and environmental hazards.

One of the impediments towards the achievement of a success story in India's environmental policies is the principle of democracy and federalism in Indian governance. Federalism has been broadly categorized by *Allan Erbsen (2008)* in *Horizontal Federalism* as vertical and horizontal.¹³ Vertical Federalism is characterised by central dominance over the state whereas Horizontal Federalism focuses on lateral cooperation among the state units who collectively needs to articulate their interests. More recently, Indian Government was in a perpetual trouble with the menace called 'coalition'. The coming into power of a single majority party in May, 2014 after a decade of coalition politics nevertheless builds a hope into billion hearts of a smooth functioning government, free of deadlocks and interest driven petty party politics. India's future in foreign policy with respect to environmentalism as with respect to other issues shall similarly lie in its leadership stance but exclusive of the big brotherly attitude. A comparative analysis of all South Asian neighbours only shows India as more and more capable of extending most of the developmental, financial and technical aids required to meet the environmental hazards as well as work for environmental awareness and protection. Lastly, in order to work according to standard international environmental law, certain recognised international norms may act as the basic pillars such as, 'Principle 21' of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which states that 'States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction'.

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Afghanistan: Prioritizing America's 'Other' War

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ABSTRACT

In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, the United States embarked on a self righteous path of waging a 'just war' against the perpetrators of evil. However, the war, dubbed as the 'war on terror' was not just aimed against any particular nation or for that matter Al Qaeda – the fanatic group that executed the terror attacks, but its expanse was global in nature. President George W. Bush vowed to fight the scourge of terrorism throughout the world. And since, Al Qaeda was based in Afghanistan, operating with the help and support of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan became the first trial case of the global 'war on terror.' This article looks into the various challenges the Afghan conflict poses: that of striking hard on Al Qaeda strongholds and flushing them out, building up stability in a territory ravaged by three decades of conflicts, with a strong tribal identity, and lastly, maintaining that security and stability so that

Afghanistan ceases to be a base of terrorist activity. The article, thus, profiles the genesis of the US policy and its execution in Afghanistan and also looks into the various fallouts.

Key words: 9/11, Afghanistan, U.S. policy, Operation Enduring Freedom, Taliban, Counterinsurgency.

Introduction

Commentators across the world tried to come to terms with the events of September 11 by insisting on the significance of the event in recent history – which since the end of the Cold War had the capacity to divide world politics into pre and post 9/11 scenario. Indeed, the attacks of September 11 came as a jolt that was as sudden and unexpected as to convince nearly all that we had entered a fundamentally new world. Whether such observation is right or mere exaggeration is not the point. The point is President Bush indeed considered 9/11 as a rupture with the past.¹ For President Bush, after the onslaught on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 'night fell on a different world.' He declared war on 'every terrorist group of global reach.'² 9/11 was quoted by Bush as a 'unique war,' a struggle against terrorism itself and it also encouraged a new idea: that it was a war without any limitation.³

The Bush administration invoked moral and religious rhetoric in their attempt to console the nerve wrecked people of America. The administration's strategic language, however, hinted at the masculine expansion of American power. The strategy that defined America's response to the attacks of 9/11 came to be known as the 'Bush Doctrine,' at the heart of which rested the grandiose idea of the 'war on terror,' which soon transformed into a theology;⁴ with a vision to destroy terrorism throughout the world, a historical mission to spread democracy and above all, it recognized few limits to American power.⁵ The National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 contends that the unparalleled U.S. position of primacy creates a 'moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe...[the United States] will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free market, and free trade to every corner of the world.' This view is based on the belief that U.S. power is 'the sole pillar upholding a liberal world order that is conducive to the

principles [the United States] believes in.’⁶ Thus the first target of this strategy or theology of ‘war on terror’ was Afghanistan and its fate, therefore, a test case of the real nature of this war.

Into the Graveyard of Empires

‘Terrorism against our nation will not stand,’ Bush declared moments after the second jet slammed into the south tower of the World Trade Center.⁷ Indeed, America was going to respond. But the question was how and when? Immediately after the attack, the intelligence community confirmed that Osama Bin Laden had masterminded the attacks. Laden and his Al Qaeda network had settled in Afghanistan with the support of the Taliban regime.⁸

Thus, Afghanistan became the obvious and immediate target for military action. NATO for the first time in its half century existence, invoked article 5, offering unconditioned and immediate assistance from all member nations.⁹ The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1368, which recognized ‘the inherent right of individual or collective self defense’ of article 51 of the UN Charter, and it also declared UN’s ‘readiness to take the necessary steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and to combat all forms of terrorism in accordance of the charter of the UN.’¹⁰ Nations across the world expressed solidarity with the United States of America in its fight against the scourge of terrorism. However, the Pentagon which has battle plan for almost every conceivable contingency had no detailed plans for Afghanistan. According to Rice, there was ‘nothing on the shelf for this kind of war.’¹¹ Nonetheless, CIA Director Tenet presented the president with the most acceptable plan of attack. He proposed that the CIA and Special Operation Forces (SOF) provide direct support to the main Northern Alliance opposition forces seeking to overthrow the Taliban regime.¹² Along with that, limited but well chosen type of American military power was to be used to defeat Al Qaeda and Taliban.¹³ Secretary of State Collin Powell helped persuade Pakistan to sever its ties with the Taliban and work with Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance, provide bases and over flight rights needed by the U.S. forces.¹⁴ President Bush also established close relation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, making it far more easier for the U.S. military to work in Central Asia.¹⁵ With the logistics in place, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was launched – – the first part of America’s larger global agenda.

It all began on 26th September 2001 with the insertion of a team of covert CIA paramilitary officials into an area of Afghanistan just north of Kabul.¹⁶ Their mission was to co-ordinate with a loose coalition of ethnic minority group opposed to the Taliban known as the Northern Alliance to orchestrate the downfall of the Taliban.¹⁷

However America faced a paradox in its strategy for the conduct of OEF that has crippled its ability to locate and defeat the enemy. US neglected the basic principles that guides small wars i.e. the protection of the population and the elimination of the influence of the insurgents or guerillas are important to gathering necessary intelligence to locate the threat.¹⁸ This has caused the elimination of the primary source of intelligence directly impairing on US ability to locate or separate the insurgents from the population, which has trapped US in an operational quagmire, same as the Soviet Union.

Sun Tzu explained the basic tenet of warfare in his *The Art of War*, 1963.

“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not to fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”¹⁹

Operation Enduring Freedom

The main objective of US intervention in Afghanistan was to eliminate Al Qaeda and its bases protected by the Taliban regime.²⁰ However, after the initial thrust of counter terrorist strategy by combining military action, law enforcement and tactical aircraft armed with new generation weapons which gave US an immediate advantage in the battlefield, the US lost sight of its priorities

and adopted drifting strategies, from a counter-terrorist strategy to a counter-insurgency approach focused on the population.²¹ Thus even after years of confrontation, and the fall of Taliban regime, the Taliban still have strong influence & terrorism is still an everyday threat to Afghan people. And so far as Afghanistan is concerned, it is neither secure nor stable.²²

When 9/11 happened the world stood transfixed with the video images of the imploding World Trade centre and the Pentagon, the symbol of global capitalism of the mighty behemoth of American military power. America was under attack, the American way of life was under attack. 9/11 was aimed at not just causing human casualties but to strike the apostates of American power, to make the Americans realize that even the world's most powerful nation was penetrable. Such an event warranted unprecedented response and for weeks, the world was speculating the US response. And on 7th October 2001, George W. Bush announced the beginning of military campaign in Afghanistan to flush out and destroy Al Qaeda operatives and to end to Taliban regime that was hosting them.²³ However, at the time when the military was suppose to enter Afghanistan there was no 'on the shelf' military plans for operations in a country which is primitive and landlocked with tribal social structures, where clans and families are interlinked, shackled together by age old customs.²⁴ Afghanistan was no easy get in and get out operation. It was protected by geography and surrounded by states with which the US had few close relations.²⁵ And to compound the situation further, looming in the background was Afghanistan's reputation as a graveyard of empires - for the Brits in the 19th Century and the Soviets in the 1980s. The generals worried that the US might meet the same fate.²⁶

However, getting the objective right was the most crucial task. 'Pay a price', 'disrupt the use of Afghanistan' for terrorist activities, 'make it more difficult' to prepare for terrorist attacks - these were vague objectives for a major military operation.²⁷ Thus, for all the talks of 'hitting them hard' and using the full spectrum of America's military capability, little of it was available the day bombing started. There were no Army troops or Marines deployed inside Afghanistan to directly take the fight to the enemy.²⁸ The operations started on 7th October with air strikes on military target in Afghanistan. The use of force was balanced by simultaneously providing humanitarian relief efforts. However, the Special Operation Forces (SOF) were not on ground till 19th October, more than a month after the air strikes had begun.²⁹ It was only after the SOF entered Afghanistan, that they were able make contact with the CIA and the Northern Alliances forces. Other SOF units established links with anti Taliban forces in Central and Southern Afghanistan. Thus, the strategy, was to maneuver the anti-Taliban forces against Al Qaeda & Taliban forces with the support of SOF and coalition air strikes.³⁰

Once the US forces were on ground, the combat operations proceeded quickly. By 10th November, the Northern Alliance and coalition forces had taken Mazar - e - Sharif and by 13th November Taliban was out of Kabul. And by the following month, the Taliban were pushed out of their last urban stronghold in Kandahar.³¹ Once Kandahar fell, most of the Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives fled into the mountains along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

The military operations proved all the naysayer wrong , It turned out to be a rousing success, once again proving the worth and superiorly of American's military prowess - owing to which, it was possible to defeat as enemy regime more than seven thousand miles away.³² However, even after the ouster of Taliban from power and destruction of Al Qaeda, the question remains how much has been achieved ? Osama Bin Laden along with many Al Qaeda operatives was still on the loose and the Taliban was still operative in many parts of Afghanistan. And if the core political objective in Afghanistan was the destruction of Al Qaeda and ouster of Taliban, than the US could well be on its way home by early 2002. But the situation was way more complicated as the war council paid little attention to who would rule Afghanistan after the Taliban was removed from power?³³ Winning peace, therefore, proved its to be more difficult issue for America.

Tora Bora and Post War Stabilization

After the ouster of the Taliban, achieving the more fundamental objectives of making Afghanistan free of Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants, ensuring fair and stable government and so on proved to be the more difficult and costly objectives. This became aptly clear in the forbidding mountains of Tora Bora.

U.S. intelligence, after the fall of Kandahar, got wind that many Taliban and Al Qaeda forces sought refuge in the former Mujahideen cave complexes located in the white Mountains, South of Jalalabad known as Tora Bora.³⁴ Here was a chance to capture Bin Laden & many of his lieutenant. Yet, in a decision of immense strategic consequence, General Tommy Franks (Head of Central Command) decided to rely on local militias and Pakistani army to tighten the noose around Tora Bora.³⁵ Along with these fighters, US special forces began assault on Tora Bora with a massive bombing campaign with B-52 bombers.³⁶ But after almost 17 days of bombing, it became clear that many of the fighters, including Bin Laden, had fled to Pakistan.³⁷ The U.S. forces learned that the Afghan militias have practiced free market loyalty and had allowed the Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters to slip away into nearby Pakistan.³⁸

Tora Bora along with the entire Afghan Campaign demonstrated the failure of America's COIN strategy. From the earliest days of America's involvement in Afghanistan up through the present, the core political objective has been the destruction of Al Qaeda. Yet General Franks relied on local Afghan fighters rather than on American troops for this critical mission.³⁹ The reasons have been many - fear of American casualties, another fear that the Afghans would react violently to a large American military presence and finally, the argument that it would have been difficult to deploy large number of American troops quickly into Afghanistan.⁴⁰ Nonetheless Tora Bora was a crucial military operation which would have surely justified the risk.

COIN STRATEGY (Counter insurgency) in Afghanistan

COIN is synonymous with armed nation-building. The idea is that the U.S. Army can put itself down in a foreign land where an insurgency is occurring and provide support to the host nation government threatened by the insurgency.⁴¹ However, the application of COIN in Afghanistan required greater introspection with regards to the objective of the war, because the war of counterinsurgency takes a long time, they cost a lot and their results are often inconclusive.⁴² If the purpose of America's invasion of Afghanistan was, to create a country of long lasting peace and stability, COIN would have been an apt strategy. This is so because, the doctrine argues that the way to defeat insurgency is to provide the local population with certain critical assets like improved governance and infrastructure, effective local security forces, an improved economy and most importantly security.⁴³

But such a strategy appeared conflictual with the broader outline of Republican or Bush administration's political ideology. Bush's ideological disdain for nation building was apparent during his presidential campaign where he frequently denigrated American efforts to rebuild other nations.⁴⁴ The president and most of his advisers were assertive nationalist wrapped up in the notion that superpowers fight wars, they do not do windows.⁴⁵ As a result, even when the first bombs were falling, the administration was still not sure about whether to remove the Taliban from power or keep them in the loop for some kind of post-war arrangement in Afghanistan.⁴⁶ However, if the US allowed Taliban to stay in power, it risked sending message to oppressive regimes around the world that they could harbor terror outfits like Al Qaeda and then negotiate a bargain with the US. Thus, the US decided to remove the Taliban from power. It was only when the decision to oust Taliban was made; a post-war arrangement in Afghanistan became an imperative. Even then, the disdain for nation-building became apparent when Rumsfeld distanced himself from any U.S. responsibility for helping the Afghan in forging a more stable post Taliban Government.

He said, 'I don't think (that) leaves us with a responsibility to try to figure out what kind of government that country ought to have. I don't know people who are smart enough from other countries to tell other countries the kind of arrangements they ought to have to govern themselves. One would hope and pray that they end up with governments that would provide the best possible for the people of those countries.'⁴⁷

This failure to underline a definitive strategy in Afghanistan sucked US in a quagmire. In war, strategy presumably links policy and tactics. Policy directs what the war is to accomplish and then strategy looks to policy and applies the resources of war – like – operational art, tactical action and other national resources – to achieve policy aims. The idea of good strategy is that it employs the resources of war in the most cost-effective manner.⁴⁸ And in Afghanistan, good strategy has been absent from the start.⁴⁹ To achieve the core objective of destroying Al Qaeda, the U.S. should have used limited military force in a refined manner rather than trying to achieve that goal by building up an Afghanistan government and economy that could win the population over to its side and thus prevent the return of Al Qaeda.⁵⁰ The bankruptcy of American policy lies in the fact that it tried to achieve the singular policy of destroying Al Qaeda through a maximalist policy/operational method of armed nation building.⁵¹ After the so called military objective was achieved – destruction of Al Qaeda (though Osama bin Laden was captured and killed only in 2011), the Bush administration acknowledged while learning the lesson 'from the previous engagement in the Afghan area, that we should not just simply leave after a military objective has been achieved,' he suggested that it 'would be a useful function for the United Nations to take over the so-called "nation-building" – I would call it the stabilization of a future government – after our military mission is complete.'⁵²

The Crisis of America's Afghan Policy

America's response to 9/11 was uniquely arrogant and unilateral in nature. As soon as Kabul fell in January 2002, President Bush threatened to bring the fight to other autocratic regimes that supports and harbor terrorism – regimes like Iraq.⁵³ Washington turned aside most allies' offers of military assistance in Afghanistan. It limited international peacekeeping forces there to the Kabul city limits. It invaded Iraq against the advice of several of its most important allies and contrary to the wishes of nearly all the surrounding states that it claimed to be rescuing from potential Iraqi aggression.⁵⁴ Throughout 2002, the Bush administration was far more focused on invading Iraq than on rebuilding Afghanistan. As a result, America's military effort was stretched thin in both the countries. In 2002, American troop levels in Afghanistan hovered around 10,000.⁵⁵ Though, it would not be right to assert that America starved Afghanistan to feed Iraq but Afghanistan, by far, is America's least resourced war in the last 50 years.⁵⁶

Apart from the squabble regarding what is to be achieved in Afghanistan once the invasion began, the initial American policy was to minimize American military and economic resources committed to post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld justified this "low-profile, small foot print" approach by arguing that Afghanistan would become self sufficient more quickly by avoiding excessive dependency on U.S. and other international aid.⁵⁷ The Bush administration further insisted on confining international peacekeeping forces to Kabul and its surrounding areas, ignoring both United Nations and Afghan government pleas to extend the security umbrella to the rest of the country, and also refused to have American troops play any public safety role, insisting that Afghanistan should shoulder the responsibility of their internal security.⁵⁸ Thus, once the Taliban were disposed off, the security scenario further deteriorated with warlords across the country vying for power. Faced with the failure of its initial efforts to stabilize the country, the United States was compelled to vastly increase its commitments of personnel and money. As a result, reinforcing only under the pressure of failure has thus proved a far more expensive approach to nation-building.

Today, even though roughly 100,000 U.S. troops are still in Afghanistan, the support for U.S. war campaign has reduced considerably. Troops from more than 40 countries still make up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), of which most of the countries prepare to depart Afghanistan.⁵⁹ Though, over the years, the U.S. mission has lost much of its clarity of purpose, policy makers in U.S. are still dedicated to denying Al Qaeda's return to Afghanistan and a probable Taliban takeover, once the foreign forces have withdrawn.

In 2003, the Afghan insurgency made a dramatic recovery and in 2005, the Taliban and other insurgent groups began one of the most impressive comebacks against a U.S. led military coalition in history.⁶⁰ By the time President Obama came into office, U.S. was seriously considering a new strategy for a new war in Afghanistan. It was behind this backdrop, the Obama administration undertook its policy review in 2009.⁶¹ There were many in the new administration who initially opposed sending additional troops to Afghanistan but eventually did so because of reasonable skepticism. Washington, in early 2009 had send more than 30,000 additional troops but the situation deteriorated to the extent that within a few months, the military was asking for tens of thousands more.⁶² The policy makers eventually realized that Afghanistan, with its tribal society and weak traditions of loyalty to the state, was not a promising place for classic counter-insurgency operation. They argued that the twin goals of protecting the population and guiding the Afghan security forces to self-sufficiency were inconsistent with Afghanistan's history, culture, and society.⁶³

Fixing a Failed Strategy

The new strategy – aimed to marginalize the insurgency by regaining control of the countryside in the provinces most affected by the insurgency. The current strategy of 'shape, clear, hold, and build' strategy requires control of territory and a separation of insurgents from the population. Troops clear an area, remain there, and implement an ambitious development program intended to gain the support of the population.⁶⁴ Here the focus was on the population and not the territory. However, the context in which these theories were created is quite specific: First, there was a state, albeit a colonial one; second, the insurgency was initiated by a group of nationalist intellectuals who, as far as the rural population was concerned, were outsiders. The failure of the current policy stems from the underestimation of the Taliban and the impossibility of 'clearing' an area of insurgents.⁶⁵ Key to the current strategy is understanding the relationship between the Taliban and the population. A common misperception is that the insurgents are terrorizing the Afghan people and that the insurgents' level of support among the people is marginal. This has led to the objective of 'separating the Taliban from the population' or 'protecting the population' from the Taliban.⁶⁶ In fact, there are conflicting versions of the kind of relationship between the insurgents and the local population. The Taliban are generally careful not to antagonize the population. They are much more tolerant of music and of beardless men than before 2001, and Mullah Omar has repeatedly made clear that the behavior of the fighters should be respectful (for example, paying for the food they take).⁶⁷ Again, most of the insurgents are local and in case of heavy clash, local solidarities tend to work in favor of the Taliban,⁶⁸ which was aptly demonstrated during the clash in Tora Bora.

