

JAIR

Journal of International Relations

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Preface from Chief Editor

Welcome readers and well wishers to the current issue of JAIR Journal of International Relations.

Many would perhaps agree that of late the world seems to have been caught up in cross currents of events where the domestic and the international are getting much too entangled. The phenomenon is far beyond the text- book interface we conventionally ascribe to them in a neo-realist frame of reference.

To start with, we may pick up a small instance that gave a big jolt to an old and established nation like U.K. The reference is to the Scottish implosion. That was somehow contained by political resources till now at U.K's disposal but it did send shockwaves that reached the shores of Europe as well. It clearly showed centrifugal forces getting the better of conventional bonds of solidarity. Indeed, there were apprehensions if the tide once stopped might not return again.

Attachment to an irrevocable sense of sovereignty pulls at a nation's political culture in a manner that neither helps it get at a relaxed yet viable hold in home affairs nor allows it to reach out to wider external association from which it could draw sustenance .Which is why 'Brexit' was in the air for quiet sometime . That may not have upset the EU but clearly made things difficult for the Organisation when it was bogged down itself with many untoward developments. There were already the sundry burdens of economic melt down and then came the Paris terror attack followed by unprecedented waves of uprooted families pouring from west Asia. One can see in this, as though, Europe was ready to take some moral responsibility for the West Asian tragedy, having been involved in the civil wars there in league with its Trans -Atlantic partner, the USA .Without questioning the large heartedness of the host governments, one wonders if their hospitality was stretchable for an indefinite period of time. For the war that uprooted these people shows little sign of abating once the issue became one of regime change versus regime restoration. In the process the early promises of the Arab Spring simply went astray. Indeed, the natural consequences of a civil society uprising were blocked, external powers moving in with their respective agenda that were anything but compatible. To date there is little respite for the hapless people of the region from a war that they certainly never wanted. The result is an unprecedented refugee crisis for which relief and rehabilitation could eventually become an impossible burden. To make matters worse, there lurks the fear of infiltration of undesirable elements in the guise of shelter seekers.

One would be tempted to trace the turmoil back to US intervention in Iraq early this century, which replaced political authority there to America's satisfaction but no viable political order. Instead the land became the scenario of endless violence between religious groups who had earlier managed to live in peace no matter what the former authoritarian leadership stood for. Out of the ashes of a fierce communal clash that ensued arose the new phantom called IS. IS strutting not merely West Asia but any and every vulnerable part of the world with unabated fury. This is global terrorism at its latest avatar out pacing the erstwhile Al-Qaeda and similar outfit. This new phantom does not believe in hit and run surprise attacks killing

(vi)

innocent lives off and on. Now it is open and declared war of the IS against humanity, challenging the internal politico - social integrity of many a nation. It is significant that the threat today is not directed only at the competence of the State to protect its citizens or properties or infrastructure and vital connectivities, but the very collective sense of unity, however defined, of groups of people who may or may not be mono cultural or mono ethnic and yet have been long used to stay together. Today's terrorists are out to strike at the very root of this undefinable feeling of unity. It is the national society that is in danger of being split apart. Obviously, that would also impact the many transnational points of convergence the present global order has been able to work out so far. Any particular State or even a coalition of States may not find it easy to meet the complex challenge that terrorism has managed to mount with virulence unlimited. The most that the State or States can do is to augment counter-force operations while speculatively trying to improve pre-disaster security systems. What they still cannot seriously think of doing is to cut off the lines of arms supply and flow of extorted and voluntary funds, patently because a vested interest has now grown to turn terror into good business proposition

The crux of the matter is that results would not be visible until the concerned civil societies are truly resolved to stand firmly behind their erstwhile notion of collective unity, despite any occasional misapprehensions which can easily wait to be addressed conveniently later. In the first place it will have to be a thick network between the State and the civil society agencies, taking every care that residual political antagonisms , if any, between groups within do not block the urgency of maintaining solidarity. A corollary of this is to deal with ideological debates habitually raised so often by intellectuals within the society, rather too eager to establish their "critical" stance, no matter whether that strengthens or weakens the resoluteness of the community already endangered by the worst possible attacks against itself by violent groups, home grown or otherwise. The liberal vision of society which most nations today owe to the historical experience of Europe over several centuries in the past grew in a context that has little correspondence to the contemporary negative realities of a strife torn world. Humanism which also is an integral part of liberal conviction perhaps demands more critical attention today. There is no reason why humanism would be so construed as to give comfortable space for the enemies of humanity to go freely about. The imperatives now seem to be to redefine and rework domestic solidarity where simplistic formulations like "dissidence is the essence of democracy", otherwise persuasive, will have to be tempered by the need of social solidarity which is no less a democratic value, and it urges one to stand up against forces of disintegration. National societies have emerged not to be so easily smoked out of existence just because terrorists are becoming more and more wanton in their assaults or because the States are still practising old style counter terror strategies and claiming no more than limited success.

Radharaman Chakrabarti

Author Information Guide for Publication in the JAIR Journal of International Relations

Criteria for Publication

The principal criteria for publication of papers (Articles) in **JAIR Journal of International Relations** are that they:

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- Are of outstanding importance in the field of International Relations/related social Sciences
- reach a conclusion of interest to an inter disciplinary readership.

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To reduce delays, authors should ensure that the level, length and format conform to JAIR Journal of International Relations' requirements, at submission and each revision stage. Submissions should be accompanied by a cover letter stating briefly why the conclusion is an important international advance and the author's case for the work being published in the JAIR Journal of International Relations. Authors are strongly encouraged to attempt two 100-150-word summaries, one to encapsulate the significance of the work for readers of the journal, mainly the social scientists; and the other to explain the conclusions at an understandable level for the general public.

The cover letter should also specify the number of words in the text of the paper, the number of display items (figures and tables), the number of attachments (manuscript, figures, Supplementary Information if any, supporting manuscripts), and their formats.

What happens to a submitted Article?

The first stage for a newly submitted Article is that the editorial staff considers whether to send it for peer-review. On submission, the manuscript is assigned to an editor covering the subject area, who seeks informal advice from academic advisors and editorial colleagues, and who makes this initial decision. The preliminary judgment is not a reflection on the qualitative validity of the work described, or on its importance to people in the same field. Once the decision has been made to peer-review the paper, the choice of referees is made by the editor who has been assigned the manuscript. Most papers are sent to two or three referees, but some are sent to more or, occasionally, just to one.

Format of Writing an Article

Articles are original reports whose conclusions represent a substantial advance in understanding of an important problem and have immediate, far-reaching implications. They do not normally exceed 8 pages and have no more than 50 references. (One page of undiluted text is about 1,300 words.)

Articles have a summary, separate from the main text, of up to 150 words, which does not have references, and does not contain numbers, abbreviations, acronyms or measurements unless essential. It is aimed at readers outside the discipline. This summary contains a paragraph (2-3 sentences) of basic-level introduction to the field; a brief account of the background and rationale of the work; a statement of the main conclusions (introduced by the phrase 'Here we show' or its equivalent); and finally, 2-3 sentences putting the main findings into general context so it is clear how the results described in the paper have moved the field forwards.

Articles are typically 5,000-8000 words of text

The text may contain a few short subheadings (not more than six in total) of no more than 40 characters each (less than one line of text in length). Articles typically may have not more than 5 or 6 display items (figures or tables).

The rest of the text is typically about 1,500 words long. Any discussion at the end of the text should be as succinct as possible, not repeating previous summary/introduction material, to briefly convey the general relevance of the work.

Word counts refer to the text of the paper. References, title, author list and acknowledgements do not have to be included in total word counts.

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South Asian Integration: Should We Concede Defeat?¹

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ABSTRACT

With fewer list of achievements, South Asia is regarded as one of the least integrated regions of the world. From intra-regional trade share to people-to-people contact not much has changed in South Asia despite the establishment of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in 1985. India and Pakistan, the two important constituents of South Asia are yet to learn the art of living together and are regarded as arch rivals, with both possessing nuclear weapons. South Asia is also regarded as poor performing regions in terms of human development index. While other regions (even if we ignore Europe) of the world like Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa have made remarkable stride in terms of regional integration, South Asia is still struggling to find its way. This is certainly a pessimistic situation. While acknowledging the prevalent negativity for South Asian integration in this paper an effort is made to argue that there is a hope. The paper will make theoretical argument supported by empirical evidences, for South Asian integration. The paper also argues that we are at a critical juncture and if South Asian countries remain ignorant about regional integration then there is a heavy economic cost attached to it. An effort is made in this paper to also underline the role of India in the regional integration process of South Asia. The paper will also briefly discusses relevance of regional consciousness in promoting regional integration drawing mainly from Positioning theory of regional integration.

Keywords: South Asian Integration, India, Positioning Theory.

I: Introduction

Regionalism undoubtedly has come to be regarded as one of the most important phenomenon influencing contemporary international relations. This can be inferred from the fact that practically every country of the world today is a member of at least one regional organisation. Relevance of regionalism is also accepted and endorsed by International Organizations like the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organization (WTO). There is a wider consensus that regional organizations help in promoting peace, democratization, and trade between nation-states (Fawcett, 2013). This argument for instance stands validated in the case of Europe. The European Union (EU) was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for its role in promoting peace, democracy and human rights in the region. Likewise, the African Union (AU) for the first time proposed that international community has a Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and thus incorporated it in Constitutive Act of the African Union. The UN eventually adopted the R2P in 2005. These undoubtedly are epitomes of the constructive contributions by regional organisations both at regional and international levels. In our illustration we can also include Latin America and Southeast Asia to authenticate how regionalism helps in the overall development of a region.

Coming to South Asia, the level of regional integration is dismal when measured in terms of intraregional trade, movements of people and exchange of ideas (Ahmed & Ghani, 2007). As a result South Asia is regarded as one of the least integrated regions of the world. This is despite

the fact that countries of South Asia established the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985, with a noble objective of promoting regional integration. With the pedestrian path of growth that SAARC has followed since its inception, one might consider the coming of what Ernst Haas calls the "turbulent nongrowth" for SAARC. It is a situation when an organisation faces stable or shrinking budgets, a low morale and fails to acquire new tasks in addition to the organisations participating actors being utterly confused about the goal and purpose of the organisation as a result of which they demonstrate ambiguity and lack of commitment in any negotiation (Haas, 1990). Despite the fact that the SAARC official documents elaborating its aims and objectives are excellently drafted, it fails to stimulate the process of regional integration in South Asia. Thus the question that arises is what inhibits regional integration in South Asia? Are there shortcomings at the level of institutional arrangements that preclude regional integration or is there something more to it? After three decades of the existence of SAARC one seriously needs to investigate as to what leads to its lackluster performance. Similarly, we also have to keep on discussing about the prospects of regional integration in South Asia and one such attempt is made in this paper.

II: Post-Cold War Analysis of Regionalism

The post Cold War world order witnessed a surge in regionalism. This also influenced the academic discourse on regionalism drawing attention of scholars of various disciplines. This sudden and fast turn in the study of regionalism influenced the discourse on various concepts related to regionalism. Thus, the classical, geography centric understanding of region was challenged and modified by scholars (Vayrynen, 2003). The old definition of region linked to specific spatial was challenged with regions getting identified more with the process of regional integration. Even the definition of regional integration becomes more discipline oriented bringing varied perspectives in the study of this subject. For example, an economist views regionalism as policy arrangements between states to facilitate trade while reducing the transaction costs. Robert Gilpin defined regional integration as a response of state to safeguard its interest in the era of economic uncertainty due to globalisation (Gilpin, 2001). Likewise regions are also perceived as spaces essential for security of the state. Regional security complexes as described by Buzan further strengthen conceptualization of region on the basis of security (Vayrynen, 2003). Along with economic and security imperatives, regionalism is also influenced by regional consciousness. Every individual have multiple identities that also include "supranational regional identity" and these identities are created over a period of time (Slocum & Langenhove, 2005). This brings the issue of identity into the domain of regional integration studies. Going beyond the disciplinary confines of geopolitics, issues of identity has given a new life to the study of regional integration. The change is now articulated in terms of New Regionalism. In New Regionalism, regional consciousness that is linked to regional identity is given prominence (Lack, 2006). Regional integration project is expected to bring people together in a way that they get linked with each other through a common regional identity. It is imagined that regional integration processes will lead to creation of 'region-states' which shall be possible with the people developing a common regional identity (Hettne & Soderbaum, 2002).

Interestingly, Regional Organizations also at the same time emphasize on creating regional discourse in order to gain legitimacy from the people. In other words, regional organisations willfully take programmes and projects that help in developing regional consciousness and regional identity. In case of the European Union (EU) it is project 'Europeanisation' with an objective to bring people together from the member states and to impart the notion of 'One Europe'. Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) claims to have 'one vision, one identity, one community'. Arab nationalism helped Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in its effort to regionally respond to some of the challenges. Likewise, historically countries in Latin America always supported regionalism and projected a shared regional identity. Such common identity projection has been lacking in the case of SAARC and also the member states have not shown utter keenness in

promoting regional consciousness. In this paper we are arguing how lack of regional consciousness is also a part of the problem when we are discussing about regional integration of South Asia.

III: Regional Integration Theories and South Asian Integration

While referring to South Asia, Ashis Nandy (2005) calls it as 'partly imposed' idea and argues that 'South Asia is yet to enter our consciousness' (Nandy, 2005). Even the role of SAARC in propagating the idea of South Asia has been limited. Formation of SAARC in 1985 had given a new hope to South Asia but it somehow failed to successfully carry out project and programmes of regional integration (Muni & Jetly, 2008). Although, South Asian integration does not have a very inspiring history but South Asian region has a distinct socio-cultural character that links almost all the countries of this region. Despite being endowed with myriad diversities, South Asia shares a common cultural and historical bond (Bose & Jalal, 1999). This is also true for the range of problems including poverty, unemployment, environmental issues, etc that has gripped almost every country of South Asia. These similarities and common challenges open obvious possibilities of cooperation and integration in South Asia but unfortunately this has not happened in the way it should have been.

There are other realities of South Asia that cannot be ignored while discussing issues and prospects of regional integration. South Asia is one of the fastest growing regions of the world. According to World Bank reports the economic growth in South Asia has been averaging at around 6 percent a year for over the last 20 years. This growth rate is projected to touch 7.6 percent by 2017 according to the continuing trends, which reflects some strong consumption and investments.

Interestingly this economic growth does not get reflected in the intra-regional trade of South Asia, which was around 5.31 percent in 2014 (Tripathi, 2015). Since regional economic activities have not improved, economists are now of the view that this will affect prospects of economic growth of South Asian countries in the long run. To sustain economic growth, South Asian countries need to work jointly in order to promote trade in service sector, building of regional infrastructures and in creation of better institutions. These regional efforts will induce growth supporting the regional integration (Ahmed & Ghani, 2007). Some socio-political and economic conditions on times act a catalyst for regional integration (Nye, 1965). In this regard economic growth might be considered as a required catalyst for regional integration of South Asia (Tripathi, 2013). Still till date there are lack of evidences to cheer for South Asian intra-regional trade and economic activities.

There are number of theories and approaches to study regional integration. These theories and approaches will help us to understand as what will be an appropriate method to analyse challenges associated with South Asian integration. These theories and approaches can be broadly divided into two groups – state centric and supranational. The state-centric approaches of regional integration mainly draw its basic understanding from mainstream International Relations (IR) theories. This includes both Realism and Liberalism. While both Realist and Liberal theories of IR assume that international system is anarchic and accepts the centrality of state, the both differ in their prescriptions for dealing with this anarchy. These IR theories also explain the process of regional integration within specific paradigmatic framework. Realists define regional integration as a strategy of state to effectively responds to the uncertainties that are obvious outcome of the globalisation (Gilpin, 2001). It is also supposed by Realists that participation of state in regional integration process is largely incentivized by the prospect of relative gains (Grieco, 1988). Liberals support the idea of regional integration because cooperation is necessary in order to deal with the prevailing uncertainties rising out of anarchy. Cooperation will lead to the creation of international regimes thereby influencing the notion of national interest (Keohane, 1984). Thus, Liberal school of thought endorses cooperation amongst nation-states and supports regional integration.

Unlike mainstream IR theories, there are theories of regional integration that are not primarily focused on the role of state. These are federalist theory of regional integration, functionalist and

neo-functionalism theories of regional integration. In this category we can also include positioning theory of regional integration that is mostly inspired by the constructivist approach. Federalist appeal remained limited due to its overt and strong criticism of the concept of sovereignty. Still, the European integration process drew many ideas from the federalist school of thought (Burgess, 2000). Amongst the theories of regional integration, functionalism and neo-functionalism are not only regarded as classics but they also attract sufficient attention of scholars even today. Functionalism believes that regional integration is a real possibility with cooperation in functional areas. In words of Mitrany, "spreading web of international activities and agencies in which and through which the interest and life of all nations would be gradually integrated" (Mitrany, 1966, 112). While endorsing basic arguments of functionalist theory, E.B Haas added the relevance of politics, supranational institutions and regional bureaucracy in regional integration (Haas, 1964) Functionalist theory also assumes that cooperation in functional area once started will have a spillover effect and create a section of beneficiaries in long run. This benefitted section in different states will ultimately support the regional integration projects and programmes (Lindberg, 1966).

Amongst the contemporary scholarship, Luk Van Langenhove and his colleagues at the United Nations University - Institute on Comparative Regional Integration Studies (UNU-CRIS) are working dedicatedly on the positioning theory of regional integration. Drawing from social constructivism, the positioning theory has developed the concept of "integration speak". "Integration speak how the different issues of regional integration are constructed, represented and negotiated in different sorts of discourses by different actors.....positioning theory proposes a discursive ontology according to which relevant components to be studied are speech acts, positions and storyline" (Slocum & Langenhove, 2003). Positioning theory accepts that "regions-like states- are not a given part of reality, but are the result of a process of social construction" (Slocum & Langenhove, 2003). Positioning theory is largely influenced by the constructivist approach accepting that personal experiences and social surroundings shape our understanding. For positioning theory regions are not given but constructed and there are specific role of actors.

Not so popular within the regional integration studies is the Marxist approach that regards regionalism as a means of accumulating capital at the regional level. Marxist scholars accept that integration in Europe mainly commenced for spread of state's function "so that fundamental features of capitalism remained intact. Political and economic integration are methods of providing institutional character for the expansion of capital, while social integration is the process of legitimating the new institutions" (Cocks, 1980). From political economic perspective Andrew Moravcsik also academically engaged with regional integration process of Europe. Moravcsik highlighted the role of different actors, state and supranational organizations in the regional integration of Europe (Moravcsik, 1998).

In the light of these theoretical discourses one has to situate South Asian integration process. As discussed above South Asia is presently at a critical juncture. South Asia is one of the fastest growing regions of the world in term of economic growth. South Asian economies are highly integrated with international economy but it is not the case with regional economic integration. The low intra-regional trade figures are testimony of lack of regional economic integration. The other regional problem is non-translation of economic growth into economic development. As a result South Asia continues to remain one of the least developed regions of the world. In terms of Human Development Index (HDI) that is collated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), except for Sri Lanka² no South Asian country is in list of top 100. There are several domestic, social, economic and political issues pertaining to lack of economic development in the region and it is a common character of South Asia. In this regional effort to resolve these problems could give some respite to the people of South Asia who otherwise are largely struggling with day-to-day issues of life.

There is also an issue related to regional consciousness and somehow this is also not been properly addressed in the South Asian context. Thus, we need to explore possibilities of using those mediums

and tools that should actively promote regional consciousness in South Asia. For this we should draw from positioning theory which focuses on “region speaks” and how this can be a possibility for South Asia. Thus, in this paper we will be taking issues pertaining to political economy of regional integration in South Asia and what type of role is there for India and also how regional consciousness is also important in this region. For explaining the role of regional consciousness we will draw from positioning theory.

IV: South Asian Integration: Discussing Economic Causes and Role of Regional Consciousness.

South Asia is also a region that despite several problems is full of potentials. This is a growing region economically and abundance of human resources. It is relatively a young region where one-fifth of the population of South Asia is between age of 15 and 24. According to the World Bank, “[T]his is the largest number of young people ever to transition into adulthood both in South Asia and in the world as a whole”. On one hand this kind of demographic profile is advantageous but in these circumstances, “[N]ot addressing the issues young people face today can result in adverse economic, social, and political consequences” (World Bank, 2016). This young population has their own sets of intricacies and skewed economic growth is only adding to the existing woes. This young population in South Asia requires meaningful employment that comes with proper education. To the dismay, on both fronts of youth employment and literacy South Asia is not performing well. Statistics authenticates that economic growth in the region somewhat remain limited to few sections, whereas majority of the population, particularly youth are deprived of benefits (see table 1).

Table 1: Youth Dominate Working Age Group in South Asia
(population 15-24 as percentage of population 15-59, 2001)

Country	Percentage (%)
Sri Lanka	29
Nepal	38
Pakistan	37
Bangladesh	39
India	32

Source: World Bank, [online: web] accessed on 12th February 2016, URL: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,,contentMDK:20827027~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html>

These are some old figures, although not much change is expected in the percentage due to population growth rate but for better clarity we should take some other figures. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) figures “youth unemployment stood 13 percent globally at the end of 2009 equivalent to 81 million young peoplemore than 36.4 million of these 15-24 year olds are in Asia Pacificand 15.3 million in South Asia” (International Labour Organization, 2010). There had been change in unemployment figures after the economic crisis things improved but even then the figure for South Asia remained unchanged (International Labour Organization, 2015).

South Asian countries are loosing on their demographic advantage as they are largely struggling to provide quality education to young generation. According to some estimates South Asia requires almost 200 new universities and 50000 faculty members to meet the growing demand of higher education. Proper and quality education is also necessary for generating employment in South Asia (British Council, 2014). Education and unemployment is directly related issues with the youth in this region. Quality education will help in generating employment and will support economic growth in the region. Interestingly, this demand of higher and quality education cannot be meet without regional cooperation. It will be wrong to make a prediction at this juncture but

cooperation in education sector with the involvement of both private and public players can bring essential and desired changes. Theoretically it could a functional area of cooperation because it will involve actors, institution and could have spill over effect. Regional cooperation in education sector will not stop only at the level of education it will also open prospects for regional job market and can pave the way for regional integration.

Similar to education there is a huge demand for energy especially of electricity in whole of South Asia. The recent economic growth has added more to the already burdened electric sector in South Asia. As per the World Bank report “electricity is still not available to about half of the region’s 1.5 billion population, especially in rural areas, which adversely affect the efforts to reduce poverty and create better opportunities for all” (World Bank, 2016). This is at a time when industrialization and economic growth is also putting extra demand for electricity that cannot be meet without cooperation among the South Asian countries. A good example of such cooperation is between India and Bhutan. There are hydropower projects that were established by the help of Indian government in Bhutan and India is also the main buyer of the electricity. This is a kind of example that can be replicated at the regional level and again it is a functional area of cooperation. This is right time for South Asian countries to start cooperation in electricity sector. Cooperation in this sector would cerate its own set of beneficiaries in the long run those who will support the regional integration process in South Asia. Briefly, education and electricity can be coal and steel for South Asia integration. There are other areas where regional cooperation can lead to regional integration process. These are infrastructure projects, health sector etc.

Regional consciousness does play an important role in regional integration as analysed by the positioning theory of regional integration. In the case of South Asia there is certainly a deficit of regional consciousness, which is not an ideal situation. The problems that South Asian countries have on number of issues including borders, trade, etc mars the prospect of developing the regional identity. The lack of mobility, people to people contact, lack of regional forums and groupings in South Asia are few good indicators of missing regional links. Thus, there is a need for concerted effort from the side of the South Asian governments to promote regional consciousness. In this category textbooks can be a medium through which government can promote regional consciousness. In South Asia textbooks are overly nationalized and the best example of this is Pakistani textbooks where manufactured history is presented to scuttle the objective learning. In context of South Asian textbooks one of the often-quoted example is of the Pakistani textbooks. Pakistani textbooks till 1960s shared a common history with India in its curriculum before military ruler Ayub Khan introduced changes with a purpose (Zaidi, 2009). The change in textbooks in Pakistan was also with the motive to link it closer with West Asia and project India as “other” (Ali, 2002). Pakistani textbooks are concrete example of how state is creating a different image of a country for certain political agenda. We also have to analyse textbooks of other countries on similar lines to understand how South Asia is introduced in the schools. This will also give us a clue of how member states of SAARC are supporting the idea of regional integration. South Asia has to be introduced in a proper way to the young minds and this will promote regional consciousness.

