
Securing India's Security Interests in a China-Taiwan Conflict

Kamlesh K Agnihotri

Abstract

The security situation across the Taiwan Strait is precariously poised, with China having adopted an overtly proactive stance over the past couple of years. The current hardline stance of China which considers this time as “a new starting point for reunification”, creates further portends for conflict. In this context, this article provides a brief overview of the evolving India-Taiwan relations; assesses the contours of the China-Taiwan conflict; investigates the effect of such a contingency on India's interests in terms of quantum and intensity and finally analyses the options available to New Delhi to mitigate, if not wholly address the consequential challenges.

Introduction

The Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), having faced the brunt of the protracted civil war with the communists in mainland China in the 1940s, was forced to relocate to the island of Taiwan in 1949, along with around 1.2 million loyalists and followers. Taiwan's efforts to

Captain **Kamlesh K Agnihotri**, IN (Retd.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi. He researches maritime facets of security vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, and also focuses upon holistic maritime security issues in the Indo-Pacific region. Views expressed are personal.

Notwithstanding the serious challenges to its very existence—both on account of lack of formal recognition by the majority of countries across the globe, as also threats of reunification by China—Taiwan continues to function quite effectively as a sovereign State.

continue being the sole political entity representing a unified China received a huge setback when the United Nations (UN), vide its resolution number 2758, recognised the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the only legitimate authority representing the whole of China; and removed Taiwan from the membership of the UN.¹ The establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States (US) and the PRC with effect from January 1, 1979,² and the consequent closure of

the US diplomatic mission in Taipei, further eroded the status of Taiwan as an independent country.

All this while, China, having always considered Taiwan as its own territory, harboured clear intentions to reunify it at an opportune moment. China passed an ‘Anti-Cessation Law’ during the third Plenary of the 10th National People’s Congress (NPC) to the effect that the “[s]tate shall never allow the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces to make Taiwan secede from China under any name or by any means;”³ and will “...use non-peaceful means and other necessary measures”—albeit as a last resort—to prevent Taiwan’s cessation.⁴

Notwithstanding the serious challenges to its very existence—both on account of lack of formal recognition by the majority of countries across the globe, as also threats of reunification by China-Taiwan continues to function quite effectively as a sovereign State. It maintains its own national defence establishment and freely manages its foreign affairs. The main objective of Taiwan’s foreign policy is to engender a favourable environment for national preservation and long-term development. Within the geopolitical constraints imposed upon it, Taiwan has reasonably

vibrant economic and cultural relations with many countries of the world, including India.

India-Taiwan Relations

India-Taiwan interactions have been quite restrained because India recognises the 'One China Policy' with the dispensation in Beijing being at its helm. However, with the establishment of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre (TECC) in New Delhi in 1995 and the India-Taipei Association (ITA) in Taipei, both countries and their people started to engage more closely with each other.⁵ After about a quarter century of diligent perseverance, the restrictions in many facets of bilateral engagements have gradually loosened. Many bilateral agreements have been signed between the organisations and entities from both sides to bolster trade, connectivity and technology cooperation. Some important agreements/Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) are mentioned below:⁶

- MoU on Scientific and Technological Cooperation-2007.
- Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement-July 2011.
- Customs Mutual Assistance Agreement-July 2011.
- MoU on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises-December 2015.
- MoU between India's PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Taiwan Chamber of Commerce-June 2016.
- Air Services Agreement-September 2016.
- MoU on Promotion of Industry Collaboration-December 2017.
- MoU between Association of Indian Universities, and Taiwan Foundation for International Cooperation in Higher Education-2019.