Thus, in order to be successful, the coalition forces must gain the trust of the Afghan people which is key to any counter-insurgency operation. However, even after spending more than a decade in Afghanistan, the coalition forces are yet to gain the trust of the Afghan people. The situation is further compounded by the past poor behavior of some Coalition forces – the beating of prisoners, arbitrary imprisonment, aggressive behavior on the road – and the unwitting bombing of civilians.⁶⁹

Again, counter-insurgency strategy suggest that to ensure security throughout the country of approximately 30 million people, such as Afghanistan, a security force of at least 600,000 is needed.⁷⁰ America however, from the beginning adopted a 'low-foot print' strategy, supplemented by high-tech smart weapons. Thus, in Afghanistan, America realized the problem of fighting a

high-tech war against a low-tech enemy. Nonetheless, any estimation is only approximate. The IASF, by the end of 2010 had only 150,000 troops in Afghanistan. And the Afghan security forces numbered around 250,000, with only 150,000 in decent shape. Thus, there were only 300,000 competent security forces in place—another 300,000 short of the actual requirement.⁷¹ However, with the new president in office, new hopes emerged. In order to reverse the momentum in Afghanistan and then get out, Obama adopted a strategy called 'escalate and exit,'⁷² and to get out of Afghanistan, Obama had to redefine and drastically narrow America's objectives. Obama dubbed the Afghan war as the 'war of necessity' with the commitment to fight till all of America's goals has been achieved.⁷³ However, after spending his first few months in office, Obama was also having his doubts whether the war was as necessary as he first believed. Such reassessment came in the context of the fact that he took office at a time when America was facing worst financial crisis and soon American people would lose their patience with the soaring cost of war. Hence, by the end of 2009, a consensus had been reached. Robert Gates puts it succinctly: 'We don't need to defeat the Taliban, we only need to degrade them. They need to be weak enough that the Afghan forces can deal with them alone.'⁷⁴ That soon become the mantra—the 'Afghan good enough policy'.

Conclusion

Afghanistan is called the 'graveyard of empires,' essentially so because Afghanistan's geography and social structures have never justified the huge costs of occupying it. Because of that, it became a buffer state between empires in the nineteenth century and, after failing to control it in the twentieth century, the Soviets finally evacuated.⁷⁵ Afghanistan is to become for U.S. what it was for the Soviet Union—'a graveyard.' The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan has adopted different approaches since 2001: From counterterrorism to counterinsurgency; from enemy-centric to population-centric warfare; and, finally, from extensive use of air strikes to a commitment of more troops on the ground. Despite some initial achievements, the situation in Afghanistan is still complicated and far from being solved. It might take many years to stabilize and secure Afghanistan in order to prevent al-Qaida and the Taliban from gaining ground. As Larry Goodson from the U.S. Army War College has said, 'Time is running out in Afghanistan.'⁷⁶ The only relief for the western policy makers was the assassination of Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, which once again reasserted the power of American military capability. The Bin Laden raid will surely go down in the history of counter-terrorism as an extraordinarily bold presidentially ordered attack.⁷⁷

For American policy in Afghanistan to have any hope of success, it is necessary to learn from three lessons of the war in Afghanistan. First, U.S. strategy should be aimed at creating security and stability through a trusted government and not a puppet regime like that of Karzai and a reliable national army which the IASF took the responsibility of facilitating. Second, U.S. strategy should be focused on maintaining positive results through a robust commitment to the local population. Finally, it should involve regional players in a more proactive and constructive dialogue to create a stable and secure regional environment that could lead to the security of Afghanistan. This is necessary because Afghanistan has been traditionally opposed to foreign interference and is a traditional society, organized around cultural and ethnic ties. Constant involvement of foreign forces is likely to create suspicion and misperception among local population regarding the 'end' of foreign involvement.

Thus, in Afghanistan, an effective aid program—both military and civilian—should not involve a preponderance of Americans or other Westerners assuming leadership roles. Had the advisory role with which the United States began the war been kept in operation, the United States could have secured its vital interests in the region on a more sustainable basis. Afghan traditions, tribal procedures, and methods of conflict resolution should have been incorporated systematically into the U.S. effort from the beginning. There is no doubt, however, that even such well thought out

policy would be difficult to achieve because the Afghans themselves have different views of what Afghanistan is and should be. Intense rivalries among Afghans do not make it easy to pursue Afghan solutions to Afghan problems.⁷⁸

Nevertheless, one legacy of 9/11 may ultimately be more-or-less democratic regimes in Afghanistan, although the costs involved will discourage any attempts to replicate that avenue to democratization elsewhere. President Bush's vision of a democratically transformed Middle East may also be closer to realization now than at any time in history, and this could well prove to be the best antidote to further terrorism emerging from that region. However, any exaggeration of American policy is misleading because, democratic values have become widely shared around the globe, and the American example is important in this respect, but America's involvement in Afghanistan and the Middle East can be at best described as cynical.

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'4 Dimension' Policy Initiative of the Contemporary Government of India: Is India Making a Move as a Leading Global Power?

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ABSTRACT

The contemporary Government of India, Narendra Modi has taken staunch steps in reforming democratic India through the introduction of "4 Dimension" policy initiatives. The venomous effect of corruption and strategy less thinking on the part of the predecessors have somewhat plagued the entire policy structure of India as showcased by the new leader. Thus stress on good governance for more simplification of procedures and processes in the governmental arena is highly pre-requisite measure in-order to make the entire system transparent and faster under the umbrella of India's new democratic set up. Here, technology has played a dominant role in bridging the divide between the government and the citizens. It acts as an empowering tool for the citizen and an accountability medium for the government. Devised to transform India into a global design and manufacturing hub, and to attract foreign investments from outside, the contemporary Government is ushering in a new dawn in the history of Indian civilization. In this regard, the Government's vision of a Digital India can only transform the country into a digitally empowered society and knowledge economy.

Keywords: De-regulation, Good-governance, Economic Growth, Make in India, Digital India, Renewable Energy, Bilateral Relations.

Introduction

India is presently one of the leading and probably the finest growing economies of the world with a growth rate of about 7.3% according to the latest IMF Reports. Indian Diaspora has emerged as a significant factor in domestic politics of several countries. Advancing sustainable human development requires strong democracy. It is only in a strong democracy that people can be empowered to demand and shape better policies, express grievances, seek justice and hold leaders and the private sector to account. Societies with strong, democratic institutions can only empower people to influence their government to prioritize national development that is equitable and sustainable. Good governance today is a major discursive tool enabling the global transition of democracies to a form of Government that some academics have labeled as 'soft authoritarianism'.

The present Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modi, is a member of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) who have encountered a journey of all-round and inclusive development where every Indian can realize their hopes and aspirations. He is a Hindu nationalist and the member of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. He remains deeply inspired by the principle of 'Antyodaya', of serving the last person in the queue. After coming to power in 2014, the leader wants to unleash the target of a sustainable future by putting people at the centre of the development process. Under his strong leadership, the development of India has been made possible with the introduction of the '4Dimension' (4D)'s policies – *Democracy, Demography, Demand and Deregulation*, to showcase India's enormous manufacturing potential.

Democracy as interpreted by the present Prime Minister is not just a system of giving contracts; it is an exemplary channel to collectively accomplish the hopes and desires of a nation, an excellent way to fulfill the needs and wishes of people of the country. Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants its citizens to realize that in democracy, the people in governing system are not the rulers but are the servants, so the people need to start looking at the people those who are in governance as servitors and not as rulers. Creating favorable conditions in India would also enhance India's GDP growth and a healthy trade figure. It would likely to strengthen bilateral ties with the other nations of the world. It would also generate employment opportunities as well as self-employment opportunities for the youth in the coming years. Tourism would also create job opportunities for the youth and good infrastructure in the country would attract the tourists from other countries of the world. Major targets could be achieved through the Government's "Make in India" flagship programme which would accord more manufacturing designs, research and development. This programme has encouraged many people to integrate with the world on equal terms. According to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in the "Make in India" policy initiative, India has accounted for about 12.5% of the global growth and FDI showing a gross increase by 48% from the previous years.

Some Major Improvements

The year 2016, has shown highest percentage of coal production in the country till dated. Steps are been taken by the manufacturing sector, to simplify processes and rationalize provisions. This includes licensing, cross-border trade, security and environmental clearances, electronics and textiles.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi has pitched for investments by domestic as well as foreign investors in next generation infrastructure like roads, ports, railways, airports, telecom, digital networks and clean energy. Various passenger friendly mechanisms have been launched in India like Wi-Fi on railway stations, passenger helpline, security helpline, paperless unreserved ticketing, e-catering, mobile security app, and CCTV cameras for the safety of women.

The 'Make in India' policy is expected to witness the participation of over 9000 companies with 1000 international companies and 8000 Indian companies. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has promised more economic reforms and a stable tax regime so as to take manufacturing's share in the gross domestic product to 25 percent in the near future. Addressing the Make in India event in Mumbai (13-18th February, 2016), the Government has promised to make India's tax regime more efficient and streamlined processes to ease further investments. Now the States would get 42% of tax revenue as compared to 32% in the previous years. The Prime Minister Narendra Modi has asked the industrialists to make a positive move in investing in India as there are immense opportunities in India. The National Investment and Infrastructure Fund and Promotion of Entrepreneurship are positive steps financed by the Government of India.

In the defence sector the Government has recently approved the plan to develop seven stealth frigates. These frigates will be developed in dockyards of Mumbai and Kolkata. Apart from it, the Government has also approved the project to build six nuclear submarines.

Measures Taken

As part of the Companies Act, 2013, companies have to spend at least two per cent of their net profit on CSR and Rs.1000 crores every year. The Centre has taken an initiative in making the projects such as 'Digital India', 'Make in India', Skilling India, Creating 100 Smart Cities, Niti Aayog and Swachh Bharat Mission (cleanliness) programme replacing the previously built Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan led by the erstwhile UPA Government, are successfully running campaigns throughout India. The Beti Bachao Beti Padao Campaign and the Clean Ganga Mission are other important initiatives announced by the Government, the future of which remains a challenging task for the Government.

Sanitation has always been a game of 'ping pong' between people and the authorities blaming each other. Taxpayers complain that not enough is being done in cleaning the streets and sewers by the local authorities, while the latter conveniently blame it on the 'habits' of the people who throw trash out in the open. A solution of working together could be found to this problem as a collective effort. In the west, a community or a neighborhood adopts a street or an area and work together on cleaning it regularly, taking joint responsibility. Under the fundamentals of the Swachh Bharat Mission which was started on 2nd October, 2014 on the birth anniversary of our legend Shri. Mahatma Gandhi, cleanliness has been accrued the topmost priority. But cleaning should not only be done from 'outside' but also our 'inside'. By inside he means that everyone should keep their country clean from the vices of corruption, communalism, gender inequality and casteism in thought and in act. He has pointed out this aspect to the Ministers as well. Cleanliness begins at home. The Swachh Bharat Mission starts cleaning up homes as a family, not just the female members, working alongside the helpers and maids wherever necessary. It is not somebody else's responsibility but our own. The report for the cleanest cities has been released by the government. The survey conducted in the 476 cities shows Mysore to be the cleanest city in India according to the recent reports.

The creation of Smart Cities in India is all set to become the most-populous in the world by 2030, making it the home to the biggest and the most under-penetrated market for global manufacturers and service providers. Unlike its preceding generations, this growing population is also shifting to top tier cities of the country giving rise to new megacities which is estimated to generate 80% of economic growth, with potential to apply modern technologies and infrastructure, promoting better use of scarce resources. Investments of about US\$1.2 trillion would be required over the next 20 years across areas such as transportation, energy and public security to build Smart Cities in India. India has also been inviting foreign partnership in developing the smart cities and has signed deals to build eight cities – three with Germany, three with the US, and one each with Spain and Singapore. India's Smart City plan is part of a larger agenda of creating Industrial Corridors between India's big metropolitan cities in India. These include the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, the Chennai-Bangalore Industrial Corridor and the Bangalore-Mumbai Economic Corridor. It is hoped that many industrial and commercial centres will be recreated as 'Smart Cities' along these corridors. A few Smart Cities have already come up across the country, including Kochi Smart City, Gujarat International Finance Tec-City (GIFT) in Ahmedabad, Naya Raipur in Chhattisgarh, Lavasa in Maharashtra and Wave Infratech's 4,500-acre Smart City near New Delhi.

The 'Grand Innovation Challenge' is being launched by NITI Aayog, which involve citizens at the very first stage in creating something new for India's development. The Government strongly believes that the States, as Team India, would try involving every citizen to ensure India's progress, leaving no one behind. With a clear focus on the social sector, and India's most vulnerable sections, would seek to involve citizens in addressing challenges facing India's development. In Phase I of the Grand Innovation Challenge, it gathers citizens from the gamut of societies those who are facing challenges in India, across areas significant for the country's development and discuss issues they believe are critical for the nation to address, in order to develop its social sector. In the spirit of decentralized planning, the Government has asked people as to what are the pressing challenges India needs to work with on a priority basis. In Phase II, based on a shortlist of the urgent challenges as suggested by citizens, the Government would seek innovative solutions to address the musing appropriate technology. Through this Grand Challenge, the Government is encouraging innovation, entrepreneurship & citizen-led solutions to problems. Thus to overcome challenges, NITI Aayog would ensure the best, innovative solutions to the pressing challenges receiving full backing from the Government of India starting from funding, mentoring, technical & academic support to scaling it up across the country and absorbing them in government schemes. These solutions should be specifically designed for India, is made in India, and adopted by Government of India to radically develop India.

The Government is busy undermining the autonomy of institutions. With the RSS-driven Siksha Bachao Andolan Samiti and Vidya Bharti, becoming the guiding force behind the Governmental efforts to reform the education system and curriculum.

India has been facing a dual challenge of paucity of highly trained workforce, as well as non-employability of large sections of the conventionally educated youth, who possess little or no job skills nowadays. As India moves progressively towards becoming a global knowledge economy, it must meet the rising aspirations of its youth. This can partially be achieved through focus on advancement of skills that are relevant to the emerging economic environment. The challenge pertains not only to a huge quantitative expansion of the facilities for skill training, but also to the equally important task of raising their quality. National Policy for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship 2015 supersedes the policy of 2009. The primary objective of this policy is to meet the challenge of skilling at scale with speed, standard (quality) and sustainability. The policy links skill development to improved employability and productivity in paving the way forward for inclusive growth in the country. The skill strategy is complemented by specific efforts to promote entrepreneurship in order to create ample opportunities for the skilled workforce. Job creation for skilled youth is also a major challenge before the nation. The face of entrepreneurship is also changing across the world. The International Labor Organization (ILO) reports that globally, almost 13% of young people (close to 75 million people) are unemployed. This phenomenon is particularly evident in regions where wage employment is difficult to obtain. Access to funding remains the primary obstacle for entrepreneurs from all markets. The public and private sector each have an important role to play in creating entrepreneurial ecosystems essential for human development in India.

Counseling and guidance have emerged as the biggest challenges in the skill space today. Good counseling is useful for creating aspiration; reduce the attrition rates during training and employment by helping candidates make informed choices. The vast network of existing Post Offices and Citizen Service Centres (CSCs) would be leveraged with industry support to create such a support system for the youth. Furthermore, the network of 2.85 lakh Youth Clubs/Mahila Mandals of Nehru Yuva Kendras with presence in 623 districts would also facilitate in providing counseling and guidance to the youth of the country about various skilling programmes and opportunities. Similarly, the cross-country network of volunteers of Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan and National Service Scheme will also be utilized to create awareness and build a favorable pro-skilling environment amongst the youth in the country. These agencies will be provided with necessary brochures and other material for dissemination of required information through its volunteers amongst the target audience.

The Government of India dreamt about e-governance and mobile governance where all important Government services are available on the mobile phone. Digital India envisages high speed digital highways, quality education and digital learning and e-healthcare that percolate right up to the remotest regions of the country. Farmers are empowered with Real-time Information which would connect them with global markets. Mobile and e-Banking ensures financial inclusion and e-Commerce drives Entrepreneurship.

Renewable energy is another area of priority. His COP21 interventions skew the numbers, but the Prime Minister Narendra Modi has consistently talked about India's renewable energy capacities (175 GW by 2022). He has traversed several countries including Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Japan, Australia, Russia and the United States, clearly focusing on India's rising energy needs, given its own challenges with energy production. In the United States, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has pitched for a multi-billion dollar push for India's renewable power sector. A \$1 billion loan agreement has been signed between the U.S. Ex-Im Bank and Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency (IREDA), which will fund sourcing of U.S. equipment for solar projects in India. Meanwhile, China is also developing Nepal's energy industry and securing its own supply. In the neighboring Bhutan which he chose for his first official overseas trip; Prime Minister Narendra Modi pushed

for speeding up hydroelectric plants under construction there with government funding. Three projects totaling 3,000 MW are underway and will be operational in the coming two-three years. Electricity is Bhutan's single largest export and India its largest recipient. As a matter of fact, Bhutan has been sandwiched between India and China in the Himalayas has huge untapped potential to generate at least another 24,000 MW of hydropower, making it key to India's energy security. Steps have been taken to deregulate diesel prices. The competition is also expected to foster greater efficiency in oil companies benefitting the consumers.

Strengthening Bilateral Relations

There is no denying that India has a long way to go before fulfilling the promise of becoming a leading global power. India's caution on global issues since the early 1990s seemed sensible given the compulsion to reconstitute India's foreign policy after the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The shambolic state of the Indian economy at the turn of the 1990s reinforced that proposition.