V: Role of India

South Asia also has a peculiar geopolitical scenario. In this, one of the member states, namely India controls more than 80 percent of the region’s economy, 70 percent of the area and also has 70 percent share of the region’s population. Even if we ignore the strategic depth of India, there is no denying the fact that it is a regional hegemon in a true geopolitical and economic sense. Europe and Southeast Asian regions have the advantage of being home to countries that have almost similar economic, geographic and political capabilities. Such an equitable power balance is certainly missing within South Asia. Thus, though it might appear as ‘politically incorrect’ but the hard reality is that ‘South Asia is an India centric region’. Even though India’s hegemony in

South Asia is generally referred as being part of the problem but there is much more to it. It is also related to the attitude of New Delhi, primarily because its foreign policy establishment has failed to realise the true strategic relevance of South Asia. Within the official corridors of the Indian foreign policy, South Asia is generally regarded as being part of India's backyard. This dominating and erroneous attitude eclipses India's potential and creative role in this region. While looking up towards the West for recognition, New Delhi remained ignorant of the fact that its actual international respect is largely dependent on its regional image (Tripathi, 2016). If the other SAARC countries challenge India regionally, then its international ambition would not be fulfilled. New Delhi should mend its policy and approach towards South Asia. In this regard, Gujaral's doctrine could make a difference. To be frank, South Asian integration cannot meet its desired objectives without a proactive role by India and this role cannot be one of an arrogant hegemon.

VI: Conclusion

The answer the question that is initially raised in this paper, that should we concede defeat? Surely No. This is because South Asia is full of hope the only thing is that we have to start working on policies and issues that promote regional integration in a true sense.

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Endnotes

1. This paper is based on the presentation in national seminar on Imagining South Asia in New Perspectives: Prospects and Challenges, Mumbai, India, 17-18 February 2016, organised by Mumbai University
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Centrality of Central Asia in Sino-Indian Energy Competition

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ABSTRACT

Energy is a primary industry to sustain national and regional socio-economic development as well as a basis for human development. China and India are the most populous countries in the world and with their rapid socio-economic development; both countries are increasing their demands on energy. But due to large shortage of domestic energy supply, both countries import from the foreign countries. This situation has serious repercussion on Sino-Indian energy security and economic security. Energy security is now high on the foreign policy agendas of both India and China. Although both countries have had some achievements in taking measures to solve issues concerning their energy shortage and energy security, but still these two countries compete with each other in the exploration and exploitation of energy resources from foreign countries. This paper discusses Sino-Indian energy rivalry in the energy resource rich Central Asian countries.

Key Words: *Central Asia, India, China, Energy, Competition.*

The Central Asian region consisting of five 'Stans', namely, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan is "possibly the last explored or unexplored oil-bearing region in the world" and, therefore, "its opening up generated huge excitement amongst the international oil companies".¹ The energy resources and, in particular, the oil and natural gas deposits have now become the apple of discord in Central Asia among the different powers.² China, India, Russia and the EU are the main actors in the region competing for oil and the large natural gas reserves. While China along with Russia already has strong energy relations with these states, India is aspiring to connect its energy markets with the region. Unlike China, there are a few factors that affect India's energy links in Central Asia. Firstly, unlike China, India is dependent on transit states for access to Central Asian energy and India's calculations are complicated by geopolitical considerations over which it has limited influence. Additionally, India is large energy markets intent on diversifying her imports necessitated by the internal dynamics. Finally, India is a rule-based democratic actor with values and interests that may sometimes clash with the Central Asian states. Most importantly, India has been unable to create linkages that allow her to exploit the region's energy reserves.³

Energy scenario in Central Asian countries

Proven oil reserve estimates in the Central Asian region vary between 15 to 40 billion barrels, representing 1.5 per cent to 4 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves. According to the estimate of International Energy Agency (IEA), the proven gas reserves range from 6.7 to 9.2 trillion cubic meters, with perhaps 8 trillion cubic meters of additional reserves. This represents approximately 6-7 per cent of the world gas reserves.⁴ Kazakhstan is the second largest oil reserve country in CIS and fifth largest in the world. Turkmenistan possesses world's third - largest reserves of natural gas. Uzbekistan is one of the 10 top natural gas producers in the world. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have rich potentiality of hydroelectric energy. Turkmenistan has 4.3

per cent of the world's gas reserves and Kazakhstan 3.2 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. According to estimates by British Petroleum, Kazakhstan has 1.0 percent of the world's proven gas reserves and the figures for Turkmenistan's and Uzbekistan's proven oil reserves were unavailable. Uzbekistan has 0.9 percent of proven gas reserves, and Azerbaijan 0.6 percent of both oil and gas reserves.⁵ Several outsider companies and consortiums are engaged in exploring and exploiting the energy resources of the region. China and India along with other actors are competing in the region to get their due share.

Sino-Indian Energy Supply and Demand Situation

Over the past decades, China and India have been emerging economic giants in the world. During 1978-2007, the average real GDP growth rate was 9.9 per cent in China and 5.6 percent in India.⁶ Though India is still lagging behind China in terms of economic performance, it has caught up with China in the past decades. With both governments being fully committed to the goal of high economic growth and poverty reduction, the current development momentum is expected to continue for decades to come. Governments of both countries have increasingly focusing on the development of their own people. So the eradication of poverty and prosperity depend upon the economic development of a nation which in turn is dependent on an adequate and continuous supply of energy sources. Hence energy is life line of economic development. Both countries' growing population and expanding economy with the shift in focus from agriculture to the manufacturing and services sectors have led to an increase in energy intensity which has resulted in an unprecedented demand for energy sources.⁷ Both India and China are rapidly becoming a force to reckon with in the global energy system. The economies of China and India are booming and their increasing energy demand is not only transforming the world's energy markets but also changing the geopolitical setting. Presently both are the net importer of oil and gas.

Trends for China

Following the economic development, China's demand for energy, particularly oil has skyrocketed. Industrialization and improvement in living standards have entitled a surge in energy consumption. Between 1993 and 2006, China's oil consumption nearly doubled from 2.9 million barrels per day (b/d) to 7 million, which represents an annual growth rate of 7%.⁸ The Chinese government estimates that the demand for energy will double from 2005 to 2015.⁹ In order to meet increased demand for oil, China became a net importer of oil products in 1992 and of crude oil in 1993. It cannot return to the era of energy self-reliance and net exports.¹⁰ At present China is the second largest energy consumer as well as importer after the US.¹¹ Presently China imports more than 40% of its energy consumption and the energy import may rise to 70% by 2020. According to US department of state, Chinese demand for petroleum will double by 2020, reaching 13 million barrels per day, while that for natural gas will triple 100 billion cubic meters per year.¹²

Despite surging demands, domestic supply of oil has been a disappointment. New sources in the western and southern provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet have underperformed. Off-shore production will remain controversial as long as competing claims with neighbouring nations on maritime borders are not settled. The existing oil production capacity is also deteriorating from maturing without new domestic oil fields large enough to meet its current and future energy needs. China is one of the biggest coal producers and in 2004, it produced two billion tons which amounts 42 per cent of world production. Coal mining as well as coal based electricity production leads to immense environmental and health problems. China's coal demand will peak around 2020 and then stay steady until 2035, IEA reported.¹³ China's natural gas strategy is mainly motivated by the country's air quality problems. Until the late 1990s, natural gas played a minor role in China's energy mix as domestic resources are limited. However, imports from countries like Russia and Kazakhstan along with both on and offshore, may fulfill the country's natural gas strategy. Nuclear power will continue to play a minor role for China's electricity production. At present, nuclear

power plants cover 1.5 per cent of the country's primary energy demand. China plans to build 30 additional nuclear reactors until 2020 which will double this amount to 3 per cent.¹⁴ However, the fear of increasing use of nuclear energy is that China's civilian nuclear plants are closely linked with the country's nuclear weapon programme.

Trends for India

India's rise as one of the world's major energy consumers shows many parallels to China. According to BP statistics, in 2010, India consumed 3.32 million barrels of oil per day amounting nearly world's 4% of the total.¹⁵ The Indian government estimates that the country's energy consumption will rise 50% by 2015 based on 2005 levels. Planning Commission of India estimates that India will consume 4.12 million barrels of oil per day by 2016-17 and the oil import will rise to 80% compared to present import of 76%.¹⁶ Other estimates show that India will be 4th largest net oil importer of the world by 2025. Similarly to China, reliable energy supply has both become a limiting factor for the future development of India's economy, both for its emerging industry as for the country's rural development.

India's domestic coal reserve reaches 101,903 million tons with an annual production of over 400 million tons. While some coal is still being imported from Australia, Indonesia and South Africa, vast majority of the domestic demand is met with domestic production.¹⁷ IEA report predicted that in 2025, India will overtake the United States as the world's second-largest coal user.¹⁸ In 2010, India's natural gas consumption stood at 2.3 trillion cubic feet which is nearly 2% of the world's total. India has around 1.2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves while current demand is around 57.32 billion cubic meters per year and India manages around 46 billion cubic meter per year from domestic supply and rest from imported LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas). According to India Hydrocarbon Vision 2025 estimates, published in 2002, India's future demand for gas could reach 113.61 billion cubic meter per year by 2015 and 135 by 2025.¹⁹ The IEA foresees that by 2030 oil imports will rise to 90 per cent and gas imports to 40 per cent to meet India's energy demand.

The other sources of domestic energy supply are either limited or advanced technologies are not available. India has a developed renewable energy sector, based on both traditional and modern technologies. India is one of the top five wind energy generating countries along with Germany, the U.S., Denmark and Spain.²⁰ India relies mainly on the international engagement of its private energy sector. Other than China's national oil companies and European or US based multinationals, India's private energy companies are seriously undercapitalized. In 2005, India signed a far reaching energy cooperation agreement with the U.S. The agreement contains the provisions for technology cooperation in the areas of nuclear technology. Like China, India's military and civilian nuclear development is closely linked. As fast growing economies, China and India may both need to double their oil requirements by 2030.

Constraints in China and India's Energy Imports

Their increasing domestic consumption of energy has almost put both countries among the top-five energy importers of the world. Both countries have given special priority to energy cooperation in abroad in their foreign policy making. However, there are several constraints for both the countries in importing oil and natural gas. For China, the known regions of the world that could supply China with oil and gas are all risky in different ways, for ex. the middle east, which has 61 per cent of global oil reserves and 41 per cent natural gas reserves, is politically unstable, Africa has drawbacks like societal instability, the risk of terrorism, and its distance from China; Latin America, in geopolitical as well as geographical terms is too close to the US.²¹ Central Asia, on the other hand is a region that is close to China and in which it has geopolitical advantages. Similarly, India has several obstructions in importation of energy resources. First, many of the

countries with which India is dealing are known for severe violations of human rights, sponsorship of terrorist activities, and general misuse of oil revenues. Further enrichment of oil supplying countries like Sudan, Syria and Iran may not be in the interest of India, a country which itself is a prime target of Islamist terrorism. Secondly, the exploration of overseas oil fields, especially in the area of the South China Sea, could bring India in direct competition with fellow Asian countries like China and Malaysia.²² India like China is making serious attempts to forge new equations with the energy rich Central Asian countries.

India-China in Central Asia

In Central Asia, China has made much progress while India is considered as a latecomer into the region. Initially India was not much inclined towards the region considering the region as Russia's sphere of influence and China on the other hand considered the region as significant to its national security and territorial integrity. China was one of the first countries who recognized their independent status. Mostly India's Central Asia policy confines to Afghanistan and it regards the Central Asian region can contain terrorism from Afghanistan and Pakistan. China has made significant progress in economic relations with these countries. China presently is the largest trade partner of most of the Central Asian states. India's trade (two-way) with the region is very negligible compared to China's trade turn over with these countries.²³ India's two way trade with the Central Asian states is just about US\$500 million compared to China's US\$29 billion and Russia's US\$22 billion in 2011-12.²⁴ China is taking advantages of its relations with these countries through Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) while India was very recently admitted to the group as a member. However, according to Ajay Patnaik, two landmarks signified India's changing approach towards these newly independent republics.²⁵ In November 2003 India agreed to renovate and upgrade the Ayni air base in Tajikistan. In August 2005 Indian state-owned company ONGC combined with Mittal Industrial Group to form ONGC Mittal Energy Limited (OMEL) to acquire energy assets in Kazakhstan.

Sino-Indian Energy Competition in Central Asia

There are many reasons for the commonly held belief that China and India are competing with each other in Central Asia. First, both states are rising powers and as such, competitiveness is part of their makeup; second, there are border and territorial disputes between them, so that geopolitically they are wary of each other and this wariness extends into Central Asia.²⁶ But a more important factor that generates competition between the two is their search for energy and natural resources and thus the resources of Central Asia have become focus of their rivalry. According to Elizabeth Wishnick, "even as Sino-Indian relation improves, they are emerging as competitors for trade and energy markets in Central Asia".²⁷ In Central Asia, both China and India are competing in terms of access to oil, uranium and other mineral resources, although the Indian business presence is very minimal compared to China. China sees Central Asia as a means to access the Iranian-Turkish Middle East.

From China's perspective, India is not an important actor in Central Asia. Although China and India may well be competing in the sphere of energy resources, the quality and degree of this competition is in no respect different from India's competition with other nations, such as Russia, the EU, and Japan. China has greater geographical advantages than India and has not experienced much pressure from competition with India. Indeed for the time being, except for hydrocarbons, where the Indian and Chinese companies have already come to terms, China largely dominates all the other areas.

A number of factors can be explained in India's degree of involvement in the region is very insignificant compared to China. First, India and Central Asia do not have multilateral institutions that can promote the development of their relations while SCO helps Beijing. Second, India and Central Asia have no common borders, while the proximity between Xinjiang, Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan facilitates trade relations between China and Central Asia. Thirdly, the current Central Asian economies need what the Chinese world's workshop has to offer, i.e, investment in transport infrastructure and energy production, as well as cheap goods that fit in with a low standard of living. Finally, like Japan, the US or the EU, India is penalized by the private nature of its economy. Indian companies do not receive state support while the Chinese firms have the diplomatic and financial support of Beijing on their side.²⁸

Sino-Indian Energy Acquisition in Central Asia

Comparing China and India's energy trade relations with the Central Asian states, China has already established the capabilities to import gas from this region while India is yet to sign any such deal with these countries. China's main players in Central Asia are - the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and its affiliates, such as the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) specializing in foreign investment, the National Oil and Gas Exploration and Development Corporation (CNODC) and the firm Sinopec (China National Petrochemical Corporation). For India, they are the Oil and Natural Gas Company (ONGC), Punj Lloyd, India Oil Corporation (IOC), the national gas company Gail, and Mittal.

In the acquisition of energy interest in this region, India lacks far behind China and India on several times despite publicly proclaimed energy cooperation outbid by China such as in the negotiations on the Kurmangazy field in Kazakhstan. According to UNCTAD report, in 2011, China petroleum import from Kazakhstan stood at US\$ 5,797,078, and US\$ 22,054 from Uzbekistan and for India, in 2008, it import from Uzbekistan stood at US\$ 1671 and from Turkmenistan in 2007 at US\$294.²⁹ In comparison to India, China's political approach to these countries is more pragmatic. China since its first energy engagement in Kazakhstan in 1997 concluded many oil and gas deals with the Central Asian states. Chinese companies have successfully launched themselves into the Kazakh market and by 2008; they were managing about one quarter of Kazakh production.³⁰ Chinese strategy is to connect all the acquired fields with the giant Sino-Kazakh pipeline. China has an advantage of an oil pipeline more than 3000 km long connecting the shores of the Caspian to the Dostyk-Alshnkou border post, and with a capacity of 20 million tons a year. CNPC's main Kazakh acquisition remains the company AktobeMunayGaz, in which it purchased a 60 per cent share in 1997 and further 25 per cent share in 2003. Located in the Aktobe region, it controls almost 15 percent of Kazakh petroleum and in particular holds a 20-year license for the exploitation of the Zhanazhol and Kenkiyak petroleum sites, which represent 5 per cent of Kazakhstan's total petroleum reserves. The offshore Darkhan site is operated by China, which is also involved in more isolated fields that can be located along the route of Sino-Kazakh pipeline. CNPC's last acquisition, mangistauMunaygas, which includes the Kalamkas and Zhetybay fields, was negotiated in 2009.³¹

China is interested in the gas deposits in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Beijing, Ashgabat, Tashkent and Astana agreed of building a shared pipeline and jointly selling gas resources. This pipeline which began to operate in December 2009, will deliver 30 bcm of gas.³² The Pipeline which starts at the Samardepe well stretches 180 km on Turkmenistan, 500 km in Uzbekistan and for nearly 1300 km in Kazakhstan before reaching Xinjiang. All the three countries will supply 10 bcm each to China. CNPC is the first foreign gas company in Turkmenistan to gain the right to carry out onshore gas extraction activities in the Amu-Darya basin. China sanctioned a US\$3 billion loan to Turkmenistan to develop the south yolotan gas field.

India has signed several agreements and memoranda of understanding with the countries of the region on transportation, pipelines and energy but its involvement in Caspian energy is still very meek. Since 2000, Indian companies have tried to get involved in purchasing deposit but have practically never succeeded. In 2005, ONGC Videsh out bided by the Chinese CNPC for the acquisition of Petro Kazakhstan. ONGC Videsh tried in offshore deposits of Kurmangazy, and Karkhan, but lost the tenders. In 2009, ONGC-Mittal Energy signed an agreement for joint exploration

of the Satpayev offshore block in the Northern Caspian Sea with estimated reserves of 1.85 million barrels, but the project is yet to be finalized. Indian companies at present are involved in the petrochemical sector. Punj Lloyd has been involved in several engineering and infrastructure projects in Kazakhstan. Punj Lloyd Kazakhstan has won many tender bids for building crude oil pipelines. Indian Oil Corporation has offered to construct a gas treatment station and refinery at Atyrau and Aktau. Kazakhstan invited GAIL and IOC for talks on the US\$1.3 billion plant.³³

Indian interest in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan is more limited. In 2006, a memorandum between GAIL and Uzbekneftegaz was signed which provides for the joint exploration and exploitation of Uzbek sites, as well as for the construction of liquid gas and oil factories in the western regions of Uzbekistan.³⁴ In Turkmenistan, ONGC - Mittal energy made an acquisition in 2007 of 30% of the share of two oil sites in the Turkmen sector of the Caspian Sea. In Kyrgyzstan, India's Jagson oil invested more than US\$1 million to build six fill-up stations in the Osh region.³⁵

India has already been in talks with the building of several pipelines from the region to India. These included the \$7-8 billion Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) project, and the \$7.6 billion ADB-backed Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline project.³⁶ However, despite years of planning and negotiations, none of these projects have made any progress. Although safety of transit routes for the IPI and TAPI projects is a concern, the reasons for India's disinclination may be because of India's changing gas scenario. Since 2002, India has announced huge gas discoveries in the Krishna-Godavari basin in the Bay of Bengal area. Apart from conventional gas, India is working in developments of shale gas. India is projected to have huge shale deposits spread across the Gangetic plain, Assam, Punjab, Rajasthan, Gujarat and southern coastal areas. Through the help of the new US technology called 'fracking' as well as horizontal drilling, shale gas extraction is easier and cost effective.³⁷ The discoveries of natural gas and prospective shale gas reserves have also had an impact on India's LNG imports.

However, India has recently reaffirmed their interest in progressing with the TAPI pipeline project. For India, access to Central Asian energy reserves and countering the expanding presence of China in Central Asia could be factors stimulating Indian interest in Turkmenistan. Unlike IPI, Washington is supporting the TAPI project. The American interest in Central Asia is to marginalize Russia and Iran and not to promote China and at the same time, USA wants greater involvement of India in the region to contain China in the region.³⁸ But doubts persist over whether Turkmenistan has sufficient reserves to supply the project because of its commitment to supply around 90 bcm to China, Russia and Iran. Turkmen gas was charging three times what India had committed to Iran. Finally, India prefers LNG over pipeline deals as LNG was the only viable option for India's gas imports.³⁹ The alternative project of TAPI is South Asian Gas Enterprise (SAGE) project. This project is a gas swap deal through which Turkmenistan will supply to India through Iran gas grid. The other possibility is that through North-South Transport Corridor which consists of sea, road and railway, India can import gas from the region. India can have Central Asia's gas through China by linking its Leh-Demchok to Xinjiang. China and India can cooperate with each other in Central Asian rich energy resources through the Asian energy security network. In this context, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and SCO signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005 for the energy cooperation.⁴⁰ If all ASEAN and SCO members and affiliates are willing to cooperate on the energy issue on the same platform, the plan for a truly Asian energy network could be a step closer to the reality. Countries that are neither affiliated with ASEAN and nor the SCO, namely, North Korea, Turkmenistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Nepal would in most likelihood, be drawn to participate what could be termed as the ASEAN-SCO partnership. However, with the improvement of Sino-Indian relations, there has been growing energy cooperation between these two countries in other parts of the world. For ex. With China's establishment of an oil refinery in Khartoum in Sudan, India has built a pipeline which can transport refined oil to the harbor nearby.⁴¹ China and India are cooperating with each in energy

fields in many other areas including the Central Asian region. However, their energy cooperation is still quite limited compared to their energy requirement.

Conclusion

Although Indian companies are competing with Chinese companies in the acquisition of energy resources of the Central Asian countries, but India's presence is very limited and restricted compared to China's establishment in the region. In Central Asia, China is present in all sectors whether it is energy import or export of necessary cheap materials or food products while India is a minor economic actor in the region with specialized functions. India's major obstruction comes from its geographical context with which it has very little control. In terms of energy trade volume and deals, India lags behind China in securing its energy interests in the region. Several times, Indian companies were outbid by Chinese companies in oil field acquisition. While India is handicapped about the transport of oil and natural gas from the region due to instability in Afghanistan and anomalous relations with Pakistan, China's political approach to the countries of the region and important transit countries is far more pragmatic and has enabled China to gain lucrative deals. India's increasing engagement in the Central Asia region and her various planning for pipeline and trade routes with her Central Asian partners are however, signal for India's strong interest in the region. It is to expect that India, with the US-Indian nuclear agreement already concluded and increased domestic economic pressure in terms of increasing resource demand, will in future play a more active role in the Central Asian region and speed up her energy diplomacy. The increasing engagement of India in Central Asia's energy resources may bear the danger of clashes with rival China.⁴² According to Blank, India's presence in Central Asia is likely to rise and it will probably come into political and economic rivalry with other major Asian players, such as China.⁴³ India may play as a 'balancer' in the backdrop of rising Chinese influences and declining Russian dominance. India in order to access Central Asian and Caspian energy needs to adopt a cooperative approach towards the region, normalize relations with Pakistan, work for the stability of Afghanistan, and India-Chinese oil and gas companies should form consortium in bidding oil and energy sites in the region.

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Evolution of India's Grand Strategy by Addressing Security Concerns as a Part of its India's Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Objective

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ABSTRACT

As like every aspiring Great Power, India too finds itself at present in a position to address both its national security strategy and co-operating with other countries in an effort to address international security which will enhance its diplomatic prestige among other nations.

However, there is still some differentiation which is required on what is India's national security threat exclusive to it and the preference that it requires more than on international security. This differentiation in a way will help Indian policy makers to form a coherent national security strategy and for the academicians to start generating ideas on the concept.

As with India faces hard-power military threats which along with threats such as insurgency and terrorism which are zero-sum, Indian policy makers have unique responsibility to addressing these challenges for overall strategic outlook which is called Grand Strategy which of course includes having military means for political ends.

As like every aspiring Great Power, India too finds itself at present in a position to address both its national security strategy and co-operating with other countries in an effort to address international security which will enhance its diplomatic prestige among other nations.