With the above policy initiatives providing a veritable roadmap, India-Taiwan bilateral trade has grown considerably over the past decade. Significant progress was observed in the fields of trade, science and technology, critical supply chains, and education—particularly after the

opening of a second TECC office in Chennai in 2012. The total trade figures for 2022 crossed US\$ 12.5 billion, rising from US\$ 10.5 billion in 2021, and US\$ 8.5 billion in 2020.⁷ Taiwan has now decided to open a third TECC office in Mumbai, to further enhance trade and commerce.⁸ Taiwan currently operates 26 Taiwan Education Centres (TEC) in India, which largely teach Chinese language to Indian students. Taiwan also offers language and academic fellowships to Indian scholars and students in Taiwanese universities and institutions.

While bilateral trade, investment and cultural relations have maintained a positive momentum; the conversations on ongoing geopolitical dynamics, national security and maritime order have been rather muted. This is probably on account of existing foreign policy constraints. However, India, in the recent past, appears to have adopted a more nuanced position on these issues while seeking greater engagement with Taiwan. A scholar, in fact, posits that the emergence of the Indo-Pacific construct, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and China's aggressive behaviour were the main triggers responsible for transformational changes in India-Taiwan relations since 2020.⁹

Both countries have also shown the resolve to discuss the maritime security situation in the Indo-Pacific and the current challenges posed to the 'rules-based order' therein. Taiwan sees a great role for 'think-tank diplomacy as the fifth pillar' of its 'New Southbound Policy (NSP)' of 2016 for establishing regional connections. Accordingly, the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF), a think tank affiliated with Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has built institutional linkages with India's National Maritime Foundation (NMF)¹⁰ and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF).¹¹ The TAEF and ORF also held the first Taiwan-India Dialogue in October 2022 to discuss the security situation in the Indo-Pacific region and the prospects of India-Taiwan partnership in such a scenario.¹² The Chairman of NMF also participated in the latest edition of the 'Ketagalan Forum: Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue-2023'

organised by Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹³

China's Taiwan Unification Gambit—Portends for Conflict

The security situation across the Taiwan Strait presents quite a tenuous picture, with China having adopted an overtly proactive stance over the past couple of years, particularly after the visit of Ms. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker

of the US House of Representatives in August 2022. The overt display of increased Chinese naval manoeuvres in the Strait, as also in waters surrounding Taiwan—with the PLA Air Force aircraft violating Taiwan's ADIZ and also flying across the median line virtually on a daily basis—has heightened the sense of alarm in Taiwan, and indeed across the Indo-Pacific region. The high intensity of PLA's aggressive brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait was particularly noticeable on September 17, 2023 when a large number of PLA Navy ships were observed to be operating therein, along with many PLA Air Force (PLA AF) aircraft. One hundred and three PLA AF aircraft flew in the Taiwan Strait on that day, of which 40 crossed the median line and violated Taiwan's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in its south-western and south-eastern sectors. The intruding aircraft included the Sukhoi-30, J-10, J-11, and J-16 modern fighters, along with Y-20 aerial refuellers and KJ-500 Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft.¹⁴

However, such a hard-line posture adopted by China has not come about, all of a sudden. Various official pronouncements, media articulations and White Papers have progressively ratcheted up the issue of national reunification, in tandem with the increasing diplomatic,

Various official pronouncements, media articulations and White Papers have progressively ratcheted up the issue of national reunification, in tandem with the increasing diplomatic, informational, military and economic heft of China.

informational, military and economic heft of China. The Chinese White Paper of 1993 on ‘The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China’ sought to emotionally link the origin of the Taiwan issue to the country being subjected to “aggression, dismemberment and humiliation” by foreign powers during the last century.¹⁵ The tone, tenor and language of that White Paper was almost entreating, seeking the understanding of the world towards Beijing’s interpretation of the vexed issue. China, then headed by President Jiang Zemin, had a GDP of less than US\$ 500 billion, with 157 countries having accepted the ‘One China Principle.’