The Government's Foreign Policy agenda is more or less the continuation of past policy but the style, shade, emphasis and pace has changed dramatically. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made 61 interventions on foreign policy, in the form of speeches, press releases, media interactions, and community receptions. Nearly a quarter of these were delivered in India and the rest on visits abroad. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Foreign policy actions are: 'Neighborhood First', 'Act East' and now to, 'Look West'. There is a growing demand that India would make more contributions to the maintenance of the regional order in Asia. A quarter century ago, New Delhi's aim was to win membership of major regional organizations in Asia. It now faces the challenge of overcoming its image as a dawdler in Asia's regional integration, and the perception of India as a reluctant regional power. With India becoming the world's fastest-growing economy, New Delhi would take larger responsibilities to facilitate global economic revival and strengthen regional economic integration. The old order is breaking down at the global level as well as different regions. The world is yet to recover from the effects of the global economic crisis of 2008.

In November 2015 the Prime Minister of India joined the COP21 Summit in Paris, where he, along with President Hollande of France deliberated on climate change, unveiled the International Solar Alliance, a forum to harness energy of the Sun to light homes.

The choice of Bhutan as the Prime Minister's first foreign trip and India's gift of SAARC Satellite to Neighbors for the use of space technology are actions worth noting. New Delhi has been a little too 'proactive,' with its unilateral incursion into Myanmar in a cross-border raid and Indo-Pak policy has also appeared rudderless and resolute. But Prime Minister has re-iterated many a time that the problem of Kashmir is a bilateral issue and any third party intervention would not be welcomed. The new 10 points bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan replacing the previously mooted 8 points has added Terrorism and Religious Tourism into their new foreign policy agenda.

The Government of India saw the strategic importance of Indian Ocean Region as one of the key areas of his Foreign Policy and that every nation should join hands to ensure their maritime stability. With an eye to developing relationships at key points around the Indian Ocean - the Persian Gulf, the Malacca Strait and southern Africa, India has also been cultivating security relationship with Madagascar, Mozambique and Seychelles. India is also developing closer ties with Mauritius - the entry point to the Atlantic Ocean which is of immense geo-strategic value involving defense and trade among other things. But explaining the broader focus on oceans, the Government said that the oceans are critical for global energy security as over 60% of world's oil production moves through sea routes. He commented that oceans are lifelines of global prosperity. They present enormous economic opportunities to build our nations.

The Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi has attached great importance to strengthen ties with the Arab world. His visit to UAE in August 2015 was the first visit by an Indian Prime Minister in 34 years, enhancing India's economic partnership with the Persian Gulf region. In July 2015 Shri Narendra Modi has visited the five central Asian Nations in a visit that was seen as path breaking. These 5 countries are Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Vital agreements were signed between India and these nations in spheres like energy, trade, culture and economics. Also noteworthy here is to mention about India's enhanced partnership with her western neighbors Pakistan and Afghanistan. Also, the Prime

Minister Narendra Modi's recent visit to Tehran have boosted four main national and international road networks that would help in enhancing trade and economic ties between the two sides: Chabahar-Bandar Abbas, Chabahar-Irانشahr-Kerman, Chabahar-Irانشahr-Zahedan- Mashahd and Chabahar-Irانشahr-Zahedan-Milak (on the Afghanistan border). India would invest about \$500 million building two terminals and five cargo berths at the Iranian seaport of Chabahar.

Saudi Arabia is India's fourth largest trading partner with two-way trade at more than \$40 billion. It is also India's largest supplier of crude oil, accounting for almost one-fifth of New Delhi's imports. Nearly 3 million Indians living in Saudi Arabia, the largest expatriate community, send more than \$10 billion in remittances every year. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has attributed India's growth to its political stability as he began a two-day visit to Saudi Arabia aimed at enhancing trade and firming up security cooperation to counter terrorism. The Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi was welcomed by the governor of Riyadh when he flew into Saudi Arabia. This is the first visit to the kingdom by an Indian Prime Minister in six years. India's Persian Gulf policy has been facing 'balancing act' situations since the 1979 Iranian Revolution that had changed the basic dynamics of regional security. India, once an equally close friend of all regional powers, had to deal with several sets of balancing acts which include Iran versus Israel, Iran versus the US, Iran versus Iraq and Iran versus Saudi Arabia. From an Iranian perspective, Iran too faces the difficult situation of balancing between India and Pakistan, and between India and China. Iran has to be integrated in India's South Asia and neighborhood policy where India and Iran have unlimited opportunities to go together.

Even the President of Russia Vladimir Putin has given a strong fillip to 'special and privileged strategic partnership' in areas of defense procurement and indigenization, nuclear energy, hydrocarbon prospecting trade and economic ties.

In April 2016, the Prime Minister of India has joined the Nuclear Security Summit where he put forth a strong message on the importance of Nuclear Security at the world stage. Several world leaders including Prime Minister of Australia Tony Abbott, President Xi Jinping of People's Republic of China, President Maithripala Sirisena of Sri Lanka, President Vladimir Putin of Russia and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany have visited India and these visits have achieved breakthroughs in improving cooperation between India and these Nations. The 2015 Republic Day saw President Barack Obama visit India as the Chief Guest, is a first time in the history of India-USA relations. In August 2015, India hosted the FIPIC Summit (Forum for India-Pacific Islands Cooperation), which was attended by top leaders from the Pacific Islands. Key aspects relating to India's ties with the Pacific Islands were discussed.

During his tenure, he has managed the unprecedented feat of addressing every major multilateral grouping barring the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in which India is a member: the United Nations, the East Asia Summit (EAS), the G20 bloc, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the India-Africa Summit and the Forum for India-

Pacific Islands Cooperation. These foreign policy themes are closely connected to three initiatives that the Government of India has mooted: the Technology Facilitation Mechanism, a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, and the International Solar Alliance. The Government of India has consistently highlighted the need for India's entry into export control regimes – the

Missile Control Technology Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Nuclear Suppliers Group – indicating that India's special bilateral relationships cannot substitute for inclusive multilateral arrangements. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also highlighted the importance of securing "cyber networks" from state and non-state actors. India needs to have a dynamic and broad approach to tackle cybercrime as they are nothing but "bloodless wars" and thus strengthen cyber security within its frontiers as cyber security is intuitively related to the national security of India.

China Factor

The Sino-Indian economic ties are somewhat on the edge today. Trade has shrunk and there is no big Chinese investment plan being talked about. This is despite Chinese investment still holding major attractions for India to develop its infrastructure and manufacturing sector leading to large-scale job creation. China cannot be matched by any other country in this partnership - neither in the scale of investment India needs nor in the relevant developmental experience. Economic diplomacy has disappeared from Government of India's priorities towards China. Of course, China remains manifestly eager to accelerate economic cooperation, but it is topsy-turvy. The Government of India has instead chosen to identify with the US' rebalance strategy in Asia whose *raison d'être* is the containment of China. In provocative moves, India barged into the South China Sea dispute as if it is an aggrieved party. These strange whirling of strategies flaunted as 'Act East' policies are based on the assumption that Washington and Tokyo envisions India as 'counterweight' to China. Paradoxically speaking, both the US and Japan themselves have relationships with China and they practice robust economic diplomacy, but never took an eye off the Chinese market.

China have found that Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi has made genuine and rigorous efforts to improve market access for Chinese companies, create opportunities for Chinese capital and surplus infrastructure capacities, resolve business visa problems and so on. This has given India space. Even on "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) policy, while remaining skeptical about its overall thrust - several of its component projects make sense only as Chinese political investments and have thin commercial logic. The Government of India have shown objections against the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor going into areas that were part of undivided

Jammu & Kashmir and are at the very least internationally recognized as disputed territory. This has placed some pressure on the Chinese, who have urged the Pakistanis to "sort out" the legal status of Gilgit-Baltistan. Even India, as founder member and second-largest shareholder of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, is indirectly contributing to OBOR projects. In India's eastern periphery, there is hope that Chinese OBOR initiatives and Indian desire to enhance international connectivity for its east and northeast regions are common. The Government has always been mature and open-minded, but not instinctively hostile.

On the other hand, India's power equation is easier to comprehend. Despite dissimilar backgrounds, Prime Minister of India Narendra Modi has established a bond with President Barack Obama to resolve outstanding bilateral and multilateral issues one being China's growing influence and indulgence as a part of Asia's leading nation. However, to bolster the political and economic ties all the more a Summit, would be held between India and the US on 7th-8th of June providing greater scope in advancing their defense, nuclear and technology-related issues. The agenda is still being worked out, but his itinerary will, in all likelihood, include an address to the joint session of Congress. Ocean economy, space cooperation, cyber security and nuclear commerce are the likely issues that the top leaders would discuss.

Assessment

India as a developing economy with aspiration of the youth riding on its shoulders needs a strong, vibrant leader who can effectively usher into the elite group of nations. This is where

Prime Minister Narendra Modi fits in as a strong contender who can step up and show his charisma as a leader of the nation. The popularity of Prime Minister Narendra Modi is no longer limited to the territorial boundary of India. The idea behind all such measures and policies are to make India a global manufacturing hub for the foreign investors to make more investments in our country. If one closely look at the policies of the present NDA Government it would be clear that it has ushered fruitful results in the recent era. As far as the enactments of policies are concerned we could see that Prime Minister Narendra Modi believes in 'action than words'. Through his speeches the Government has truly displayed India's potential for economic development, corruption free government and a strong aspiring nation which acquires the support of millions across the world. The Prime Minister Narendra Modi has also mastered the art of communication to connect with the rest of the world in terms of technology facilitating one-to-one interaction with each other and every leader of the nation. Wise and correct use of technology can invariably help reach out to individuals at large and thereby can bridge the communication gap. He is a true businessman and a staunch dictator. His clear successes relate to his external diplomacy. He subsequently made his mark as a world leader to reckon with. Domestically, he made his big pitch when he talked of social issues, inclusive banking, cleanliness (Swachh Bharat) and safety of women. Since then he has been portraying himself not just as head of Government, but as an inspirational political leader trying to inject self- confidence in the people at large. Creating favorable conditions in India would also enhance India's GDP growth and a healthy trade figure. It would also likely to strengthen bilateral ties with the other nations of the world and create immense employment and self-employment opportunities for the youth in the coming years. Tourism would also create job opportunities for the youth and good infrastructure in the country would create a congenial environment around us. As a matter of fact, India needs a Prime Minister who has a well-balanced vision for India, the ability to manage complex issues of paramount national importance, prioritize between the short and the long term issues, balance different and contrary perspectives, initiative and manage constructive dialogue between different stakeholders, represent new and evolving India to the international world and come across as an political statesman par excellence.

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Moving Beyond the Anarchy Problematique? Explaining the Dynamics of Contemporary IR Through the Dominant Paradigms in IR Theory

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ABSTRACT

*The Westphalian nation-state system has been the primary unit of analysis in IR since its official inception as an autonomous academic discipline in 1919, in aftermath of the First World War. Although the first theoretical paradigm for explaining the nature of the international system-Idealism or Liberal Internationalism pioneered the process of explaining the dynamics of inter-state relations during the inter-war period, it was the ascendancy of Political Realism in the 1940s, in the backdrop of World War II that really gave birth to the **Mainstream tradition of IR Theory-The Realist-Positivist Tradition. The Positivist Tradition** is based on the unquestioned notion of inter-state anarchy which presupposes, taking cue from Hobbesian analysis, the **prevalence of anarchy** in the international system, marked by the absence of a any form of a centralized regulating authority. The Positivist tradition assumes that the states are the primary actors in a system where **anarchy is the organizing principle**, which is a pre-state, eternal, immutable condition. But, as the Cold War entered its final phase following the inception of The New Cold War in 1979(Soviet intervention in Afghanistan being the catalyst), and the emergence of several new issues in IR agenda during the 1980s such as environmental issues, gender, Non-traditional security issues led to a dramatic shift in the realm of IR Theory also. The **Post-Positivist** approaches emerged virtually as critics of the dominant Realist-Positivist discourse and tried to break the anarchy-power politics determinism and present an alternative to the merely **explanatory** approach of the positivist discourse and in the course of it, seek the path of an **emancipatory** approach that could strive to free IR from the 'clutches' of power politics. Among the important theoretical approaches that can be treated as constituents of the Post-Positivist tradition, Constructivism, Feminist approaches, Critical Theory, Post Modernist approaches, Normative Theory, Environmental/Green theory are prominent, that sought to challenge the hitherto dominant Positivist theoretical tradition by questioning the fixated and eternal and pre-state and unchangeable notion of inter-state anarchy. Although critics put up the question that whether these are theories or merely approaches that are just critical reactions against Realism, and due to significant variations among their arguments, that whether they can be clubbed together under the banner of an alternative theoretical tradition, yet the value of their alternative theoretical research needs to be analyzed. In this paper, attempt has been made to analyze **Constructivism** in details to argue whether there can be any viable alternative to the principle of anarchy on which the mainstream-positivist tradition is based.*

Key Words: *Inter-state Anarchy, Positivism, Post-Positivism, Constructivism, Agents and Structures.*

The Westphalian nation-state system has been the primary unit of analysis in IR since its official inception as an autonomous academic discipline in 1919, in aftermath of the First World War. Although the first theoretical paradigm for explaining the nature of the international system-Idealism or Liberal Internationalism pioneered the process of explaining the dynamics of inter-state relations during the inter-war period, it was the ascendancy of Political Realism in the

1940s, in the backdrop of World War II that really gave birth to the Mainstream tradition of IR Theory-The Realist-Positivist Tradition. The factors leading to the World WarII, the onset of superpower rivalry, Cold War dynamics, arms race, quest for increasing the spheres of influence, above all the dynamics of power politics, championed the process of gradual dominance of Realism as the dominant paradigm in IR theory. Realism emerged 'victorious' out of The First Great Debate in IR (Idealism vs Realism)

The Positivist Tradition is based on the unquestioned notion of inter-state anarchy which presupposes, taking cue from Hobbesian analysis, the prevalence of anarchy in the international system, marked by the absence of a any form of a centralized regulating authority. The Positivist tradition assumes that the states are the primary actors in a system where anarchy is the organizing principle, which is a pre-state, eternal, immutable condition—states are virtually born in such a condition of anarchy and can only react to such a situation. Human nature is reflected in the nature and behavioural pattern of of the states. Following Machiavelli and Hobbes, Realist discourse as spearheaded by E.H. Carr, Hans J. Morgenthau, Reinhold Neighbuhr, Stanley Hoffman, George F. Keenan etc. holds that human nature is essentially ego—centric, power hungry, self -interested- this gets reflected in the nature of the units that is, the states. States strive for security in this self-help system; security presents itself in the form of dilemma on part of the states as there is no centralized authority to regulate and distribute the same among the states(security dilemma) and is a relative concept. To apportion security, states relentlessly strive to acquire more and power to meet the end of security. How much secure a state can be is conditioned by the fact that how much secure or insecure its counterparts are in the international system. Hence the International System virtually becomes a war-of all-against all. States have high regard for the values of national security and survival while living under the anarchical international system. Realists portray national interest as defined in terms of power with less regard for moral norms. It gradually becomes a world dominated by the major powers—the key players in the game of power politics. The First phase of the Cold War could succinctly be explained by such explanatory theoretical tool designed by the Realist-Positivist paradigm.

A new turn in the Cold War was witnessed following The Cuban Missile Crisis and the onset of 'détente', as superpower confrontation now paved the way for economic, strategic cooperation, arms control agreements; hotline agreement', as well as the developments in the Middle East(oil shock), and the demand for NIEO, showcased the importance of economic factors also in IR. The Neo-Realist or Structural Realist paradigm emerged as a constructive extension of Realism. Neo-Realism goes beyond the unit-level analysis of Realism in analyzing how the structure of the international system can constrain the behaviour and actions of states and looks at power not just as an end but as a means and having both military as well as economic dimensionality. Neo-Realism harps on the notion of distribution of material capabilities across the states in the international system and treats the state-units as functionally alike but varying in concordance with their material capabilities. The Billiard Ball model(of states deadlocked in constant collision) was somewhat revised in the Neo-Realist Research programme of Waltz, Gilpin and Krasner, in asserting that states can cooperate to some extent although anarchy acts as a limiting force in the process of cementing long-term cooperation. The Neo-realist paradigm was challenged by the Pluralist and Neo-Liberal Institutional paradigm that argued how even under conditions set by anarchy, states can go in for effective and durable cooperative ventures, with institutions acting as cementing forces of cooperation as well as they showcased the importance of complex interdependence among states. Various issues on which the superpowers had to cooperate such as arms control, including nuclear non-proliferation, global economic issues, as well as the development of cold war alliances such as Sino-US -Pak nexus and India-USSR alliance could showcase the relevance of the Neo-Realist and Neo-Liberal paradigms during the 1970s.

But, as the Cold War entered its final phase following the inception of The New Cold War in 1979(Soviet intervention in Afghanistan being the catalyst), and the emergence of several new

issues in IR agenda during the 1980s such as environmental issues, gender, Non-traditional security issues led to a dramatic shift in the realm of IR Theory also. The **Post-Positivist** approaches emerged virtually as critics of the dominant Realist-Positivist discourse and tried to break the anarchy-power politics determinism and present an alternative to the merely **explanatory** approach of the positivist discourse and in the course of it, seek the path of an **emancipatory** approach that could strive to free IR from the 'clutches' of power politics. Among the important theoretical approaches that can be treated as constituents of the Post-Positivist tradition, Constructivism, Feminist approaches, Critical Theory, Post Modernist approaches, Normative Theory, Environmental/Green theory are prominent, that sought to challenge the hitherto dominant Positivist theoretical tradition by questioning the fixated and eternal and pre-state and unchangeable notion of inter-state anarchy. Although critics put up the question that whether these are theories or merely approaches that are just critical reactions against Realism, and due to significant variations among their arguments, that whether they can be clubbed together under the banner of an alternative theoretical tradition, yet the value of their alternative theoretical research needs to be analyzed. In this paper, attempt has been made to analyze **Constructivism** in details to argue whether there can be any alternative to the principle of anarchy on which the mainstream-positivist tradition is based.

Richard Ashley's seminal publication, "**The Poverty Of Neo-Realism**" published in International Organization, in 1984, may be said to have acted as a significant catalyst in the process of development of this alternative tradition in IR Theory. Ashley presented a wide-ranging and immensely influential critique of Neo-realism. Ashley began his deconstruction of neo-realism by contending that the so-far dominating theoretical paradigm in IR was an "orrery of errors", "a self-enclosed, self-affirming joining of statist, utilitarian, positivist and structuralist commitments" (Ashley 1984: 228). To Ashley, Neo-Realism suffered from the four following fallacies: Statist, Utilitarian, positivist and structuralist. Neo-Realism is so fixated on the state-as-actor model of the international system that it cannot visualize or comprehend a world populated by the non-state actors. Neo-Realism is criticized for its blindfold commitment to utilitarian perspectives regarding social order, action and institutional change (S. Chatterjee 1997: 51). Neo-Realist structuralism is inconsistent in that it tends to vacillate between two dialectical notions of structure: one structuralist and the other, atomist (S. Chatterjee 1997: 51). Neo-Realism treats states as having fixed interests and identities and thus cannot see how such interests are created, constructed and transformed by global-historical forces (R Chatterjee 2013 :29). In its theoretical design, it cannot comprehend how global-historical forces can create the very identities, interests and capacities of states. It is so committed to materialism that it constructs an artificial view of society that is completely devoid of ideas, beliefs, rules (Smidt 2012 :21).