However, there is still some differentiation which is required on what's India's national security threat exclusive to it and the preference that it requires more than on international security. This differentiation in a way will help Indian policy makers to form a coherent national security strategy and for the academicians to start generating ideas on the concept.

Key words: *India, Grand Strategy, Defense Policy, Maritime Strategy, Culture.*

India's national security strategy has extended to include non-traditional security threats which are included in International Security and this may not be an immediate national security threat for it.

International Security one can safely say that the non-zero sum challenges is those like energy, water, maritime security and others. And there are those which overlap both categories, like cyber threats, space and nuclear threats. It's also true that many of above threats or by addressing these threats doesn't serve India's longer term military objectives.

As with India faces hard-power military threats which along with threats such as insurgency and terrorism which are zero-sum, Indian policy makers have unique responsibility to addressing these challenges for overall strategic outlook which is called Grand Strategy.¹

As a part of addressing this challenge, there is an overwhelming need to undertake the hard power military modernizations and revolutions and internal security reforms necessary to defend its increasingly complex society and economy.

India's contemporary Great Power, China has been better at understanding concept and the reason why the former has not been still able to find its core security threats differentiating it from non-traditional threats and co-operating with other countries in International Security is because it has still not been in a position to come out with a Defense White Paper which will address those issues as a single-point policy document.

Therefore, Strategic thinking in India today is derivative, using concepts, doctrines and a vocabulary derived from other cultures, times, places and conditions which has not addressed India's security concerns, or to find a place in domestic and international discourse though India has rich experience of realistic strategic thinking right from the time of Arthashastra if not even before.²

However, though not articulated India still had strategic thinking while addressing security concerns as since independence it has followed a unique path in addressing its national security threats both internal and external. This was influenced both by both domestic reasons and the existing geo-political situation at that time such as the Cold War between the United States (US) and the Soviet Union.

A classic example for the unique path was the way; India decided not to participate in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) despite pressure from both the US and the Soviet Union in an effort to make India sign it. It was clear that though India supported the concept of nuclear weapons abolition in an effort to address to international security, it was clear that in a quest to attain nuclear deterrence as a part of its strategy, and India decided both to go nuclear and not to sign NPT.

The end of the Cold War meant that the concept of international security propagated by the western powers such as the US assumed more importance. Countries in the Western Europe which have the luxury of having the United States security umbrella readily embraced the concept of international security at a parallel to its national security.

This binding was one of the reasons why the countries such as France, United Kingdom and Germany contributed to its troops as a part of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks. Although, India faced more imminent security threat from Afghanistan decided to not to send troops but to contribute in terms of economic aid.

It's also true that the effort to curb terrorism attained increased importance in the international security lexicon and increased attention was given to it though as India had been more a direct victim of terrorism from Independence which was left to its own national security threat until 9/11.

It can be argued that India's quest for addressing terrorism related threats was addressed by the international community and therefore India's national security concerns was understood by other countries can be partially true.

But it's also important to understand the existing national security concerns such as land-based threats from both Pakistan and China are exclusive to India and the other Great Powers in other regions might not consider those as their national security threat and therefore might not be included as international security threats.

However, concepts such as maritime security which were more pronounced in the international security lexicons until recently have now started to dominate Indian policy making circles which have helped in developing effective maritime strategy and co-operating with countries such as Australia, Indonesia, Japan, Vietnam and the United States in maritime domain in the last ten years.³

The co-operation is set to increase with United States' forward policy in the Indo-Pacific region and China's increased maritime expansion in the region. Though the co-operation in the maritime

domain with the United States not explicitly stated to aim at curbing Chinese increased maritime expansion at least it has helped India to form an effective strategic co-operation if not an alliance with countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

For the above to happen, it's also true that India will expand its maritime capabilities and strategic thinking which will be a role-reversal from the pre-dominant continental strategic thinking for most part of the last millennium except for a brief period interrupted during the Cholas period which by having a strong blue-water presence addressed what is now in international security lexicons such as piracy and maritime terrorism.

The understanding of the above nuggets may not be the only step for addressing India's Grand Strategy, however it will serve its overall ability to address security threats external, internal and in differentiation from the international security concerns for effective strategic outlook as a part of its foreign and defense policy objective.

India's Strategic Culture and Continental Strategy

During the Cold War, the United States defense strategic community closely studied the strategic orientation of Napoleon's Grand Armee and the Prussian General Staff towards Russia and subsequently towards Soviet Union in an effort to understand how the Russian army reacted to the threat perception or eventual invasion from its West.

The reason was obvious as United States despite having overwhelming technological advancements in third and fourth generation warfare was reluctant to get involved in a land war under a limited nuclear weapon option with Soviet Union in the Eastern Europe.

On the other hand, the Office of the Net Assessment of the United States concluded that Soviet Union or to its prior Russia had a strategic culture which enabled it to mobilize its Defense in Depth for offensive operations when faced with a threat or invasion. This mobilized resources in men and material eventually pushed the opposition forces backwards and helped the Russian army along with its coalition to get near Berlin or Paris. It was concluded that this was a unique strategic culture of the Russians.

If there is no initiation of offensive operations from the west, then the cost of mobilization especially its standing army will be too high for the Soviet Union to sustain for years which reflected in its disintegration. Therefore, the strategic culture of the Soviet Union was unable to sustain a prolonged war readiness which ultimately resolved in no war at all at first place.

This inability of the strategic culture to absolve changes is one of the prime reasons for other Great Powers to disintegrate either by over-planning or by under-preparation. The United States' too had to suffer because of its strategic culture's inability to absolve changes in varying terrains as for example the use of excessive Air Power which enabled to win wars against Nazi Germany and military regime of Japan in the Second World War proved as a futile exercise against a war involving the need for extensive ground forces such as the one in Vietnam.

The reverses faced by the US strategic community in Vietnam and along with the need to study Soviet Union strategy enabled the study of strategic culture closely and scholars such as Jack L. Snyder after analyzing Soviet deterrence policy in the Eastern Europe concluded that US analysts failed to predict Soviet reactions. This happened because they took for granted the fact that the Soviets would react the same way as the Americans would do in certain cases. However, policy outcomes proved that this kind of 'behavioral prediction' on behalf of US scientists which is based on rational-actor paradigms and game theoretical modeling in analyzing superpower relations proved to be wrong in predicting the behavior of the Soviet Union.

As a result of this failure to predict reactions, a number of scholars came to the conclusion that each country had its own way to interpret analyses and react to international events. This brought

the question of a state/national culture back to the agenda and created a new wave of literature which focused on the development of a new tool of analysis, notably that of strategic culture

This brings to the question of what is Strategic culture is at first place from a policy perspective. Strategic culture refers to the security perspectives, traditions, institutions and behavior of a nation with respect to other nations and so multi-lateral institutions. In general terms, though the aspect of strategic culture has been more so related to the war-fighting tradition among the academics, it's also both a diplomatic and political aspect which supplants its war-fighting traditions.

The concept of strategic culture has been applied in various ways and to a range of countries, regions and security institutions in order to examine the main aspects of their security policies. It has been concluded that by applying the notion of strategic culture to certain case studies scholars try to explain continuity and change in national security policies. Further, academics involved in the study of strategic culture attempts to create framework which can give answers to certain policy options undertaken by nation-states.

Strategic culture encompasses the full array of security concerns, from intelligence-gathering techniques and priorities to trade orientation and diplomatic alliances that make up the larger framework with which policy-making elites perceive the strategic environment in which they operate.

Strategic culture has also been confused with the war-fighting tradition of nations and so much has been written on the aspect of different styles of warfare such as Arab, American, Australian, British, Chinese, German, French, Israeli Indian or Russian. By studying various war-fighting traditions, it was understood that some traditions prefer attrition over maneuver, others prefer tactical flexibility to centralization of command, and still others prefer deception and stealth across ill-defined fronts rather fixed lines of combat in well-demarcated battle spaces.

Broadly, strategic culture involves geopolitical perspectives and geostrategic orientation, institutional morphology and historical practice of nations. Nation-States with large land masses and multiple borders see things differently than do island states. Countries with ample resources and robust economies of scale in value-added manufacturing may resort to their approaches to trade and security differently than resource poor agro-export platforms.

On the other hand, countries with on-going territorial, cultural or political disputes tend to "see" threats differently than those that are not encumbered by such conflicts. Countries governed by authoritarians often perceive things differently than well-established democracies. So do countries with long histories of warfare (internal as well as external) when contrasted against countries with peaceful internal histories and little involvement in foreign wars.

Strategic culture is also impacted by domestic political dynamics over time, as well as specific histories of military and diplomatic alliances. Strategic culture is a product of national character molded by historical practice, current political dynamics, institutional framework and geopolitical context.

If formed in an equation, strategic culture will be followed by geopolitical orientation, geostrategic perspective, threat environment assessment, contingency planning, security force orientation, force composition, force staffing, training and equipment, force deployment and operations.

The equation can also be included to collection of intelligence and police services as well as the military, as it includes internal and external security roles. The most important thing to note is that strategic culture is the point of departure for all that follows; inability of the strategic culture to absolve changes can impact negatively on all of the other variables arrayed along this particular chain of causality or that matter if there is an inability of the strategic culture to absolve changes reflects in the performance of other aspects.

India's Continental Strategic Orientation

India as it faces predominately continental security threat from both Pakistan and China has a dominant continental strategy as a part of its strategic disposition. India has primarily an offensive continental strategy towards Pakistan whereas towards China it has a defensive strategy.

Further, in recent years India has started to adopt and use Afghanistan as a base for its 'Look West' and 'Look North' policies. The 'Look West' policy has not been nearly as co-ordinate or successful as the 'Look East' policy because New Delhi is restrained from pursuing relations across Central Asia and the Middle East by Pakistan. Similarly, its relations with the United States, though positive, have not developed significantly because Washington has not necessarily welcomed India playing a major role in the Middle East and Central Asia. Washington needed Islamabad as a base for its operations in Afghanistan, but with the winding up of its military support to the Afghan Government, the US will be more comfortable with New Delhi expanding its reach to possibly serve as a counterweight to any Chinese ambitions in Central Asia and the Middle East, just as it has done in South-East Asia.

Further, as part of its expanding continental orientation, India should reconsider deploying a squadron of Su-30MKIs at the Farkhor base in Ayni Tajikistan, to counter increased Chinese military assertiveness in its western borders.⁴ From India's point of view, the region north of Afghanistan will soon prove to be pivotal to the energy security of continental Asian powers.

To allay potential apprehensions in Pakistan over these actions, India will be required to reconfigure its policy approach towards that country, including demonstrating that its military focus is China-centric. This might include, but would not be limited to, reducing as much as realistically possible its western defenses and then re-configuring India's capabilities so as to obtain a single mechanized armored corps and several independent armored brigades from the present three strike corps in its eastern regions. The excess personnel and assets would be transferred to form two offensive mountain corps, in addition to the one being raised now, to give a total of three such corps positioned for an offensive land operation against China. This would be a strategic shift from the existing defensive continental posture.

Such a shift may win Pakistan's confidence enough to facilitate a genuine normalization of relations, while building up potent Indian offensive forces for operations on the Tibetan plateau as a deterrent to the Chinese forces stationed along the disputed mountain border. Strategically, it could help to establish India as an actor in Central Asia with Pakistan potentially even providing elements of support.

India's Maritime Strategy in the 21st Century

India from being continental regional power has decided to pursue an active naval policy for its Great Power ambition since the end of the Cold War through its 'Look East' Policy since 1991. The 'Look East' Policy is primarily aimed at curtailing India's greatest security threat- China in South-East Asia. The policy has found consensus within India's ruling elite so far and among other countries in the South-East Asian region such as Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.

India's 'Look East' policy is considered an ambition to graduate itself from being a regional power in South Asia to a great power in the Asia Pacific region or in the newly coined Indo-Pacific region.

Great Powers by definition have tended to have both core and peripheral security dilemmas and be competitive in both when it's emerging especially when faced with a challenge or threat⁵. India's core security threat from nation states have been continental with fighting four limited continental limited wars with Pakistan and one continental war with China. It's understood that India's power-projection by nullifying the existing security dilemmas in the core could be achieved

by pursuing an effective policy of naval-expansion in its periphery. The periphery of India's security could be argued from the Gulf of Aden in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east which of course coincides with the strategic priority of other Great Powers in the Asia Pacific such as the United States and China.⁶

Coming to the 21st century, the region between the Strait of Malacca to the Gulf of Aden is hailed as the 'Centre Stage of the 21st century' as mentioned by Robert Kaplan in his book 'Monsoon' If India has to graduate from being a regional power in South Asia to a great power in Asia-Pacific, it needs to control these vital links in the Indian Ocean by both hard power and soft power through Naval Diplomacy as Navy has a way of projecting a country's Soft Power from historic times through trades than the uniformed army which's viewed in suspicion by the host country which was understood well by India.⁷

India's maritime strategy in contrast to its continental strategy is primarily based on offensive realism and has started to be influenced by Alfred Thayer Mahan's famous quote that "Who controls world oceans controls the world" as a part of its overall strategic priorities.

To start with, India shows both continental and maritime country characteristics with the former getting more importance as New Delhi has to overstretch its diplomatic initiative for Pakistan. But with India's economy growing, it can re-link its historical maritime and cultural contacts politically through Naval Diplomacy. For example, India's 'Look East policy had boosted its trade relations with the Southeast Asia supplanted by Naval Diplomacy which involved regular visits of the Indian Naval Officers to South East Asian Countries. However, there's a need to extend India's Look East Policy till South Pacific by utilizing its peninsular characteristic for its strategic objective by drawing lessons from the history. India's relations with countries such as Myanmar, Cambodia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia are historically interlinked. If we go by the book written by V R Ramachandra Dikshitar in his book "Origin and Spread of Tamils," it's understood that Tamilian Chola kings had cultural and trade relations with the Polynesians in the South Pacific.⁸

So far, India hasn't fully understood the strategic dimensions of the 8000 miles long coastline as other great powers in the 19th and 20th century had done. Countries such as Britain, the United States and Japan (Naval Powers) and Soviet Union, Germany and France (Continental Powers) maximized their geographic position to exert maximum strategic maneuvering in when they were considered as Great Powers.

Though India has failed to tap these long lost relations, it's now the time to revisit the cultural ties with the atolls and island nations from the west of Indian Ocean till South Pacific which can act as a counter-weight to China's String of Pearls strategy which involves building bases around India's peninsular region. China started this with building deep sea port on the southern coast of Sri Lanka, in the town of Hambantota. Second, China has helped Pakistan to build a deep sea port in the town of Gadara in Baluchistan. Third, China has started to court the littoral states in the Indian Ocean such as Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles through Yuan Diplomacy in exchange of having Naval Base

Historically, Great powers in the Indian Ocean Region such as Portugal, the Netherlands, Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union had sought a base in the Maldives as Gan (Maldives) Antsiranana (Diego-Suarez), Diego Garcia, Aldabra and Farquhar islands and le Desroches in Seychelles are the vital choke points in the Indian Ocean.

To counter China's encircling in the Indian Ocean, India's Naval Diplomacy means sending naval officers on a routine trip to Atolls and having regular exchanges at the Naval Officer's level. Second, India should initiate more bi-lateral trade pacts and multi-lateral initiative in Indian Ocean region by strengthening the regional multi-lateral organizations such as the South Asian Association of Regional Co-operation and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation.

India's strategic culture has been defensive so far despite having a continental strategic priority with land-based threats from China and Pakistan. This defensive strategic orientation has been extended to its maritime dimension which is about to change with first with developing a robust maritime capabilities.⁹

India's inability to identify its geographic and cultural overreach has been one of its constrains. But with India's economy growing and with a place secured in the world affairs in the 21st century, India should now start re-linking its historical maritime and cultural contacts politically through 'Cultural and Naval Diplomacy'¹⁰

India's Strategic Culture

India's strategic culture permits a limited use of force for political objectives which has served the existing status quo in the civil-military relations. India has sent its expeditionary forces in countries such as Maldives in 1988, Seychelles in 1986 and Sri Lanka in 1987 which were all done with active participation of Indian Navy besides committing itself to the United Nations Peacekeeping forces. India was also about to send its troops in Fiji after the coup in 1987 but wasn't able to because of lack of logistics to carry out an operation of that distance.

India is still yet to develop a robust indigenous military-industrial complex befitting a Great Power. The Army with an approximate budget of for 50 per cent of the defence budget, followed by the Air Force with 25 per cent), Navy 19 per cent, Defence Research and Development Organization six per cent) and the rest for Ordnance Factories. It is noteworthy that Indian Navy keep increasing its share of defense budget.

The Indian government in recent times has given much more priority to the jointness of the three services to counter China's threat and not primarily relying on its Land Forces.¹¹ Tri-service commands have been established, such as the Andaman and Nicobar Command (2001), and the Strategic Forces Command (2006). Major joint exercises have been undertaken in an attempt to validate the joint doctrine. AMPHEX 07, a tri-service amphibious exercise, serves as a prime example. Defence procurement procedures emphasize ever more heavily the benefits of tri service coordination.

Indian Navy which is the fifth largest in the world forms the basis of power-projection capabilities in South-East Asia with India is still yet to acquire the sophistication for joint amphibious attack for which a greater synergy of existing competition within its tri-service is required. India despite not being an organic naval power such as United Kingdom, the US, Australia and Japan has invested considerable effort to increase the operational capability of its navy. The Indian Navy has transformed itself from "coastal defense force to a 'blue water' fleet."¹²

In other words, from being providing a protective shield for the defense and security of its home population, Indian navy is transiting itself first to provide strategic shield for the neighboring atolls in the Indian Ocean region and so extending itself to be a partner for other major powers such as the United States in the Indo-Pacific region¹³.

Indian Navy conducts Theatre Level Operational Readiness Exercise annually to test the readiness of the Indian Navy to respond to maritime challenges annually which involves elements from the Indian Army, Indian Air Force and the Indian Coast Guard. Indian Navy has three commands - the western, southern and eastern commands. The eastern command, which is headquartered at Visakhapatnam in the state Andhra Pradesh, is home to the Indian Navy's submarine arm. The eastern naval command has grown remarkably in recent years. In 2005, it had 30 warships under its command. Six years later, that number has grown to 50 - roughly a third of the Indian Navy's entire fleet strength. It is poised to expand further.

India's only aircraft carrier INS (Indian Naval Ship) Viraat is in the eastern command. All guided-missile destroyers (modified versions of Soviet Kashin class destroyers), which were with the western command have joined the eastern fleet.¹⁴

The Indian Navy's only ship acquired from the Americans, the amphibious USS Trenton, now renamed INS Jalashwa, has been put under the eastern command. It is joined by the indigenously manufactured stealth frigates INS Shivalik, INS Satpura and INS Sahyadri as well as the US-manufactured P-8I Poseidon long-range maritime patrol aircraft and the Italy-made new fleet tanker, INS Shakti. India's nuclear submarines INS Arihant was constructed at Visakhapatnam. Two other nuclear submarines are developed here.

The eastern command has bases at Visakhapatnam and Kolkata. It will soon have a forward base at Tuticorin and an operational turnaround base at Paradeep. In addition to naval air stations at Dega and Rajali, the eastern command has got INS Parundu at Uchipuli, where UAVs are being deployed. According to open sources, India is constructing a nuclear submarine naval base near Visakhapatnam. Codenamed Varsha. Indian Navy currently operates 14 diesel powered submarines, which are based at Visakhapatnam on the east coast and Mumbai on the west coast.

Annually, Indian Navy conducts multi-lateral naval war games involving primarily with the United States, Japan, Singapore and Australia (which participated in the 2007 exercise which was conducted near India's eastern command). India and the US have conducted more than 50 joint military exercises in the last seven years including the Malabar 2015 Exercises which involving Japan.¹⁵

India's Look East policy so far hasn't crossed the strategic 'Strait of Malacca' though in the next five years, India's Look East policy at least diplomatically will be extended till South Pacific as countries in the region such as Fiji has important political and cultural relations with India.

Diplomatically, India has shown interest in the South Pacific affairs by participating in the Pacific Islands Forum annually from 2002. India also has initiated support to the islands in South Pacific by providing soft loans for development projects. But so far, it has no military presence but this can change in the next five years if India starts increasing the Eastern Fleet's Operational Capabilities till South Pacific. It's to be seen whether that will find consensus among New Zealand, United States and Australia for an effective deterrence against China.¹⁶

United States which has been shown on Chinese's increased naval presence in the Indo-Pacific and wishes to partner to curtail the presence. There are several main reasons that might explain the increase in India-US naval cooperation. First, the Barack Obama administration does not believe unilateral solutions are available to deal with regional security challenges. Second, India's importance in Washington's eyes as a potential strategic partner has steadily increased because of Delhi's growing economic and military capabilities as well as its strong democratic credentials. Third, both the US and India are concerned about the rising power of China in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.¹⁷

Although the US and India want and actively seek strong cooperative relations with Beijing, both are conscious of potential conflicts of interest in bilateral relations with Beijing. This recognition has cumulatively served to bolster US-Indian ties. Washington also now believes that US-Indian political and military cooperation is necessary to counter the very real challenges of international piracy and Islamist terrorism in the Horn of Africa.¹⁸

From the US's point of view there is a fear that China might intervene forcefully in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Nearly 44 of the 51 small islands and reefs are claimed by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei. The conflict stems from overlapping sovereignty claims to various Spratly Islands, which potentially could produce natural resources such as oil, natural gas and seafood. China's aggressive stance is motivated by its need to meet growing energy demands that outstrip its supply capability. The US might be forced to "intervene" and would need a partner in India.

From the US point of view, its geo-strategy is based on the concept of the 20th century geo-strategist and the 'Godfather' of the containment strategy, Nicholas John Spykman, who declared:

'who controls the rim land rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world.' The 'rim land' refers to the maritime fringes of the Eurasian continent¹⁹.

Spykman also emphasized that the U.S. needs partners in the rim land to counter any rise of the Heartland (Soviet Union) or the Middle Kingdom (China). There is no prize for guessing why 2010 USQDR implicitly talks about the importance of having India as a strategic partner to balance the power of China in Eurasia.

Every aspiring Great Power tries to project its own power outside its own "Sphere of Influence" through hard power military base. In that context, India offers a curious case as it tries to graduate from being a regional power in South Asia with a continental strategic orientation to great power aspirations in Indo-Pacific adding a maritime dimension to its existing strategic culture, Central Asia falls slightly out of its radar logically

However, India's only military base outside its territory is in Central Asia's Tajikistan named Ayni which if properly defined is in Russia's own backyard India is Russia's all-weather friend and vice-versa and despite that India's power-projection is not welcomed in Moscow.

Under the above caveat, it offers a good case study of India's strategic culture and the compounding problems that it faces in graduating itself from being a regional power to a great power and the foreign and defense policy that it needs to follow.

In that context, it can be argued that despite India's power-ambition in the Indo-Pacific region, there's a lack of coherence within its ruling elite for an effective way that a power-projection could be achieved.

Conclusion

In conclusion, in recent times India has started as a process of its expanding Great Power ambitions by giving more focus to its out of contingency operations which will be more focused strengthening the existing naval capabilities and integration of command with other services.

Though the aspect of power-projection has found consensus among other countries especially in the South-East Asia, it's to be seen whether such initiatives will find consensus within the ruling political elite.

To be sure, India's ambition as a Great Power coincides with its will to have the ability to operationalize its Grand Strategy²⁰. The key question is whether India's internal institutional mechanism will be able to internalize the changing geo-political scenario to have a robust policy which ultimately be able to negate the security threats and able to have a coherent national security strategy or Grand Strategy.