China released another White Paper titled ‘The Taiwan Question and China’s Reunification in the New Era’ in August 2022. The very title of this White Paper connoted that China had undergone a “historic transformation” in the intervening three decades; and that the “rejuvenated China of the new era” considered this time as “a new starting point for reunification”.¹⁶ The stridency of tone and the hard-line was quite evident from the terse business-like assertion: “We will always be ready to respond with the use of force or other necessary means to interference by external forces ...”¹⁷

Comparison of these two white papers, provides a great insight into the evolving harder-line resolve of Chinese intent vis-à-vis Taiwan. It is quite apparent that contemporary China under President and Party General Secretary Xi Jinping, with a GDP exceeding US\$ 17.5 trillion, and having diplomatic relations with 181 countries, based on the ‘one-China Principle’; believes that this is perhaps the right moment for attempting ‘reunification’.

Therefore, the question which troubles the strategic community worldwide is: Will China be emboldened by the ‘special military operation’ which Russia is progressing in Ukraine? The long-cherished wish of China which sees ‘reunification’ as its unfinished agenda, and in light of the increasing conviction of the current Chinese leadership

about the appropriateness of the timing and confidence in the nation's capabilities to pull this off; it could most likely happen, sooner rather than later. When and how is the only variable yet to be ascertained. There is though, considerable speculation in the global media with regard to this ominous event taking place within the timeline of 2027.¹⁸

Effect on Indian Interests

If such a cataclysmic eventuality were to actually come about, then the global security order will certainly be impacted. Since the Taiwan Strait and the adjoining East and South China Seas are critical sea lanes for global trade and energy flow; the emergent situation will have dangerous ramifications for the whole of the Indo-Pacific region. India having important stakes in the Indo-Pacific, both, geopolitically and economically, will also be affected to a great extent. The ongoing bilateral trade with Taiwan would certainly be disrupted in the short-to-medium term. Since more than 55 per cent of India's bi-directional trade by volume passes through the international sea lanes (ISLs) of the Pacific Ocean, the resultant regional instability would pose serious risks to its safe transit. In addition, the fledgling technology collaboration and FDI with Taiwan would suffer a huge setback.

None of these outcomes can, however, cause grave harm to India's national interests. An economically resurgent India having inbuilt diversity in its critical supply chains can certainly take this setback in its stride. India instead, has to be mindful of its maritime security interests in proximate waters getting adversely affected as an indirect consequence of the Taiwan contingency. The benign-sounding role of the PLA Navy to "conduct international cooperation in distant waters"—first articulated in its 2008 Defence White Paper¹⁹—had by 2019 gradually evolved to "safeguarding of China's maritime rights and interests", including those of overseas Chinese people, organisations and institutions.²⁰

The PLA Navy with more than 370 blue water ships has already become larger than the US Navy, and hence the largest in the world in terms of numbers, and is projected to grow to about 435 units by 2030.

The PLA Navy with more than 370 blue water ships has already become larger than the US Navy, and hence the largest in the world in terms of numbers, and is projected to grow to about 435 units by 2030.²¹ In the contemporary geopolitical scenario, the bulk of this large Chinese naval force will be deployed in and around the Western Pacific Ocean. The Taiwan issue and long-standing security

guarantee offered by the US by way of forward and actively deployed US Navy in the Pacific Ocean are, of course, the top concerns for Beijing. Considering the additional force requirement for dominance in other hotspots like the East and South China Seas, the immediate and emergent focus of the Chinese political and military leadership continues to be closer home.

At present, six to eight PLA Navy ships are generally present in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). These are often supplemented by two to four research, survey, hospital, intelligence collection and space-telemetry ships. This empirically works out to less than 5 per cent of the PLA Navy's total force level, a number highly inadequate for any credible posturing. In the event of Taiwan getting reunified—whenever that happens—a major driver for the employment of a large Chinese naval force in the Western Pacific Ocean would no longer exist. The subsequent deployment of the PLA Navy then, would obviously be towards the Indian Ocean in large numbers. When this begins to happen in right earnest, the hitherto-before prominence that the Indian Navy enjoyed in and around its primary areas of maritime interest would come under serious challenge. When seen in the context of strained bilateral relations on account of the flaring up of the India-

China boundary question in the recent past and the situation likely to remain so in the foreseeable future the Indian maritime security would definitely be threatened. To place the level of threat in perspective, even 20 per cent of the PLA Navy's operationally employable warship inventory works out to more than 50 ships. China's pre-existing "*higher than mountains and deeper than oceans*" friendship with Pakistan²²—which has been a troublesome neighbour all along in its own right—will further compound the threat quotient for India in the maritime domain. In this scenario, the capabilities and resolve of India's maritime security apparatus would be severely tested.