Research 'Gaps' in the Theoretical Field of IR/Research Questions

In the 1980s, the two dominant theoretical paradigms in IR-Neo Realist and Neo-Liberal research asserted that state interests are hard wired and fixed and that the structure of the international system is conditioned only by material factors such as distribution of power, technology, geographical resources etc. This material structure constrains state behavior, Hence, ideas, values and norms cannot possibly shape state behavior.

Ashley's devastating critique could expose some of the gaps in the research field of IR theory during the second half of the 1980s. Some of the important questions that cropped may be delineated:

1. Do the states have 'fixed' interests and identities defined only in material terms?
2. Is 'anarchy' an eternal and immutable condition of the international system?
3. The structure of the international system or the units /states - which is more important?
4. What is the exact relationship between the units and the structure?

5. Human factors, cultural factors, role of ideas, beliefs, values, norms – what role do they have to play in IR?
6. Is the international system and IR a fixed nature, which is unchangeable, or the paradigm and dynamics of IR can be changed and constructed?

Inability of the dominant paradigms in explaining the emerging dynamics of IR in the 1980s, growing interest in social theory, especially Anthony Giddens' structuration theory (that explains how structures not only constrain but also constitute the actors' identities and interests), and Ashley's critique became the basis of an alternative paradigm in IR theory during the late-1980s—that became one of the most influential approaches within the Post-positivist tradition of IR Theory. It was the Constructivist paradigm in IR Theory that attempted to challenge Neo-Realist research and break the 'theoretical deterministic deadlock' of the typical Positivist-Realist tradition based on an unquestionable and eternal principle of inter-state anarchy.

In 1987, **Alexander Wendt** introduced IR scholars to the agent-structure problem and its relationship to international politics. The question, according to Wendt is: how should International Relations scholars conceptualize the relationship between agents (states) and structures (structure of the international system)? Waltz's approach, he argued, began with states, examined the aggregate properties of states capabilities to determine a structure defined by the international distribution of military power, and then posited that this structure constrains what states can do and generates patterns of inter-state behavior (Baylis and Smith 2005: 254). The problem, according to Wendt, is that Waltz fails to see how structures do more than constrain agents; they also construct or constitute the identities and interests of agents/states. Structures are also defined by ideas, norms, and rules, in other words, structures contain normative and material elements. The challenge, therefore, is to recognize that the normative structures can create agents and that agents can create and possibly transform those structures. Employing Anthony Giddens' concept of structuration, Wendt argued that an international normative structure shapes the identities and interests of states, and through their very practices and interactions, states re-create that very structure and sustain it (Barnett 2005: 255). Norms do not operate behind the back of the actors—rather actors determine what they are. Frequently actors reproduce these norms without much thought, acting reflexively as a consequence of taken-for-granted knowledge, habits and routine, yet at times they self-consciously construct new norms that might affect not only the incentives for certain behavior but also the very structure itself. Agent, in this way, might knowingly attempt to transform the structures too. (Barnett 2005: 255)

Thus, Wendt laid the foundation of The Constructivist approach in IR theory, in which **Nicholas Onuf**, **Peter Katzenstein**, **Friedrich Kratchowil** are other leading figures. Constructivism may be defined as an approach to international politics that concerns itself with the centrality of human ideas and consciousness and stresses a holistic and idealist view of structures. As Constructivists have explained world politics, they have been broadly interested in how the structure constructs the actors' identities and interests, how their interaction are organized and constrained by that very structure, and how their very interaction serves either to reproduce or transform such structures (Barnett 2005: 259).

Main Assumptions of Constructivism

The focus of constructivism is on human awareness or consciousness and its place/ role in world affairs. Like critical theorists of IR constructivists believe that there is no such external, objective social reality as such which cannot be comprehended by human beings. Constructivists hold the view that society, human relations and the world including the international system are not just natural and physical or material, they are shaped by human thoughts, ideas and beliefs. The international system does not exist on its own like the 'solar system' (Jackson and Sorenson 2003:257). According to constructivists, the international system exists as inter-subjective consciousness among

the people – it is a human creation not of a physical or material kind just of a purely intellectual and ideational kind. It is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms – which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place (Jackson and Sorenson 2003:258).. If such thoughts and ideas change the system will change as well. Culture, identities, norms, institutions are parts of the inter-subjective world that is created rather than a material objective world that is discovered. (Jackson and Sorenson 2003:258).

Every material manifestation in IR bears meaning given to it by human beings. Various manifestations in IR including cooperation, conflict, interests, power distribution, capabilities of states are subject to human interpretations (Jackson and Sorenson 2003:258).. War is made in the minds of men and it is in those minds that peace can be ensured (Jackson and Sorenson 2003:258). Cooperation and conflict are reflective of agreements and disagreements of the human mind. According to Wendt, international systemic structure, like social structures emerge through human ideas. Ideas precede matter in IR. The crux of the Constructivist research programme can be analyzed through the following analysis of Alexander Wendt, who may be treated as *a la* Morgenthau for the Realist school.

The Realist – Constructivist Debate on Anarchy / Alexander Wendt’s Conception of “Anarchy is What The States Make of it.

In his celebrated article published in the Spring issue of *International Organization* in 1992, entitled “Anarchy Is What States Make Of It: The Social Construction Of Power Politics”, Alexander Wendt has focused on the main arguments of the constructivist research programme.

1. The fundamental attitude of the constructivists is not different from the realists on the question of interstate anarchy. Wendt argues that while non – state actors, international organizations, MNCs are relatively important actors in the international system, the sovereign states still remain as its dominant political actors. In this sense, Wendt may be analysed as a ‘statist and realist’. Wendt and the constructivists are strong defenders of the anarchical inter – state system and they nowhere suggest the need for transforming the prevailing anarchical interstate system into a democratically constituted hierarchical system or a world government system. But Wendt believes that state identities and interests can be collectively transformed within an anarchical context by various factors individual, domestic, systemic, by norms, values, ideas etc.
2. Wendt and the constructivists present an alternative view regarding the constituting process of interstate anarchy – they challenge the realist – positivist agreements regarding the notion of anarchy as a pre – state, pre – existing construct which is eternal and immutable (Bandopadhyaya 2003: 46). They argue that there is no objective international world apart from the practices and institutions that states arrange among themselves – there are no such international institutions and arrangements and practices that are outside the preview of state activities and beyond regulation of the norms made by the states – even there is not state which is above such rules norms and practices. From this perspective, Wendt argues that anarchy is not an external objective reality but is a construction of the states through their mutual interaction process and then it becomes a core principle based on which their relationships are governed. States are not ‘prisoners’ of the anarchical structure of the international system – rather they constitute ‘anarchy’ which becomes the fundamental principle based on which the interstate system operates (Bandopadhyaya 2003: 46)..
3. Wendt links ideas to identities and interests of the states. The distribution of material capabilities across states is subject to the ideational causality rooted in the changing identities of states. States create a non – material structure of ideas which mutually constitute them. This structure is embedded in the very identities of states and their interests are determined

object. These identities are build up by the ideas, values, beliefs, norms of the people of the states – are a part of human activity – nothing social exists outside human activity or independent of it. Wendt portrays states as having ‘constituted’ their relations in terms of their shared ideas about what a state is and accordingly what its interests are. Identities and interests of state are not fixed and are not determined only by material factors, as the neo – realists believes states are not merely reactive to a condition of anarchy and build their relations on the basis of it. Wendt portrays states as perfectly free to create anarchy as they want to. States are not merely constructed by material factors – their identities and interests are determined by human ideas, values, norms which can be changed.

4. States are handmaidens of their own construction(Jackson and Sorenson 2003:258). Waltzian neo – realism presented a ‘static’ model of the international system. States find themselves in a situation which they themselves have created. Material interests of the states and identities are not fixed but determined by ideas, values, norms made by the human beings who are the constituents of states. As these factors change, states’ identities and interests can change and the international system also changes. Everything is in a state of flux – nothing is given or certain. Anarchy is a condition made by the states and the nations of ‘self – help’ and ‘power – politics’ are essential features of anarchy and not its institutions; ‘security dilemma’ is not an immutable condition but is a condition created by the states themselves. States do not just react to a pre – set condition of anarchy but constitute anarchy and then are subject to it. If self-help is not a constitutive feature of anarchy, it must emerge causally from processes in which anarchy plays only a permissive role.(Wendt 1992: 403)
5. Actors acquire identities-relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self-by participating in such collective meanings. Identities are inherently relational: “Identity, with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific , socially constructed world. Each person has many identities linked to institutional roles such as brother, son, teacher and citizen etc. Similarly a state may have multiple identities such as ‘sovereign’, ‘leader of the free world’, ‘imperial power’, and so on” (Wendt 1992: 397). Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a portfolio of interests that they carry around independent of social context, instead they define their interests in the process of defining situations.(Wendt 1992: 397)

Although the Constructivist research programme argued for the prevalence of anarchy as the principal factor conditioning inter-state relations, yet its unchangeable, pre-determined, immutable nature was challenged using the alternative framework that the anarchical structure of the international system is virtually a construction of the states and not merely material manifestations and wherein human ideas, beliefs, norms, rules, values have a significant constitutive value. Nothing in IR is fixed but constructed by the states in their mutual relations where human beings as the constituent element of the states and their ideas, values, beliefs have a significant role to play.

The significant contribution of the Constructivist approach is that it tried to break the anarchy-power politics deterministic deadlock of the Realist-Positivist school in analyzing that every material manifestation in IR –cooperation, conflict, allies, enemies, power, interests – bears meaning given to it by human beings. Human relations, based on inter-subjective beliefs can be both cooperative and conflictual. There can be agreements and disagreements among people that may lead to cooperation and conflict. Constructivism tries to find out the causes behind such cooperation and conflict. But Constructivist research analyzes that that conflicts or cooperation in IR are not due to material considerations alone; these are reflected through agreements or disagreements of human minds. For a constructivist, cooperation happens because people may want to achieve it. In other words, constructivists may visualize cooperation as agreements or adjustments of two minds or mindsets. For a Postivists, on the contrary, cooperation may take place due to material

advantages, such as economic benefits. A neo-realist would establish anarchy as the reality in international politics; a constructivist, on the other hand, would search the roots of anarchy in human minds. Nothing in IR is natural but created by human agency, everything is a product of conscious construction by human beings (A Chatterjee 2010: 48). Social structures, according to Wendt, are created through human ideas. There can be different, sometimes opposing, social structures in IR, but they are all dependent on human ideas. From the Constructivist viewpoint, a 'security community', like, the NATO—may be treated as a social structure created by men, as also the 'security dilemma' of states, where one country views the other as its opponent or enemy (A Chatterjee 2010: 49)..

Again, a fundamental principle of constructivist theory is that people act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have towards them. States act differently towards enemies than they do towards friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not. Anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to explain which is which. USA's military power has a different significance for Canada than for Cuba, despite their similar 'structural positions', just as British missiles have a different significance for USA than do Soviet missiles (during the Cold War) (Wendt 1992: 399). The distribution of power may always affect states' calculations, but how it does so depends on the inter-subjective understandings and expectations, on the distribution of human knowledge that constitute their conceptions of self and other. Mutual perceptions of actors are important. If the USA and Soviet Union could have decided that they are no longer enemies, the cold war may have been over-constructivist logic harps on this note. Constructivists may argue that it was USA's perception (or misperception) of Soviet Union's communist aggressionist designs, stimulated by George F Keenan's Long Telegram, that led it to design the containment policy which in fact led to onset of the Cold War rivalry—it has been explained also as 'a mirror image syndrome'. Regarding the process of the end of the Cold War, Constructivists strive to present an alternative explanation (to the Neo-Realist structural explanation) that it was not a change in the material capabilities, principally the military capabilities of the superpowers and other structural causal factors that led to the Soviet demise and precipitated the end of Cold War days, but, they attribute the same to a change in the Soviet way of thinking regarding domestic politics, economics and international affairs, spearheaded by Gorbachev's, 'New Thinking' (Glasnost Perestroika) that precipitated the process of 'collapse' of the USSR. Wendt argues 'by acting on that understanding to conciliate the West, the Gorbachev regime virtually single-handedly ended the Cold War' (Kololdzlej 2005: 286)

But Constructivist logic of 'anarchy is what the states make of it' cannot possibly be extended to explain the weakness of the United Nations and its inability to function as a World Government authority—something which could have led to a recognition of a truly regulating authority in the global order—which could possibly have been somewhat of a solution to the problem of anarchy, power politics and war (an alternative which the post-positivist tradition has been hankering after). If states are responsible (major power politics) for the 'crippling' 'undemocratic', 'oligarchic' nature of the UN, why cannot they deconstruct the same? Herein the Constructivist research programme fails to progress any further. Realist-Positivist explanatory paradigm and its timeless wisdom does prevail thereby.

Yet there can be a scope for further research in IR theory taking cue from the Constructivist research programme. An attempt has been made to explain the same at the end of this paper

If one dwells into the realm of IR Theory to explain the security dynamics in India-Pakistan relations, one may harp on the Realist-Neo-Realist chord by analyzing that Kashmir is an undeniable aspect of power struggle between the two states of India and Pakistan in an anarchial world order where there is no overarching authority and the pressures of the global hierarchical systemic order acting as a constraint on both the states. Structural constraints like nuclear proliferation across the globe and USA and China's support to Pakistan's militarization (In February 2016 US President Obama has pledged to sell fighter aircraft to Pakistan despite his earlier assurance to

India to stop military aid to Pakistan) and nuclearization process imbued India to tread the nuclear path, setting off a nuclear arms race in South Asia. Terrorism as an aspect of Pakistan's India-centric policy is aimed at indirectly boosting Pakistan's power potential in an alternative yet negative way, vis-à-vis India in 'the battle over Kashmir'. But the Realist-positivist school of IR theory somewhat fails to provide any solution to the same although explaining how the same is being sustained. If one turns to the so-called 'emancipatory' research projections of the Post-Positivist Constructivist paradigm, one can explain how the *ideas, values, interests of leaders on both sides of the border* are at least attempting to dilute the discordant spirit bolstered by cross-border terrorism from Pakistan, vis-a-vis alternative pressures from the 'terror industry' that are working to derail the same. Modi and Sharif's recent initiatives at initiating a composite dialogue process and bring back Indo-Pakistan ties somewhat back on the track can be highlighted although the Pathankot terror attacks has been acting as a vehement constraining force on the same. **Yet a question remains-can any theory of IR really theoretically address the questions of causes of terrorism in India-Pakistan relations and suggest any measures to root out the same?** The Constructivist logic of 'anarchy is what the states make of it' may not be able to research further on the *same yet out of its theoretical folding emerges the notions of identities, interests, norms, values, cultural norms, human factors*, which can be used for further theoretical research in the context of the deep-seated cultural factors, factors of exclusion, disillusionment, identity crisis of the minorities –a people-centric approach that can be utilized to dilute the causes that grow and sustain terrorism, the terrorist mindset and the terror-industry. Meagre Realist advocacy of military means cannot be a long-term solution to the problem of terrorism since it cannot remove the real causes of terrorism. Hence there remains a further scope of research in the theoretical field of IR in this aspect which can also be useful in the context of terrorism as a prime security imperative in the context of India-Pakistan relations as also of the global order, plagued by the rampages of global terrorism.

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The Changing Dynamics of Indo-Japanese Security Partnership in the Post-Cold War Era: An Overview

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ABSTRACT

In the period between World War II and the end of the Cold War, the positive popular perceptions of each other were not sufficient to prevent India and Japan joining the post- World War II community of nations with diametrically opposing political orientations. Non-alignment, peaceful coexistence and recognition of China's rightful place in the world shaped India's outlook, whereas Japan based its position on alignment, balance of power and the containment of China. In consequence, they moved slowly and cautiously with respect to each other in political and security terms; their relations remained limited to economic, commercial and cultural matters where relations progressed extremely slowly. The collapse of the Cold War structure released India from its earlier ideological inhibitions and impelled it to broaden the base of its foreign policy. Similarly Japan also crafted a new strategic policy to respond to the new challenges to its security and foreign policies, in the post-Cold War period and found India as a new partner. In the post-cold war period there has been a paradigmatic shift in India-Japan relations, including the attempt to build a mutual strategic, security and global partnership. Until recently, their interests were primarily limited to economic matters like development assistance and trade, but today they are more diversified and cover a wide range of subjects, the salient ones being counter terrorism, energy cooperation, nuclear disarmament, maritime security, UN reforms, regional community building etc. The positive trends in bilateral relations started during the tenure of Narasimha Rao and has continued under his successors – Atal Behari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh and Narendra Modi.

Keywords: *India, Japan, Security cooperation, strategic and global partnership*

Introduction

The end of the Cold War has brought about a major transformation in the security policies of most Asian countries. Many of them, were constrained by Cold War pressures for decades and they now started making appropriate policy changes in order to catch up with the rapidly changing economic and strategic situation of the region. Ideology, which had been a major determinant in the Cold War years, has now become irrelevant and in its place a variety of new elements have started to influence relations among countries. At the dawn of the 21st century the Asian giant Japan also started crafting a new strategic policy to respond to the new challenges to its security and foreign policies, in the post-Cold War period and found India as a new partner. Any study of India-Japan interaction in the post-Cold War period should take note of the critical changes that have occurred since the turn of the 1990s. Despite the prolonged period of recession during the 1990s, Japan's share in the global GNP and global trade has been considerable. It has also been a major provider of economic aid to most developing countries of Asia.¹ Even today Japan enjoys a strong clout in many of the international financial bodies like the World Bank, the

International Monetary Fund, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It has used these institutions to give resonance to its voice in international relations.