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Sino-Indian Dynamics in Himalayan Neighbourhood

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ABSTRACT

There is a context of usurping power in politics of regionalism. A powerful actor achieves this by influencing its relatively smaller neighbours through various means. China's all-out engagement in security, politics, economics, infrastructure development with Bhutan, Nepal, Afghanistan, POK, and Pakistan exemplifies a trend of well-crafted regionalism that goes against the interest of India. This becomes significant, because, India and China, two competing big powers in South Asia, are each trying to show its might by managing to accrue in contrast to the other, as many allies as possible from its Himalayan neighbourhood. But China's 'East Turkistan' or Uyghur militancy in Xinjiang, the western province of China underscores all the silver linings especially with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Hence, if 21st century features India either as a challenger to the Chinese story or as an irritant as China tries to catch up with the US, and more so, due to the Uyghur militancy, China might deter the policy of sub-regionalism, though wielding of soft power through leverages might continue for both India and China.

Key words: Regionalism, Himalayan neighbourhood, Outflank, Special relationship, Asymmetry.

China, it is believed, has engaged itself in different spheres of activity in Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even though Nepal earlier tried to maintain equidistance from both India and China, but post-2008, the Maoist-led government announced 'all unequal treaties signed with India should be scrapped including the historic Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1950' ('Anti-India Hawk Splits Maoist Party,' 2012:1), indicating a stronger move towards closer ties with China. Bhutan, though still a strong Indian ally since 1949 treaty, shows a tilt towards China as well. Going northwest, in the adjoining buffer area in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Afghanistan, things look dismal for India. China's opening its narrow border with Afghanistan with roads and a tunnel under the Pamir ranges skirting Jammu and Kashmir has strategic implications for India. As an 'outflanking move', the former Indian Army Chief Gen. V.K. Singh states: 'India risks losing the influence it has in Afghanistan because of a China-Pakistan link getting stronger and is seen in evidence here' (Dutta 2012:1).

Few factors motivate this probing. First, is China showcasing its proclivity towards carving out a sub-region in the Himalayan belt? Second, India's relationship with Pakistan, an ally of China, being strained by historical and political reasons stands at the lower rung of the hierarchy of bilateral relationships. Third, in Sino-Indian relationship, these two powerful actors are competing regional powers exhibiting basic conflict of values, besides mutual suspicion and misperceptions. The perennial competition for power and influence in Asia will prevent them from coming together politically. Fourth, due to Asian supremacy geo-political equations and strategic significance among the countries are shifting. China's aspiration to become a world power and its continued belief in the balance of power paradigm will encourage it to enhance and maintain military power consistent

with such a position. It might deter or cajole smaller neighbours to dissuade more powerful rivals of the region.

Politics of Regionalism

According to Rafal Riedel, 'Regionalism is a tendency in international relations characterised by the intensification of co-operation through the increase of institutional and non-institutional, formal and informal interrelations among countries belonging to some geographical area.' (Riedel, 2004:50). He says that processes in regionalism have different dynamics and characteristics like regional identity among societies; appearance of visions of future co-operation; improving relations, contacts and influences; adoption of legal or institutional norms and integration of the region. But regional formations as Alvin Toffler describes is a process of 'creating new centres of influence and power. Region forms a new form, where concentration of power equals with sovereignty'. (Riedel, 2004:51).

Charles P Kindleberger (Escribano, 2000:3) has stated that following the regional 'hegemon' argument, security and foreign policy objectives, also can constitute a rationale for regionalism that inherently favours accumulation of power in one regional bloc in contrast to the other (Lorca and Escribano 2004-2005: 131-135). There always remains a context of usurping power in the politics of regionalism by a powerful actor through integrating with neighbouring states, claiming supremacy over either competing big power or bloc of the region. This article examines the dynamics of Sino-Indian sub-regionalism in Himalayan neighbourhood through five windows of triplets.

India-Bhutan-China

Bhutan believes that India and China, being 'two competing regional powers' and 'not partners' in the region, create a difficult atmosphere for its small neighbours. The geostrategic location of Bhutan as 'a yam between two boulders' makes it important in big neighbours' perception of security. The global shift in the regional and international relations is changing the edifice of India, Bhutan and China relationships. According to Bhutan, it is under increasing pressure to start a diplomatic relation with China, and 'diplomatic relation was made an indirect precondition for resolving border dispute. In Bhutan, the current trend is, if one bunch of Bhutanese politicians lean towards India, another is bound to lean towards China', commented Sunanda K Datta Ray (Datta Ray 2013:1). Given the fragility of Sino-Indian relations, this polarization is not in Bhutan's interest. It is even less in India's interest for the Bhutanese to have to face such a choice.

To neutralize its relationship, Bhutan has started turning towards China to maintain equilibrium vis-a-vis India. China always maintains that Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1949 is an 'unequal' treaty, a symbol of India's hegemony in the region. Bhutan contends that Chinese approach in resolving the border as in Nepal was through 'package deal' rather than 'sector-by-sector' settlement.

China has always been keen on maintaining good relations with its Asian neighbours - 'periphery countries'. The PRC has outlined its plan of extending the railway network from Lhasa to Zangmu on the Nepal border, branching out midway, at Shigatse. This line will move east and go up to Yadong, at the mouth of Chumbi Valley- strategically located at the tri-junction of India-China-Bhutan.

Bhutan has been a strong ally of India and had refrained itself from establishing relations with China initially. It was concerned over the takeover of Tibet in 1950 and was anxious that its sovereignty would be compromised because of Chinese claims to Bhutan as part of a greater Tibet (Singh. 2012: 1-2). This had led to the closure of the Tibetan-Bhutanese border in the north.

Sino-Bhutan bilateral relations have remained strained because of the dispute over their 470-km border. The disputed areas that China claimed covered a total of 764 square km in the North West (269 sq km) and Central parts of Bhutan (495 sq km). In the border talks initiated in 1996, China for the first time offered Bhutan a package deal, proposing an exchange of Pasamlung and Jakarlung valleys in central Bhutan, with the pasture land of Doklam, Sinchulung, Dramana and

Shakhatoe in north-western Bhutan. In 1998 both countries signed a peace agreement promising to 'Maintain Peace and Tranquility on the Bhutan-China Border Areas'. The agreement was significant for Thimpu because China for the first time acknowledged Bhutan as a sovereign country and stated clearly that 'China fully respects the territorial integrity and independence of Bhutan'. China-Bhutan engagement has intensified over the years, an aspect which sheds some light on the Chinese intentions of trying to create leverages inside Bhutan.

In November 2007, Chinese forces dismantled several unmanned posts near the Chumbi valley, distorting the Sino-Bhutanese border near Sikkim, with Chinese forces only a few kms away from the Siliguri corridor. Chumbi Valley is significant as it is 500 kms away from Siliguri corridor which connects India to north east India and Nepal to Bhutan, sharing borders with Tibet and Sikkim. The north-western areas of Bhutan which China wants in exchange for the central areas lie next to the Chumbi Valley tri-junction. The PRC wants Bhutan to compromise on the Chumbi valley, an exchange deal that raises strategic concerns in India.

Meanwhile, the evolving Sino-India relations represent two dominant strands. While the first is a co-operative relationship on issues of mutual interest, the second strand is reflective of a conflicting behaviour, which in the recent past has been triggered on territorial and water diversion issues. Since Indian concerns emerge in response to the latter, hence any development on Bhutan's north-western front could ring alarm bells for Indian strategists. The December 2009 statement made by the Ugyen Tshering, the then Foreign Minister of Bhutan, is indicative of the potential that China holds for Bhutan. The Minister claimed that diplomatic and trade ties between Bhutan and China 'are definitely conceivable in the future' (Bisht. 2010:3), adding that an indirect trade link has already been established as India often buys heavy machinery and equipment of superior quality at competitive prices from China and then installs them in Bhutan. China in the past few years has already made inroads into Bhutan by exporting farming and telecommunication equipment. Unquestionably, China is an attractive source of investment.

Until now, Bhutan has never played its China card. The 19th round of border talks in 2010 was noteworthy for three new developments. First, India and Bhutan revised their friendship treaty in 2007 and Article II, which stipulated that Bhutan should be advised by India in its foreign policy decisions, was symbolically dropped. Second, Bhutan witnessed the first stage of democratization in 2008 by holding elections, thus taking the maiden step towards domestic political reform. Third, China in the past few years has made significant progress in constructing roads right next to the disputed border areas. Six roads have so far been built by China near Bhutan's north and north-west areas.

The more Bhutan's security is vulnerable either due to China's linking of establishing diplomatic relations directly with Bhutan with Sino-Bhutan border resolution or due to India's negligence in counter-terrorism in the northeast, thereby dissatisfying Bhutan; or unstable domestic politics in Bhutan due to anti-national movement involving the Nepalis in south Bhutan and the Drukpa community, generating refugee problem outside the soil of Bhutan, the more will it add to India's discomfort. Because, for India, even today, a weak Bhutan means weak buffer state or to politically state 'extended frontier' with China. The 'special relation', Bhutan claims with India, has slowly evolved from a donor-recipient status to equal partner relationship. Taking the example of hydropower generation, Bhutan justifies that while India is helping her to harness water resources through aid, grant, and loan, India benefits from energy import from Bhutan.

India-Nepal-China

Beijing is stepping up its engagement with Kathmandu. It is focusing on investment, cultural exchange and heightened contact at all political levels. Despite sharing its religious and cultural background with India, Nepal's domestic politics have shown a sudden inclination towards Beijing because China is helping the country reduce its considerable trade deficit. China's direct investment in Nepal doubled between 2007 and 2011. 'It funds almost everything from military aid, new

roads, telecommunications, building infrastructure, food supplies to hydroelectric power projects,' says Saransh Sehgal (Sehgal. 2014:1). China signed a deal with Nepal in 2012 to invest \$1.6bn in the 750 and 456 megawatt hydropower projects in West Seti and Upper Tamakoshi, respectively. To push its business interests beyond Nepal via land route, China has modernised the 115km-long Araniko Highway, connecting Kathmandu to the Chinese border town of Kodari. It has invested \$20m to upgrade the 17-km dirt track between Nepal's Syaphrubesi and Kerung in Tibet. On the other side of the border, it has already built Highway 318, which leads to Lhasa and ultimately to Shanghai [Joshi.2013:4]. In order to facilitate its exports, China is constructing dry ports at Larcha in Sindhupalchowk district and at Yari-Pulam, Rasuwa-Jilong and Kodari-Zangmu (Khasa), Kimathanka-Dingri, Olangchungola-Riwa and Mustang-Ligzi. Ensuring further flow of goods and people between Nepal and Tibet, China developed cross border roads through Simikot-Hilsa (85 km), Jomsom-Korala (80 km), and Khandbari-Kimanthanka (80 km) in the Nepal-Tibet border.

India wants to uphold its traditional leverage in Nepal, whereas China wants to disrupt this relationship by stopping India's presence in Nepal's northern region bordering Tibet. While India planned to spend \$361 million to develop connectivity with the border region of Nepal through roads and rail, China, too, declared an increase in its annual aid to Nepal by 50 per cent to nearly \$22 million. The Maoists in Nepal have been advocating for the extension of the Chinese railway from the Nepal-Tibet border down to Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha. Being at a stone's throw distance from the Nepal-India border, observers see the initiative as making a Buddhist Mecca to increase China's soft power and win the hearts of both Tibetans and Nepalese.

Hari Bansh Jha thus commented '... what is intriguing is that one of the neighbours is aggressive in increasing its area of influence in Nepal, while the other does not want to lose its traditional foothold in the country in view of its social, cultural and economic ties' (Jha.2013:75). Both Nepal and China have engaged in active military cooperation in controlling its borders, for which Nepal receives substantial military aid from Beijing. This resulted in a US \$8 million military aid to the army. The latest Chinese economic package to Nepal came with US \$1.63 million worth of election-related material for November 2013 Constituent Assembly elections, further convincing the Nepalese that China supports its democratic process (Sehgal. 2014:3).

Experts believe that the Beijing's economic policy is a major gamble in the South-Asian region. Daniel S. Markey, a Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) told *Defence Review Asia* that,

'China's expanding economic power is being translated into regional influence, whether through infrastructure, commercial, or diplomatic activities. Obviously, Beijing intends to consolidate its position in Tibet, as part of a decades-long effort. And, the consequences for growing Chinese influence in Nepal for Indian anxieties have also been clear. Along with other Chinese provocations, they inspire military planners in New Delhi to consider new investments in border defense' (Sehgal. 2014:3).

'The Himalayas are no longer a barrier between China and Nepal,' says Kanak Mani Dixit, Editor of *Himal Southasian*. Using Nepal as a transit point to spread their business across South Asia, much to India's discomfort, it is already inundated by Chinese goods [Joshi 2013:4]. "India should watch out for Chinese activities in Nepal and if China starts spreading its influence southwards to the Terai Region, then it's worrying for India," said Deb Mukherjee, former Indian ambassador in Kathmandu.

Relations between India and Nepal are close yet fraught with difficulties stemming from geography, economics, and archetypal problems inherent in big power-small power relations and common ethnic and linguistic identities that overlap the two countries' borders. The Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1950 cemented a 'special relationship' between India and Nepal that granted the

latter preferential economic treatment and provided the Nepalese in India the same economic and educational opportunities as Indian citizens. But as the number of Nepalese living and working in India increased and the involvement of India in Nepal's economy deepened in the 1960s and after, Nepalese discomfort with the 'special relationship' started to emerge. Indian dissatisfaction with Nepal's 1988 acquisition of Chinese weapons played an important role. Since then, Nepal sought to establish extensive military cooperation with China in a move to reduce perceived Indian influence. On January 9, 2013, at the 6th General Assembly of the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) in Kathmandu, Chairman Mohan Baidya Kiran stated, 'China respects Nepal's sovereignty unconditionally, while India has set an evil eye... there exists several unequal treaties between the two countries.' Nepal has also increasingly become concerned over the trade deficit with India, surging to 33.7 per cent.

The principal factor driving China's Nepal policy is to quell the Tibetan unrest through periphery consolidation. Trilateral cooperation among China, Nepal, and India as proposed by Prachanda, the Chairman of United Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), will enable China to expand its influence in South Asia, marginalizing India's pre-eminent position in the subcontinent. Hence, trilateral cooperation would come at the cost of India's security, economy and diplomacy. While, security concern should not be ignored, it is important to acknowledge the economic rationality behind the concept. (A Round Table Event Report. 2013:1).

India-Afghanistan-China

The Chinese connection to Afghanistan, as the former army General V.K. Singh opined, is through the Wakhan Corridor that skirts the northern areas of Jammu and Kashmir, a territory that India claims, but is under Pakistani occupation. But for PoK, India would have had direct access to Afghanistan through the Corridor. Otherwise, India does not have transit rights to Afghanistan through Pakistan. China's objective is to increase connectivity with Afghanistan where it already has considerable presence along with India in different projects. This physical and comparatively quieter connectivity of Wakhan Corridor would facilitate China to exploit the natural resources in Afghanistan.

Highlands of Central Asia from the Karakoram ranges—stretching from Pakistan to China skirting the Wakhan Corridor and Tajikistan to the Hindukush Mountains of Afghanistan, are the cynosure of the region's eyes. As the US draws out from Afghanistan in 2014, the Afghan leadership is threatened by Taliban insurgents at home and those connected to Pakistan next door. For the time being, Chinese have quietly resisted a public role in post-2014 scenario. China is concerned with rising Islamic insurgency and Uyghur or 'East Turkistan' nationalism in Xinjiang, western province that borders central Asia as well as Afghanistan. Beijing might believe that Pakistan will be able to control these fringe elements that are a continuous cause of instability in its periphery, but Afghans might not. Hence, as the endgame of the war in Afghanistan begins, the Afghan search for water-tight commitments from the region's players to respect its sovereignty intensifies. India, China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are all looking for its roles to play in the regional game.

A growing realization in the West believes that the situation in Afghanistan may ultimately hinge on the roles India and China may play. India's role in Afghanistan is being fully acknowledged, but China is also viewed as potentially a stabilizing force in Afghanistan. Former Japanese ambassador to Central Asia, Akio Kawato wrote:

'Afghanistan is not alien for China ... it was a vital part of the Silk Road and was a conduit to India from where China imported Buddhism. The Taliban, more 'civilized' now than in 2001, may incur China's strong involvement in the Afghan affairs' (Stobdan 2013:2).

Both China and India have high stakes in the Afghan stability to achieve high growth in the next two to three decades. Otherwise, for China stabilizing efforts in Xinjiang will never be that easy.

So the logic of establishing links with Afghanistan makes sense since in the changed context, China and Afghanistan need each other. Hence, India's Afghan policy will not be designed to counterbalance anyone but for reasons not only of helping Afghan people, but also for India's own security. Therefore, when India reviews its post-2014 Afghan policy, the China factor should not be seen in a zero-sum perception.

Over the years, China has increased its economic interests in Afghanistan and has invested heavily in exploiting its mineral resources. China has bought rights to mine copper in northern Afghanistan and gold and oil deposits worth around \$3 trillion. Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) and Jiangxi Copper Corporation (JCCL) won the tender in 2008 to develop the copper deposits in Logar, with investment of \$4.4 billion.

In contrast, India is investing up to \$11 billion to mine the Hajigak iron ore. Hajigak deposits contain about 1.8 billion tons of ore, with an exceptionally high iron concentration ranging from 61 to 64 per cent. "However, unlike China, India does not share a border with Afghanistan and the sea route can be expensive. That is why India has been exploring the Pakistani land route for transport of iron ore" [Ansar 2013:2]. As compared to using the longer Iranian route via Chabahar, India prefers Pakistan for transporting the ore out and for building a slurry pipeline. While Pakistan approved the trade and transit treaty that allows Afghanistan to send goods to India, it remained concerned about losing influence in Afghanistan lest Indian economic clout increases there.

On the Chinese approach in the 1960s, American scholar Dupree notes, 'The Chinese moved from behind the bamboo curtain to woo the Afghans socially, politically, and, in a lesser degree, economically.' During the Afghan *Jehad* against the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the Chinese supported the Afghan Mujahideen. Barnett Rubin, an authority on the Afghan *Jehad*, writes,

'The operation was not just a CIA operation; it was a joint operation of the CIA, the ISI, the Al Istakbarat al-Ama (General Directorate) of Saudi Arabia. The Chinese were also involved (although they were and are rather discreet about this). These were four intelligence agencies that met every week in Islamabad. A lot of weapons from China went into Afghanistan as well but were not paid for by the Chinese.'

Ironically, the success of the Afghan *Jehad* invigorated China's main internal security threat – Xinjiang's Uyghur militancy, and quest for throwing off the Chinese yoke. In the 1990s, as the Taliban gained strength and territory in Afghanistan and as their alliance with the al-Qaeda deepened they began to give sanctuary and support to Central Asian Islamic militant groups, including the Uyghurs. It is believed that a thousand Uyghur militants came to Afghanistan in 2003. China turned to Pakistan to persuade the Taliban to expel the Uyghur militants from Afghanistan. The 'all weather friend' interceded. Chinese officials met senior Taliban leaders who made promises to rein in the Uighur militants but promises were not kept. Following 9/11, the Taliban were ousted by the Coalition and Northern Alliance forces in November 2001. They retreated into Pakistan and the Uyghur militants went with them. China went along with international efforts on Afghanistan after 9/11 but remained restrained in its public articulation on the Taliban and low key on Kabul after the establishment of the Hamid Karzai-led Interim Administration. "On his part, Mr. Karzai began to assiduously woo China, a courtship he has continued throughout his presidency" [Katju. 2013:4]. Along with bilateral track Chinese and Afghan leaders constantly used multilateral platforms for additional opportunities to meet each other, especially the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which the Afghan leaders regularly attended. Gradually bilateral ties have been upgraded: from 'good neighbourly' to 'comprehensive cooperation' to 'establishing strategic and cooperative partnership,' finally culminating with the signing in 2006 the Treaty of Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation. However, China's relations with Pakistan, Pakistan's connections with the Taliban and continuous Taliban sympathy for the Uyghur cause, complicate the relationship.

The Uyghur militancy in Xinjiang has been bloody which will likely endure for a long time for China. According to Chinese scholar Zhao Huasheng, 'China views Afghanistan as an inseparable part of building Xinjiang's security' (Huasheng. 2012:4). The first victim of Afghan narcotics was again the Xinjiang. According to Xinjiang police in 2010, they detected 15 cases related to drug trafficking from Afghanistan [Huasheng. 2012:4]. China has focused on the development of Xinjiang as an industrial base and as a pole in the trade and transit network it is putting in place with Central Asia and beyond, by co-opting the latter in this grand design. The ambitious Gwadar-Kashgar Trade and Transit Corridor Project which China and Pakistan have undertaken have importance in this context. The development of the Gwadar port which will eventually enmesh Afghanistan, has obvious geo-strategic implications for India as it goes ahead with Iran to develop the Chabahar port and its links with and through Afghanistan to Central Asia and beyond. China is conscious of an inevitable element of competition between the two transit systems. Hence, it is paying close attention to the Chabahar port and developments in western Afghanistan, especially around the Indian-built Zarang-Dilaram Highway that connects the Chabahar port with the strategic Kabul-Kandahar-Herat Road. The Aynak Copper mines project envisages the construction of a railway to evacuate copper to Xinjiang via Tajikistan. This will be designed to integrate a major part of the Afghan mining activity with the economy of western China.

'China takes a long-term view of its interests but pursues them relentlessly. It will do so in Afghanistan too. India has built a fund of goodwill in Afghanistan through the example it holds as a democracy as well as its popular assistance programme. With these assets it is well placed though it will have to navigate the next few years through the minefield of the consequences of the US forces drawdown. In the long term, India will need to evolve new strategies to safeguard and advance its interests in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, it has to make a success of the Hajigak iron ore project and ensure that transport systems are established to move the product through Chabahar,' says Katju, the former Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan.

India-POK-China

China's 'all-weather friend' is an integral part of its 'look west' policy to find economic sustenance for landlocked western provinces of China. China and Pakistan signed deals in 2013 to push forward the economic corridor and the first-of-its-kind fibre optic link from the Chinese Xinjiang to Rawalpindi. The 820-km link would cost \$44 million, with 85 per cent of the financing coming from the Chinese with three years completion time. The deals were signed when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif undertook his first overseas visit to China after taking over as Prime Minister. He hailed the relationship as 'higher than the Himalayas, deeper than the deepest sea in the world and sweeter than honey' during his meeting with Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. The highlight of the eight agreements signed was a long-term plan to build an \$18 billion economic corridor from Xinjiang on China's western border to the Gwadar port. The existing 600kms highway across the Karakoram mountain range that connected Kashgar in north-west China's Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Pakistan's northeast was supposed to be expanded into an ambitious 2,000kms China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. It will connect the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea with Xinjiang, providing China easy access to fuel imports from the Middle East and Africa while creating a cheap overland export route to a maritime exit port for interior provinces such as Gansu and Qinghai. 'The corridor is conceived and planned at the cost of India's interests,' said S.D. Muni, Former Ambassador (Roy Chowdhury 2013:3). The Pakistani government transferred the contract for running Gwadar from the Port of Singapore Authority to China Overseas Port.

Both the corridor and the link would pass through POK, underscoring China's willingness to pursue projects in the region despite India's objections. Chinese President Xi Jinping strongly backed deepening the 'all-weather' ties between the two countries, describing the relationship as one of 'good neighbours, friends, partners as well as brothers. The partnership with Pakistan is a priority in China's foreign policies,' Xi said (Krishnan a 2013:2).

During the visit of Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari to China in August 2010, Beijing declared Kashgar as a special economic zone. The Sino-Pak collaboration in hydro-power project in Bunji in northern areas is also a matter of concern for India. Notwithstanding India's concerns, China has agreed to provide Pakistan \$448 million for the 969-mw Neelum-Jhelum hydropower project, currently underway in PoK ('China to Give \$448 million Neelum-Jhelum Project in POK'. 2013:1). Both countries completed a pre-feasibility study for a railway line linking Kashgar in Xinjiang to Havelian, running through the Khunjerab Pass and POK. Asked about India's concerns, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei said, 'China's position on the Kashmir issue is clear and consistent. We hope India and Pakistan can solve the relevant issue through dialogue' (Krishnan b 2013:2). India raised serious reservations on Chinese activities in POK. Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai stated "Our views have been conveyed to the Chinese authorities. We have serious reservations on it" ('India has 'Reservations' over China's Activities in POK'. 2013:1).