Options for India

It is therefore in India's interest to ensure that Taiwan continues to exist as an independent State, free from overt threats of reunification. Since India is located so far away from Taiwan, it would be quite unrealistic for New Delhi to contribute militarily in case of a China-Taiwan conflict. Nonetheless, unconfirmed media reports have speculated that the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) had ordered a study within the Armed Forces about the scenarios of China attempting a reunification by force; and the possible options for the Indian Defence Forces in such a scenario.²³ However, various other options to indirectly mitigate the possibility of this 'reunification' contingency, can certainly be considered; and may in fact, already be under unstated implementation.

The Indian defence force level and heightened posture along the 'Line of Actual Control' (LAC) which has been in place since mid-2020, may occasionally be raised further to coincide with specific events like in the run-up to Taiwan's national elections or when excessive Chinese brinkmanship in Taiwan Strait is observed. It will convey a strategic message of nuanced Indian solidarity with Taiwan, in addition to keeping the PLA second-guessing whether a second front from an opposite axis will go alive or not.

India has rejected the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a part of the Chinese ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), because the project ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The issue of keeping the PLA busy on multiple fronts from different directions can also be actively considered by the QUAD grouping. Japan may be requested to become more proactive with respect to the employment of its naval and air force assets off the Senkaku islands and Chunxiao gas fields. The visible increase in Japan’s proactive engagement with the Philippines—with nearly half a billion US dollar

loan to build five patrol vessels in addition to providing two large ships to its Coast Guard—in the context of Chinese aggressive posturing in the South China Sea, is also a step in right direction.²⁴ Continual cross-strait passage of US naval ships coupled with the freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) around the Chinese-claimed features in the Paracel and Spratly chain of islands²⁵ and air surveillance missions in the South China Sea will also continue to engage sizeable attention and effort of the PLA forces.

India has rejected the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a part of the Chinese ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), because the project ignores its core concerns on sovereignty and territorial integrity.²⁶ Since part of CPEC passes through the Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK), India could formally start using the acronym CPOKEC (China-Pakistan Occupied Kashmir Economic Corridor) to convey its opposition in a symbolic riposte. In fact, the usage of this nomenclature (CPOKEC) is already gaining traction in the Indian geo-strategic narrative.²⁷

India must also proactively join the international community in every possible forum to oppose the attempts by China to unilaterally change the status quo in the South China Sea with regard to its illegal

and unlawful claims on many features and associated maritime zones therein. In this regard, India's nuanced change in position with respect to the 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in favour of the Philippines, wherein New Delhi called for "... the need for peaceful settlement of disputes and for 'adherence' to international law, especially the UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea ..." is a great step.²⁸

Conclusion

Despite the changing geopolitical circumstances, India continues to retain its official 'One China policy'. In December 2021, in response to a question in Rajya Sabha on whether India was looking forward to augment its diplomatic, economic, trade and bilateral relationship with Taiwan to a strategic level; the Minister of State replied that the "Government of India's policy on Taiwan was clear and consistent. The Government only facilitates and promotes interactions in areas of trade, investment, tourism, culture, education and people-to-people exchanges."²⁹

However, in the currently changing geopolitical reality, both, India and Taiwan face an increasingly overbearing adversary—albeit in different domains—who believes in leveraging its comprehensive national power (CNP) to engage in a revisionist expansive agenda. It is, therefore, not an option for either country to accept the adversary's ploy to forge a 'new normal'. In such circumstances, it is for New Delhi to take a call on whether or not, there should be a significant change of stance in India-Taiwan relations; and also, to decide when, and by how much.