The Look East Policy

The 'Look East' policy initiated by former Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao became a driving force for India to forge closer links with Japan, China, Korea and the ASEAN countries. Though India's relations with these countries are centuries old, this historical advantage was not fully factored into their interactions. Until the Bandung Conference in 1955, India maintained high profile diplomacy in the region. However, the momentum in its relations with countries in the region tended to slow down soon after that. India's commitment to non-alignment did not always resonate favourably with many countries in East and Southeast Asia. The Gulf War of 1990-91 and the fall of the Soviet Union hit the Indian economy so badly that New Delhi had to look for alternative regions with potential for trade and investment. Unfortunately, its own immediate neighbourhood South Asia had little to offer by way of investment and trade. On the other hand, the focus of global attention was shifting to East Asia as a major growth centre. During the initial phase of the 'Look East' policy, India's focus was on ASEAN countries, but soon it realized that the long term goal of the policy would be best served by fostering close economic ties with Japan, Korea and China as well. In June 1992, Narasimha Rao visited Japan in pursuance of his 'eastern drive.' He and his Japanese counterpart, Kiichi Miyazawa, recognized that the new emerging world order provided them with a unique opportunity to deepen their bilateral relations and that they 'must cooperate in restructuring international relations in a manner that permits global and regional issues to be tackled both effectively and in a more democratic international environment.' The 'Look East' policy bore fruit in 1994 when India became a full-fledged dialogue partner of ASEAN. Having joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996, India takes a keen interest in its deliberations. India also participates in the ASEAN +1 annual meeting. In 2005, India became a member of the East Asian Summit (EAS) mainly due to the initiative taken by Japan. Prior to the formation of the EAS, China had made it clear that it would like to limit the summit membership only to ASEAN+3 countries. The absence of the US from the EAS impelled Japan to desperately look for other options to balance China and, despite Beijing's stiff resistance, it succeeded in broadening the forum's membership by including India, Australia and New Zealand, provided they fulfilled the criteria earlier laid down by ASEAN itself.²

India's Nuclear Tests of 1998 and its Impact on Indo-Japanese Relations

Indo-Japanese relations suffered serious setback following India's nuclear tests in May 1998. Tokyo's decision to suspend its Official Development Assistance (ODA) and the accompanying reluctance of the Japanese business houses to invest in India led to a state of near stagnation in the bilateral relations that had lasted for about three years. This was an unfortunate phase in the post-Cold War bilateral partnership. Many in India and Japan felt at that time that the measures taken by the Japanese Government under Ryutaro Hashimoto were too harsh. Japan was not content with just suspending economic aid; it almost spearheaded a campaign against India at several international forums, including the G-8 Summit held in Birmingham in May 1998, the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (June 1998), the UN Security Council (June 1998) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (July 1998). Tokyo co-sponsored a resolution in the UN Security Council that exhorted both India and Pakistan to stop their nuclear race and join the international regime for non-proliferation. The resolution made a specific reference to the strained relations between India and Pakistan and called upon them to find mutually acceptable solutions to bilateral issues, including Kashmir. Japan also insisted on India's commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as a condition for resuming ODA loans.³

While India understood Japan's sensitivities on the nuclear issue, because of its tragic Hiroshima and Nagasaki experiences, it was nevertheless disappointed by Tokyo's failure to appreciate

India's serious security dilemma. Unlike Japan, India did not enjoy the benefits of a nuclear umbrella provided by an outside power. But what were the reasons for Prime Minister Hashimoto to adopt such a 'harsh posture' against India? A close examination of Japan's overreaction would reveal certain domestic compulsions that the Hashimoto Government encountered at that time. First and foremost, the Government was very much down on the popularity chart because of its ineffective handling of the economy in the wake of one of the longest recessions in post-war history. The banking system witnessed serious crises with several financial scandals being exposed. Further, Hashimoto had to face a crucial Upper House election in July 1998 and his continuance in office was linked to the outcome of the polls. He had to use all the tools available to him to strengthen his image before the eyes of the electorate. At a time when public criticism of Japan's ODA policy was mounting, he had to demonstrate his concern that the official loans were extended strictly in accordance with the 'conditionalities' mentioned in the 1992 ODA Charter. He also wanted to project himself as an exponent of nuclear non-proliferation by seeking to play a larger than life role in some global forums. Above all, Japan was keen to preserve the prevailing global nuclear order and it considered India's action as a threat to the stability of that order, as it could encourage more countries to develop nuclear weapon programmes.⁴

During 1998-2000 when ODA, the core element of the partnership, remained suspended, it virtually affected the whole gamut of bilateral ties. Both countries understood that in order to make the partnership vibrant and strong, it should rest on a more solid foundation that would include issues like security, political and cultural relations. Japan understood that there was a limit to the use of ODA as an instrument of exerting pressure for obtaining certain political ends. As India's economy was making impressive strides, the suspension of Japan's annual ODA did not have much impact. In fact, Tokyo's action did not translate into any tangible political results even in the case of Pakistan. Lastly, a new thinking was slowly gaining ground in India that the time had come for India to graduate to the next stage, that is, to build a bilateral partnership based more on private investment than on ODA.⁵

Relations during Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his Japanese Counterpart Yoshiro Mori

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori undertook an official visit to India in August 2000 and met his Indian counterpart Atal Behari Vajpayee and both the leaders set the ball rolling for Indo-Japanese relations in 2000 with the call for 'global partnership.'⁶ Showing a great vision for the future, Mori took the initiative to redefine the contours of the bilateral partnership. He cautioned that both India and Japan, despite their high profile roles in global politics, were inescapably embroiled in their narrow bilateral problems and called upon both countries to build a global partnership that would address a wide spectrum of issues such as nuclear disarmament, structural reform of the United Nations (UN), counter terrorism, maritime security and energy cooperation. Under the slogan of global partnership, he believed, both India and Japan could contribute substantially towards the resolution of several global and regional issues. When Mori mooted the idea of global partnership, what he really wanted was to redefine the bilateral relations in the light of the rapidly shifting geo-political landscape of Asia as well as the world. Their relations, he stressed, should rest on a broad and solid foundation manifesting their economic and security commonalities and the high stakes that they together have in the shaping of a new regional and global order. It is necessary to further probe the circumstances that compelled Mori to make his proposal for a global partnership with India. After the end of the Cold War, Japan, a diplomatic beneficiary of the Cold War, took a fairly long time to adjust itself to the unfolding new geo-strategic realities. During the 1990s, there was considerable misunderstanding in Japan on President Bill Clinton's overtures to China and many Japanese leaders wondered whether it would be wise for Japan to continue to depend solely on its alliance with the United States. This scepticism was further deepened at the time of the currency crisis in 1997-98 in Southeast Asia. During the crisis,

Japan's proposal to create an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) with a capital of US \$10 billion for assisting the countries affected by the crisis was turned down by the US, as it did not entertain a prominent role for Japan in the region. It is relevant in this context to note that Japan at the same time was promoting ASEAN+3, a new institutional mechanism that would bring greater coordination with China and South Korea and link it up with ASEAN countries. All these developments indicated Japan's anxiety to increase its diplomatic options outside the ambit of US-Japan alliance. It is in this backdrop of Japan's quest for seeking a broader Asian arena to safeguard its own interests that Mori's call for a global partnership-between India and Japan was made. The beginning of this trend goes back to January 2000, when India's Defence Minister George Fernandez visited Tokyo to initiate a new defence dialogue. Following a series of meetings with Japanese leaders, he observed that 'after fifty years of aloofness, India and Japan have decided on a security and defence related dialogue on a regular basis.'⁷

Following Mori's enunciation of the concept of global partnership in August 2000, the strategic factor in the bilateral relations came to be strongly stressed. In July 2001, the first comprehensive bilateral security dialogue was held in Tokyo to discuss security and defence policies, the Asian security environment and nuclear non-proliferation. The dialogue was institutionalized as an annual event. This was followed by greater military-to-military cooperation between the two countries. Japan's participation in the International Fleet Review held in Mumbai in February 2001 was an important event followed by the visit of a Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) squadron to Chennai in May 2001. Such mutual visits have been taking place regularly since then, in addition to exchange of visits by service chiefs. This new emphasis on security was welcomed by India's Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and his Japanese counterpart Junichiro Koizumi, who in their joint communiqué on 10th December, 2001 expressed their satisfaction at the outcomes of the bilateral Comprehensive Security Dialogue and military-to-military consultations, which were both held in July 2001. Emphasizing the importance of holding such dialogues, they also set up another mechanism on counter-terrorism within the bilateral security framework.⁸ That the security factor was assuming greater salience within the official circles in Japan became clear when Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi stated in January 2003 that 'achieving ever closer cooperation on the security and defence front is crucial for Japan and India.' The momentum for an intensified dialogue on security was kept up at the talks between Shigeru Ishiba, Japan's Director General of the Defence Agency and George Fernandez in New Delhi in May 2003. This reflected Japan's increasing interest in forging a new strategic partnership with India.⁹

Manmohan Singh-Koizumi Joint Statement

The idea of global partnership received a fresh impetus when Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited India in April 2005. The Manmohan Singh-Koizumi Joint Statement was issued on 28th April, 2005 and it contained the 8-point initiatives giving a new direction to the bilateral relations. This laid a solid foundation to realize the strategic partnership by developing a well-structured framework for security dialogue and cooperation between the two. Both strove to achieve this at bilateral, regional and global levels. This demonstrated that bilateral ties had assumed a wider dimension and issues affecting both should be dealt with comprehensively. The visit made by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi was a landmark that set in motion a process by which the Prime Ministers of the two countries would meet annually in either of the countries. The joint statement contained an eight-point agenda which provided a new direction to the bilateral relations. One of its objectives was to develop a well-structured framework for security dialogue and cooperation between the two countries. It was agreed that both countries would pursue their partnership at three levels. Bilaterally, they would strive to strengthen the prevailing political and economic links. At the regional level, they would promote peace and security in Asia by contributing to regional cooperation in such areas as maritime security and energy self

sufficiency At the global level, both would cooperate in areas such as UN reforms, nuclear disarmament, counter terrorism and environment.¹⁰

The second summit was held in Tokyo in December 2006 when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met his new Japanese counterpart Shinzo Abe. Their joint statement entitled 'Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global Partnership' constitutes a long and detailed roadmap for building a multilayered network of bilateral relations. Broadly, it proposed that following actions be taken: a) holding annual summit meetings between the top leaders of the two countries; b) institutionalizing strategic dialogue at the level of foreign ministers; c) pursuing negotiations for the conclusion of a bilateral economic partnership/ agreement; d) establishment of a business leaders forum; e) cooperation in the field of science and technology; f) encouragement of people-to-people exchanges; g) cooperation in multilateral platforms like the UN, SAARC, EAS and ARF and; h) cooperation in areas like energy, environment and global trade.¹¹

Shinzo Abe's Initiative for Quadrilateral Cooperation

The third summit was held in New Delhi in August 2007 when Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in an effort to accelerate the pace of the partnership, articulated a broader vision of Asia, outlining the roles of the two countries to ensure peace and security in Asia. Prime Minister Abe broached the proposal for working out a value-based quadrilateral (Quad) understanding between Japan, the US, India and Australia for consolidating peace in Asia. Though, subsequently, his idea generated a great deal of debate, it failed to take off because of the deep suspicion expressed by Beijing to the effect that the proposal was hostile to China. In fact, even in May 2007, when the officials of the four countries met on the sidelines of the ARF security policy meeting to conduct exploratory talks on the Quad, China registered its strong protest. The proposal finally failed because neither India nor the US, or for that matter Australia, under the then newly elected Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, showed any interest in the proposal. In Japan itself, Abe had to resign rather abruptly due to a combination of political and health reasons and the new Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, showed no inclination to pursue the subject. On the contrary, he went on to build new bridges of understanding with China.¹²

American Interest in Trilateral Understanding

The US has been evincing considerable interest in developing close security understanding with Japan and India because of their many common interests and concerns, including the security of the sea-lanes, counter terrorism and energy security. The first joint maritime exercise by the US, India and Japan was held in April 2007 in the Pacific Ocean off the Boso Peninsula, central Japan. This was followed by a five-power joint exercise, including Australia and Singapore in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007. Earlier, in 2004-05, the US, Australia, Japan and India coordinated their relief operations following the tsunami in December 2004. Many influential groups and individuals in the US have also shown interest in the development of a new and closer security understanding between the three countries. At an official level, the joint statement of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee (2+2) held in Washington on May 2007, expressed interest in continuing to build upon the partnership with India and recognised that India's 'continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, freedom and the security of the region.'¹³ The need to draw India into a closer partnership was also supported by influential private sources. The summary report of a trilateral dialogue between the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, the Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo, and the Confederation of Indian Industry, India, after holding in-depth discussions, recommended that close trilateral relationships would serve each nation's interests and the cause of peace and stability in Asia.¹⁴ Making almost a similar recommendation, the Second Richard Armitage Report stated in 2007 that the US and Japan should strengthen their respective strategic partnerships with India and seek trilateral cooperation. It is to be noted that Japan played a positive role in supporting the Indo-US civilian

nuclear agreement at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers' Group.¹⁵

Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

A truly epoch-making development took place on 22nd October 2008, when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and his Japanese counterpart Taro Aso signed the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation.¹⁶ This is a historic document because Japan has such arrangements only with Australia and the US. Undoubtedly, it was an outcome of the continuous efforts made by the top leaders of both countries over a long period. A study of the document shows that it embodies almost all the pledges and assurances made by them in various joint statements and other official meetings since 2001.¹⁷ One significant aspect of the Declaration is the emphasis placed on the need for bilateral policy coordination in regional affairs, as well as bilateral cooperation within multilateral forums in Asia such as the EAS, ARF and the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). The Declaration essentially seeks to build on the existing tempo in defence ties, while attempting to broaden the framework with a view to influencing the emerging security architecture. In this context, it has also envisaged an action plan that would define specific measures to concretize security cooperation.¹⁸

Prime Minister Hatoyama and the Signing of the Action Plan on Security Cooperation

The fact that the Indo-Japanese partnership transcends domestic party lines in Japan was amply proved by the successful visit to India made in the last week of December 2009 by the Japanese Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, who represented a new ruling coalition headed by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Despite several economic and diplomatic challenges he faced at home soon after assuming office, he showed a great keenness to visit India before the end of the year in order to maintain 'continuity' in bilateral relations. It was unusual for a newly elected prime minister to undertake an overseas trip at such a busy time. The Japanese media almost in one voice complimented Hatoyama for his decision to visit India. Acknowledging that the strategic and global partnership had reached 'a new stage', he not only stuck to the summit meeting, but also had no hesitation in concretizing an action plan on security cooperation with India, which had been proposed by the previous Japanese government led by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).¹⁹ In the realm of security, one major outcome of Hatoyama's visit was that both countries signed an action plan to strengthen bilateral security cooperation. The Singh- Hatoyama action plan lays out a comprehensive agenda that mentions specific measures to be taken by the two countries in nine areas, including strategic and defence cooperation mechanisms, maritime security, safety of transport, cooperation at the UN, disaster management, and cooperation on disarmament and non-proliferation. Of particular significance is the decision to annually hold a comprehensive 2+2 security dialogue at the cabinet/senior official level. It is useful to note that, in March 2007, Japan and Australia had also signed a Declaration on Security Cooperation, which was given a concrete shape by an action plan in December 2009. The present Indo-Japanese Declaration on Security Cooperation is based on the Australian model with many similarities. For example, the 2+2 dialogue mechanism in the case of Australia is at the level of cabinet ministers. In addition, the India-Japan agreement is essentially bilateral in nature and does not have references to any other relationship. But, as Brahma Chellaney says, the three agreements between Japan-Australia, India-Japan and India-Australia (2009) are alike in the 'structure and even large parts of the three security agreements.'²⁰ While it is wrong to assume that these agreements in a way bring the earlier quadrilateral security proposal closer to realisation, there is no doubt that the flow of communication among these countries on strategic matters could be easier now because of these accords.

Maritime Security

As noted earlier, the India-Japan Action Plan pays considerable attention to maritime security as a critical area in the bilateral relations. Both countries share identical interests and concerns on the need to ensure the safety of the sea-lanes of communication (SLOCs) in the Indian Ocean area. Maritime security in the Indian Ocean calls for systematic efforts at multilateral levels in view of the diverse and overlapping interests of numerous countries involved. Since it will take a long time before a regional ocean regime is created, it is essential for the countries concerned to undertake such measures as would contribute to the security of the SLOCs. In this context, it is imperative for both Japan and India to jointly address several issues such as ocean piracy, maritime environment, transport of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the safety of Malacca Strait. Indo-Japanese cooperation should become a key component in the whole Indian Ocean security mechanism. Japan is a maritime nation depending on the Ocean for its basic resources and external trade. More than seventy per cent of its energy resources are transported by sea from the Middle East and any disruption to its energy supplies could seriously affect its economy. Indian Ocean security is directly linked to the well-being of the Japanese economy.²¹

With a coastline of 7,500 kilometers, India too has a vital stake in the security of the Indian Ocean. Since the end of the Cold War, India has pursued a comprehensive maritime strategy that emphasizes the development of modern ports and harbours, exploitation of marine resources, expansion of shipping, and modernization of fishing industry. Following the implementation of the UN Convention on Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS), it set up its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and went on to widen the framework of its maritime strategy. Equipped with warships, aircraft carriers, submarines and minesweepers, India has one of the strongest and most sophisticated navies in the Asia-Pacific region. India also has a highly developed Coast Guard whose main function is to protect life and property at sea against piracy and terrorism. The India-Japan Action Plan talks about strengthening cooperation between the navies and Coast Guards of the two countries. Both countries have held periodical antipiracy joint exercises in the Bay of Bengal.²²

Indian strategic thinker Vijay Shakhujia notes that 'the Japanese interest in the maritime capabilities of India was triggered with the rescuing of a Japanese freight ship *M.V. Alonda Rainbow* in November 1999 by the Indian coastguard from pirate hijackers. While appreciating the effort made by the Indian forces, the then Japanese transport minister Toshihiro Nikai wrote a letter to the Indian Defence Minister, in which he clearly stated that the Indian initiative in this regard underscored the importance of international cooperation to challenge piracy. He also hoped that such an action would be able to deter piracy acts in the region in the future.'²³ Thus cooperation in maritime security opened doors for strategic cooperation. The next year when Indian Defence Minister George Fernandez visited Tokyo he announced that both countries would hold annual high level defence consultations and noted that '...the Japanese coastguard ships and Indian vessels will conduct joint training in tackling piracy. The issue, though, is not piracy alone.'²⁴ While referring to the unresolved territorial disputes in the South China Sea region, he further stated, 'A strong India, economically and militarily well endowed, will be a very solid agent to see that the sea lanes are not disturbed and that conflict situations are contained.'²⁵

Indo-Japan relations received a boost in maritime security cooperation since the initiation of the bilateral security dialogue. As reflected in the earlier discussion, such cooperation basically included anti-piracy operations and the security of the Sea Lanes of Communications (SLOCs). While referring to the convergence of maritime interests between India and Japan, during her January 2003 visit to India, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi stated, 'Cooperative maintenance of the security of maritime traffic in the sea lanes that stretch across the Indian Ocean and the Straits of Malacca are among the security and defence issues which deserve our increased attention. Both countries share common interests and concerns regarding these issues.'²⁶ The statement suggested that Japan wanted to extend existing maritime cooperation, which it started with India

to ensure the safety of SLOCs beyond the present commitments. Indicating for the first time towards this need, former Japanese defence agency chief Shigeru Ishiba observed-'the Most important thing for this region is to have a good collaboration between Australia, the US, India and Japan. These four countries should have a candid exchange of views and then try to make a contribution to formulate rules for international society.'²⁷