While the Sino-Pak nexus has always been a matter of concern for India, what has exacerbated the matter further is the degree of seamlessness the two countries are fast acquiring in the POK. This prompted journalist Selig S Harrison, specialized in South Asia and East Asia, to comment that 'Islamabad is handing over the de facto control of the strategic Gilgit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of the disputed Kashmir to China' (Das 2014:1). The growing foot-prints of China in the POK getting robust over the years, is a matter of serious anxiety for India. As far as physical occupation of Jammu & Kashmir is concerned, while India is in possession of 45 per cent and Pakistan 35 per cent, China occupies about 20 per cent of the territory (including Aksai Chin and the Sakshgam valley ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963) [Das 2014:1]. China is well on track to firm up the sale of two more nuclear reactors to Pakistan, raising serious concern in India which has conveyed its objections at both the political and official levels in China, as well as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The project which is to be located off Karachi (KANNUP 2 and 3) is valued at about \$9.6 billion. New Delhi was deeply concerned after reports that the China National Nuclear Corporation Ltd had signed some initial commercial contracts with Pakistani authorities (Samanta, 2013:1).

India-Pakistan-China

The roots of the India-Pakistan animosity are deep-seated in religion, history and the politics of revenge—and predate India-China hostility. Beijing has long been the most important player in the India-Pakistan-China triangular relationship, making heavy strategic and economic investments in Pakistan to keep the common enemy, India, under pressure. Interestingly, China's attempts to improve ties with India since the early 1990s have been accompanied by parallel efforts to bolster the Pakistani military's nuclear and conventional capabilities vis-à-vis India. Ever since Chinese and Pakistani leaders underscored their nations' commitments to each other's core security interests at the Bandung Conference in 1955, Pakistan has occupied a unique position in China's foreign policy calculus [Pant, 2012:84]. Their relations have been described as 'arguably the most stable and durable element of China's foreign relations' (Pant, 2012:84). India has been the main factor that has influenced China's and Pakistan's policies vis-a-vis each other. Since the late 1990s, China had become increasingly concerned by the steady rise of India coupled with the growing US-India entente and the talk of 'India as a counterweight to China' in US policy circles, together with Pakistan's gradual descent into the ranks of failed states. Since the end of cold war, politically dysfunctional and economically bankrupt Pakistan's flirtation with Islamic extremism and terrorism, coupled with its nuclear and missile programmes, had alienated Washington too.

Pakistan's military modernization is dependent on Chinese largesse; with China supplying Pakistan with short-range M-11 missiles and helping Pakistan develop the Shaheen-1 ballistic missile. The two states have been actively involved in a range of joint ventures, including the JF-17 fighter aircraft used for delivering nuclear weapons, an Airborne Warning and Control System, and the Babur cruise missile. China is supplying its most advanced homemade combat aircraft, the third-

generation J-10 fighter jet, in a deal worth around \$6 billion. Beijing is helping Pakistan to build and launch satellites for remote sensing and communication, even as Pakistan is reportedly hosting a Chinese space communication facility at Karachi. (Mohan, 2007:2). On the economic front, China and Pakistan have a free trade agreement, with China accounting for around 11 per cent of Pakistan's imports. The two sides are committed to achieving a trade target of \$15 billion by 2015 (Qingfen 2011:1). China's 'no-strings attached' economic aid to Pakistan is more appreciated than the aid it receives from the United States (which often comes with riders attached), even as Chinese assistance is nowhere near what the United States has given to Pakistan. The United States provided \$349 million in military and economic assistance to Pakistan in 2010 alone (Pant 2012:86).

For New Delhi, Beijing's military alliance with Islamabad remains a sore point because the Sino-Pakistani nuclear nexus has introduced a new element of uncertainty in sub-continental equations. Beijing shares Islamabad's deep mistrust of India's strategic ambitions and seeks to prevent India's emergence as a peer competitor and a major strategic rival in Asia. That is why Chinese strategists have long argued that China's pursuit of great power status is a historical right and perfectly legitimate but India's pursuit of great power status is illegitimate, wrong, dangerous, and a sign of hegemonic, imperial behavior [Malik a, 2002:5]. Many Chinese strategists believe India is using the war on terrorism as a pretext to militarily subdue Pakistan or to destabilize and dismember the country. 'China, though still concerned about the continued activism of Islamist groups in Pakistan and contiguous areas, is not at all willing to see the regional balance of power significantly tilt in favor of India' (Ahrari, 2002:2 cited in Hutzler 2002:1).

Though Beijing welcomes the new US commitment to prop up Beijing's 'all-weather friend' after a decade of abandonment and estrangement, however they are 'highly uncomfortable' with the four US military bases in Pakistan at Jacobabad, Pasni, Dalbandhin and Shamsi. It bitterly complained about Musharraf's granting the United States exclusive access to airfields at Jacobabad and Pasni, and allowing the U.S. intelligence agencies to set up listening posts in the north opposite Xinjiang and Tibet (Horner, 2002:45). Of special concern to Beijing is the US presence at Pasni in the Baluchistan, where China is constructing a deep-water naval port at Gwadar, the inland Makran coastal highway linking it with Karachi, and several oil and gas pipeline projects.

China is aware of the fact that the Sino-Pakistan relationship is fundamentally asymmetrical. Pakistan wants more out of its ties with China than China is willing to offer. Today, when Pakistan's domestic problems are gigantic, China would be very cautious in involving itself even more. Moreover, the closer China gets to Pakistan, the faster India would move in to the American orbit. Amid worries about the potential destabilizing influence of Pakistani militants in Xinjiang, China does not hesitate to take a harder line against Pakistan. The flow of arms and terrorists from across the border in Pakistan remains a major headache for Chinese authorities and Pakistan's ability to control the flow to China at a time of growing domestic turmoil would remain a major variable. Whether it is due to US drone strikes in the tribal areas of the country or repeated Pakistan army operations in South and North Waziristan and Khyber agency to control violence, the country is the worst sufferer. China publicly applauded Pakistan's Operation Zarb-e-Azb, which targets militant groups in the North Waziristan tribal region. That includes groups affiliated with Uyghur separatist movements that have carried out attacks on Chinese soil.

Yet despite China's vocal support for counter-terrorism in Pakistan, tangible assistance has been so far limited. China has given Pakistan over \$500 million in the past 10 years to assist with counter-terrorism. By comparison, the U.S. has contributed \$28 billion in total aid to Pakistan since the September 11 attacks - including \$11 billion specifically for counter-terrorism (Tiezzi 2014:3). Although, counter-terrorism cooperation is becoming even more important as US and NATO forces are withdrawing from Afghanistan and especially after the Peshawar attack in December 2014, but would China secure its own national interests - by becoming more deeply involved with Pakistan in counter-terrorism or give priority to other political game plans that are

emerging in the region? As the western forces move out of Afghanistan, Beijing worried about regional stability, recognises that close ties with Pakistan will not make it safer as troubles in Xinjiang have once again underscored. Not only Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is emerging so strong, for China, it is particularly crucial as terrorist groups targeting China, like the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), are known to be based in Pakistan.

The South Asian military balance of power is neither pro-India nor pro-Pakistan, it has always been pro-China. And Beijing will take all means possible to ensure that the regional power balance does not tilt in India's favour. In the meantime, a major consolation for Beijing is that a stronger Pakistan aided by the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and international financial institutions would be better able to balance and contain rival India (Malik b. 2002:8). But officially, the two states will continue to view each other as important partners, as India's rise continues to aggravate Islamabad and cause anxiety in Beijing.

Conclusion

Against India's interest, Bhutan is already being dragged into Himalayan politics. Her tightrope situation of how to keep equidistance from India and China has made her more vulnerable. Her transition to parliamentary governance, from guided foreign policy to the role of full player on the world stage, and the change from medievalism to modernity together present enough challenges for Bhutan. Bhutan being within India's security interests, whatever course Indo-China relations may follow, will bear implications for Indo-Bhutan relations, as well.

China is increasingly working to take over India's position of the largest trading partner of Nepal. To deal with its internal problems, Nepal has serious business to engage with China rather than India. China too has deeper motives than just business cooperation. The Tibetan community in Nepal is a serious concern for the Chinese authorities. Moreover, China's open diplomatic policy in Nepal remains to exploit the resources of Nepal and take advantage of Indian market as well. China's policies towards Nepal on one hand are to safeguard its core national interest of Tibet and also to counter as well as check India's influence in Nepal.

On the contrary, China holds clear, coherent, and relatively low-profile position on Afghanistan. China refuses to join the American Northern Distribution Network (NDN) to Afghanistan. Afghanistan having strong influence on the security of Xinjiang, China's aims in Afghanistan relate mainly to the issues of security of the region and Xinjiang in particular. *The Indo-Pak equation, implications of a large US military presence in the region, consequences of growing drug proliferation and its linkages with pan-Islamist groups potentially stirring trouble in Xinjiang are adversely impacting upon China's desire to expand and secure its commercial interests in the region.* Hence, without resolving problems with Afghanistan, China cannot guarantee security of the surrounding regions including Xinjiang.

Relations between China and Pakistan are indeed growing, especially with respect to military and nuclear ties. Bilateral trade and investment have increased in the recent years. China's expanding influence in Central Asia and its interest in overland access to the Arabian Sea could motivate even stronger links with Pakistan. But Pakistan's deep-rooted hostility towards India, Washington's post-cold war courtship with New Delhi, and the potential for a future global order characterized by competition between the United States and China may adversely change the happy going in China-Pakistan relations. China-India trade is now larger than both trade between China and Pakistan and trade between India and the United States.

India is not entirely sure whether it wants to place all its eggs in the U.S. basket. In a worst case scenario, internal violence and instability in Pakistan would even scare off its Chinese ally. In a best case, Islamabad might act to realize its own economic interests through normalized relations with India. If future U.S.-China relations are more cooperative, then Chinese involvement in Pakistan offers little to worry. China's concerns about the future stability and development of

Pakistan will limit the extent to which China will bail Pakistan out of its current economic difficulties, and the degree to which China will seek to drive a wedge between Islamabad and Washington. China's concrete economic and political interests in Pakistan are currently propelled by China's own interest. Finally, with the US' renewed interest in Asia, Washington has sought to prop up India as a counterweight to China's rising influence. If India's foreign relations become more assertive, China may indeed start to take India seriously and India will not accept Chinese domination of Asia as well. Hence, if 21st century features India either as a challenger to the Chinese story or as an irritant as China tries to catch up with the US, and more so, due to the Uyghur militancy in its own country – – China might deter the policy of sub-regionalism, though wielding of soft power through leverages might continue for both India and China.

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The Rohingya Refugee Crises and India's Security: A Contemporary Perspective

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ABSTRACT

The issue of Migration has proved to be a serious security threat for a nation in the political, economic and social sphere and India is no exception to this. India from time immemorial has provided shelter to the Refugees who have migrated to India due to political upheavals in the unstable neighbouring countries. The Rohingyas, who are an ethnic minority of the Rakkhine (Arakan) State of Myanmar, fled to India during the British Raj in fear of religious persecution. These Muslim asylum seekers came to limelight when they settled in the posh locality of Vasant Bihar in New Delhi in April 2012 in deplorable living conditions.

India not being a party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and in an attempt to strengthen the growing Indo- Myanmar economic and strategic synergy, rendered a half-hearted solution to the problem of the Rohingya Refugees by issuing the 'Protection Certificates' through the UNHCR. Although Myanmar has forbidden the Rohingyas the Burmese citizenship and Bangladesh has denied to accept the Rohingyas as 'Bengalis' there is still a flicker of hope in the wake of the National Democratic Polls in twenty five years and the landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar. In view of The International Community turning a deaf ear to the pleas of these vulnerable people the article draws attention to the possibilities of a larger security threat which these people can pose both for India and the world by joining hands with the volatile North East and with the Islamic terrorist outfits as an expression of their long standing grievances. Thus, in keeping with the age old proverb, 'Prevention is better than cure, India and Myanmar, as well as Bangladesh along with the entire International Community must jointly try to restore the lost status of this long deprived, ethnic group.

Key Words: Refugees, Migration, Ethnic minority, Rakkhine State, State Security.

Myanmar, geographically the closest South East Asian country to India is strategically very important for India as it acts as a bridge between the countries comprising the SAARC and those of the ASEAN member states. Apart from this, India and Myanmar share long land and maritime boundaries.¹ Moreover, the growing importance of the western most state of Myanmar, historically known as the Arakan, which is officially known as the 'Rakkhine State' ² has been a very important factor in the recent development of the Indo Myanmar relations.

The State of Arakan-A Double-Edged Sword for India?:

The State of Arakan has come to limelight in the recent years owing to various national and international events one of them being the series of tripartite negotiations (India Myanmar and Bangladesh) over the issue of gas import from the Rakkhine coast of Myanmar to India. Although it ended in a failure due to Bangladesh's demands of some other favours from India in return for offering transit facilities through its territory, the Rakkhine state promises India with the bright

prospect of carrying out intensive bilateral economic engagement with Myanmar.³ However, it is this particular region from where the Rohingya Refugees have migrated to India, an event which have jeopardized the state security in many ways.

Migration: A Social Security Threat for the States

Migration has been defined as societal security threat from two dimensions in the Copenhagen school model: First, society is "overrun" or "diluted" by influxes of another group of people.

Secondly, the identity of the first is altered by a significant change in the composition of the population. But this insight also suggests how the securitization of the societal questions may be seen as a negative effort of broadening the security agenda into new sectors, and as a development that is in conflict with the commitment to the enhancement of individual and group security. Buzan, Waever and De Wilde however, are of the opinion that migration is a threat to the society rather than to the state, because it threatens the self-identity of the existing population.⁴

A migration may prove to be important for the receiving country, when the alternative values and behaviours of the migrating population dramatically affect the culture of the receiving country. The population may fear a change in their ethnic, religious and cultural composition, while Governments might fear a rise in xenophobia in the country and an increase in the size and population of the racist political parties. Apprehending such dangerous possibilities the Government would invariably try to impose restrictions on immigration.

Migration becomes a security threat in the political sphere, when the issue, even if it is on too small a scale to meaningfully affect the character of the existing population, are successfully securitized by politicians to raise such fears in order to promote their own political agenda. The political and economic effects of migration are a possible source of insecurity to the state as well as society to the extent that they generate instabilities by overloading the capacity of the Government to cope with resulting problems. The degree of instability and insecurity generated will depend on 'The capacity of the social, economic, political and administrative institutions to integrate large numbers of immigrants, and the resistance of some immigrant families to assimilation.'⁵

On the other hand, the presence of migrants can also prove financially beneficial for the host country in terms of cheap labour and skills provided by them, but they also prove to have a detrimental effect on the concerned country's health and housing systems, and result in scarcity of jobs. But, there is no sense of existential threat to a community or a culture in this conception. It is the addition of the cultural dimension and threat to identity that transforms the issue into one of societal insecurity, in which the scale of the perceived crisis might be much greater than the actual impact of such cultural subversions.⁶

Migration and State Security: An Indian Perspective

South Asian refugees who have fled to India face serious problems in their daily lives. From forcible repatriation to starvation, refugees find themselves on the edge, clawing for mere survival. India has provided shelter to these refugees for centuries for both geopolitical and socio-economic reasons. Political upheaval in the unstable neighbouring countries of India have often forced citizens to seek refuge in our country. Additionally, ethnic and religious persecution forced minorities to join similar peoples in India's multi-ethnic and multilingual society. For example, the ongoing conflict between the ethnic Tamils (mostly the Hindus) and the majority Sinhalese (mostly the Buddhists) has forced a large group of ethnic Tamils to seek refuge in India. Similarly, The Reangs and the Rohingya Muslims have thus been coerced out of Myanmar by the military junta. They have sought refuge in India and Bangladesh which have recently emerged as a matter of grave concern for the Indian policy makers.

The juridical basis of the international obligations to protect refugees, namely, non-refoulement

including non-rejection at the frontier, non-return, non-expulsion or non-extradition and the minimum standard of treatment are traced in international conventions and customary law. The only treaty regime having near universal effect pertaining to refugees is the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees which is the magna carta of refugee law.⁷ Since India has not yet ratified or acceded to this regime its legal obligation to protect refugees is traced mainly in customary international law.

The plight of refugees in India generally depends upon the extent of protection they receive from either the Indian Government or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Among the three categories of Refugees that India harbours, the Arakan refugees fall under the third category, i.e. the refugees who have entered India and have assimilated into their communities. Their presence is not acknowledged by either the Indian Government or UNHCR. This category includes Chin refugees from the Chin State of Burma, Nagas from Burma, Rakhain refugees from Arakan State in Burma, and ethnic Nepalese of Bhutanese nationality.⁸

Now let us see how the Rohingya refugees have endangered the security of the state and whether they have been able to be a determining factor in Indo- Myanmar bilateral relations.

The Rohingyas: Who are they and from where have they come?

The **Rohingya people** (*Ruáingga* pronounced as *rui hang ja* in the Burmese language) are Indo-Aryan people from the Rakhine State, Myanmar, who speak the Rohingya language. According to some scholars, they are indigenous to Rakhine State, while other historians claim that they migrated to Myanmar from Bengal primarily during the period of British rule in Burma, and to a lesser extent, after the Burmese independence in 1948 and Liberation War in 1971. Though the Rohingyas consider themselves as an ethnic minority of Burma, they are not enlisted among the 135 indigenous ethnic minorities of the country and the Burmese Nationality Law, 1982 forbids them from Burmese citizenship. For the Burmese nationalist the Rohingya is a "Muslim" (hence heretic) and a "Bengali" (hence outsider) who will never be accepted in Burma.⁹

The Present Status of the Rohingyas: The Stateless People within a State

As of 2013, about 1.3 million Rohingyas live in Myanmar. They reside mainly in the northern Rakhine townships, where they form 80–98% of the population.¹⁰ However, Myanmar's nationalist discourse often raises the spectre of creeping silent Islamization of the country, exhibiting Islamophobia. The Buddhist nationalists want the Rohingyas to be expelled out of the country not merely because they are 'outsiders' but they are perceived as the bearers of an expansionist religion, Islam which is a threat to Buddhist culture of the country.

Given the popularity and prominence of the Ma Ba Tha and Ashin Wirathu, the monk who lead the anti- muslim 969 movement among the majority Bamars, the socio-political space of the Rohingyas seems to be narrowing in Myanmar. Therefore of late, the Rohingyas have been forced to identify themselves as "Bengalis" and they have been asked to prove that their ancestors did not arrive later than 1823 if they are to be considered as Burmese citizens and those Rohingya who fail to acquire citizenship are to be marginalized, according to the Rakhine Action Plan, by forcing them into isolated and restrictive settlement zones.¹¹

As a result of such discriminatory attitude of the Government, many Rohingyas have fled to ghettos and refugee camps in Thailand. More than 100,000 Rohingyas in Myanmar continue to live in camps for internally displaced persons. Rohingyas have received international attention in the wake of 2012 Rakhine State riots, and more recently because of their attempted migration throughout Southeast Asia in the 2015 Rohingya refugee crisis.¹²

The Rohingya Refugee Problem in India: *Historical Background*

The problem of the Arakanese refugees can be traced back to the period of the British Raj in India when thousands of Arakanese fled into this region in fear of persecution. However, with the inception of military rule in Myanmar in 1988 a fresh inflow of refugees was witnessed in the adjoining North East states of India. Like the Chakmas they also came in waves, the first occurring in April 1993, when 45 families from two villages of Pagawa and Foaylak-wa, situated in the North Arakan Hill Tracts fled in to India and are presently occupying a place newly named as the Kaki village on the banks of the upper Kaladan River inside India.¹³

The next wave of Arakanese refugee influx occurred on 15th December 1993 when a troop, led by Captain Tint Zaw Hla of Marei- wa military post under the battalion 374, burnt down Khone-roa- one Khami ethnic minority village. The next occasional refugee influx occurred in mid- 1994 when over 20 families from the villages of Northern Arakan fled to India. And settled in a place named Takpoche roa at the upper Kalak Choung River in India, only 2 miles away from the Bhutan border.¹⁴

Indian Response to the Plight of the Rohingya Refugees in India

Although the Arakanese refugees did not demand for citizenship in India, they formed an organization named, Committee for Arakanese Refugee Relief and Welfare (CARRW), with its head office in New Delhi. The Executive Committee members comprised of the Arakanese political exiles in India, refugee camp representatives and MPs and ministers from NCGUB (National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma). This organization made several appeals to the Government of India and the Government of Mizoram as well as UNHCR and the International and the Indian Red Cross for urgent help to meet the needs of the Arakanese refugees. A demonstration at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi in the year 1995 marked the first organized movement, where they highlighted the plight of the Arakanese people who were already harassed by the Burmese army. However, the UNHCR bypassed the responsibility on grounds that it was an issue concerned with the Home Ministry of India. Thus, these distressed people submitted a memorandum to the Government of India on 13th August, 1995, followed by similar appeals in 1996-97 when fresh turmoil in the border region resulted in more influx of refugees. Although the Home Ministry expressed willingness to give permission to supply food to the camp refugees, the Foreign Ministry did not support the decision on diplomatic grounds.¹⁵

These Muslim asylum seekers from Burma (Myanmar) came to the limelight when they settled in the posh area of Vasant Bihar in New Delhi in April 2012. They lived in deplorable conditions without the basic amenities like water and sanitation. With regard to the plight of these refugees the UNHCR admitted that they were unable to maintain a group of 700 people (along with women and children) in a place like Vasant Bihar in New Delhi with extremes of weather conditions.¹⁶

The Nature of India's Response to the Rohingya Refugees in India

The Government's response in this regard is not only that of apathy like the refugees of Bhutan, but at times the Government has made life difficult for these migrants by arresting and even deporting these people.

Since India is not a party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, India can treat unauthorized migrants as 'illegal immigrants' who are often arrested. Since India has not signed any legal conventions for the protection of the refugees, it was not obligatory for India to treat all refugee groups in the same manner. Naina Bose, a member of one of the NGOs working for the said Rohingya Refugees in India said, "For us the core issue remains protection, how best can we protect these people? So by registering them as asylum seekers we believe that we are fulfilling our core mandate of protection. By giving them asylum seeker cards they will not be arbitrarily deported or sent back." She also informed that the UNHCR has registered 1,800 Rohingyas as sylum seekers in India. Thousands of them have fled to Bangladesh where they face similar

neglect from the Government.¹⁷

Unlike the Afghan refugees from the North or the Sri Lankan Tamils from the South, Rohingyas have no cultural or historical ties to India. So while the National Government mandated health care and education to all, the Rohingyas are often turned away by providers because they neither have the Press to write about them, nor any charismatic leader like Aung San Suu Kyi to champion their cause.¹⁸

An Introspection into India's Insensitive Response

India's unwillingness to get involved in the Rohingya Refugee Crisis can be well understood through a closer analysis of the recent developments in the Indo Myanmar relations. The Indian Government in an attempt to deal with the insurgent groups operating in India's North East region from its bases in Burma reportedly offered to supply varieties of military hardware such as, tanks aircraft etc. to Burma. The Kaladan Multi Modal Transport Project has been set up in the area to facilitate anti- insurgency operations. In April 2007, it was reported that Indian and the Myanmar Security Forces were 'conducting joint military operations along the 1,643 km Indo - Myanmar border to neutralize insurgent groups.' In July 2010, Than Shwe and Manmohan Singh agreed upon a strategy of increased security cooperation and a strengthened collective effort to fight the insurgents and to combat terrorism along the border of the two countries.¹⁹

Another interesting point of this strategy is that the military equipment donated by India for the crackdown of insurgents can also be used by the Burmese military against the ethnic civilians of Burma. It is noteworthy to mention in this regard that India has never supported the International Arms Embargo on Burma.²⁰

The China Factor: In spite of such significant developments in India- Myanmar relationships, India has been slower than China to develop infrastructure in Myanmar and to benefit from its natural resources. India is also concerned about Pakistan's long- standing military ties with Myanmar. Thus, the India-Myanmar relationship presents a complex scenario, given the Sino-Myanmar, Sino-Pakistan and Pakistan-Myanmar triangle of relations. China has cast a long shadow over India's Myanmar policy, but does not completely envelop it. A stable, economically vibrant and independent Myanmar would be in China's as well as India's interests. Symptomatic of the delicate balancing act that New Delhi has to perform, the visit to India of the Myanmar Opposition leader, Suu Kyi, after a gap of more than four decades is both actually and potentially important in determining the future direction and shape of India's Myanmar policy.²¹

Under these circumstances it would not be beneficial for India to champion the cause of the Rohingyas. India thus, has tried to wash off its hands of the entire matter by half- heartedly issuing the 'Protection Certificates' through the UNHCR. However, this minor benefit also does not trickle down to these wretched people in the border areas, and are restricted to some of the influential refugee leaders within the country.²²

Possibilities of Larger Security Threats for India

A half hearted attempt by the Indian Government, in the nurturing of the Rohingyas within the country has resulted in complex security threat which is perhaps stealthily sneaking from its backdoor.