In the meanwhile, India must find ways and means within the confines of its existing foreign policy choices to safeguard its national interests by a combination of its own endeavours, as well as lending its support to multilateral organisations/forums which call for rules-based order and resolution of national disputes through dialogue and peaceful

means. Because the antagonist must be made to realise that “*This is not an era of war*”, as Prime Minister Modi has publicly articulated at various global forums.³⁰

Notes

1. United Nations Digital Library, “Restoration of the lawful rights of the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations”, *UN General Assembly* (26th Session: 1971), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054>. Accessed on November 1, 2023.
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “30 Years of Sino-US Relations (1)”, at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/ziliao_665539/3602_665543/3603_665545/201403/t20140325_697794.html. Accessed on November 1, 2023.
3. The State Council of People’s Republic of China, “China releases white paper on Taiwan question, reunification in new era”, August 10, 2022, at https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/202208/10/content_WS62f34f46c6d02e533532f0ac.html. Accessed on November 1, 2023.
4. Third Session, 10th National People’s Congress and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, “China Clarifies Conditions for Non-peaceful Means to Stop Secession”, March 5, 2005, at <http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122097.htm>. Accessed on November 1, 2023.
5. Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre, “Taiwan-India Relations”, January 13, 2023, at https://www.roc-taiwan.org/in_en/post/39.html. Accessed on November 3, 2023.
6. Ibid.
7. Invest India, “India-Taiwan Relations”, at <https://www.investindia.gov.in/country/taiwan-plus>. Accessed on November 3, 2023.
8. Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in India, “Republic of China (Taiwan) to Establish Taipei Economic and Cultural Center in Mumbai to Further Advance Substantive Ties with India,” July 5, 2023, at https://www.roc-taiwan.org/in_en/post/6311.html. Accessed on November 3, 2023.
9. Sana Hashmi, “India investing in Taiwan relations”, *Taipei Times*, February 25, 2023, at <https://www.taipetimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2023/02/25/2003794992>. Accessed on November 3, 2023.
10. Lu Yi-hsuan and Jake Chung “Taiwan, Indian Think Tanks Sign Cooperation Deal.” *Taipei Times*, October 9, 2020, at <https://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/10/09/2003744869>. Accessed on November 3, 2023.
11. Alan H. Yang and Sana Hashmi, “Think tanks are leading Taiwan’s overseas outreach from the front,” *The Sunday Guardian*, October 2, 2022, at <https://sundayguardianlive.com/news/think-tanks-leading-taiwans-overseas-outreach-front>. Accessed on November 3, 2023.