These statements identical in nature were witnessed at a time when China was maximising its naval powers by constructing a military port in Gwadar in South West Pakistan. Similarly, China built a container port facility in Chittagong in Bangladesh for its naval and merchants' fleets as well as more naval and electronic intelligence-gathering facilities on islands owned by Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal.²⁸ The US Defence Department has termed the construction of these chains of ports by China as a 'string of pearls' strategy in a bid to strengthen its sea power.²⁹ This alarmed major maritime powers such as Japan, the US and Australia. Following the 2004 tsunami, India, Japan, the US, and Australia cooperated closely in the relief operations that led later to their participation in a joint naval exercise.³⁰

The five- power Malabar Naval Exercise held in the Bay of Bengal in September 2007 provoked a strong protest from China. A major challenge from now on would be the question of how to address the growing naval strength of China, and as members of the ARF, the only security forum in the region, both India and Japan should try to make it a focal point in the sphere of maritime security. Its Track II, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) could play a useful role in allaying the anxieties of China. In promoting maritime cooperation, India and Japan should carefully avoid creating an impression that it is directed against Beijing.³¹

India, though, has not shown much enthusiasm to forge an alliance with Japan or any other country to contain the emerging maritime power of China, but collaboration between Japan and India which are located east and west of China certainly would be an effective policy of caution. India's participation in joint exercises in the Bay of Bengal with ships from Japan, the US, Australia and Singapore was enough to believe that it is being drawn closer in 'containment of China strategy' though they admit that these exercises were aimed at responding to a regional disaster. At a time when India is emerging as an economic power, an initiative from India for collaboration in maritime security with Japan and Australia would prove helpful also in safeguarding its vessels ferrying in the Indian Ocean. Expectation, however, is growing in India about Japan's complementarities in naval and in other fields.³²

United Nations (UN) Reform and UN Peace Keeping Operations

United Nations reform, specially the expansion of permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC) and cooperation in UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO), is yet another issue on the bilateral agenda of both governments. From Asia both Japan and India are aspirants of acquiring a permanent seat on the UNSC. But instead of lobbying for the high table alone which could have led to some bickering both decided to join hands with other aspirants-Germany and Brazil. They formed Goup-4 to realize their UNSC aspiration. This was certainly a new push to the friendship of both countries. In 2004 they reaffirmed that 'we will work together towards realising a meaningful reform of the United Nations, including that of the Security Council, together with other Member States' and pledged to 'support each other's candidature.'³³

In 2005 the G-4 again reiterated that 'the Security Council must be reformed to represent today's global realities, not the world of 60 years ago' and demanded that 'the Security Council must be expanded in both permanent and non-permanent categories, on the basis of equitable representation, with the inclusion of both developed and developing countries'.³⁴ However, after the term of Kofi Annan as Secretary General of UN (who was one of the strong proponents of UN reform) ended, the issue has not been debated vigorously. Nonetheless the issue remains on the agenda of both governments as they keep reiterating the need for UN reform and expansion of the

Security Council. Both Japan and India reiterated their commitment in a joint statement when Prime Minister Hatoyama visited India in 2009. Both 'decided to accelerate their efforts, in close cooperation with the G4 and other like-minded countries ... to make the Security Council more representative, credible and effective for meeting the challenges of the new century'.³⁵

The other issue which is still at the level of debate among the strategic communities of both countries is a possible cooperation between the two countries in peacekeeping operations. The Japanese Diet has allowed its Special Defence Forces (SDF) to participate in peacekeeping missions in non-combat zones only. Since there are strict conditionalities on using arms, the Japanese SDF has participated in a peacekeeping mission in Samawah, Iraq under a 'security cover' provided by other nations such as Norway and Australia. India providing a similar security cover to the Japanese SDF in a peacekeeping mission could be a possibility, but only in a UN mandated mission where Indian troops are also on the ground. It would be difficult for India to undertake this responsibility in a mission which has no approval from the UN as well as the Indian parliament and public.³⁶

The Meeting Between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Japanese Premier Yoshihiko Noda

The determined effort by India and Japan to inject life into their bilateral relationship produced positive results during the meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Japanese premier Yoshihiko Noda during the sixth annual India-Japan summit held in December 2011. The meeting was a marker of the steady progress and yielded the first official confirmation since Japan's devastating tsunami-earthquake-Fukushima meltdown that the country has not shut the door on a civilian nuclear deal with India. While Mr. Noda stressed the importance of learning the right lessons from Japan's nuclear accident, it appears that negotiations on a deal to assist India develop peaceful nuclear energy will continue. His pledge of \$4.5 billion over the next five years for the development of the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, a commitment of financial assistance for two more infrastructure projects – Phase 3 of the Delhi Metro and a biodiversity conservation project in West Bengal – and his interest in sharing high-speed railway technology with India are significant. Japan's enhancement of its currency swap arrangement from \$3 billion to \$15 billion will help India better manage the rupee's slump against the dollar. This also boosted financial cooperation and economic and trade ties. The Indian side wanted more Japanese investment. For its part, Japan, which had just lifted a longstanding ban on the export of weapons, would be looking to sell defence hardware to New Delhi. Prime Minister Noda's visit capped a year of intense bilateral activity. The foreign ministers of the two countries held a strategic dialogue in October 2011, followed by talks between the defence ministers. During the first week of December 2011, India, Japan, and the United States held their first trilateral strategic dialogue. It is creditable that despite the political instability in Japan, and the scandal-induced paralysis in India, both countries managed to fit in these high-level exchanges. It is crucial that growing India-Japan ties had been viewed independently of each country's relations with China. New Delhi and Beijing were engaged in improving relations at various levels, including trade, eventually aiming to amicably resolve the boundary question. China is Japan's biggest trading partner; the two have a bilateral trade of \$340 billion that neither can afford to endanger. The fears expressed in a section of China's news media that Mr. Noda's visit was part of a 'containment strategy' aimed at Beijing were needless. The Chinese government had done well to play them down.³⁷

Reinvigorated India-Japan Relations under Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe

Prime Minister Narendra Modi's maiden five-day visit to Japan which ended on the first week of September 2014 saw the latter nation pledging financial support for building infrastructure in India. Sticking to his 'Make in India' slogan, Modi gave an open invitation to Japanese companies to consider India as a 'competitive low-cost manufacturing hub'. The meet also saw India-Japan

relations being upgraded to the level of 'Special Strategic Global Partnership'. The visit resulted in certain crucial developments in bilateral relations which are as follows:-

- a) **PM Modi's 3D mantra:** Inviting Japanese investors to 'Make in India', PM Modi said, 'There is no better place than India for Japanese investors. India is one of the most competitive markets in the world.' Addressing Japan's Nikkei Exchange, Modi said that India offers the three essential 'Ds' for businessmen to thrive namely: Democracy, Demography and Demand. 'It is important for Japan to move to low cost hubs of manufacturing.' Promising a conducive environment for investors, Modi said, 'Foreign investors need a proper environment to grow in India. We are working towards improving ease of doing business in India. There is no red tape but red carpet in India. We have eased off a lot of regulations,' Modi sought to assure.³⁸
- b) **Bullet Trains:** With Japan committing to fund bullet trains, the dream of running high-speed trains on Indian tracks is now a step closer. Modi's dream project got a big push after Japan expressed readiness to provide financial, technical and operational support to introduce bullet trains in India. The first high-speed train is expected to run between Ahmedabad and Mumbai at an estimated cost of around Rs 60,000-70,000 crores. As Japan is a pioneer in running superfast trains, the agreement is expected to help Modi achieve his dream of a bullet train for India running at a maximum of 300 km per hour.³⁹
- c) **Two Nominees of Japan in PMO's Special Team:** PM Modi announced that a special management team would be set up directly under the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) to facilitate investment proposals from Japan. The decision to include two nominees of Japan in the special management team is unprecedented and such a system of having nominees of the foreign government will happen for the first time. Modi said that the two nominees selected by Japan would also be part of the decision-making team which evaluates business proposal.⁴⁰
- 4) **'Special Strategic Global Partnership':** Japan and India have upgraded their partnership to the level of 'Special Strategic and Global Partnership' with the signing of a defence pact for regional stability and Tokyo's decision to double FDI in India. India and Japan also decided to 'upgrade' and 'strengthen' their defence cooperation as they asked officials to launch consultations to promote military equipment collaboration and accelerate discussions on modalities for the sale of Japanese US-2 amphibian aircraft. Five agreements, including defence cooperation, health, roads, women's development and clean energy, were signed. The two sides signed a Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defence during Modi's five-day visit. 'We intend to give a new thrust and direction to our defence cooperation, including collaboration in defence technology and equipment, given our shared interest in peace and stability and maritime security. We have also decided to expand our cooperation in advanced technology, science and technology, people-to-people exchanges, educational exchanges, etc,' Modi said at the joint press briefing with Abe. As part of its anti-China 'pivot', Washington has been pushing for increased trilateral cooperation between the US, India and Japan. In July 2014, Japan participated in the annual US-Indian Malabar naval exercise, from which it had withdrawn five years ago so as not to antagonize Beijing. Modi and Abe have announced that Japan's participation in Malabar will continue and that their governments will explore the possibility of holding trilateral meetings between their foreign ministers and the US secretary of state.⁴¹
- 5) **Civil Nuclear Deal Remains Elusive:** Despite last-minute negotiations, the two sides could not narrow down differences over Tokyo's insistence for a tougher safe-guard regime and 'no nuclear test' clause in the bilateral agreement. Japan wants India to guarantee not to conduct nuclear tests and more stringent inspections of its nuclear facilities to ensure that spent fuel is not diverted to make bombs. India has been insisting on self-imposed moratorium

on its tests and does not agree to Tokyo's insistence on the clause in the text of the agreement that provides for automatic termination of nuclear ties if India conducts test in future. Addressing a joint press briefing with Abe, Modi said that 'significant progress was made in the negotiations on civil nuclear cooperation and the two sides also reached better understanding of each other's positions through this discussion. Both countries agreed to instruct their negotiators to work expeditiously to conclude the negotiations at an early date for the further strengthening of the strategic partnership.' Abe commended India's efforts in the field of non-proliferation, including the affirmation that goods and technologies transferred from Japan would not be used for delivery systems for weapon of mass destruction. After the bilateral talks with Modi at the Akasaka Palace, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced his country's intention to invest 3.5 trillion yen (Rs 2.1 lakh crore) in India over the next five years. This large scale funding, which will be both public and private, will be invested on the rejuvenation of Ganga, smart cities, transport systems, skill development and next generation infrastructure among other projects. Abe and Modi also agreed to set a target to double Japan's FDI and the number of Japanese companies in India within five years as part of the 'Japan-India investment promotion partnership.' Modi promised single-window clearances and speedy, non-discriminatory decision-making.⁴²

During his Japan visit Prime Minister Narendra Modi also said the 'expansionist' ideas of the 18th century are still visible in the world – some countries 'encroach' on others, some 'enter the seas', and some 'capture other's territory'. While he did not name China, the reference to 'encroachment' and 'entry into the seas' is being interpreted as a reference to China's spats with Japan over the Senkaku Islands. Modi's Japan visit is a clear sign that India wants to revamp its 'Look East' policy. Originally initiated by P.V Narasimha Rao in the early 90s and pursued by his followers, the policy involves efforts to strengthen strategic and economic ties with Southeast Asian countries in a bid to counter the increasing regional influence of China – strategically, militarily and economically.⁴³ The Chinese government has responded cautiously to Modi's trip to Japan, just as they have to other provocative statements and actions taken by his government, including the invitation of the head of the Tibetan government-in-exile to his inauguration and a build-up of military personnel and infrastructure near the Indian-Chinese border.⁴⁴

Under conditions where the US and Japan have already inflamed China's relations with most of its neighbours and are intent on trying to harness India to their strategic drive against China, Beijing clearly calculates its best course is to offer New Delhi trade and other inducements. Chinese President Xi Jinping is reportedly preparing to offer India participation in a series of joint development projects as well as full membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Asked about a comment Modi made while in Japan that was uniformly interpreted by the western media as directed against China and in which India's Prime Minister castigated unnamed powers that are thinking of 'expanding by taking away land of another nation and going into the seas,' a Chinese foreign ministry official claimed not to know what Modi was referring to. He then recited previous statements by Modi in which Modi had declared 'China and India' to be 'strategic partners for common development' whose 'good neighbourliness and cooperation' is of 'great significance' for 'all mankind'. In a series of editorials, China's state-run *Global Times* voiced its concern and anger about the strengthening of the Indo-Japanese partnership. They first played down Modi's condemnation of 'expansionism', then warned New Delhi that 'Japan is located far from India' while 'China is a neighbour it can't move away from.' 'Sino-Indian ties,' it concluded, 'can in no way be counterbalanced by the Japan-Indian friendship.' The second *Global Times* editorial hit out at Japan. It declared, 'We need a rational Japan that behaves itself and stops serving as the pawn of the US to sabotage China's strategic interests.'⁴⁵

Meeting Between Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida

In January 2015 Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and her Japanese counterpart Fumio Kishida discussed bilateral political and security ties and agreed to further strengthen relations in accordance with the special strategic and global partnership. The two ministers reviewed various infrastructural projects including western dedicated freight corridor and high speed rail between Ahmedabad and Mumbai and considered possible projects with Japanese support in North East India and linkages with ASEAN. Swaraj, during the meeting with her Japanese counterpart, emphasized that Japan is a key partner in Prime Minister Narendra Modi's 'Make in India Initiative'. She further highlighted the special arrangements for Japanese companies and banks under Japan+ initiative that started following the Prime Minister's successful visit to Japan. Meanwhile, Kishida informed Swaraj that India is now viewed as most promising destination by Japanese companies and hoped that Abenomics and Modinomics would work together to achieve goals of doubling Japanese investments and assistance to India. Both the ministers agreed to have an early meeting in 2015 of the two plus two dialogue mechanism which had last met in 2012. They positively evaluated trilateral dialogue mechanism between India, Japan and the US and also reviewed the progress on US-2 Amphibian Aircraft. ⁴⁶

The Recent India Visit of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and its Impact on Indo-Japanese Relations

An official visit of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to India on 11th -13th December, 2015 and his talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi are said to be one of the three landmark events of the previous year, which have been shaping the political situation in the Pacific Rim with China and the United States, the two other leading world powers, playing the primary roles in the process. What really spurs affinity of the two countries is their concern over the fact that China is turning out into a global power. During the December 2015, Summit both India and Japan discussed a host of issues related to the situation currently taking shape in the Pacific Rim and in the world as a whole. Reorganization of the UN Security Council and the willingness of Japan and India to become permanent members was the main topic discussed by the parties. Upon signing a number of bilateral documents on 12th December, 2015, the Indian Prime Minister uttered a symbolic phrase that the two countries "have achieved immense progress in the areas of regional partnership and security." This notion was reflected in the Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: "Special strategic and Global Partnership working together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World". The Joint Statement lists particular measures aimed at the development of cooperation in the domains of defence and security. It also specifies regular, and not one-off (as was the case before) participation of the Japanese navy in the large-scale American- Indian naval military exercise MALABAR that has been annually conducted in the Bay of Bengal (the Indian Ocean) since 2007. In addition the document states that both countries agree on holding "dialogues and joint events" in the tripartite format with the participation of the United States. ⁴⁷

The Joint Statement also indicates the intention of both governments to sign a bilateral agreement on joint participation of nuclear projects once "some technical details, including those that have to comply with international procedures" have been reconciled. India is one of the few countries that refused to join the NPT Agreement, and it will be Japan's first partner in the nuclear cooperation. In 1998, Japan imposed economic sanctions on New Delhi for conducting nuclear tests. However Tokyo lifted the sanction in 2001 and relations between the two Asian economies have warmed since then. The two countries also decided on the need to assure the "safeguarding of the global commons in maritime space and cyber domains" and proposed "to avoid unilateral actions that could lead to tensions in the region" of the South China Sea. Signing of an agreement on the implementation of specific projects in the transport infrastructure development is one of the key

practical results of the December 2015 visit of Prime Minister Abe. The parties agreed to build a 500 km. high speed rail known as bullet trains which will connect two biggest cities in the western part of India namely Mumbai and Ahmadabad. This agreement might just be the starting point of an expanded participation of Japan in the development of Indian transport infrastructure since it is in plans of the Indian government to build six more high speed railroads.⁴⁸

Conclusion

The above study shows that Indo-Japanese ties have witnessed a paradigm shift after the establishment of strategic ties between the two countries since the post-cold war era. Unlike Chinese strategic thinkers who believe that the strengthened Indo-Japanese strategic cooperation can be aimed at containing China, the opinion among Indian strategic thinkers are diverse on the issue. The Indian strategic thinking can be divided into two broader lines, one consisting of those who think a cooperation with Japan will put China in check and help achieve power equilibrium in the region and the second consisting of those who think that China is equally important for India. As regards the ongoing strategic cooperation Brahma Chellaney, a noted strategic thinker, termed the ongoing burgeoning relationship between India and Japan as a significant milestone in building an 'Asian power equilibrium'. He notes that Japan and India are natural allies, with no negative historical legacy and no conflict of strategic interest. He observes that 'never before in history have China, India and Japan been all strong at the same time' and advises that the three powers 'need to find ways to reconcile their interests in Asia so that they can peacefully coexist and prosper.' But he opines that only 'India and Japan desire a multipolar Asia and multipolar world.' The other two have 'different playbooks: the US wants a unipolar world but a multipolar Asia; China seeks a multipolar world but a unipolar Asia'.⁴⁹

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Stepping Stones for Cross-Border Engagement: The Case of Zowkhathar-Rih

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In keeping with the larger regional goals of integration and development under the Act East Policy, it is very important to create local stake for the sustenance of the same over a long period of time.

However, if India's land connectivity with Myanmar through Mizoram is to offer the economic advantages that is expected and if the objectives of looking east to be realised, then there needs to be enabling mechanisms for the regions that are geographically going to be instruments for the realization of the policy. In the context of the development of Zowkhathar-Rih therefore, the state of Mizoram needs to be an active part of the connectivity process. This would not only lend a sufficient degree of strength to the Act East initiative, but also address the vital criticism of failing to engage a region and a people who are otherwise critical to the success of this decades old policy that is much behind schedule.

Although increased connectivity is estimated to be greatly beneficial, especially for the states of the northeast, from the information gathered during the field visit to the border town of Zowkhathar in Mizoram, it appears that because the production and export potential of Mizoram is limited, the Zowkhathar-Rih region and the State of Mizoram has limited prospects of its own growth and progress and is set to be little more than a transit region.