First, after Bangladesh's refusal to accept any more Rohingya refugees in the wake of 2012 ethnic violence in Rakhine, many of the asylum-seekers had turned towards India's northeast. In The Asia Times Online, reported at that time quoting police authorities that more than 1400 Rohingya refugees were intercepted while entering into Indian territory, half of them trying to enter directly to India using the Manipur and Mizoram borders, while the rest had tried to enter through Tripura from Bangladesh under considerable pressure from the Bangladeshi authorities to go back to their native Rakhine state in Myanmar. The Hindu also, last year, reported that more

than one thousand Rohingya refugees were detained while entering into West Bengal. Nevertheless, these reports clearly suggest that a silent new wave of migration into India's Northeast is taking place.²³

Secondly, the Rohingyas, with the same religious affinity with the other Islamic terrorist outfits can integrate themselves with the later, in order to pressurize the government of Burma to get back their lost status. This will definitely have its repercussions on India, in the form of increased terrorist activities in the country, as the migrants might try to adopt similar pressure tactics on the Indian government to be more sensitive towards the cause of the Rohingyas.

Thirdly, led by extreme poverty and hunger, they might get involved in petty crimes like robbery etc. or might unleash heinous atrocities against women and children like rape, kidnapping, murder etc., thus adding on to the various social insecurities already existent in the country or might take to drug peddling and smuggling of arms and ammunitions into the country.

Although India has adopted a very cautious strategy with Burma in order to control the North East insurgency problems, there is a possibility that India's insurgent operations might accelerate, if the Rohingyas join hands with these insurgent groups, in their demand for a separate statehood.

Thus the issue needs a sensitive handling by the Governments of the concerned countries, as well as that of the international community.

Response of the International Community to the Rohingya Problem

Although the 'First World' countries like, the United States and Australia have started relaxing their sanctions on Burma, as a reward for progress towards democratic reforms, the Human Rights issue, including the plight of these refugees has taken a back seat for the entire international community, who has just promised to raise the issue.²⁴

On the other hand Bangladesh has denied accepting the Rohingyas as "Bengalis", though the country has been sheltering thousands of Rohingya refugees who fled Rakkhine prior to the 2012 violence. Prior to this, in 2011 Bangladesh Government had introduced ID Cards on the basis of which the unregistered Rohingya asylum seekers were denied access to basic amenities like food and education. The plight of these hapless people can be well understood from the reports of the UNHCR in the year 2014, according to which out of 200,000-500,000 refugees in Bangladesh, only 32,355 are registered. Thus, there has been an exodus of Rohingya refugees to India from Bangladesh.²⁵

Conclusion: Word of Caution

The Problems of illegal migration from one country to another always has a spill-over effect on the third country and India has been no exception in this case. However, the issue has not proved to be an irritant in Indo- Myanmar relations so far. As has been discussed earlier, India has only meted out half hearted treatment to these refugees who continue to languish in the sordid, dirty camps in our country.²⁶

Back in their homeland in Myanmar even equal and just treatment of these people seems to be bleak in the wake of Myanmar's democratic polls on November 8th 2015, in which only select ethnic minorities in particular states and regions were entitled to vote. Even prior to this, the Rohingyas have been denied genuine autonomy by the Government. However, The National Democratic vote in twenty five years and the landslide victory of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar have raised a flicker of hope among the Rohingyas although she has been criticized by many for her failure to speak out on the issue of Human Rights regarding the persecution of the Rohingyas.

As for the International Community the repeated terrorist attacks must act as an eye opener for all. The countries must not forget the possibilities of the Rohingyas joining hands with the insurgent groups in India's volatile North East or with the Islamic terrorist outfits, as an expression of the

redressal of their long- standing grievances. Such Unfortunate events will adversely affect both India and Myanmar's joint efforts to curb the insurgent operations in the North East as well as their cooperation for further economic developments. Thus, in keeping with the age old proverb, 'Prevention is better than cure, India and Myanmar, as well as Bangladesh along with the entire International Community must jointly try to restore the lost status of this long deprived, ethnic group.

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India's Responsibility of Reconciling Development and Climate Change

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ABSTRACT

In response to the unprecedented greenhouse gas emissions and its detrimental impact on the climate system, the world community has come together to chalk out a legally binding international agreement through the Conference of Parties (COP 21), that seeks to mitigate the perils of climate change. This paper looks at the practicality of the Paris pact and India's independent stance on the issue of the 'firewall' between the global north and the global south. The paper strikes a balance between the developing countries' dichotomy of taking concrete steps to combat climate change and addressing the need to fulfill the aspirations of their populace. The developing world can ill afford to have serious constraints being imposed upon it as it embarks on the path towards progress and attempts to ensure that rich nations pay back their debt for overdraft on the carbon space. The paper assesses India's 'Intended National Determined Contribution that claims to propagate a sustainable way of living based on moderation, values of conservation and tradition.

Key words: *India, Development, Climate Change, Sustainable Development, Mitigation.*

India's economy which is largely dependent on agriculture is vulnerable to any impacts of climate change. Around 700 million rural population¹ directly depend on climate sensitive sectors like agriculture, forests and fisheries for their livelihoods. While ensuring that climate change is factored in the policy measures, we also need to ensure to look into the needs of the population of the country, which includes 30% of the global poor. India's INDC has mentioned that more than half of the India of 2030 is yet to be built. It therefore faces the challenge of completion of the development agenda and ensuring that 'environmental sensibilities' are imbibed. It recognizes that this model can only work with the collaborative efforts of both Developed and Developing countries.

The success of climate agreements at the global level has always significantly depended on the willingness of countries to concede something with the intent to obtain some greater gain. The Paris Agreement has been no different. The premise of CoP 21 is that by agreeing to some checks on national greenhouse gas emissions, and hence energy use patterns, each country benefits from decreased collective exposure to harmful global climate change.² However critics have expressed reservations about the lack of an appropriate redress mechanism in the agreement to ensure that countries around the world stick to their pledges and curb climate change.

Some of the prominent principles as identified under UNFCCC are Common Concern of Humankind, the Right to Sustainable Development, Intergenerational Equity, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Precautionary Principle. India has been propagating 'carbon justice'. It directly attacks the tool of low cost energy that was applied to the development of many nations. India has been claiming that it is not the polluter and is also not responsible for the climatic changes

that the world faces today. Developed countries have attempted to dilute these principles in successive summits because the criteria of 'developed' and 'developing' no longer has a straightjacket application, particularly with the rise of China as the second largest economy in the world. The fact that India is the fourth largest emitter of carbon dioxide shows that the shield of a 'developing nation' cannot help India to evade its responsibilities. A study of the World Resources Institute makes an important claim that while the top 10 emitters contribute to 72 percent of emission of green houses, intriguingly they have different capabilities to deal with it. The fact that India managed to keep the static distinction of the 'firewall' intact with the respect to the domain of climate technology support from developed nations has helped the country in its efforts to tackle climate change. India should be cautious about depending totally on these finances and look up for new sources of the same.

We have to build a robust and ongoing national process to examine our energy and climate future, to replace India's current ad hoc, disconnected process of energy planning and policy. This requires a more cogent system of energy information gathering and analysis. It also requires exploring actions that bring synergies across development and climate outcomes (such as energy efficiency and public transport) and those that come with direct costs to the economy.

The developing bloc has always reasoned that since they are not historically significant emitters of greenhouse gases, the imposition of a harsh emission mitigation mechanism would detrimentally affect their development prospects. These considerations are reflected in India's Intended National Development Contribution submitted in October 2015 to UNFCCC.

India's Intended National Development Contribution

The Main Objectives of India's INDC are

- a) Reduce emission intensity by 33-35% by 2030 as compared to the 2005 levels.
- b) Produce 40% of electricity from non fossil fuel based energy resources, with the help of technology transfers and low cost finance.
- c) Create an additional carbon sink 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide through additional forest cover.
- d) Develop robust adaptation strategies for agriculture, water and health sectors.

The document lists numerous policies and government initiatives that have been framed and implemented in order to achieve these targets. As India's energy targets represent a rapid increase in renewable energy generation, this would not be sufficient to meet the rising energy demands. Existing policy measures are described in detail in the document, but the description of the targets is brief. That India will not be bound by the sector specific mitigation has also affected the document's transparency.

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The document lists numerous policies and government initiatives that have been framed and implemented in order to achieve these targets. The initiatives need not come from conventional sources. International forums such as UNESCO (Climate Change Education for Sustainable Development), climate change engagement initiatives like Tread Lightly for young people and role of bodies like national parks⁴ in creating awareness among the people and spread consciousness about the serious effects of climate change.

Financing Developmental Projects

A minimum of USD 2.5 trillion is required between now and 2030 to effectively implement all planned actions and USD 206 is required for adaptation needs by India.⁵ Presently, CDM is the

only mechanism (under Kyoto Protocol) that allows non-Annex I Parties (mainly developing countries) to participate in the global carbon market and operate only on a project-by-project basis. It is necessary for the global community to identify the future of CDM mechanism for the international climate negotiation and the future of this scheme post 2020 (Kyoto). This is more important for the countries like India where CDM market is helping to fund energy generating and mitigating efforts. India should take note of this success and argue for its continuation.

The private sector has been aggressive to seize the new opportunities that the new low carbon developments that is unfolding in the world. It has come in various forms and through various sources like self-financing, private equity investments, venture capital and carbon finance, where ever available. India's INDC has no mention of combating climate change with well structured PPPs. These are considered to be excellent vehicles of promoting cost-effective projects and can also spur the private sector's capacity to innovate. Moreover, technological innovation can be brought about with the government offering concessional financing to them.

In India, where \$9.8 billion was invested in 27 projects of a total capacity of 12GW, most projects were also hydropower plants (21), followed by wind (five) and biomass (one).⁶ It must also be mentioned that this figure only underestimate the scope of the private sector participation which has been very diverse and widespread. In fact, the government should take a proactive role at providing incentives for promotion of businesses that reduce GHG emissions. One of the turning points in the Indian energy scene would when the energy movement in the private sector in consonance with the government regulations. According to a non-profit Carbon Disclosure Project⁷, Indian Companies are reporting business implication on climate change which -----enables investors, companies, cities and governments to understand and act on the business case for reducing impacts on the environment and natural resources. This is an indication that the businesses are also interested in environmental damage control.

The 100 million US dollar Green Climate Fund will soon become operational in India and it is currently in the stage of identifying central organizations which can access the funds and contribute to climate mitigation and adaptation.⁸ It is an uphill task for the country to chalk out a roadmap for the adequate utilization of the Green Fund. India's quasi-federal structure makes it essential for the Centre to involve the states and the local self-governments as well in the process, after identifying the differential need of geographical areas that are reeling under ecological degradation. The mandatory participation of the private sector as a part of its corporate social responsibility, including non-governmental organizations is also crucial for utilizing the fund at the grassroots level. Thus, these central organizations can be a channel through which the Green Fund can be utilized. India is increasingly shifting from a strategy of a negative 'carbon credit' to a positive 'green credit'.⁹

India's current renewable energy capacity is 33,000 MW which is nearly 15 per cent of the country's total installed electricity generation capacity. The Union budget has set an ambitious target of 1, 75,000 MW. India's budget allocations for renewable energy are Rs 75 crore for electric cars production and renewable energy target for 2022 is 100KMW in solar; 60K MW in wind; 10K MW in biomass and 5K MW in small hydro.¹⁰ Increasing coal cess to Rs 200 a tonne from Rs 100 is being considered to be helpful for sustaining subsidies to clean energy projects. The budget also includes proposals for the creation of a national infrastructure and investment fund where an annual flow of Rs. 20,000 crore is expected. The Economic Survey 2014-15 has predicted India's clean energy sector was likely to generate business opportunities of \$160 billion in the next five years.¹¹ If the capacity addition of renewable projects such as solar and wind were to happen as per, this number is expected to go up to 1,75,000 MW by 2022; thus the budget target can be realistically met. However the budget does lack clearly spelled out sector-wise energy development programmes, which might be a bottleneck for the actual fulfillment.

Back to Indigenous Ways: Lessons to Learn

Indigenous knowledge provides a valuable insight into the climate change scenarios that have been developed by the scientists at a broader spatial and temporal space. This knowledge is also very important when we consider the community based mitigation and adaptation activities that have kept intact the resilience systems of the ecology at the local, regional and global levels. Workshops organized by the IPCC with the collaboration with United Nation University's Traditional Knowledge Initiative (UNU-TKI) have commendably ensured that the indigenous people's experience and their adaptation and mitigation strategies are widely available globally. Traditional farmers who hold around 10-15% of the land under cultivation, who have been identified as the priority targets and can create additional carbon sinks so that it can refill depleted soil carbon reserves and also sequester carbon from the atmosphere.¹² These include traditional agricultural techniques like crop residue retention, no till farming, crop rotation and other complex systems.¹³ Indigenous people around the world are also participating in various important CDM projects. Some traditional practices have been frowned upon and are considered largely as destructive, like shifting cultivation. Decades of research has shown that it is an enabler of greater carbon sequestration than other forms of land use.¹⁴ The World Bank¹⁵ as well as the Oxfam¹⁶ recognizes the fact that clean energy is the solution to poverty. India has the twin challenge to fulfilling the aspirations of the poor as well mitigating emissions thus can be best met by indigenous renewable energy models. A National Lab Policy can adequately identify the requirement of infrastructure for the development of indigenous technology.¹⁷

The most impressive renewable energy models in India are arguably the solar and wind energy. The ramping up of solar power which was just 2MW in 2010 but is now over 4,000 MW – did perhaps go a long way in ensuring some degree of leverage for India at the climate talks. The Jawaharlal Nehru Solar Mission was launched in 2010 and has been instrumental in underpinning India's solar direction. At the end of 2010, India had 10 MW of installed solar power capacity and the journey to 3883 MW (as of May 2015), has defied perceptions of sclerotic public procurement programmes in India. The World Bank has also acknowledged the emergence of India as a solar leader.¹⁸ Most of this development, under the aegis of the federal programme JNNSM, took place in Gujarat and Rajasthan which were obvious choices both in terms of availability of arid land and high levels of irradiation.¹⁹ India has also launched an International Solar Alliance at CoP21 in Paris that includes countries located within the Tropic of Cancer and Tropic of Capricorn. The Solar Alliance shows India's leadership in clean energy programmes.²⁰ As far as solar energy is concerned India can take a cue from the hugely successful solar energy models in its developing counterparts Bangladesh,²¹ where the government aims to achieve hundred percent rural electrification by 2021. The benefits of using solar homes systems include increased study time for children, empowerment of women through knowledge from TV viewing, income generation from mobile phone recharging services, as well as contribution to emissions reduction as a result of kerosene replacement.²²

Wind power is another area that India has considerable scope to develop. India already ranks fifth among the top ten wind producers of the globe. India plans to increase the capacity to 55,000 MW by 2017 from the current level of around 30,000 MW.²³ Favorable regulatory environment and eased lending is expected to deliver better than expected capacity addition in India's wind energy sector. The most recent of the positive measures recently implemented by the Government was the introduction of tax incentives for manufacture of wind turbine equipment. The recently approved National Offshore Wind Energy Policy has opened up a large part of India's coastline for wind energy projects with the first auction of offshore blocks slated to take place in early 2016.²⁴

The availability of solar and wind energy is largely determined by the weather conditions, and therefore characterized by strong variability. As a result, power generation from these sources cannot easily be matched to the electricity demand, like power generated from conventional plants such as coal-fired units and gas stations.²⁵ Biomass energy can be a viable alternative to

support the solar and wind sectors.

India is a country that has great potential in biomass energy because it produces around 600-700 tonnes of agricultural residue. India's biomass programme had taken off when TERI had pioneered the development of technologies that use biomass for heat applications in small, micro, and rural enterprise like it is used in small cook stoves to MW scale power plants to industrial process heating plants. Biomass has usually been relegated to a position after wind and solar energy development in India's renewable energy set up. The government needs to recognize the fact that biomass energy can contribute immensely to the socio-economic elevation of villages if their daily activities are woven around it. Energy from biomass is cost-effective and provides non-intermittent electricity, just like conventional grid electricity. Thus it can adequately supplement the solar and wind energy sectors and provide a continuous flow of clean electricity to our rural areas. Technologies for converting biomass into energy are indigenous and there is no import dependency. In fact, properly supported, this indigenous industry can be easily transformed into an export hub for other developing countries. And finally, it can be utilized to meet the energy needs of different strata of our economy. A holistic national biomass energy mission, with ambitious goals and appropriate means is the need of the hour.²⁶ Panchayats in India's rural areas can be involved to implement biomass projects. Funds should be allocated to panchayats to undertake biomass energy development independently with state support. The NREGA is another central structure that India already has in place that can strengthen the biomass energy sector as well as provide rural workers with steady employment.

The ambitious Skill India initiative²⁷ can be a tool for providing vocational training to rural workers to start such projects in the rural areas. The government can engage with the private sector and include the biomass energy investment option as a part of the corporate social responsibility policy. Firms investing in industrial projects can be made to give a miniscule percentage of their profits to the local gram panchayat to develop renewable energy with the active participation of the local people. This kind of a model will be a great boost to the Indian economy, besides fulfilling the objective of reducing dependence on conventional forms of electricity. The proliferation of biomass electricity generation projects can eradicate power shortage problems in India's rural areas.²⁸

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act has been fruitful in providing guaranteed wage employment to the poor in India. In addition to supplementing wage employment, NREGA's secondary objective has been to strengthen rural natural resource management. This has been achieved by financing rural works that address causes of drought, deforestation and soil erosion, thus restoring the natural capital base on which rural livelihoods depend.²⁹ The government had, in the recent past, started a pilot project to quantify climate change benefits from the path breaking anti-poverty programme, the NREGA. About 70% of works under the NREGA are "green jobs" such as water harvesting, afforestation and land development. Thus the NREGA can be a potential instrument to supplement India's concrete action plan for mitigating emissions. The Indian government's view with regard to the pilot project was that instruments like the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol are not fine-tuned enough to recognize the potential of such initiatives.³⁰ The International Labour Organization has recognized the potential of the NREGA to lead to a green economy with green jobs that can contribute to environment sustainability.³¹ The UNEP has opined that NREGA has been successful in restoring ecological infrastructure in the rural areas of India, besides fulfilling its primary objective of empowered the marginalized groups of Indian villages.³² For example, 20 percent of NREGA's budget has been devoted to execute water conservation models.³³ The large scale rainwater harvesting programme adopted in Mandi recently is an illustration of the significant role that NREGA can play in India's sustainable development approach. Over 3000 housing tanks have been sanctioned for irrigations and other purposes, including tanks in educational institutions.³⁴

Traditional Rural Systems of Mitigation and Adaptation

Several ground examples testify that the rural poor can adapt to the climate change which can also be replicated by the government. For instance, watershed systems dating back to 300 BC to 200 AD which channeled the rainwater to the man made water troughs, natural systems of bio composting with bio pesticides and bio-manure and natural input system to cultivate land are being revived in Tamil Nadu.³⁵

Promoting a culture where the consumer trends shift towards the usage of cosmetics, food and pharmaceuticals made with natural ingredients, so that the corporate strategies shift towards more 'eco friendly' which would result in investments in natural substitutes. This can be effectively implemented to help in poverty reduction and generation of employment with investments to further environmental conservation. A pioneering work in this area has been initiated by Nepal, Namibia and Peru called the Capacity Building for BioTrade (CBBT) project, which has identified some common shortcomings of the countries which include adhering to international quality standards, poor infrastructure, and lack of coordinated investment in the sector, and is working on common solutions to these problems to advance BioTrade sector.³⁶

The self sufficiency in food that was brought about was at the expense of environment and therefore the agricultural system adopted from the West has shown that it is unsustainable and we need to develop methods that are suitable to our needs. Organic farming although developed in its present form by the West, works on the basic principles of traditional agriculture that has been practiced by farmers in India and China. It has been adopted by many countries of the world due to the growing consciousness about its effects on both health and environment. The initial results during conversion period would be low but it gets better eventually.³⁷ The success stories in Cuba, wherein the trade embargo and the dire need of self sufficiency drove the government to make the practice of organic agriculture lucrative thereby driving people towards increasing the yields by using the organic farming techniques like earthworms, composts, bio-fertilisers, can be surely emulated.³⁸ This is a lucrative way to benefit from export earnings and revenues from the organic produce as the case from Uganda shows. Various studies have shown that organic fields sequester 3-8 tonnes more carbon per ha than conventional agriculture.³⁹

In the 1970s, the village of Sukhomajiri in Palamau was riddled with problems like soil erosion and sparse vegetation; however, Sukhomajiri transformed into a green belt with the help of the ChakriyaVikasPranali model, a cyclic system of development is a community-based natural resource management system by bringing landless and land holders together through equitable system of sharing income.⁴⁰ This model has spread to many villages in Jharkhand. The World Bank Group has concluded that the model of sustainable development in the village of Ralegan Siddhi in Maharashtra has transformed it from a highly degraded village ecosystem in a semi-arid region of extreme poverty to one of the richest in the country. The management and conservation of natural resources with the help of cost-effective watershed management models⁴¹ lead empowerment of the local people with the equitable distribution of benefits. The adoption of such development models on a larger scale with the help of the pioneering role of the panchayat can be crucial in a nation like India where this can meet the nutritional requirement of the rural poor and maintain the productive capacity of natural resources while protecting the environment.⁴²

The involvement of the village community to develop sustainable eco friendly models of economic development and the subsequent elevation of the quality of life are goals of the local self government that were laid down by the 73rd amendment of 1992 that established Panchayati Raj throughout India.⁴³

The Saharanpur rope-makers' initiative of sustainable use of natural resources provides gainful employment and can be improved with government support.⁴⁴ Water-harvesting techniques with the help of check dams have transformed the drought-prone region of Saurashtra in Gujarat.⁴⁵ Government funding to India's 'Pani Panchayats' - a form of management and collective utilization

of local water resources through the participation of responsible locals in a unanimously elected body of members - can be very helpful in sustaining water resources in Indian villages.