12. The Yushan Forum, "Inaugural Taiwan-India Dialogue, Exploring Avenues for Deepening Bilateral Ties", Press Release, October 11, 2022, at <https://www.yushanforum.org/news.php?id=1082>. Accessed on November 3, 2023.
13. "Ketagalan Forum-2023 Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue-Live streaming", YouTube Video, 8:56:11, August 8, 2023, at https://www.youtube.com/live/2z_qDOICjPA?app=desktop&feature=share. Accessed on November 3, 2023.
14. Dzirhan Mahadzir, "Massive Chinese Fighter Surge Near Taiwan is 'Destructive', Say Officials", USNI News, September 18, 2023, at <https://news.usni.org/2023/09/18/massive-chinese-fighter-surge-near-taiwan-is-destructive-say-officials>. Accessed on November 3, 2023.
15. The State Council of People's Republic of China, "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China", White Paper, August 1993, at <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/taiwan/index.htm>. Accessed on November 3, 2023.
16. The State Council of People's Republic of China, "China releases white paper on Taiwan question, reunification in new era", August 10 2022, *ibid*.
17. *Ibid*.
18. Amy Hawkins, "Taiwan foreign minister warns of conflict with China in 2027", *The Guardian*, April 21, 2023, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/21/taiwan-foreign-minister-warns-of-conflict-with-china-in-2027#:~:text=US%20intelligence%20believes%20that%20Xi,%20reunited%20with%20the%20mainland>. Also see Robert Delaney "Xi Jinping has yet to decide whether to order Taiwan unification by 2027: top US military adviser", *South China Morning Post*, July, 1 2023, at <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3226202/xi-jinping-has-yet-decide-whether-order-taiwan-unification-2027-top-us-military-adviser>. Both accessed on November 3, 2023.
19. State Council Information Office of the PRC, 'China's National Defense in 2008,' Chinese Defence White Paper, January 2009, at http://www.china.org.cn/government/central-government/2009-1/20/content_17155577_4.htm. Accessed on November 6, 2023.
20. Xinhua, "China's National Defense in the New era", China's Defense White Paper, July 2019, Section III, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/24/c_138253389.htm. Accessed on November 6, 2023.
21. US Department of Defense, "Military and Security developments involving the People's Republic of China-2023", p. 55, at <https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF>. Accessed on November 6, 2023.
22. Xinhua, "Interview: Pakistan-China relations exemplary in world, says Pakistani president", May 21, 2021, at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/asiapacific/2021-05/21/c_139960481.htm. Accessed on November 6, 2023.
23. Nitin Gokhale, "Indian Military Weighs Options in Case China Attacks Taiwan", *Bharat Shakti*, August 7, 2023, at <https://bharatshakti.in/indian-military-weighs-options-in-case-china-attacks-taiwan/>. Accessed on November 6, 2023.

24. The Maritime Executive, “Japan Provides Aid to Philippines for Five New Coast Guard Patrol Boats”, November 9, 2023, at <https://maritime-executive.com/article/japan-provides-aid-to-philippines-for-five-new-coast-guard-patrol-boats>. Accessed on November 7, 2023.
25. The latest cross-Strait transit and FONOP was conducted by a US Navy destroyer, Dewey (DDG-105) on 2 and 3 November 2023. See Heather Mongilio, “USS Dewey Sails a South China Sea FONOP Day After Destroyer Transits Taiwan Strait”, *USNI News*, November 3, 2023, at <https://news.usni.org/2023/11/03/uss-dewey-sails-a-south-china-sea-phonop-day-after-destroyer-transits-taiwan-strait>. Accessed on November 7, 2023.
26. India’s Ministry of External Affairs, “Official Spokesperson’s response to a query on participation of India in OBOR/BRI Forum”, May 13, 2017, at [https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/ Official+ Spokespersons+response+to+a+query+on+participation+of+India+in+OBORBRI+Forum](https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/28463/Official+Spokespersons+response+to+a+query+on+participation+of+India+in+OBORBRI+Forum). Accessed on November 7, 2023.
27. Prashant Sharma, “Economic and Technological Overview of Indian National Power”, *Indian Defence Review*, July 15, 2023, at <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/economic-and-technological-overview-of-indian-national-power/>. Accessed on November 10, 2023.
28. Kamlesh K Agnihotri and Nirmal M Shankar, “India’s Outlook Towards South-East Asia and Beyond: ‘Changing Tack’ in Contemporary Environment?”, National Maritime Foundation, August 22, 2023, at <https://maritimeindia.org/20901-2/>. Accessed on November 10, 2023.
29. Ministry of External Affairs, Media Centre, “QUESTION No. 540 Augmenting Relationships with Taiwan”, Rajya Sabha unstarred Question, December 10, 2021, at [https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/34558/ QUESTION+No+540+AUGMENTING+RELATIONSHIPS+WITH+TAIWAN](https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/34558/QUESTION+No+540+AUGMENTING+RELATIONSHIPS+WITH+TAIWAN). Accessed on November 10, 2023.
30. PM India Website, “Address by PM to the Joint Session of the US Congress”, June 23, 2023, at https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/address-by-pm-to-the-joint-session-of-the-us-congress/. Accessed on November 10, 2023.