The best way to ensure the active involvement of Mizoram is for the local economy to be engaged so that subsequently, local stake can be explored and created. Doing this would enable mutually supporting structures that would sustain and spur the agenda of India's engagement with Southeast Asia on the one hand and on the other, the development of Mizoram in the process. While instruments for facilitating the country's links with the east of the continent are already in various stages of implementation, it is the other part of this drive that needs to be looked into. This can be done in two ways in the context of Mizoram- through tourism and services. Tourism and services are the two sectors of Mizoram which can be tapped to ensure the involvement of the state its contribution as well as advantages as part of the broader agenda of the Act East initiative. The focus of this paper will centre on how the expansion of the Zowkhathar-Rih border trade will benefit the state of Mizoram and in turn complement the objectives of India's eastward thrust.

A Brief Outline of the Present Status

The transport and trade networks that connect Mizoram with Myanmar on the one hand and on the other, with the rest of the country are part of a twofold plan. The first of which is directed at energizing trade ties on a regional and sub-regional level and the second aims at infusing life into the remote border areas by making points along the border hubs for the exchange and passage of goods and services. For Mizoram, the increased usage of the Zowkhathar border point is expected to boost economic development. However, development is best realized when the local economy has a stake in the process. This is why, there needs to be an active involvement of the state for the economic progress to happen. Mizoram can be part of this process in two ways-tourism and services.

In this scheme of things, the town of Champhai has an important role to play. Champhai lies at a distance of about 20 odd kilometers from the Indian border with Myanmar. Champhai is the oldest settlement in Myanmar. If one were to take a walk around the town, one would find that it is quite a large settlement and indeed, Champhai is the second most important town after the capital city Aizawl and is also known as the 'Fruit bowl of Mizoram'. The town in this respect is unlike many others which are located close to bordering areas because such towns generally tend to be small, without much apparent activity and visibly remote. The two primary means of livelihood are agriculture and business.

But Champhai is different. In more than one way. The locals at the town inform that the primary livelihood of the people is agriculture, followed closely by business. However, it is important to note that despite agriculture being important to the people, the state of Mizoram is not blessed with alluvial soil but with terrain that is not easy to cultivate. Hence, one would find that rice fields, are small and located in isolated patches. In addition, for decades, farmers have used *jhum* cultivation, a practice that in a short span of time leads to soil decay.

At the beginning of the 11th Five Year Plan, the area under *jhum* cultivation was 44,947 hectare which decreased to 25,826 hectare during 2011-2012 marking a 42% reduction. In addition, the Wet Rice Cultivation area has increased by 13.6% with the current amount of rice produced by the state meeting about 33% of the requirement. Oil Palm cultivation has also been encouraged with about 3700 hectares being allocated for it. The New Land Use Policy (NLUP) which aims at enabling farmers to achieve better productivity through more sustainable use of their land, and also by incorporating non-farming activities, has been very beneficial for the state. For instance, it has helped those shifting away from *jhum* cultivation to earn much more than they used to previously. Recognizing that there is potential for the development of horticulture in Mizoram, the decision to expand the area under horticulture to include an extra 20,000 hectares was taken in the as a target for the 12th Five Year Plan along with a further reduction in the area being used for *jhum* cultivation, increase the area under oil palm cultivation. Nevertheless, despite these initiatives, the agricultural potential of the region is limited.¹

Business on the other hand, on a cursory glance appears to be more promising with shops full of electronic and other consumer goods, mostly of Chinese make. This is not surprising since goods from China and other Southeast Asian nations find their way quite easily into India through the porous and largely unmanned border between India and Myanmar. Locals refer to these goods that enter from Myanmar into India (whether legally or illegally) as 'Burmathil' which translates as 'goods from Burma', no matter where the goods may have originated. The volume of legal trade is meagre compared to that of informal trade and it estimates suggest that the informal border trade benefits Myanmar greatly as most of the profits are directed in favour of the latter.



The Haat at Rih, in Myanmar

In a scenario where Zowkhathar and Champhai are left to carry on with their usual course of business, the region will amount to little more than a transit for the import and export taking place through the border point. Concerns of the large volume of informal trade, smuggling of narcotics and arms and other causes of disquiet will continue to prevail. The potential and scope of the Act East policy would, in such a situation remain limited efficacy.

With the rise in connectivity links leading to increased people to people interactions as well as an increase in trade and business, the border point of Zowkhathar-Rih is set to witness an upsurge in communications and economic traffic. And this holds a lot of potential for Mizoram to reap the benefits. Located on opposite sides of the Tiau river, there is already a seamless interaction between the peoples of on both sides with the Free Movement Regime agreement between the governments of India and Myanmar being in place. The FMR allows people to enter and move freely within 16 kms from either side of the border. Zowkhathar in fact acts as one big settlement on two sides of a river rather than settlements on an international border. Coupled with this is the ethnic similarities shared by people on the both sides of the border.

Moreover, in addition to the focus on improved and more sustainable land use, the 12th plan focuses on another key aspect that requires urgent attention. This pertains to improvement and upgradation of 1740 kms of the existing road network in the state, a 2000 crore 350 km road project to be piloted by the World Bank for strengthening road links with neighbouring countries and a 168 crore 55 km stretch to be contributed by the Asian Development Bank. The 12th plan aims at increasing the road density of the state to 40km/100 sq km. During 2012-2013 Rs. 200 crore was allocated under the Special Plan Assistance for Special Road Development. The same is however yet to be released by the Ministry of Finance. The increase in physical connectivity links would pave the way for further scope for fostering socio-economic ties.



Work Underway on the Road from Champhai to the Border at Zowkhathar

Besides the upgradation of road links on the Indian side, it is also important to have mototrable connectivity on the Myanmar side, which at present is poor. The Indian government has constructed the Tamu-Kalewa-Klaemyo road, which is popularly known as the India-Myanmar Friendship road. However, there is need for increasing the number as well as quality of roads. For instance, roads connecting Tiau-Rihdil-Falam-Kalemyo and Rihdil-Tiddim-Kalemyo are necessary to integrate communications. The Indian government is in talks with the Myanmar government for providing assistance in the construction of these roads.

Instruments of Engagement

The state of Mizoram has a lot of scope to develop its tourism potential taking advantage of the rise in the movement of people and goods that will follow as the use of the Zowkhathar-Rih border point increases. For instance, in the district of Champhai which is closest to Zowkhathar, is home to ancient monuments and relics besides its natural beauty. Wildlife sanctuaries are also found throughout the state. There are various places of tourist interest including the Murlen National Park, Lengteng Wildlife Sanctuary, and the Phawngpui Peak, to name a few. Other places of interest in Mizoram include the Bridge of Rock in Lunglei, the Vantawng Waterfalls in Serchhip, and the Mini Zoological Garden, the Mizoram State Museum and the Luangmual Handicrafts Centre in Aizawl.



Champhai, Mizoram

Besides these, the biggest and arguably the most beautiful tourist destination is the Rih Dil which lies a few km from the border on the Myanmar side. The Rih Dil and its location hold a lot of mythological and spiritual significance for the Mizos and although it is not yet fully developed as a tourist spot, plans for the same are underway. It is popularly believed that spirits of the dead pass through the lake on their way to future abode known as Mitthi Khua. The road link from Zowkhathar to Champhai, being developed by the World Bank is not yet complete, but it is motorable in its present state. With pleasant weather throughout the year and magnificent scenic beauty, tourism in the state is not yet developed to its potential. The state government is encouraging the youth with education reforms and diversification to develop soft skills. To this end, plans to set up engineering, mass communication, media studies and management institutes are underway.²² Interview of Chief Minister of Mizoram, Pu Lal Thanhawla with Namaskar.

Citation

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Soft Border, Hard Politics: Trans Border Terrorism Between the Two Bengals

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With the emergence of the Modern state, Border has become very important. Borders are creating an identity of State, acting as a Security mechanism too. From a very long time people cross boundaries and migrate for various reasons. But now because of complex international system Boundaries are not as flexible as it was once. Now if you cross the North Korean border illegally then you will get 12 years hard labour with torture. If you cross the Afghan border illegally you will get shot without warning, in case of Saudi Arabia you will be jailed. But in case of India the picture is a bit different. However, when it comes to crossing Indian borders, scenario is exactly the opposite. Illegal infiltrators, by virtue of alleged vote bank politics by certain opportunist politicians, get all sorts of support like a ration card, a passport if needed then more than one, education, voter identity card, job reservation, health care so on and so forth.

When the Rohingya Muslims of Burma, who were denied any citizenship in their own country crossed the Bangladeshi border, then the Bangladeshi government did not allow them to step in and sent them back. But when the Bangladeshi migrants come to India, the Indian state governments – as well as national at times – provides them all sort of facilities. There is a difference between the migrants who come here to escape religion based persecution (as in the case of Hindus in 1947 or 1971) and those illegal infiltrators who come here for better economic opportunities and indulge in terrorist activities in the country that provides them shelter. India has historically provided refuge to persecuted and oppressed like the Jews or the Parsis, the Tibetan and Burmese Buddhists. But if it becomes the internal and external security threat to the Indian state, then actions must be taken. Presently this issue has become one of the major challenges to the Indian strategic decision makers. Every year millions of Bangladeshi people cross the border and settle in India but at the same time there are people who are taking advantages of the porous border of India for Trans border terrorist activities.

Before we analyse it, we should understand cross border terrorism. The 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington in 2001 brought the issue of terrorism to the forefront of Western security thinking and resulted in the declaration of a 'Global War on Terror' by the George W. Bush administration.(Rogers 2008). The Americans realized to be the Frankenstein who was betrayed by its own monster, the Afghani Talibans. Terrorism is a kind of violence which can be politically, religiously or ethnically motivated. The civilians are the worst target of this sort of violence. Terrorist activities basically happen to destabilize the civil order and the government. However, terrorism is not some new phenomena; it was long there like in India we can talk about the 'thugees', band of kali. But they were more regional. Post World War II, India continued to remain a victim of actions of non-state actors with tacit support of Pakistani establishment as well as occasionally from Bangladesh government too. Presently, these violent activities are involving the civilians of several countries. Hence, they are known as the cross border terrorism. There are trans national organisations who are controlling the terrorist activities all over the world like the Al Qaeda, Talibans, Lashkar-e-

toiba etc. This paper attempts to explore the nature of cross border terrorism emanating from Bangladeshi soil and how the Indian government is prepared to handle it.

I

Presently, cross border terrorist activities has become a non-conventional security threat to South Asian region. India is the most important part of this region which has remained a victim of cross-border terrorism since independence. Pakistan's propensity for using non-state actors as proxies to fight its war goes back to 1947 and has continued to the present. Pakistan is not alone promoting these acts, "but what makes it unique and worthy of attention is the dominance of these tools and the near exclusivism of their use in its relations with India" (Chellaney 2001-2). In its first attempt to take over Kashmir by military means, Pakistan initially opted to use irregular tribesmen it had trained and equipped rather than commission its regular forces for the task. This conflict precipitated the 1947 war. As conventional wars had failed Pakistan, it turned to sub-conventional war - Terrorism. Pakistan's rationale for supporting the *mujahideen* is based on the Pakistani military's determination to pay India back for its humiliating defeat of the 1971 war and dismemberment of East Pakistan into Bangladesh. The Pro Pakistani Bangladeshi government like the regime of Ziaur Rahman and H M Ershad always provided support to these activities. This led to the cross border terrorist activities between India and Bangladesh. For better understanding of this activity we can talk about the case of West Bengal. Recent terrorist activities in West Bengal shows the borders districts Nadia, Murshidabad, Malda have become a hot bed of terrorist activities, sponsored by both Bangladeshi infiltrators and the local politicians in the border region. Here comes the strange thing how the nexus between the Bangladeshi infiltrators and the local politicians of Bengal is in even possible? The answer is simple, the Porous Border. Behind the soft border there is a hard political game and these people are the players. The tale of this soft border has its own legacy. It was the story of dividing Bengal. Once Bengal was the most geographically, economically, culturally rich region of the Indian subcontinent, the hub of anti colonial movement. It was the worst victim of the well intended plan of Lord Curzon, and later the Two Nations theory of Jinnah. Bengal got *Aazadi* which was divided, politically motivated.

The jewel of South Asia was partitioned. But unfortunately the proper implementation of this partition is till now very difficult. Because the border includes plains, mountains, rivers, wetlands, jungle terrain, agricultural lands, national parks, sanctuaries, reserve forests, large estuaries and enclaves with remarkable biological and environmental diversity. Not being fully demarcated on the ground, the boundary, in many places, cuts through rivers, mountains, *char* lands, agriculture lands, and public institutions, and has resulted in the emergence of many enclaves on the border areas. (Bharadwaj Winter 2014). Even there are people living in low lying areas of both side of borders along the rivers often move up towards the mainland during floods and these internally displaced people are often termed illegal migrants. (Bharadwaj Winter 2014). In this case, we can talk about the habitants of Sundarbans. Sundarbans region is shared by both India and Bangladesh. Demarcation of this region is very difficult. So it is very easy for the infiltrators to cross the border or sometimes they use the sea routes. Crossing the border in this area is not something new. It can be 1947, or pre 1971, people from both Bengal migrate time and then. India always welcome refugees provide them shelter and work for their welfare. The relationship between Bangladesh and India has been marked by close cooperation. The beginning was very good; the contribution of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Indian army was remarkable in the liberation of independent Bangladesh. But after the assassination of Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the advent of the military and the quasi military regime of Ziaur Rahman and H M Ershad changed the equation. The Post-1975 anti-Mujib military regimes formulated their state policy based on radical Islamisation and anti-Indianism. Resultantly, extensive migration was witnessed (Datta June 2004) and has remained a continuous process due to fear and insecurity among the Hindus. They are the worst suffering minority in both of the neighbour. According to Dr. Sanjay Bharadwaj the causes and consequences

of deprivation of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh is due to the Vested Property Act (Bharadwaj Winter 2014). Not only the Hindus but the Buddhists of Chittagong Hill Tracts, Comilla, Noakhali, Cox's Bazar and Barisal are also deprived in Bangladesh. After the emergence of the BNP the condition of these minorities became miserable.

There are some other significant factors which have paved the way for migration to India for better employment opportunities, higher wages, facilities and amenities of modern life encourage migration. (Castles Winter 2002). But for the minorities political instability and deprivation are the main factors. The BNP of Bangladesh is supported by the Jamaat-i-Islami, and the Islamic Okiyo Jote, the Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (with close links with Afghan *jihadis*), Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami Bangladesh (with close links with Al Qaeda) and, Hizbut Tohid have expanded their transnational networks, with the support of the last BNP government. ("Transnational Security: Threats to Bangladesh, Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies 8, June, 2010). Reports also suggest that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), in collaboration with the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) of Bangladesh and extremist Islamist groups, has networked and coordinates activities with insurgent groups in India's northeast and Islamist extremist elements in Bangladesh. Illegal *madarsas* in the border areas of Bangladesh has led to a potential islamization. The Al Qaeda and Taliban escapees had arrived in Bangladesh after the collapse of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. (Hussain 2010). The growth of Islamic fundamentalism and extremism was fuelled by the constant economic underdevelopment, poverty and unemployment in the country. The religious fundamentalist forces were able to use the unemployed and illegal immigrants for small incentives. In fact, Bangladesh is predominantly an agriculture-based society, with more than 40 percent of the population still living below the poverty line. Domestic factors and international Islamic actors provided a rationale for taking advantage of these poor, illiterate and unemployed youth for the promotion of Islamic fundamentalism. Bangladeshi men and women are also trafficked for commercial purposes, and as domestic servants, bonded labour and sexual workers. Burmese women are also trafficked to India via Bangladesh ("Human Trafficking & Modern-day Slavery," People's Republic of Bangladesh June 2007) There are people on both sides of the Bangladesh-India border involved in this trafficking chain.³² The main trafficking route is the Dhaka-Mumbai-Karachi-Dubai one. The spread of deadly diseases like AIDS due to drugs and sexual contact is the latest fear. (India: Country Brief: Drug Intelligence Brief January 2004).

II

Every year thousands of Bangladeshi refugees to India. Sometimes, they are simply refugees looking for safer lives and sometimes, morphed as "refugees", they are the criminals. Most of the time people from Chittagong, Dhaka, Khulna, Rajshahi, Rangpur and Sylhet cross the border and enter to the five Indian Border States West Bengal (2,216.7 km), Tripura (856 km), Meghalaya (443 km), Mizoram (318 km), and Assam (262 km). (Annual Report 2007). West Bengal shares 2,200-km porous international border with Bangladesh. West Bengal has become the den of all anti national activities functioned by the jihadist militant groups reside in the border areas. Using West Bengal's territory as a safe heaven, but why? The linkages between the internal politico-security landscape and the external environment have made the issue favourable for the insurgents. Both of the Bengal share same linguistic, social and cultural similarities so it is easy for this people to be a part of the crowd. It is easy for them to access Kolkata and Siliguri which connect the entire India. Not only that but through this border, these infiltrators have been engaged in smuggling of goods, drugs, gold, terrorism, insurgency, trafficking of human, arms and animals.