Urban Mitigation Schemes

Cities can make changes in their own capacities at the local and subnational levels. The Compact of Mayors,⁴⁶ is one such alliance wherein the mayors and city leaders have voluntarily decided to cut greenhouse gas emissions, prepare for the impacts of climate change and track progress. This would help not only the local communities but would act as a kick start for meeting the targets of Paris agreement. Moreover, city level activities account for 70% of the greenhouse gas emissions.⁴⁷ This is where the sustainable planning of the cities can help to combat climatic changes. The direct outcome of rapid unplanned urbanization is that the low income populations are moved to the margins in areas threatened by floods, landslides, epidemics and so on. Developing small scale water and energy systems will result in local economic development and would enhance a sense of place and bring about significant cumulative results.⁴⁸ Contemporary urban planning in the developing world has been shaped by the 19th century Western planning, which fails to take into account the 21st century challenges faced by the cities such as food insecurity, climate change, and oil dependence and has also failed to acknowledge the need for bringing the stakeholders to contribute in the planning of the cities.⁴⁹ Another major concern is the easy availability and heavy dependence on oil. Vehicular emissions significantly contribute in greenhouse gas emissions and therefore the urban public transport needs to be promoted to reduce the vehicular density, simultaneously turning to alternatives that have the potential to replace fossil fuels like Hydrogen.⁵⁰

The ministry of new and renewable energy is promoting projects for recovery of energy from urban wastes, which is more important for treating and disposing off the waste. The government in its website⁵¹ has also mentioned that in most of the developed countries the entire waste management is being handled by the private industry. The advantages of this would be to get rid of the excessive quantity of waste and net reduction in the pollution. The Pune Municipal Corporation's waste to energy project is a model of waste management in cities. At a time when generating energy from segregated biodegradable waste is on the rise, Pune undertook an ambitious PPP model of developing energy from unsegregated waste.⁵²

Tianjin Municipality in north China has increased the pollution fee imposed for smoke and dust discharged by industrial enterprises by nine times on May 1, in a push to reduce emissions. Under the adjustment, the fee is 2.75 Yuan (0.45 U.S. dollar) per kg of smoke and dust, compared with 0.275 Yuan per kg under the previous rate, which has been used since 2003. Dust and smoke are important components of PM2.5 and PM10, which are key air pollutants. The fee for dust at construction sites was increased 10 times according to a joint document issued by the Tianjin economic planning, finance and environmental protection departments. Beijing's environmental watchdog announced late April it had imposed the capital's largest fine of 3.9 million yuan on a joint venture food company over water pollution.⁵³

The idea behind such a move is indeed positive - to a certain extent, this can ensure that industries do not flout environmental norms that have been laid down by the government. The pressure to reduce pollutants can also pressurize industrial companies to upgrade technologies for recycling use of treated waste. At the same time, implementing such a regime of 'pollution' tax may lead private investors to think twice before setting up even an ostensibly profitable industrial unit. The government can impose such a tax and at the same time give the same industry an alternative to shift to the comparatively less polluting renewable forms of energy by making an arrangement where the latter would seem more attractive.

China's Renewable Energy Law, offers a variety of financial incentives, such as a national fund to foster renewable energy development, discounted lending and tax preferences for renewable energy projects. The combination of investments and policy incentives has encouraged major advances in the development of both wind power and solar power.⁵⁴

The National Electric Mobility Mission Plan (NEMMP), 2020 has been launched with an ambitious goal of shifting to electric propulsion for surface transport. This can reduce our dependence on diesel and petrol and lead to lower emission levels. To best harness the potential of such an initiative, it should be coupled with alternative or additional transport energy reduction strategies such as better urban planning and design and enhancing the public transport system and mass transit systems with seamless connectivity to safe, accessible non-motorized transit (NMT) systems, along with efficient traffic management and effective travel demand management measures. The Motor Vehicles (Amendment Bill, 2015, has brought e-vehicles - e-carts, e-rickshaws - under the ambit of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988⁵⁵ The Supreme Court had banned this form of eco-friendly transport because of concern for commuter safety.⁵⁶ The government by bringing them under the ambit of the Act has attempted to ensure that standard motor vehicle norms are applicable to this transport and safety isn't compromised. The government should make efforts at skill development for promotion of e-vehicles in the country.

The government's national electric mobility mission plan (NEMMP) which aims to have 6-7 million electric or hybrid vehicles on the roads by 2020 with the aim of 6-7 million units of new vehicle sales of the full range of electric vehicles, along with resultant liquid fuel savings of 2.2 - 2.5 million tonnes. Also noteworthy in this regard is the slew of green initiatives adopted by the Himachal Pradesh government to take the state tourism corporation buses and government vehicles with a nine-year lifespan off roads. To reduce the number of goods carriage vehicles, the government will encourage multi-axle trucks on the roads. In another important step, the government will attempt to replace the auto-rickshaws with e-rickshaws.⁵⁷ The National Green Tribunal too is playing a pro active role in encouraging eco-friendly transportation in India. Recently it has banned the plying of diesel vehicles ten year old in Delhi-NCR.⁵⁸ NGT has also directed Delhi government to submit a proposal a green belt, covering open grounds with grass and installation of air purifiers in all government and corporation schools.⁵⁹ The role of governments in these projects is of utmost importance. In order to regulate and bring about some change on the level as pledged by the country the government ought to think what is usually termed as 'out of the box'. Unconventional sources might take some time for the results to manifest but once the groundwork is laid it will have great impact on the society and the world at large.

The Paris Agreement is built on a different logic: the motive power for change in energy systems will come from domestic politics in country after country, but the international process can amplify and provide leverage for domestic actors. By this logic, the key elements of the Paris agreement are the national pledges made before Paris, and the mechanism to encourage those pledges to be ratcheted up over time. This mechanism includes: a mandatory five-yearly update of all pledges; a technical review process of both climate actions and financial contributions that is meant to ensure countries take their updates seriously; transparency provisions; and a global 'stock take' on the aggregate effect of these actions. The idea is that the Paris Agreement will set in place mandatory procedures, which then stimulate an iterative process in country after country, ideally stimulating ever greater shifts to low-carbon trajectories.

Conclusion

India faces a major threat because of the projected alterations due to the climate change because its economy is closely tied to the natural resources. Any sustained exploitation will have huge impacts in the long run. The inherent paradox with this situation is that while industrial development significantly contributes towards economic growth, it also brings along a host of environmental problems. The need is to balance development and environmental equilibrium, which the traditional ways can help us achieve.

It has been widely accepted that environmental conservation need the active participation from the people. There exists a strong positive correlation between the Human Development Index and Energy use. To provide minimal acceptable level of well being for its citizens, India has to

substantially increase its per capita energy consumption.⁶⁰ The focus on increasing energy efficiency has to be in modifying usage patterns and ensuring that the energy needs of the last mile are met. Capacity building of key stakeholders (builders etc.), involved in construction sector on energy saving options and technologies, is required. It is true that in light of the current climate change challenges, the energy demand cannot be simply met with traditional sources, as it would need additional sources (renewable) and diversification of energy sources.

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Cyber Security in India

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ABSTRACT

Trademark law has evolved much faster and earlier to digital world and environment due to emerging issues in cyber space and domain name infringement. India has kept in pace with international developments. In today's highly competitive global financial system, IPRs are giving companies the cutting edge and increasing their competitiveness. Both Courts and Enforcement authorities must be well equipped and be trained for efficient disposal of cases relating to Intellectual Property. Intellectual Property (IP) rights infringement and in particular IP crime threatens legitimate businesses, their staff, and undermines consumer confidence.¹

Key words: *India, Cyber Security, Intellectual Property, Rights, Digital Property.*

Foundation of Digital Quandary

Borrowing a book from a local public library would seem to be one of the most routine, familiar, and uncomplicated acts in modern civic life: A world of information is available with little effort and almost no out-of-pocket cost but by accelerating transformation of information into digital form all these are now not a much to deal with² known as Cyberspace.³ The world today has entered into an era of instant communication.⁴ Intellectual Property is the creation of mind. Theoretically and practically the internet is the perfect way to collect information into homes and businesses. No one runs to the library to borrow a book these days.⁵

There is no doubt that the digital world is the most exciting and historical development in communications and media.⁶ As the world moves into the new century, we face the ever increasing reliance upon technology. However, its importance and pervasiveness are certain and continue to expand.

Digital Intellectual Property

Years ago and till date, a computer lawyer used to contract for custom software development, intellectual property side for software and technology related litigations. The age of digital media has dramatically changed intellectual property rights, (IPR). The two main areas of intellectual property law that get greatly affected by the high advent of the internet today is copyright and trademark and is in need to be transformed.

The Internet is termed as "THE WORLD'S BIGGEST COPY MACHINE"⁷ The proliferation of technologies that enable mass-market digital copying and analog/digital conversion, combined with file-sharing software and peer-to-peer networks that are easily accessible via high-speed Internet connections, have led to increased concerns about distribution of unauthorized copies of

copyrighted media. The copyright and other Intellectual property laws must be adapted to the new digital environment and also extend protection and using Anti-circumvention Measures. In particular, the movie and music industries continue to search for technical and regulatory solutions to combat digital piracy.⁸ The explosion of the Internet, and the increase in .com enterprises, has profoundly shaken the economic world and has generated new commercial models; they have also affected the legal world by posing new problems, inter alia, in relation to the protection of intellectual property on the Internet.⁹

Trademarks protect consumers by encouraging sellers of goods and services to stand by their brand, so consumers will know what they are buying and consumers should not be likely to get confuse, it also had fair use process and it give rights to the trademark holders even if not registered. Meta tags¹⁰ in the HTML of a website can infringe an existing trademark.¹¹

Some major global parameters of digital era in ambit of Intellectual Property are:

- World Online Population on Social Networking Sites and Sharing Information.
- Countries Connected To The Internet.
- The Cost of Internet Access.
- Language Used On the Internet.
- Development in Means of Internet Access.
- Value of Commercial Transactions.
- Individual Purchasing Goods & Services over the Internet.
- Distribution of Sales in National and International Markets.¹²

It can be an engine for creativity, innovation and consumer protection. When it doesn't, IP rights have the opposite effect, giving IP owners a veto on innovation and free speech.¹³ Where IP owners file on litigations to strangle new technologies and services from every next technologies that come up. Law suits to take down trademarks used by any corporation in a parody site. The licenses are webbed and backed up by law¹⁴. The Internet and Digital technologies should empower a consumer, creator, innovator and a responsible and a citizen full of intellect and fight against all illegal surveillance. People should be capable enough to share and protect their own outputs while not infringing the rights of others. The computer was developed originally to operate as an aid to computation but today's the computational abilities of the computers are also diverted in different areas.

In cyberspace is composed of bits, the binary code that is the groundwork of computing. In their digital form, images, music, video, and text are perfectly reproducible; not just once, but an infinite number of times. With digital media, a copy can be made as if it is the original. It is great getting connected to millions of people at one time but then the owner's work gets disseminated. Consumers enter into every single page presuming everything they enter into in cyberspace is in public domain unaware sometimes of the terms and conditions of a particular website or confused of the licensing agreements. Framing is the act of fraudulently displaying the contents of one website within another person's website with purpose of making the user believe that he is actually viewing the former website.¹⁵

Digital Networking and Intellectual Property

The interpretation and applicability of the law to digital realm has become hotly contested.¹⁶ According to some law has been applied indiscriminately to digital works, and thereby harms both consumers and the evolution of the technology. Content owners, especially the major music producers and film studios, see digital technology as a threat and have sought legal remedies to protect their financial interests. It was not until the launch of services like iTunes that the music industry began to embrace new business for online distribution, after years of trying with only modest

success to combat peer-to-peer file sharing through legal channels.¹⁷ What is legal, appropriate, and fair to content owners and consumers is not clear to the web. One major legislative attempt to wrestle with copyright in the digital world, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, has made potential criminals out of users without lessening the confusion.¹⁸ Copyright has always evolved and responded to technological change. Global digital networks have ensured the ease of dissemination. A single individual can copy and transmit it over the globe. This has turned to be a challenge to copyright law to protect the incentive of authors to create new works and still ensure fair use of the works in accordance with the technology.¹⁹

The applicability of copyright and patent law to software, the patentability of business methods, and the unregulated use of trademarks in paid placement search advertising are also major points of contention.

The Internet in particular is a highly interactive environment with sequential improvement, and attempts to enforce new intellectual property protections or to extend existing protections on the Internet may be inappropriate because they fail to consider the value of creative imitation. People easily copy from the internet because the costs of copying are low and is often anonymous, publishers have often responded with more aggressive enforcement of existing intellectual property rights and with calls for extensions of those rights to cover additional content, new media and new forms of access.²⁰ The Web is a “community” that is highly interactive and dynamic.

It has a balance between public good and private interest. The public good is the betterment of society that results from the constitutional mandate to promote the “progress of science and the useful arts”; the private interest are served by the time restricted monopoly (a copyright or patent) given to one who has made a contribution to that progress.²¹

Two events inspire re-examining the concepts, policies, and practices associated with intellectual property²²:

- Advances in technology have produced fundamental shifts in the ability to reproduce, distribute, control, and publish information.²³
- With its commercialization and integration into everyday life, the information infrastructure has run headlong into intellectual property law.²⁴

Firstly, Information in digital form has radically changed the economics and ease of reproduction. Reproduction costs are much lower for both rights holders (content owners) and infringers alike. Digital copies are also perfect replicas, each a seed for further perfect copies.

As a consequence, it is easier and less expensive both for a rights holder to distribute a work and for individuals or pirates to make and distribute unauthorized copies.

Secondly, down-loading files, forwarding information found on the Web can at times be obvious violations of intellectual property laws; others, such as making copies of information for private use, may require subtle and difficult interpretation of the law simply to determine their legality.

Intellectual property is a creation of smarter brains and it need to be controlled by smartest and wittiest brains. The transformation from intangible to tangible substances and getting a royalty from the creations is all what counts.

The International Telecommunication Union says that the rapid growth of the digital economy, enabled by broadband penetration, and coupled with increases in computing power and storage, creates global markets for content and rights holders. But it also creates a threat that without adequate controls piracy will damage the creative industries. The discussion paper on which this article is based, “Intellectual property rights in today’s digital economy”, therefore focuses in particular on the ways that the growing digital economy is impinging on copyright.²⁵

The Issues in Digital Intellectual Property:

- Creativity versus piracy
- Copyright, Trademark & Patents
- Social networking sites and user-generated content
- Music, Film, Television & Broadcasting
- Publishing & Peer to Peer Networking
- Software
- Games

People should take Responsibility: How Would they feel if someone Copies and Rip away fruits of their Labour!! Digital technology is probably the most important and transformative technology of our time. Because digital is fundamentally an information and communication technology (ICT), intellectual property rights lie at its heart. Today's advanced economies live or die by their ability to get smarter. Growth comes not from competing on labour costs, raw materials or access to capital: our competitive edge depends on our capacity to innovate, especially in the high margin, knowledge intensive businesses which now exist across all sectors.²⁶

Citing of a thing so that others can find the source again. We can share links in messenger and include the citation. People should not misuse sources. People should credit the original authors and owners. It becomes Plagiarism²⁷ if you don't cite the source. In copyright its Fair use when the use is temporary and for education purpose, non-commercial purpose etc. Creativity should be awarded. Piracy has become a trend these days. Streaming and downloading are forms of Piracy. Bit Torrent is one of the best examples. Infinite number of downloads take place, they violate copyright. This is the key issue that is moving forward.

In today's world economy it's very easy to copy technologies by help of digital era. The potential partners, potential investors should insist Non Disclosure Agreements²⁸. There is a Globalization of the IP Market, and people are getting involved for ip protection and commercial exploitation. There should be a centralization of the IP management. IPR has become a significant issue within telecom, ICT and digital media as there are often many overlapping claims from creators. IPR law in the digital arena is intended to safeguard the legal rights of owners to various assets including architectures, platforms, processes, procedures, methods, and the associated commercialization of applications, products, and services.²⁹ The digital age and the global economy are now closely linked. Since the 1990s, information technologies have accounted for a large share of investment and made a significant contribution to economic growth, supported by an intellectual property system that has provided effective protection for digital technologies in the new economy.³⁰

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Rhi-Zokhawtar Connectivity¹

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India's connectivity with its East and South East Asian neighbours especially the ASEAN Nations have been a primary focus area of India's Look East Policy which was initiated in the year 1991 under P.V Narashimha Rao the then Prime Minister of India. The North Eastern States of India acts as the gateway to the ASEAN nations. The only ASEAN nation India shares her border with is Myanmar. North Eastern states especially Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram shares their borders with Myanmar. Therefore North East became the launching pad for India's Look East Policy.

To establish connectivity between Myanmar and India, Nagaland cannot be considered a proper base because it is important to be kept in mind that the presence of insurgent groups in the Eastern Nagaland has always created obstructions in carrying out any operations between the two nations. Manipur on the other hand is one of the most important states in regards to connectivity between India and Myanmar. NH 34 starts from the state capital Imphal runs through the Chandel District of Manipur and ends in Moreh and from Moreh this road is connected through the Indo Myanmar Friendship Bridge with Asian Highway 1 and enters Myanmar. This route is vibrant as the two bordering towns that is Moreh on the Indian side and Tamu on the Myanmar side are busy in terms of trade and business.

However, connectivity cannot depend on a single route and thus to establish a better linkage a second option must be developed. On the other hand India needs to take into account that Manipur is not peaceful in that way, insurgency problem is also quite apparent in Manipur which can hamper trade and connectivity in future. Here comes the proposal for the development of the second important road linkage which starts from Aizwal in Mizoram runs through the Champhai district up to Zokhawtar and enters Rhikhawdar in Myanmar through a friendship bridge across the Tiaou River which marks the border between the two countries.

Mizoram is connected with the mainland India through the Lengpui airport in Aizwal. Daily and Weekly flights connects Mizoram from the rest of India. However Aizwal is also linked with other north eastern states through roadways. Aizwal is 30 kms away from the Lengpui airport. The main road connecting the city with the airport, at its initial stage is good; however it is important to note that Mizoram is a hilly region and has a rugged topography. Most of the roads are mountainous roads. The main road mentioned above, after 10 kms is muddy and marked with series of depressions. This creates obstruction in the smooth movement of traffic. Landslides and narrow waterfalls especially in the rainy season again create a major problem in the movement of traffic. These obstructions may take two hours to get cleared. There is another alternative way to enter the city from the airport. However this one is a longer route which takes two to three hours to reach the city. It is important to mention that both these roads are narrow and only one car can pass at a time.

The road from Aizwal to Champhai is a long one. The distance of Champhai from Aizwal is 186 kms. This road is again undoubtedly a mountainous one. The section of the road from Aizwal to Seling is pretty broad. However it gets narrower in certain areas. It takes two hours to reach Seling. Seling has proper eateries, few shops and vehicle servicing outlets. After crossing Seling

the road becomes extremely narrow and this continues up to Champhai. The road takes sharp bends. The road has very steep gradients which makes the journey uncomfortable. The next important town after Seling on this road is Saitung. The stretch from Seling to Saitung is again narrow with sharp gradients marked with frequent waterfalls and Rapids some stretches are stony and these stretches becomes muddy at times of heavy rainfall. Basically this is more or less the actual condition of the road and this continues up to Champhai. What is best about this particular roadway is that there are small villages and town at an interval of every two to three hours. All these villages have shops, eateries and most importantly passengers and travellers get the opportunity to freshen up as most of the roadside hotels provide washroom facilities.

From Saitung the road continues to run through the hilly regions and reaches a small village known as Keifang. Keifang is essentially a small village which does not provide basic amenities. From Keifang onwards the road takes a downward course here the road becomes a bit broader. This is the stretch where we come to see some plain areas which are mostly cultivated lands. However this is a very small stretch as within an hour the road again takes an upward course and gradually the road becomes narrow again. Here the road becomes extremely dusty. Some areas are partially broken because of the frequent landslides. What is essentially important is to note that North Eastern states witness heavy rainfall throughout the year thus problems like landslides, Rapids, Streams and depressions remain obstructions in the movement of vehicles throughout the year.

The next important village travellers come across, while travelling on this road is Khawkulh. From Khawkulh the road is somewhat better although the steep gradient, sharp bends and narrow continues but what is most interesting is that extensions have been made at the curves of the road, there are culverts to avoid obstructions by small streams and Rapids. The entry to Champhai district is marked by a vibrant and big town Khawzawl. In Khawzawl there is an Assam Rifles Post, some missionary schools, some offices and quite a few shops. From Khawzawl it takes 3 hours to reach Champhai. At the entry to the Champhai district town there is a check post. This is the single check post is the entire stretch from Aizwal to Zokhawtar. Zokhawtar is the bordering town. The other side is Rhikhawdar.

The road from Champhai to Zokhawtar is 26 kms. This stretch of road is a kuccha road only few parts are pukka. Local officials said that the World Bank has given funds for the development of the road. One thing needs a special mention that is the entire road from Aizwal to Zokhawtar is maintained by BRO. The stretch from Aizwal to Zokhawtar is entirely muddy. However work is at progress. But according to the local residents the pace is quite slow. This road ends in the Indo-Myanmar Bridge across the Tiaou river and enter Rhi village where the road condition is extremely poor. Infrastructure on the whole is underdeveloped.

Question arises that; can Rhi-Zokhawtar route be made one of the most important trade routes after Moreh-Tamu considering the connectivity factor?

If we make a comparative analysis of both these routes the we can say that from a travellers point of view the road from Aizwal to Zokhawtar is much better because this road although has a mountainous course with sharp bends and steep gradient has villages and towns throughout the route which provides amenities especially food, vehicle servicing outlets, fuel refilling stations and lavatory facilities which are essentially important. However the stretches which are muddy, stony marked with streams and waterfall, has depressions and parts of which broken need lots of improvements. However from the perspective of trade and business this route has fewer prospects because the towns on either side of the border do not have much business potentials.

On the contrary the road from Imphal to Moreh is pretty good in regards to the condition of the road but this particular road has certain drawbacks. Once the road leaves the plain and enters the hill of Manipur the entire stretch do not have any shops or eateries on the other hand the Government has taken no initiative in providing public lavatories for passengers. The entire

stretch is mapped with Assam Riffles Post and other military check posts which still follow conventional ways of security checking measures thereby making the traveller wait for half an hour at each check post. But if we consider the business prospect of this route then it is far better than the Rhi-Zokhawtar division because the towns on the either side of the border in Manipur are vibrant in terms of trading and population.

Thus the Rhi-Zokhawtar border can be made an important route if the governments of both the country invest in the development of the roads on either side and if the population on either side is encouraged to take initiatives in business and trade then this route can become the most important trading route because this region is free from military interventions, free from insurgency and considering the fact that Mizo people are essentially peace loving in nature. Taking these facts into account this particular route does have the potential in becoming a substitute of the Moreh-Tamu division when it comes to connectivity. This route will not only serve as a gateway for goods and services but will also help in people to people contact between the two nations if both the governments take some initiative in promoting tourism as the road starting from Aizwal to Zokhawtar and after entering Myanmar up to the "Rhidil" lake has magnificent scenic beauty, extensive flora and fauna, reserve forests and wildlife sanctuaries.

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Zokhawtar-Rhi Border Visit¹

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The 'Act East' upgradation of the age-old Look East policy has fallen to much fanfare. Making headway of the refurbished policy, Union Minister of State for trade and Commerce, Nirmala Sitharaman visited the border town of Champhai in Mizoram to officially open the Zokhawtar land Customs Station bordering Myanmar. Her visit was the first by any Union Minister in a remote town of Mizoram, recalled Lal Thanhawla, Chief Minister of Mizoram which is the reason why the Land Customs Station had been lying in limbo years after construction has been completed. The rationale behind border trade is to facilitate economic upkeep of people living with the hardship of distant and detached borders rather than achieving exponential rise in a country's bilateral trade. It may however incrementally and over time add to a country's foreign exchange, make civilian's stake across border so high that its political differences and security imperatives may mitigate in course and may set examples of self-sufficiency for other lesser developed areas of the country.

The rest of the report is based on observations recorded during the field visit to Zokhawtar-Rhi border in Mizoram.