Different scholars have explained this alarming issue. For instance Anand Kumar, an associate fellow for the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis in 2012 wrote "The Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh has now expanded its operations within India and the outfit has a significant presence in West Bengal especially in districts bordering Bangladesh," he also said "JMB has established three cells in the Malda, Nadia and Murshidabad districts of West Bengal with 100 full time

operatives. These cells are being used to smuggle explosives and weapons into Bangladesh" (Venkatramakrishnan 2014). Bangladeshi human right activist Shahriar Kabir, said "The most alarming news that appears to us that now India has become a safe haven for the Islamic militancy and the home ground for Islamic militancy like Indian Mujahideen; they have also joined hands with Jamaat-e-Islami of Bangladesh and Pakistan," Kabir also argued at a seminar on international terrorism. "It is alarming not only for the national security of Bangladesh but also for the regional security of South Asia." (Venkatramakrishnan 2014) The Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, in fact, has used its expertise in trafficking across the border to help facilitate a Lashkar-e-Tayyeba-led counterfeiting ring across South Asia, the report also said. According to another report, just five years ago, Indian Mujahideen (IM) co-founder Yasin Bhatkal was briefly apprehended in Kolkata (he managed to get away at the time, thanks in equal measure to an assumed identity and lack of coordination among state and central security agencies) (Bhabani 2014). It was also informed that the ammonium nitrate for the IEDs that killed 21 people in Varanasi in 2006 was bought from the Burrabazar wholesale market at Kolkata. It is also suspected that the raw material for explosives that tore through Pune's German Bakery in 2010 was given to Bhatkal in Kolkata by an IM operative native to the border district of Nadia (Bhabani 2014). Not only terrorist activities but it has also emerged as a major channel for the smuggling of fake Indian currency notes (FICN). In fact, Bhatkal was arrested in 2009 by the Kolkata Police Special Task Force for carrying FICN, while intelligence sources said the IM operative of Bangladeshi origin Zahid Hussein was involved in an FICN racket that helped fund "subversive" activities (*ibid*). In the Burdwan explosion case the two militants killed in the October 2 Burdwan explosion and their acquaintances are said to be associated with the Bangladesh-based terror group Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). One of the militants killed, Shakeel Ahmed, hailed from Bangladesh. (*ibid*) An accidental bomb blast on October 2 in Burdwan, West Bengal, and investigation so far has revealed that the accused persons and their associates were the members of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, a Bangladeshi terrorist organisation and they were preparing Improvised Explosive Devices which were being transported to Bangladesh," the agency said in a release. Investigation so far has revealed that the accused persons and their associates were the members of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, a terrorist organisation proscribed in Bangladesh and they were preparing Improvised Explosive Devices which were being transported to Bangladesh," the agency said in a release. (Venkatramakrishnan 2014) Joint mechanism should be formed with the efforts of the central and state governments. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has decided to transfer the Burdwan blast probe to the National Investigation Agency (NIA) despite reservations expressed by the West Bengal government about the case being handed over to the federal agency. The MHA transferred the case without consent from the state government by citing Section 6 (5) of the NIA Act, which states that the central government can *suomotu* direct the agency to conduct an investigation. (Bhabani 2014). In 2016 some recent incidents happened in Bengal which shows the real threats. For instance

- Malda District emerging as the "capital" of FICN, the internal security committee in West Bengal has decided to meet officials of central agencies dealing with the issue in the state. In 2015, the BSF seized INR 2,60,82,000 of FICN from the Malda border alone.
- The fake passport racket of Baguiati (Kolkata), there is emerging evidence of a possible JMB link. Sources say Bangladeshi national Hafeez Sheikh *alias* Nur Mohammad, will play a pivotal role in understanding the modus operandi of the gang. Malda is the region which is crucial because of its communal aspects. Narcotics money is at the heart of lawlessness in Malda District bordering Bangladesh. The Police say a large portion of this drug money goes into buying sophisticated weapons smuggled through the porous Bangladesh border, and running hundreds of unrecognised *madrasas* (Islamic Seminary) in the District. Border areas like Golapganj, Baliadanga, Kaliachak, Mohabbatpur, Mothabari and Danga are now the epicentre of anti-national activities, because of flourishing drug trade. the extensive

poppy cultivation is now going on in the District, The BSF in association with West Bengal Excise Department, Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) have begun destruction of poppy being cultivated close to the Indo-Bangladesh border in Kaliachak area of Malda District. Kaliachak is considered a major production centre for opium and a hub of cross-border smuggling. While narcotics are trafficked across the border to Bangladesh, FICN is received in return. This FICN is circulated from Kaliachak to the rest of the country.

- The NIA arrested a student of mechanical engineering in Durgapur in Burdwan District of West Bengal, in connection with its case against the IS. A resident of Hooghly, Ashiq Ahmed was arrested by the agency after several days of questioning.

(Source: www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/database/westbengal.htm)

The condition is becoming worst day by day. Serious actions must be taken. In the last election, there was a burning debate between the then Prime Minister candidate Narendra Modi and Chief Minister of West Bengal Mamta Banerjee. Modi in his speeches during the campaign in West Bengal accused the state government of being soft on illegal immigrants because it was looking to secure votes from ethnic and religious minorities. "You are concerned about infiltrators and not your own people ... they must go back, they are robbing the youths of India of their livelihood," Modi told the rally. (BARUAH Nov 30, 2014) There are two types of people who have come in – illegal immigrants and refugees. Those who are refugees are our family. It is the responsibility of all of India, whether Gujarat or Rajasthan to rehabilitate them. He claimed that in August 2005, during the UPA I government, Trinamool Congress supremo Mamata Banerjee had "thrown a shawl at the chair of the Speaker demanding that Bangladeshi illegal immigrants be thrown out." "You (Banerjee) had then said that Bangladeshi illegal immigrants have destroyed Bengal and that they were being brought in by the left for votes" Modi said. (DANIEL and DHAR May 4, 2014) It is basically what Modi is saying that day, Mamta said long back when she was in opposition. Although she is presently following the path of appeasement. In return Mamata Banerjee and some other political leaders have issued strong statements censuring Modi's views. While Mamata declared that she would protect and safeguard the interests of each and every infiltrator (Madhav May 13, 2014). But there is a difference between trans-border insurgents and the economic infiltrators. Providing help to the criminals are nothing but mere foolishness. Even in the most liberal countries of the European Union and in the US immigration laws clearly prohibit infiltration for economic reasons (*ibid*). Even predominantly Muslim countries like Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have in the recent past thrown out illegal immigrants, most of whom are their co-religionists coming from countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and India [*ibid*]. In the light of this global scenario on infiltrations for economic gain what recently was perfectly legitimate. For example the presence of Bangladeshis has changed the demographic character of that region and the local people of Assam have been reduced to a status of minority in certain districts. they are liable to be deported, 'Supreme court of India in its judgement added that 'the foremost duty of the central government (*is*) to protect its borders and prevent trespass by foreign nationals.' Modi too was perhaps suggesting the same. (*ibid*)

III

Illegal undocumented migration is the most important challenging issue presently for the Indian national security. Migration on a permanent or temporary basis has been one of the most important survival strategies adopted by people for centuries. Migration is changing the Indian demography, causing religious and ethnic imbalance, hampering the economic interest of people of India. It is not only political threats but socio economic security threats too. In country like India debates between the central and the state government is not something new. There are differences between Tamil Nadu and the central government for Sri Lankan issues, there are problems between Punjab and central government for Pakistan issue. The dual between Modi and Mamta is just the same

thing. Apart from debates and discussions there must be some concrete solutions for this problem. It should be the priority.

To understand how we prevent terrorism, we need to know the basic strategies of the central and the state governments. First of all it is the responsibility of the state to maintain law and order. For that the central government provides the states with financial support, training, professional help, and shared collected intelligence, but the responsibility for immediate action and follow-up for any law and order incident rests with the state police. Thus, whenever an act of violence is perpetrated in any city of India, the first to inspect the scene is the local police force of that state. However, these forces can adequately deal with crime and law and order situations, but cannot fight an armed insurgency without assistance from the Central Government. But most of the time we see a communication gap between the centre and the state government. (Asthana June 2010) The central government has intelligence agency for gathering cross-border information, like the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) – the external intelligence agency and the Intelligence Bureau (IB), a division of the Home Affairs ministry, is responsible for collecting intelligence information inside India. The Central Government has a large number of paramilitary forces like the Central Reserve Police Force, Central Industrial Security Force and the Border Security Force. These paramilitary forces work along with the state police during the terrorist attacks. After the Mumbai attacks of November 2008, the Central Government also established a National Investigation Agency (NIA) empowered to deal with terror across states without special permission from the states. It will investigate terrorist crimes and offensives. (Asthana June 2010) Despite of these mechanism most of the time we see the police forces were poorly equipped, lacked adequate physical protection and did not have appropriate surveillance capacity. There were lack of sophisticated weapons, newer technology and proper training. Since the police are the first to reach the scene of such attacks and are the first to respond, the government has become more sensitive to their needs. Modernization of the police forces is another major priority for the state and central governments. The central government has agreed under the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2007-2012) to provide financial assistance for better infrastructure, training, communications, weapons and equipment to state police, and plans to implement increased computerization of police stations and development of a countrywide criminal tracking system and databases. The central government also intends to provide resources such as closed-circuit television coverage, control rooms and helicopters for better surveillance and immediate response capabilities (SPIS 2008-9: 47, 59). India's forensic ability is very limited, efforts are being made to upgrade the forensic labs. (SPIS 2008-9:65). Networking of surveillance cameras is another area where the government needs to invest, not only domestically but also on the borders. Proximate borders and a lack of integrated border monitoring provide easy access to terrorist groups looking to infiltrate the borders. (SPIS 2008-9:50). In the Mumbai attacks we saw the infiltrators entered to India by using the sea route, exposing the vulnerability of India's coastal security system. Taking a lesson from the attacks, the coastal security scheme launched in 2005-2006 has been strengthened to avoid further attacks by the sea. "Assistance is being given for setting up 73 coastal police stations that would be equipped with 204 boats, 153 jeeps and 312 motorcycles along with computer equipment and furniture. (Asthana June 2010) Bangladesh and West Bengal also share coastal borders in the Sunderbans. Every year because of high tides, floods and the changes in river routes the border shifts and immigration from both of the side take place. Not only that but erecting fences and strengthening vigilance, deportation of illegal migrants- these way outs are there but can they prevent large-scale illegal migration from Bangladesh? The answer is no. There are so many militant camps who are so active in the border areas. Fencing can at best be a physical obstruction for easy ingress into Indian Territory. But it cannot stop a determined infiltrator. The proposal was first put forward by the Assam government in January 1965.(Bharadwaj Winter 2014)The border has 6.5 km of demarcated boundaries, spread into three sectors. First, in the Assam sector(2.5 km of Lathitila/Dhumabari); second in the West Bengal sector (1.5 km of the Berubari sector at Mouza Daikhata-56 Khudipara-Singhpara); third, in the Tripura sector (2.5km

of the Muhuririver of the Belonia sectorat Naokhali/Comilla).(Chatterjee 2012)There are also some adversely possessedexchangeable and non-exchangeable enclaves. India has 111 enclaves inBangladesh (17,258.24 acres) and Bangladesh has 51 enclaves (7,083.72acres) inside India. (Alok Kumar Gupta 2000).This facilitates easy cross-border movement. apart from that.The flows of 54 cross-borderrivers constitute approximately 1,000-km-long riverine borders.Border fencing has become one of the central components of India'smigration control strategy. The project was sanctioned (1986) into two phases: Phase I (1987-1999) and Phase II (2000-2007) whichproposed a fencing of 3,438 km. However, the work in the secondphase is still going on as the project is yet to be finished. (Annual Report, (1991-92 to 2011-12)Report 2012-13 indicates that theentire 2,762.11 km India-Bangladeshborder has been fenced. (Annual Report 2012) Not only that most of the time the BSF staffs are corrupted, they collaborate with the local politicians, allow people to enter.

The BSF (Border Security Force) and the BGB (Border Guard Bangladesh) officials should work together to solve this problem. The BSF and BGB troopers should coordinate joint patrolling in the sensitive and porous borders. In the meeting of november, 2014 it was discussed the BSF would also propose to the BGB to hold mutual cultural and sports events on both sides of the border and adjoining cities and villages as part of the confidence building measures. The official said that the BSF would also ask their BGB authorities to take effective measures to prevent attacks on BSF troopers and Indian villagers by the bordering people of Bangladesh. (IANS 2014)

Though there are enough mechanisms but the ability of the Indian government to meet these challenges has been questioned because of its stance of secularism and appeasement towards minorities, which has limited the ability of these agencies. This process of dealing with these groups has resulted in India being labelled as soft on terror. In the case of west Bengal this is very much true. India's current legislative framework for dealing with terrorist organizations and activities is the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, which allows the government to ban unlawful associations, and defines and provides punishments for terrorism related offenses. Currently this Act has declared thirty-two organizations as terrorist organizations. The Act was first amended in 2004, then later amended further under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2008. This amendment strengthens the provisions for dealing with terrorism, "both in terms of the substantive provisions pertaining to offences related to terrorism, and the procedural aspects of dealing with such offences" (Annual Report 2008-2009). The Indian government has come under severe criticism for a lack of a coherent and well-conceived strategy by the political leadership to counter terror. Political consensus has remained hard to reach in countering terror in India and that is a challenge the government needs to address with honesty and sincerity. India's political leadership must exert the will to move past bureaucratic, state-centric and party rivalries. It also needs to move beyond the electoral politics of appeasing vote bank constituencies. (Asthana June 2010) For instance Investigations also reveal involvement of local elements in planning and implementation of terrorist attacks. According to the Status Paper on Internal Security, the current strategy of these groups across the border is to:

1. Recruit and train local modules, and activate them when required
2. Maintain continuous flow of finances to sustain terrorist network
3. Supply hardware through land and sea routes
4. Target vital installations, economic infrastructure, VIP and political leaders
5. Attack soft targets like market places, mass transit systems, places of worship and Congregations
6. Provoke communal tension to create a wedge between communities (SPIS 2008-9: 43).

These document is very much true in the case of trans border terrosrism between the two Bengals. Every year there is an increasing number of the terrorist attacks because of the nexus between the local leaders of both of the borders.

There are several mechanisms still the problem remain the same. But why? When we talk about India Bangladesh relations there we can see cooperation and differences at the same time. There are several attempts made by india to solve the problem. Though India made several attempts to augment and stabilize its bilateral ties with Bangladesh, the latter is blamed for not reciprocating in the same manner rather it is alleged of indulging in hostile activities threatening India's security and territorial integrity. (Mazumdar 2011) Illegal immigration is a genuinely troublesome issue in the bilateral dynamic of India and Bangladesh, which is also negatively affecting the demographic composition of innocent civilians continue to be killed while trying to cross the border, creating tension in the border areas and resulting in frequent BDR-BSF clashes. (S. Khan 2008) Despite having problems we should not forget India has always stood by Bangladesh in times of crises. It provided aid worth US \$37 million to help Bangladesh cope with natural disasters and floods in 2007-08 and is co-operating with it to rehabilitate 10 cyclone-affected villages in the southern part of its territory. And when food prices rose during 2008, India also announced that it would export 500,000 tons of rice at a reduced price to Bangladesh, despite a ban on rice exports. (Khan 2008)

There are so many scars in the bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh, to recover them the governments of both countries have to work together. The governments have to develop a more effective border management system. The Indian government aims to set up thirteen Integrated Check Points (ICPs) at all land border entry points, and to house all regulatory agencies in a single complex equipped with modern facilities for better coordination and early response in the face of a probable attack. The government has taken up modernization of thirty-three immigration check posts, which will include immigration control software and passport reading at these ICPs (*Ibid.*).

The recent development of Indian Bangladesh relations we have to mention The Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) was another achievement which solved the land border issue. The Land Boundary Agreement (LBA) with Bangladesh has been a landmark achievement in the realm of India's diplomatic relations with SAARC neighbours. After ratification of the LBA by Parliament on June 6, 2015, the legal exchange process involving 162 enclaves (111 Bangladeshi enclaves with a total area of 17,160 acres and 51 Indian enclaves covering a gross area of 7,110 acres) has been completed by August 1, 2015. The nearly 14,000 residents of the Bangladeshi enclaves in India (since integrated territory-wise into India) have decided to stay on and become citizens as per the option given to them under the LBA. So far, however, 971 residents of the Indian enclaves in Bangladesh (since assimilated into that country) out of the nearly 37,000 staying there have chosen to repatriate to India and slightly more than 920 such persons have already arrived in India. As per the agreement, the transfer of residents was to be completed by November 30, 2015, but this timeline may have to be extended for a short period owing to local exigencies. They have been enrolled as citizens and provided Aadhar cards for availing government benefits towards their basic minimum needs. The State Government is also putting in place village road networks, electricity and water supply arrangements, and primary healthcare facilities for these persons, and many of the facilities are already in place. However, the total rehabilitation package in financial terms is still to be firmed up by the central government. This needs to be done without further delay. the Bharat-Bangladesh Enclave Exchange Coordination Committee (BBEECC), which is a civil society-based NGO. Since its formation in 1994, the BBEECC has played a significant role in projecting the problems of the enclaves and the pitiful condition of the enclave-dwellers in the public domain and before the government authorities. (Sen December 29, 2015)

One of the major initiatives in the region was made in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit in 1987, when for the first time a Regional Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism was agreed upon by member states. However, in spite of the passage of over two decades, SAARC has not made any serious effort to implement the provisions of the convention. At the 15th SAARC summit held in Colombo in 2008, leaders again took a pledge to

fight terrorism collectively, but in reality SAARC has not made any progress forward on this matter. Perhaps a lot could be attributed to the political complexities of the region, with special reference to Kashmir. However, it has been argued that most member states except Pakistan have joined hands with India in the suppression of terrorism (Singh 2002).

The 14th SAARC Summit of 2007 which was followed by reciprocal visits by the representatives from both sides bore positive implications for the rejuvenation of improved bilateral ties between the two neighbours and undoubtedly fostered mutual understanding. Bangladesh's assistance in securing a violence-free North-East India and non-hostile border in the east seemed to gain a positive inclination. To take bilateral relations forward, India must seize the opportunity to engage Sheikh Hasina on India's security concerns particularly on two fronts: end of violence in the North-East where infiltrators from Bangladesh are involved in terror operations, and a complete curb on terrorist organizations like Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islami (HuJI). India should also express its concerns about a new arms bazaar in the no-man's land near the Bangladesh-Myanmar border town of Naikhangchari, which has become home to Indian insurgent outfits like ULFA, NFT and NDFB. HuJI is known to be imparting training to these outfits. On cross border terrorism, India and Bangladesh have agreed to a joint fight. (Khan 2008)

India and Bangladesh must encourage greater political exchanges and considerable security Cooperation imperative to confront common challenges. They should always be accountable in addressing the contemporary global challenges and should devote their energies towards ensuring enduring economic convergence. Closer people to people contact through cultural harmony, educational development programmes should be encouraged. Enhancing bilateral trade and exchange of high level visits are not enough for rejuvenation of bilateral ties. There is need for continued mutual trust and understanding, otherwise the increasing weight of suspicuspicion and doubt will overshadow this much- needed partnership. (Mazumdar 2011)

As a concluding remark it must be highlighted that Prime Minister Narendra Modi's interest in developing the eastern part of India, his government should give as many concessions as possible to its eastern neighbours. India should take the lead in settling all existing irritants and disputes of its neighbouring countries. In the South Asian region India is one of emerging power. Rapid economic development, democracy, stable society etc are its features. But it has neighbours who are under developed economically, politically and socially. India's neighbours are unsecured and only insecurity unites. So with the help of transnational insurgency they are trying to destabilise the civil order of the Indian state. This time only India can help herself. India has to form a strong neighbourhood policy. It has to indulge in the developmental activities of its neighbours. There should be more financial investment, and more economic and social exchanges. India has to help the down trodden masses of its neighbours. Democracy must be restored first. It is unfortunate SAARC is one of the most failed regional organisations. In this case we have to learn from ASEAN. We should forget all differences and work together. As Prime minister Narendra Modi said recently "My vision of South Asia is same as India, *SabkaSaath, SabkaVikas*" (Singh Feb 5, 2016), we should accomplish this.

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