The Favourable Conditions

Champhai is the highest town in Mizoram (5505 ft) and its spread is more expansive than state capital of Aizawl. From a scenic perspective too, it has more tourist drawing potential than Aizawl. The distance from Champai to Zakhawtar is 28 kilometres approximately. It was surprising to get internet connectivity on phone till 11 kms stretch from Champai to the second closest settlement to border : Melbuk. Melbuk village has been officially identified as 'Indo-Myanmar Border trade Township'. However, the government built settlement is not functional yet. The small township is spread along the main road leading towards Champai. Also road construction and hill-cutting was in full swing to broaden the 8 metres road to 12 metres width. A local NGO worker from Champai informed us that an alternative road will be built fit for heavy vehicle transport, bypassing the current settlement. This township was mainly inhabited by refugees from Myanmar or Indian Mizos who have come here to explore the prospects of border trade with Myanmar. On a visit to one of the considerable well-off resident's house at Melbuk, an approximately 35 inches LED TV, washing machine, immersion heater indicated the rise in standard of lives of the people as we were reported that almost till mid-1990s none of the houses had a pucca roof. Further, a wholesale medical shop, a primary school could be spotted in the sparsely populated township. There were multiple sumo service counters available which ply between Zokhawtar and Champhai, confirming this route's dependence on border trade. After 2 kms drive from Melbuk, the Zokhawtar Land Customs complex becomes visible downhill. A narrow river Tiau separates the Indian city of Zokhawtar and Myamarese city of Khawmawi. A bridge over the river connects the two countries and a simple bill board mounted at the entry gate reads : 'Republic of the Union of Myanmar'. The official emblem of border area and its militarization is minimal. In fact the transition from territory of one State to another is almost transcendental in terms of the official carriers, the people, the terrain as well as the general

environs and vibe of the place. The transition palpably visible is the change in economic contours of the two countries. Although a host of Indian products are to be seen in the shanties of Myanmar, the roads, the attire of people, the build up of the local shops, all indicate that the economic conditions of Myanmar people are poorer than their Indian brethren just across the border. Even the Indian immigration check post was in better shape and looked newer than the Myanmar one. The Zokhawtar Land Customs Station formally inaugurated in March did not house any goods. The building is sprawling and far outdoes the border check-point structures which is a one-storey structure and not more than 600 sq. km building. A border post reading 1968-'69 was decoratively surrounded by brick wall like a well which stood out perhaps as the most indicative physical embodiment of border with Myanmar. The English written local translation of Government of India, "INDIA SAWRKAR" in the bill-board adjacent to the Land Customs Station building was an accommodative gesture on part of our Central government respecting Mizo diction and in a broader sense, Mizo indigenous culture. The border at Zokhawtar is so fluid that the Myanmar children travel daily to schools on the Indian side and return to their country after their school is over for the day. These Indian schools are under Mizoram Board. Thus, their exposure to this curriculum is in a way soft power augmentation for Indian side and an inculcation of Mizo culture and way of life into the bordering people. This makes way for stronger people to people ties across borders and facilitates a more comprehensive understanding and appraisal of each other's history, culture, hardships, nuances and daily existence. In this respect, it complements the broad vision of the border trade arrangement to improve the life of the people living in the distant borders.

Existing Bottlenecks

The historical ties between the people of Myanmar and India along the Zokhawtar-Rhi border had a chequered past. In fact the shared agonies and struggle from the past had brought the Myanmar and Indian Mizos closer making the border between them increasingly resilient. This relationship has its fall out as well. Due to the porosity of border and the 16kms free mobility, Mizo people from Myanmar often immigrate here. On being asked whether this immigration creates pressure on the existing population who have limited economic opportunities, the local professional said, "...we have to accept them". This fellow feeling emanates from a historical gratitude. During the turbulence of Mizo National Front revolt in 1966, many Indian Mizos had fled to Myanmar seeking safety. The Myanmar had then welcomed Indian Mizos and many have settled there. The descendants of those Mizos and also other Myanmar often immigrate to India in search of better livelihood. The local people also praised the Myanmar Mizo's mathematical skills but other than that they mostly end up in menial jobs. They often get involved in drug abuse and local crimes, forming part of local miscreant groups. The porosity of border and their status as immigrants help them escape police and security services of Indian side. The local Superintendent of Police in Champhai reported that the Myanmar police is cooperating with them in both tracking such criminals down.

The formal trade itself is not in a good shape at Champhai. The Balance of Trade is steeply unfavourable to India. While there is a steady import albeit in little quantities, export is nil for most years. A field visit to Zokhawtar will bring to forth several dichotomies that hinder optimal utilization of the border trade potential. While the infrastructure in form of Land Customs Station, road building, border trade settlement quarters, taxi service are in place, the trade volume is not even enough to meet the local people's demands.

The exported goods from India consist of medicines, chemical fertilizers, production of which does not involve people of Champhai or Mizoram as such. Thus, the local traders in Zokhawtar are mostly suppliers of imported Myanmar products. This means the local producers cannot be really involved in this border trade. The imported items are mostly beetle nuts and agro-products. The border trade in Champhai forms a negligible component of total international trade

(figure) and also bilateral trade with Myanmar (fig). The border trade in India's North East was never conceived with the idea of earning exponential gains for our foreign reserve. The idea was to engage people in the border, to expand their economic as well as social options and in the process make our borders peaceful and as a positive part of people's daily lives. To this end, the steeped border trade at Zokhawtar has not been optimally utilized. A negative balance of trade also means lack of optimization of our own indigenous skills, lack of reciprocity of needs and their fulfillment, underutilization of our soft power tools, apart from obvious economic losses. Ar itself. However, the trail could not be found out because of multiple porters used in the chain of transport . With adjacent restive Manipur inflicted by insurgency fed by such smuggling, the unabated smuggling may deteriorate security situation of an otherwise peaceful Mizoram.

The informal trade however is much larger than formal trade. Drugs and arms smuggling forms a part of it. One of the district administration officials confirmed 3 to 4 big catches in last year. It is not clear what proportion of informal trade is smuggled goods. There is a lack of statistical data or trade (formal/informal) remains unrecorded, adding to the difficulty of assessing the situation of border trade at Champhai district.

In the seven hours journey from Aizawl to Champhai, the roads are impeccable except for in brief stretches. However , one major flaw of most road along the breadth of Mizoram is its narrowness which not only makes heavy vehicle transport difficult but a car breakdown would cause two line traffic to come to a stall altogether. Travelling towards the end of June, even a minimal slide or rubble heap may stand a challenge to traffic mobility in the region. This will make time bound overland goods transportation extremely difficult in Mizoram.

In the stretch from Aizawl to Champhai, there are only few standard accommodation, mostly catering local food. One would hardly encounter even one make0-shift car garage or workshop for about a stretch of 50 kilometres or more in a route in which overland transport is the main mode of connectivity. Under these conditions, the involvement of big traders and tourists in this part of Mizoram seems unlikely.

Prospects and Possibilities

The potential of border trade, consolidation of people to people ties are enormous. The steeped trade balance has to be set right. As Mizo people inhabit o either side of the border, there is bound to be demand for handicrafts, handloom, agro-based products which are used or consumed by people of same ethnic origin. Therefore, both Government of India and the state government of Mizoram must encourage small scale industries producing these goods to export them in Myanmar. More research endeavours may be undertaken to assess market demand and market penetration of local goods in Rhi town or other bordering towns in Myanmar. Myanmar's significance to Zokhawtar is deeply ingrained so much so that the Mizo translation of foreign goods is ' Burmatheel'. In other words, Myanmar is the gateway of Zokhawtar to other South East Asian ad foreign countries. In fact, for people of Zokhawtar it is more economical to procure goods from Myanmar and supply it to the adjoining towns and settlement. This is the reason why people have shifted from Aizawl to Champhai. Local district official informed us that Myanmar's commercial centre is very close to Rhi, this will allow a wider market for Indian goods for distant places in Myamar not restricting it to cater to those around Rhi.

Informal trade has to be increasingly brought under formal folds. This will check smuggling of goods, standardize prices which may be arbitrary, mitigate exchange of arms and drugs, as well as facilitate comprehensive records and accounts maintenance.

Political stability is indispensable to vibrant trade. In this respect, Zokhawtar-Rhi border trade has not experienced hardened militancy or insurgency. However, local crimes need to be checked and porosity of border should not be allowed to become safer escape routes for recalcitrants. Apart from a strong and vigilant security apparatus (civilian and military) o either sides, more

meaningful and responsible forms of employment has to be generated for the local people. Although ghettoization of Myanmarese immigrants is not desirable but their identity checks and documents submission has to be secured to let no one use border as a free route to evade review and retribution. Border trade may be viewed as a microcosm which needs at least in its formative stages continuous support and oversight of the macrocosm. The cost value of the means may look higher than the immediate gains but the overall end value abound for the local people, the state of Mizoram as well as India's home front and foreign policy with a more open Myanmar.

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Open Border and Thriving Informal Trade: Problems and Prospects of Promoting Formal Trade Through Zokhawthar

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India's rising trade and investment potential in Myanmar notwithstanding, the land border trade is languishing at negligible levels. Considering its peaceful status can Mizoram give the much needed fillip to the border trade? This paper will try to analyse the prospects and problems of trade through Zokhawthar (Mizoram)-Rih (Myanmar) border.

With a population of 20,000, the district town of Champhai has a disproportionately large and thriving marketplace dotted with stores selling a wide range of household appliances, electrical wares, medicines, smart-phones, footwear and others. Located a mere 28 km from the border gates at Zokhawthar; Champhai is one of the largest trading centres after the state capital Aizwal, and caters to the needs of the hilly North-Eastern state of Mizoram and the bordering Chin State in Myanmar. But the disturbing fact is that the hustle and bustle is almost entirely driven by illegal or informal trade. There are over 50 registered importers at Champhai, but only a few are active. Official trade is limited to import of a single consignment of betel nut a week, and some occasional parcels of Burmese energy drink. There is no trace of exports from India. "There are nearly 15 major informal trading routes along the 510 km¹ unfenced border shared by Mizoram with Myanmar. Champhai is the biggest draw of them all," says Export Commissioner of Mizoram Mr. C Lal Zirliana. In short that is the problem and prospect of Zokhawthar-Rih (Myanmar) border that has long been identified as one of the most promising trade routes, after Moreh in Manipur that presently controls 99 per cent of the \$ 56 million² (2014-15) land trade with Myanmar. There is surely a huge appetite for cross border trade through Zokhawthar. But the challenge is expand the scope of formal trade.

Open Border and Strategic Advantage

A visit to the border gates presents a more vivid perspective of issues involved. The 50 metre long Bailey bridge on the river Tiau - that marks the international border - is too narrow and weak, to allow movement of cargo laden trucks. Goods are to be moved across the border, by head loads. Obviously that is not the prescribed infrastructure for cross-border movement of bulk cargo. The scene is reverse when it comes to movement of people and informal trade. Excepting the names of two nations written on the archways on either sides of the bridge, it's an open border managed by local police. There are some Assam Rifles Jawans standing guard at the Indian gate but more as onlookers. Mizoram remaining peaceful since 1986, Delhi maintains skeletal presence of armed forces in this hilly State, when compared to a 'disturbed' Manipur. Two years ago, there was a proposal to strengthen this border by deploying Border Security Forces (BSF). But it is yet to be implemented. Many in the know say the proposal was sent to the cold storage to appease 'local sentiments'.

At the Indian side of the gate, two State policepersons are issuing entry passes - a small piece of paper of the size of bus tickets - to 'visitors' from Myanmar. A similar procedure is followed on the other end of the Bridge at Rih in Myanmar. As per local rule, people of either country are

free travel 16 m inside the foreign territories between 5 am to 5 pm without any formalities. Officially the limit has been reduced from the past. But there is every possibility that these rules are observed more in the breach, thanks to the social bonds between people and the limited border vigil. Champhai banks on buyers from across the border. Myanmarese students attend Indian schools. And, senior State officials say there are at least 30,000 Burmese Chins in the State capital of Aizwal, offering cheap labour to relatively wealthy Mizos who refuse to label them as illegal immigrants. Chins are a linguistic relation of Mizos in Mizoram and, the mainstay of the population in Chin State that is now leaving its disturbed past behind for peace and prosperity.

The movement is not one sided. Ask any Mizo, chances are he has travelled deep inside the foreign territories, if not for jobs – that is seldom available in a less developed Myanmar, especially the Western part of it – then for business or simply to socialise. Many or most of them have family relations in Myanmar. Peaceful atmosphere and people-to-people contact are two major attributes to promote cross-border trade. Add locational advantage to it and you have a perfect recipe for thriving trade. Zokhawthar is barely 50-60 kms from two prominent towns Falam and Tiddim (also known as Tedim) in the Chin State. Travel a little further across the Magway division and, there is Kalemmyo at the Southern end of Sagaing division of Myanmar.

Located barely 120-30 kms from Indian border, Kalemmyo³ is the largest consumption centre, complete with an airport and some industrial base, in this part of Myanmar. It is also the gateway to the more prosperous central Myanmar region that is now attracting FDIs from across the world. The Indian government is keen to capitalise on the strategic advantages of Zokhawthar, but the effort has apparently hit a few logistical hurdles. The sloth decision making, may also be a reason for lack of progress on this front.

The Indian Plan to Promote Trade through Zokhawthar and the Infrastructure Gap

In its effort to enhance trade and investment opportunities in Myanmar, and most importantly to reach out to a more prosperous Vietnam market (Vietnam attracted nearly 68 per cent of India's US\$ 699.8 million investments⁴ between April 1996 and March 2013 in the CLMV (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam) region); India already built a highway from Moreh-Tamu border to Kalemmyo. Connectivity between Zokhawthar and Kalemmyo should therefore give the much needed fillip to India's trade ambitions in the region. But there are infrastructure bottlenecks to reach this goal. According to a press communiqué issued by the Mizoram Trade and Commerce Department in March 2015, "the road from Zokhawthar-Rih border to Kalemmyo via Tiddim-Falam is a bad grade single lane *Kuchha* road" unsuitable for bulk movement of goods. In a recent move, the India government entered an agreement with Myanmar to upgrade this segment into a single-lane highway. According to the State government "a detailed project report entailing investment of Rs 711.47 crore was also approved by Delhi" but the construction is yet to start. Apart from being shorter in length than the Tamu-Kalemmyo segment; the proposed Rih- Kalemmyo road will also bypass the troubled northern part of the Sagaing division. A similar (if not bigger) advantage is anticipated in the Indian side too. The Moreh-Tamu border is connected to Guwahati (for further journey into the mainland India) by 587 km NH-39 that passes through the insurgency affected areas of Manipur and Nagaland.

According to Mr. K Lalhminthanga President of Mizoram Chamber of Industries, nearly 20-21 active insurgent groups of Nagaland (17) and Manipur (3 to 4) collect a total of Rs 50,000 extortion money from every import or export consignment that passes through that route. In comparison the journey from Zokhawthar to Guwahati is safer, as it enters Assam by passing volatile Manipur and Nagaland. The problem, if any, once again lies with infrastructure. The 28 km road from Zokhawthar to Champhai is nothing better than a village road, unsuitable for movement of cargo. India is now upgrading it into a double-lane highway. The project is midway through implementation. The 194 km road from Champhai that meets NH-54 in Aizawl is in good shape but too narrow and has too many sharp bends for movement of large multi-axel carriers. The

road is currently accessed by two-axel trucks. According to Zirilana, there is a proposal for widening the Champhai-Aizwal road into a two-lane highway. But neither the State nor India government has taken up the project so far.

Prolonged Delay to Set up Border Trade Infrastructure: A Reason for Thriving Informal Trade?

If the Mizoram government is to be believed, there was prolonged delay on the part of Government of India in setting up basic infrastructure to promote formal trade through Zokhawthar and other informal trade routes through the State. According to a Mizoram Trade and Commerce department⁵ publication, New Delhi noticed the strategic advantage of Zokhawthar way back in 1994, while entering the Border Trade Agreement with Myanmar. The decision to set up a Land Customs Station (LCS) at Zokhawthar was firmed up sometime in the last decade. The LCS was “ready to be inaugurated” in 2011. However for reasons better known to the State and Central authorities, the LCS was finally inaugurated in March 2015. That doesn’t mean Zokhawthar LCS is fully operational. Most of the LCS officials operate from Champhai, as a parallel project to build Staff quarters near the gate is incomplete.

The proposed staff accommodation facility was sponsored through the recently scrapped ASIDE scheme (Assistance to States for Development of Export Infrastructure and Allied Activities). According to Mr. Zirilana, the project now stands abandoned due to lack of funding. Also abandoned are projects to develop border trade infrastructures through ASIDE scheme in at least three other locations in Mizoram. There are other issues too and some of them are highly confusing, if not contradictory in nature.

The Union ministry of Development of North Eastern region claims that normal trade is allowed⁶ through Zokhawthar. However, according to LCS superintendent V Hangzo, only ‘Border Trade’ is allowed through this gate, thereby restricting import-export to 62 items⁷ (at 5 per cent duty), to which traders have limited interest. Mr David Thangluia, owner of Champhai based Zoland Pali Traders Pvt Ltd, feels even the designated Border Trade is difficult under the existing set of rules that caps the maximum value of an import consignment at \$20,000 or (approximately Rs 12.5 lakh at current exchange). “The limit is a big hurdle for traders, as one truckload of areca nut usually costs \$ 5500 (approximately Rs 35 lakh) or beyond,” he says. So how do traders negotiate the hurdle? Simple there are routes to cross the border avoiding the LCS. Indian Ambassador to Vietnam, Mr. Gautam Mukhopadhaya confirms hurdles to promote land border trade with Myanmar. “Measures are under way to normalize and upgrade border trade facilities at both Zawkathar and Moreh, but it will take a little time,” he said in an emailed response. “Trade will pick up once the border trade infrastructure are upgraded to handle normal trade, the road projects that we are engaged in Myanmar are completed in the next 2-3 years, and new infrastructure and investment measures in the North East bear fruit,” Mr Mukhopadhaya said.

How Big is the Land Trade Opportunity Through Zokhawthar? Informal Trade May Leave Some Indication

India has a thriving \$ 11 billion trade with CLMV countries as a whole, with balance in India’s favour. The trade with Vietnam is growing by 15-16 per cent a year. In comparison, India-Myanmar trade is stagnating in the range of \$ 2 billion for last couple of years. The balance is in favour of Myanmar due to heavy import⁸ (\$1.23 billion in 2014-15) of wood and wood products and edibles especially pulses. From India, man-made fibre, pharmaceuticals and clothing accessories are the top three export⁹ (\$ 773 million in 2014-15) items. When compared to Myanmar’s total trade of \$ 27 billion¹⁰ - including an import of \$ 16.34 billion - India has failed to capitalise on its advantages so far. According to Exim Bank, India has respectable share in only a few major items imported by Myanmar. These include pharmaceutical products (37 percent share of total imports), cosmetics (6.6 percent), rubber and articles (6.2 percent), articles of iron or steel (5.6 percent), cotton (5.6 percent), and iron and steel (5.5 percent). Officially, with a mere 0.02 per cent share in total

trade, the land-border trade has little contribution in India's trade ambitions in the region. But a look at thriving informal trade through Mizoram, may force you a change that opinion. No one dares to guess the size of the informal trade. There is not much information with the Union Commerce Ministry either. But check any apparel, footwear or cigarette shops – most of the offerings are from Myanmar. When compared to Indian products, they are significantly cheaper. A pack of 20 king size Chinese 'FarStar' cigarettes is available at Rs 40. A pack of 20 Winbody is Rs 25. In comparison, a pack of 10 regular India made Flake cigarettes cost Rs 50. Consumer durables manufactured in Far Eastern countries like South Korea, China, and Malaysia are available freely. Be it an innocent tube light, spectacle frames or spares for the outdated Maruti-800 – the touch of Myanmar is all pervasive in the everyday life of a Mizo. The 'exports' from India to Myanmar are no less impressive. Indian medicines, fertiliser (mostly urea), motorcycles, zarda a form of chewing tobacco), baby food, LPG, smartphones, mosquito repellents, pesticides, cycle parts, and solar gears fetch huge margins in Myanmar.

The 14.2 kg LPG cylinders marketed in Indian at around Rs 460 (with subsidy) is reportedly lapped up by the Burmese at Rs 4000. One paracetamol tablet priced Rs 1.5 or less in India fetches Rs 5 at Tiddim. According to Lalhinthanga, at least two truckloads of medicines (mostly analgesics, skin ointments and antibiotics) and five truckloads of fertiliser reach Myanmar every week, through Champhai (bypassing the Zokhawthar LCS). Lalminthanga is one of the earliest Mizo entrepreneurs with family links in Myanmar.

Interestingly, while the official India-Myanmar border trade of \$56 million (2014-15) is in favour of Myanmar (\$39.86 million in Indian imports), Lalminthanga says informal trade is in favour of India due to export of relatively high-value items. Zirliana, however, feels trade is evenly shared between the two nations. But is it possible to ferry such huge volumes of goods across the border? Zirliana has an interesting anecdote to share. Like most of the Mizos he has relations in Myanmar. On a recent visit to Kalemryo, he noticed an India-made JCB earthmover. "The traders drove it through," he says. The question is if the border is so porous that trucks (or earthmovers) can ply freely between the nations, what is the incentive for formal trade? One may argue that creation of better road logistics and cost-efficient bulk movement of containerised cargo, will throw smugglers out of business. But the argument is not full proof.

According to both Lalhmingthanga and Zirilana; informal trade through Mizoram is on the rise despite poor road logistics on the Myanmar side. A good percentage of the trade that was previously routed through Manipur now prefer Mizoram as a corridor. So much so that, Mizoram now shares approximately 30 per cent of the total cross-border trade (including formal and informal), says Lalminthanga. The bottom line is: Improved road infrastructure and a permissive society may end up widening the scope of informal trade in the region. And, the size of such trade may not be small. The \$ 4 billion¹¹ (BSF estimates) cross-border cattle trade through porous West Bengal border is a case in point.

Economics May Hold the Key to Success

There are debates over the effectiveness of border fencing especially in such hilly and inhospitable areas as in Mizoram, Manipur, Arunachal and Nagaland that shares 1643 km long land boundary with Myanmar. But there is little doubt that the free movement of people (and goods) has made the region into a border less territory, often misused for smuggling contraband. The concern has been expressed by both the former UPA and the current NDA¹² government. Mizoram generally escapes this conversation due to its peaceful status. But it is a common knowledge with the State and Central authorities that lack of border vigil is making it a preferred¹³ corridor for movement of arms and drugs.

The issue has now come to the fore as India is hard pedalling on economic activity through the region. But a corrective measure is not easy to enforce, as there is strong socio-political resistance

in Mizoram against strengthening border vigil. And the Indian government is understandably wary to disturb peace in a fragile region. Seen from this context, there are concerns that improvement in connectivity may open flood gates to third country imports and diversion of subsidised items, like Urea or LPG, to Myanmar. Also, the success of formal trade depends on trade openness (measured by Trade-GDP ratio) of both the countries. Myanmar currently ranks the lowest in trade openness in the CLMV region. To optimise land trade potential, Naypyidaw has to make it a win-win for both the countries. The balance may be struck by economics. Low on industrial activity, Mizoram economy is now largely dependent on huge fund flow from the Centre by virtue of its special tribal status. Nearly 95 per cent of the State population of 11 lakh are Scheduled Tribes. Government jobs and contracts are the largest money churners here. Mizo entrepreneurship is mostly limited to shops and establishments.

But the economy of largesse is not sustainable. And, Mizoram has started facing the heat. The State is undergoing through financial crunch¹⁴ for nearly a decade or more. To add to the problem, during the three decades of peace the State made rapid progress in education. In the absence of adequate employment opportunity there is a surge in number of educated unemployed. Lalhmingthanga says the State is staring at a social crisis in five years. For now the clannish Mizo society may turn the heat on 'outsiders' (as they refer non-Mizos). But that will not solve the problem, as most of them are already driven out of the State. Demands for more funds from the Centre are unlikely to be met either, in the strict fiscal management regime that is in force in the country.

The solution, if any, lies in greater economic activity and optimising the tax revenue potential (in the lines of the neighbouring State of Tripura). Mizoram is currently losing huge revenue potential from informal trade. The thriving sale of cheap Chinese cigarettes is a case in point. Cigarettes are generally a major source of tax revenue to the State governments. There are indications that the realisation has finally dawned on Mizoram State government. In January this year, the State Government withdrew¹⁵ a 17 year old ban on liquor consumption ignoring opposition from Church. The initiative is yet to bear fruit as cheap foreign liquors are available aplenty, courtesy the informal trade. But the indication is clear: formal trade is emerging as a priority. The move forward will not be easy. But the lure of money is also not easy to avoid. Probably Mizoram will respond to that and cooperate with the Centre to make formal trade initiatives a success.

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The thriving informal trade establishes the potential of Zokhawthar border with Myanmar. But a porous border, may pose a risk to the success of formal trade initiatives. Hopefully, the lucre of maximising the revenue potential will encourage Mizoram to help enhance the scope of formal trade through this land port.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

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